第9章

类别:其他 作者:Baron Charles De Secondat Mont字数:12209更新时间:19/01/07 15:06:43
WearesurprisedatthepunishmentoftheAreopagiteforkillingasparrowwhich,toescapethepursuitofahawk,hadtakenshelterinhisbosom。SurprisedwearealsothatanAreopagiteshouldputhissontodeathforputtingouttheeyesofalittlebird。Butletusreflectthatthequestionheredoesnotrelatetoacriminalsentence,buttoajudgmentconcerningmannersinarepublicfoundedonmanners。 Inmonarchiesthereshouldbenocensors;theformerarefoundedonhonour,andthenatureofhonouristohavethewholeworldforitscensor。Everymanwhofailsinthisarticleissubjecttothereproachesevenofthosewhoarevoidofhonour。 Herethecensorswouldbespoiledbytheverypeoplewhomtheyoughttocorrect:theycouldnotprevailagainstthecorruptionofamonarchy; thecorruptionratherwouldbetoostrongagainstthem。 Henceitisobviousthatthereoughttobenocensorsindespoticgovernments。TheexampleofChinaseemstoderogatefromthisrule;butweshallsee,inthecourseofthiswork,theparticularreasonsofthatinstitution。 ______ 1。Plutarch,Solon。 2。Ibid。 3。PhilolausofCorinthmadealawatAthensthatthenumberoftheportionsoflandandthatofinheritancesshouldbealwaysthesame。—— Aristotle,Politics,ii。7,12。 4。Laws,xi。 5。CorneliusNepos,preface。Thiscustombeganintheearliesttimes。 ThusAbrahamsaysofSarah,\"Sheismysister,myfather’sdaughter,butnotmymother’s。\"Thesamereasonsoccasionedtheestablishingthesamelawamongdifferentnations。 6。Despecialibuslegibusqu?pertinentadpr?ceptarDecalogi。 7。Bookx。 8。Athenisdimidiumlicet,Alexandri?totum。——Seneca,DeMorteClaudii。 9。Platohasalawofthiskind。Laws,v。 10。Aristotle。ii。7。 11。Solonmadefourclasses:thefirst,ofthosewhohadanincomeof500minaseitherincornorliquidfruits;thesecond,ofthosewhohad300,andwereabletokeepahorse;thethird,ofsuchashadonly200; thefourth,ofallthosewholivedbytheirmanuallabour。——Plutarch,Solon。 12。Solonexcludesfrompublicemploymentsallthoseofthefourthclass。 13。Theyinsisteduponalargerdivisionoftheconqueredlands。—— Plutarch,LivesoftheancientKingsandCommanders。 14。Inthese,theportionsorfortunesofwomenoughttobeverymuchlimited。 15。Themagistratestherewereannual,andthesenatorsforlife。 16。Lycurgus,saysXenophon,DeRepub。Laced?m。,10。§1,2,ordainedthatthesenatorsshouldbechosenfromamongsttheoldmen,totheendthattheymightnotbeneglectedinthedeclineoflife;thusbymakingthemjudgesofthecourageofyoungpeople,herenderedtheoldageoftheformermorehonourablethanthestrengthandvigourofthelatter。 17。EventheAreopagusitselfwassubjecttotheircensure。 18。DeRepub。Laced?m。,8。 19。WemayseeintheRomanHistoryhowusefulthispowerwastotherepublic。Ishallgiveaninstanceeveninthetimeofitsgreatestcorruption。AulusFulviuswassetoutonhisjourneyinordertojoinCatiline;hisfathercalledhimback,andputhimtodeath。——Sallust,DeBelloCatil。,xxxiv。 20。InourdaystheVenetians,whoinmanyrespectsmaybesaidtohaveaverywisegovernment,decidedadisputebetweenanobleVenetianandagentlemanofTerraFirmainrespecttoprecedencyinachurch,bydeclaringthatoutofVeniceanobleVenetianhadnopre—eminenceoveranyothercitizen。 21。Itwasinsertedbythedecemvirsinthetwolasttables。SeeDionysiusHelicarnassus,x。 22。Asinsomearistocraciesinourtime;nothingismoreprejudicialtothegovernment。 23。SeeinStrabo,xiv。,inwhatmannertheRhodiansbehavedinthisrespect。 24。AmelotdelaHoussaye,OftheGovernmentofVenice,partIII。TheClaudianlawforbadethesenatorstohaveanyshipatseathatheldabovefortybushels。——Livy,xxi。63。 25。Theinformersthrowtheirscrollsintoit。 26。SeeLivy,xlix。Acensorcouldnotbetroubledevenbyacensor; eachmadehisremarkwithouttakingtheopinionofhiscolleague;andwhenitotherwisehappened,thecensorshipwasinamannerabolished。 27。AtAthenstheLogist?,whomadeallthemagistratesaccountablefortheirconduct,gavenoaccountthemselves。 28。ItissopractisedatVenice。——AmelotdelaHoussaye,pp。30,31。 29。Themaindesignofsomearistocraciesseemstobelessthesupportofthestatethanoftheirnobility。 30。Itistoleratedonlyinthecommonpeople。SeeLeg。3,Cod。decomm。 etmercatoribus,whichisfullofgoodsense。 31。Testamentpolit。 32。Barbariscunctatioservilis,statimexequiregiumvidetur。—— Tacitus,Annals。,v。32。 33。MemoirsofCardinaldeRetz,andotherhistories。 34。Testamentpolit。 35。EdifyingLetters,coll。ii,p。315。 36。ContinuationofPufendorf,IntroductiontotheHistoryofEurope,inthearticleonSweden,10。 37。AccordingtoSirJohnChardin,thereisnocouncilofstateinPersia。 38。SeeRicaut,StateoftheOttomanEmpire,p。196。 39。SeeconcerningtheinheritancesoftheTurks,AncientandModernSparta。SeealsoRicautontheOttomanempire。 40。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany,i。ThelawofPeguislesscruel;iftherehappentobechildren,thekingsucceedsonlytotwo—thirds。Ibid。,iii,p。1。 41。Seethedifferentconstitutions,especiallythatof1722。 42。SeeJustin。 43。Seethebookoflawsasrelativetothenatureoftheclimate。Bookxiv,below。 44。Laquilletiere,AncientandModernSparta,p。463。 45。Thesamemaybesaidofcompositionsinregardtofairbankrupts。 46。TherewasnosuchestablishmentmadetilltheJulianlaw,DeCessionebonorum;whichpreservedthemfromprisonandfromanignominiousdivisionoftheirgoods。——Cod。,ii。tit。12。 47TheyseemtohavebeentoofondofconfiscationsintherepublicofAthens。 48。Authenticabonadamnatorum。——Cod。debon。proscript。seudamn。 49。DelaRepublique,v。3。 50。UtessePhoebidulciuslumensoletJamjamcadentis——Seneca,Troas,V。i。1。 51。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany,i,p。80。 52。Laws,xii。 53。Leg。6,§2;Dig。adleg。Jul。repet。 54。Munuscula。 55。Plato,inhisRepublic,viii,rankstheserefusalsamongthemarksofthecorruptionofarepublic。InhisLaws,vi,heordersthemtobepunishedbyafine;atVenicetheyarepunishedwithbanishment。 56。VictorAmadeus。 57。Somecenturionshavingappealedtothepeoplefortheemploymentswhichtheyhadbeforeenjoyed,\"Itisjust,mycomrades,\"saidacenturion,\"thatyoushouldlookuponeverypostashonourableinwhichyouhaveanopportunityofdefendingtherepublic。\"——Livy,dec。5,xlii,34。 58。Neimperiumadoptimosnobiliumtransferretur,SenatummilitiavetuitGallienus,etiamadireexercitum。——AureliusVictor,DeC?saribus。 59。Augustusdeprivedthesenators,proconsuls,andgovernorsoftheprivilegeofwearingarms。——Dio,xxxiii。 60。Constantine。SeeZozimus,ii。 61。AmmianusMarcellinus,xxvi,EtCivilia,moreveterum,etbellarecturo。 62。Republic,viii。 63。WeseethelazinessofSpain,whereallpublicemploymentsaregivenaway。 BookVI。ConsequencesofthePrinciplesofDifferentGovernmentswithRespecttotheSimplicityofCivilandCriminalLaws,theFormofJudgments,andtheInflictingofPunishments1。OftheSimplicityofCivilLawsindifferentGovernments。Monarchiesdonotpermitofsogreatasimplicityoflawsasdespoticgovernments。 Forinmonarchiestheremustbecourtsofjudicature;thesemustgivetheirdecisions;thedecisionsmustbepreservedandlearned,thatwemayjudgeinthesamemannerto—dayasyesterday,andthatthelivesandpropertyofthecitizensmaybeascertainandfixedastheveryconstitutionofthestate。 Inmonarchies,theadministrationofjustice,whichdecidesnotonlyinwhateverbelongstolifeandproperty,butlikewisetohonour,demandsveryscrupulousinquiries。Thedelicacyofthejudgeincreasesinproportiontotheincreaseofhistrust,andoftheimportanceoftheinterestsonwhichhedetermines。 Wemustnot,therefore,besurprisedtofindsomanyrules,restrictions,andextensionsinthelawsofthosecountries——rulesthatmultiplytheparticularcases,andseemtomakeofreasonitselfanart。 Thedifferenceofrank,birth,andconditionestablishedinmonarchicalgovernmentsisfrequentlyattendedwithdistinctionsinthenatureofproperty;andthelawsrelatingtotheconstitutionofthisgovernmentmayaugmentthenumberofthesedistinctions。Hence,amongusgoodsaredividedintorealestates,purchases,dowries,paraphernalia,paternalandmaternalinheritances;movablesofdifferentkinds;estatesheldinfee—simple,orintail;acquiredbydescentorconveyance;allodial,orheldbysoccage;groundrents;orannuities。Eachsortofgoodsissubjecttoparticularrules,whichmustbecompliedwithinthedisposalofthem。Thesethingsmustneedsdiminishthesimplicityofthelaws。 Inourgovernmentsthefiefshavebecomehereditary。Itwasnecessarythatthenobilityshouldhaveafixedproperty,thatis,thefiefshouldhaveacertainconsistency,totheendthattheproprietormightbealwaysinacapacityofservingtheprince。Thismusthavebeenproductiveofgreatvarieties;forinstance,therearecountrieswherefiefscouldnotbedividedamongthebrothers;inothers,theyoungerbrothersmaybeallowedamoregeneroussubsistence。 Themonarchwhoknowseachofhisprovincesmayestablishdifferentlaws,ortoleratedifferentcustoms。Butasthedespoticprinceknowsnothing,andcanattendtonothing,hemusttakegeneralmeasures,andgovernbyarigidandinflexiblewill,whichthroughouthiswholedominionsproducesthesameeffect;inshort,everythingbendsunderhisfeet。 Inproportionasthedecisionsofthecourtsofjudicaturearemultipliedinmonarchies,thelawisloadedwithdecreesthatsometimescontradictoneanother;eitherbecausesucceedingjudgesareofadifferentwayofthinking,orbecausethesamecausesaresometimeswell,andatothertimesill,defended;or,infine,byreasonofaninfinitenumberofabuses,towhichallhumanregulationsareliable。 Thisisanecessaryevil,whichthelegislatorredressesfromtimetotime,ascontraryeventothespiritofmoderategovernments。Forwhenpeopleareobligedtohaverecoursetocourtsofjudicature,thisshouldcomefromthenatureoftheconstitution,andnotfromthecontradictionoruncertaintyofthelaw。 Ingovernmentswheretherearenecessarydistinctionsofpersons,theremustlikewisebeprivileges。Thisalsodiminishesthesimplicity,andcreatesathousandexceptions。 Oneoftheprivilegesleastburdensometosociety,andespeciallytohimwhoconfersit,isthatofpleadinginonecourtinpreferencetoanother。Herenewdifficultiesarise,whenitbecomesaquestionbeforewhichcourtweshallplead。 Fardifferentisthecaseofthepeopleunderdespoticgovernments。InthosecountriesIcanseenothingthatthelegislatorisabletodecree,orthemagistratetojudge。Asthelandsbelongtotheprince,itfollowsthattherearescarcelyanycivillawsinregardtolandedproperty。Fromtherightthesovereignhastosuccessions,itfollows,likewise,thattherearenonerelatingtoinheritances。Themonopoliesestablishedbytheprinceforhimselfinsomecountriesrenderallsortsofcommerciallawsquiteuseless。Themarriageswhichtheyusuallycontractwithfemaleslavesarethecausethattherearescarcelyanycivillawsrelatingtodowries,ortotheparticularadvantageofmarriedwomen。Fromtheprodigiousmultitudeofslaves,itfollows,likewise,thatthereareveryfewwhohaveanysuchthingasawilloftheirown,andofcourseareanswerablefortheirconductbeforeajudge。Mostmoralactionsthatareonlyinconsequenceofafather’s,ahusband’s,oramaster’swill,areregulatedbythem,andnotbythemagistrates。 Iforgottoobservethataswhatwecallhonourisathinghardlyknowninthosecountries,theseveraldifficultiesrelatingtothisarticle,thoughofsuchimportancewithus,arewiththemquiteoutofthequestion。Despoticpowerisself—sufficient;rounditthereisanabsolutevacuum。Henceitisthatwhentravellersfavouruswiththedescriptionofcountrieswherearbitraryswayprevails,theyseldommakementionofcivillaws。[1] Alloccasions,therefore,ofwranglingandlaw—suitsarehereremoved。 Andtothisinpartisitowingthatlitigiouspeopleinthosecountriesaresoroughlyhandled。Astheinjusticeoftheirdemandisneitherscreened,palliated,norprotectedbyaninfinitenumberoflaws,ofcourseitisimmediatelydiscovered。 2。OftheSimplicityofCriminalLawsindifferentGovernments。Wehearitgenerallysaid,thatjusticeoughttobeadministeredwithusasinTurkey。Isitpossible,then,thatthemostignorantofallnationsshouldbethemostclear—sightedonapointwhichitmostbehovesmankindtoknow? Ifweexaminethesetformsofjusticewithrespecttothetroublethesubjectundergoesinrecoveringhisproperty,orinobtainingsatisfactionforaninjuryoraffront,weshallfindthemdoubtlesstoonumerous:butifweconsiderthemintherelationtheybeartothelibertyandsecurityofeveryindividual,weshalloftenfindthemtoofew;andbeconvincedthatthetrouble,expense,delays,andeventheverydangersofourjudiciaryproceedings,arethepricethateachsubjectpaysforhisliberty。 InTurkey,wherelittleregardisshowntothehonour,life,orestateofthesubject,allcausesarespeedilydecided。Themethodofdeterminingthemisamatterofindifference,providedtheybedetermined。Thepasha,afteraquickhearing,orderswhichpartyhepleasestobebastinadoed,andthensendsthemabouttheirbusiness。 Hereitwouldbedangeroustobeofalitigiousdisposition;thissupposesastrongdesireofobtainingjustice,asettledaversion,anactivemind,andasteadinessinpursuingone’spoint。Allthisshouldbeavoidedinagovernmentwherefearoughttobetheonlyprevailingsentiment,andinwhichpopulardisturbancesarefrequentlyattendedwithsuddenandunforeseenrevolutions。Hereeverymanoughttoknowthatthemagistratemustnothearhisnamementioned,andthathissecuritydependsentirelyonhisbeingreducedtoakindofannihilation。 Butinmoderategovernments,wherethelifeofthemeanestsubjectisdeemedprecious,nomanisstrippedofhishonourorpropertyuntilafteralonginquiry;andnomanisbereftoflifetillhisverycountryhasattackedhim——anattackthatisnevermadewithoutleavinghimallpossiblemeansofmakinghisdefence。 Henceitisthatwhenapersonrendershimselfabsolute,[2]heimmediatelythinksofreducingthenumberoflaws。Inagovernmentthusconstitutedtheyaremoreaffectedwithparticularinconveniencesthanwiththelibertyofthesubject,whichisverylittleminded。 Inrepublics,itisplainthatasmanyformalitiesatleastarenecessaryasinmonarchies。Inbothgovernmentstheyincreaseinproportiontothevaluewhichissetonthehonour,fortune,liberty,andlifeofthesubject。 Inrepublicangovernments,menareallequal;equaltheyarealsoindespoticgovernments:intheformer,becausetheyareeverything;inthelatter,becausetheyarenothing。 3。InwhatGovernmentsandinwhatCasestheJudgesoughttodetermineaccordingtotheexpressLetteroftheLaw。Theneareragovernmentapproachestowardsarepublic,themorethemannerofjudgingbecomessettledandfixed;henceitwasafaultintherepublicofSpartafortheEphoritopasssucharbitraryjudgmentswithouthavinganylawstodirectthem。ThefirstconsulsatRomepronouncedsentenceinthesamemannerastheEphori;buttheinconvenienceofthisproceedingwassoonfelt,andtheywereobligedtohaverecoursetoexpressanddeterminatelaws。 Indespoticgovernmentstherearenolaws;thejudgehimselfishisownrule。Therearelawsinmonarchies;andwheretheseareexplicit,thejudgeconformstothem;wheretheyareotherwise,heendeavourstoinvestigatetheirspirit。Inrepublics,theverynatureoftheconstitutionrequiresthejudgestofollowtheletterofthelaw; otherwisethelawmightbeexplainedtotheprejudiceofeverycitizen,incaseswheretheirhonour,property,orlifeisconcerned。 AtRomethejudgeshadnomoretodothantodeclarethatthepersonsaccusedwereguiltyofaparticularcrime,andthenthepunishmentwasfoundinthelaws,asmaybeseenindiverslawsstillextant。InEnglandthejurygivetheirverdictwhetherthefactbroughtundertheircognisancebeprovedornot;ifitbeproved,thejudgepronouncesthepunishmentinflictedbythelaw,andforthisheneedsonlytoopenhiseyes。 4。OftheMannerofpassingJudgment。Hencearisethedifferentmodesofpassingjudgment。Inmonarchiesthejudgeschoosethemethodofarbitration;theydeliberatetogether,theycommunicatetheirsentimentsforthesakeofunanimity;theymoderatetheiropinions,inordertorenderthemconformabletothoseofothers:andthelessernumberareobligedtogivewaytothemajority。Butthisisnotagreeabletothenatureofarepublic。AtRome,andinthecitiesofGreece,thejudgesneverenteredintoaconsultation;eachgavehisopinioninoneofthesethreeways:\"Iabsolve,\"\"Icondemn,\"\"Itdoesnotappearcleartome\";[3]thiswasbecausethepeoplejudged,orweresupposedtojudge。 Butthepeoplearefarfrombeingcivilians;alltheserestrictionsandmethodsofarbitrationareabovetheirreach;theymusthaveonlyoneobjectandonesinglefactsetbeforethem;andthentheyhaveonlytoseewhethertheyoughttocondemn,toacquit,ortosuspendtheirjudgment。 TheRomansintroducedsetformsofactions,[4]aftertheexampleoftheGreeks,andestablishedarulethateachcauseshouldbedirectedbyitsproperaction。Thiswasnecessaryintheirmannerofjudging;itwasnecessarytofixthestateofthequestion,thatthepeoplemighthaveitalwaysbeforetheireyes。Otherwise,inalongprocess,thisstateofthequestionwouldcontinuallychange,andbenolongerdistinguished。 HenceitfollowedthattheRomanjudgesgrantedonlythesimpledemand,withoutmakinganyaddition,deduction,orlimitation。Butthepr?torsdevisedotherformsofactions,whichwerecalledexbonafide,inwhichthemethodofpronouncingsentencewaslefttothedispositionofthejudge。Thiswasmoreagreeabletothespiritofmonarchy。HenceitisasayingamongtheFrenchlawyers,thatinFrance[5]allactionsareexbonafide。 5。InwhatGovernmentstheSovereignmaybeJudge。Machiavel[6] attributesthelossofthelibertyofFlorencetothepeople’snotjudginginabodyincasesofhightreasonagainstthemselves,aswascustomaryatRome。Forthispurposetheyhadeightjudges:\"butthefew,\"saysMachiavel,\"arecorruptedbyafew。\"Ishouldwillinglyadoptthemaximofthisgreatman。Butasinthosecasesthepoliticalinterestprevailsinsomemeasureoverthecivil(foritisalwaysaninconveniencethatthepeopleshouldbejudgesintheirowncause),inordertoremedythisevil,thelawsmustprovideasmuchaspossibleforthesecurityofindividuals。 WiththisviewtheRomanlegislatorsdidtwothings:theygavethepersonsaccusedpermissiontobanishthemselves[7]beforesentencewaspronounced;[8]andtheyordainedthatthegoodsofthosewhowerecondemnedshouldbesacred,topreventtheirbeingconfiscatedtothepeople。WeshallseeinBookXItheotherlimitationsthatweresettothejudicatorypowerresidinginthepeople。 Solonknewhowtopreventtheabusewhichthepeoplemightmakeoftheirpowerincriminaljudgments。HeordainedthattheCourtofAreopagusshouldre—examinetheaffair;thatiftheybelievedthepartyaccusedwasunjustlyacquitted[9]theyshouldimpeachhimagainbeforethepeople;thatiftheybelievedhimunjustlycondemned[10]theyshouldpreventtheexecutionofthesentence,andmakethemrejudgetheproceeding——anadmirablelaw,thatsubjectedthepeopletothecensureofthemagistracywhichtheymostrevered,andeventotheirown! Inaffairsofthiskinditisalwayspropertothrowinsomedelays,especiallywhenthepartyaccusedisunderconfinement;totheendthatthepeoplemaygrowcalmandgivetheirjudgmentcoolly。 Indespoticgovernments,theprincehimselfmaybejudge。Butinmonarchiesthiscannotbe;theconstitutionbysuchmeanswouldbesubverted,andthedependentintermediatepowersannihilated;allsetformsofjudgmentwouldcease;fearwouldtakepossessionofthepeople’sminds,andpalenessspreaditselfovereverycountenance:themoreconfidence,honour,affection,andsecurityinthesubject,themoreextendedisthepowerofthemonarch。 Weshallgivehereafewmorereflectionsonthispoint。Inmonarchies,theprinceisthepartythatprosecutesthepersonaccused,andcauseshimtobepunishedoracquitted。Now,werehehimselftosituponthetrial,hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。 Inthisgovernmenttheprincehasfrequentlythebenefitofconfiscation,sothathereagain,bydeterminingcriminalcauses,hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。 Further,bythismethodhewoulddeprivehimselfofthemostgloriousattributeofsovereignty,namely,thatofgrantingpardon,[11]foritwouldbequiteridiculousofhimtomakeandunmakehisdecisions; surelyhewouldnotchoosetocontradicthimself。 Besides,thiswouldbeconfoundingallideas;itwouldbeimpossibletotellwhetheramanwasacquitted,orreceivedhispardon。 LouisXIIIbeingdesiroustositinjudgmentuponthetrialoftheDukedelaValette,[12]sentforsomemembersoftheparliamentandoftheprivycouncil,todebatethematter;upontheirbeingorderedbythekingtogivetheiropinionconcerningthewarrantforhisarrest,thepresident,DeBelievre,said\"thathefounditverystrangethataprinceshouldpasssentenceuponasubject;thatkingshadreservedtothemselvesthepowerofpardoning,andleftthatofcondemningtotheirofficers;thathismajestywantedtoseebeforehimatthebarapersonwho,byhisdecision,wastobehurriedawayintotheotherworld!Thattheprince’scountenanceshouldinspirewithhopes,andnotconfoundwithfears;thathispresencealoneremovedecclesiasticcensures;andthatsubjectsoughtnottogoawaydissatisfiedfromthesovereign。\" Whensentencewaspassed,thesamemagistratedeclared,\"Thisisanunprecedentedjudgmenttosee,contrarytotheexampleofpastages——akingofFrance,inthequalityofajudge,condemningagentlemantodeath。\"[13] Again,sentencespassedbytheprincewouldbeaninexhaustiblesourceofinjusticeandabuse;thecourtiersbytheirimportunitywouldalwaysbeabletoextorthisdecisions。SomeRomanemperorsweresomadastositasjudgesthemselves;theconsequencewasthatnoreignseversosurprisedtheworldwithoppressionandinjustice。 \"Claudius,\"saysTacitus,[14]\"havingappropriatedtohimselfthedeterminationoflawsuits,andthefunctionofmagistrates,gaveoccasiontoallmannerofrapine。\"ButNero,uponcomingtotheempireafterClaudius,endeavouredtoconciliatethemindsofthepeoplebydeclaring\"thathewouldtakecarenottobejudgehimselfinprivatecauses,thatthepartiesmightnotbeexposedwithinthewallsofapalacetotheiniquitousinfluenceofafewfreedmen。\"[15] \"UnderthereignofArcadius,\"saysZozimus,[16]\"aswarmofcalumniatorsspreadthemselvesoneveryside,andinfestedthecourt。 Uponaperson’sdecease,itwasimmediatelysupposedhehadleftnochildren;[17]and,inconsequenceofthis,hispropertywasgivenawaybyarescript。Forastheprincewassurprisinglystupid,andtheempressexcessivelyenterprising,shewasaslavetotheinsatiableavariceofherdomesticsandconfidants;insomuchthattoanhonestmannothingcouldbemoredesirablethandeath。\" \"Formerly,\"saysProcopius[18]\"thereusedtobeveryfewpeopleatcourt;butinJustinian’sreign,asthejudgeshadnolongerthelibertyofadministeringjustice,theirtribunalsweredeserted,whiletheprince’spalaceresoundedwiththelitigiousclamoursoftheseveralparties。\"Everybodyknowswhataprostitutiontherewasofpublicjudgments,andevenoftheverylawsthemselves,atthatemperor’scourt。 Thelawsaretheeyeoftheprince;bythemheseeswhatwouldotherwiseescapehisobservation。Shouldheattemptthefunctionofajudge,hewouldnotthenlabourforhimself,butforimpostors,whoseaimistodeceivehim。 6。ThatinMonarchiesMinistersoughtnottositasJudges。Itislikewiseaverygreatinconvenienceinmonarchiesfortheministersoftheprincetositasjudges。Wehavestillinstancesofstateswherethereareagreatnumberofjudgestodecideexchequercauses,andwheretheministersnevertheless(athingmostincredible!)wouldfaindeterminethem。Manyarethereflectionsthatherearise;butthissingleonewillsufficeformypurpose。 Thereisintheverynatureofthingsakindofcontrastbetweenaprince’scouncilandhiscourtsofjudicature。Theking’scounciloughttobecomposedofafewpersons,andthecourtsofjudicatureofagreatmany。Thereasonis,intheformer,thingsshouldbeundertakenandconductedwithakindofwarmthandpassion,whichcanhardlybeexpectedbutfromfourorfivemenwhomakeittheirsolebusiness。Onthecontrary,incourtsofjudicatureacertaincoolnessinrequisite,andanindifference,insomemeasure,toallmannerofaffairs。 7。OfasingleMagistrate。Amagistracyofthiskindcannottakeplacebutinadespoticgovernment。WehaveaninstanceintheRomanhistoryhowfarasinglemagistratemayabusehispower。MightitnotbeverywellexpectedthatAppiusonhistribunalshouldcontemnalllaws,afterhavingviolatedthatofhisownenacting?[19]LivyhasgivenustheiniquitousdistinctionoftheDecemvir。HehadsubornedamantoreclaimVirginiainhispresenceashisslave;Virginia’srelativesinsistedthatbyvirtueofhisownlawsheshouldbeconsignedtothem,tillthedefinitivejudgmentwaspassed。Uponwhichhedeclaredthathislawhadbeenenactedonlyinfavourofthefather,andthatasVirginiuswasabsent,noapplicationcouldbemadeofittothepresentcase。[20] 8。OfAccusationindifferentGovernments。AtRome[21]itwaslawfulforonecitizentoaccuseanother。Thiswasagreeabletothespiritofarepublic,whereeachcitizenoughttohaveanunlimitedzealforthepublicgood,andissupposedtoholdalltherightsofhiscountryinhisownhands。Undertheemperors,therepublicanmaximswerestillpursued;andinstantlyappearedapernicioustribe,aswarmofinformers。Crafty,wickedmen,whocouldstooptoanyindignitytoservethepurposesoftheirambition,weresuretobusythemselvesinthesearchofcriminalswhosecondemnationmightbeagreeabletotheprince; thiswastheroadtohonourandpreferment,[22]butluckilywearestrangerstoitinourcountry。 Wehaveatpresentanadmirablelaw,namely,thatbywhichtheprince,whoisestablishedfortheexecutionofthelaws,appointsanofficerineachcourtofjudicaturetoprosecuteallsortsofcrimesinhisname; hencetheprofessionofinformersisathingunknowntous,forifthispublicavengerweresuspectedtoabusehisoffice,hewouldsoonbeobligedtomentionhisauthor。 ByPlato’sLaws[23]thosewhoneglecttoinformorto。assistthemagistratesareliabletopunishment。Thiswouldnotbesoproperinourdays。Thepublicprosecutorwatchesforthesafetyofthecitizens;heproceedsinhisofficewhiletheyenjoytheirquietandease。 9。OftheSeverityofPunishmentsindifferentGovernments。Theseverityofpunishmentsisfitterfordespoticgovernments,whoseprincipleisterror,thanforamonarchyorarepublic,whosespringishonourandvirtue。 Inmoderategovernments,theloveofone’scountry,shame,andthefearofblamearerestrainingmotives,capableofpreventingamultitudeofcrimes。Herethegreatestpunishmentofabadactionisconviction。Thecivillawshavethereforeasofterwayofcorrecting,anddonotrequiresomuchforceandseverity。