PhaleasofChalcedon[10]contrivedaveryextraordinarymethodofrenderingallfortunesequal，inarepublicwheretherewasthegreatestinequality。Thiswasthattherichshouldgivefortuneswiththeirdaughterstothepoor，butreceivenonethemselves；andthatthepoorshouldreceivemoneyfortheirdaughters，insteadofgivingthemfortunes。ButIdonotrememberthataregulationofthiskindevertookplaceinanyrepublic。Itlaysthecitizensundersuchhardandoppressiveconditionsaswouldmakethemdetesttheveryequalitywhichtheydesignedtoestablish。Itispropersometimesthatthelawsshouldnotseemtotendsodirectlytotheendtheypropose。
Thoughrealequalitybetheverysoulofademocracy，itissodifficulttoestablishthatanextremeexactnessinthisrespectwouldnotbealwaysconvenient。Sufficientisittoestablishacensus[11]whichshallreduceorfixthedifferencestoacertainpoint：itisafterwardsthebusinessofparticularlawstolevel，asitwere，theinequalities，bythedutieslaidupontherich，andbytheeaseaffordedtothepoor。
Itismoderaterichesalonethatcangiveorsufferthissortofcompensation；forastomenofovergrownestates，everythingwhichdoesnotcontributetoadvancetheirpowerandhonourisconsideredbythemasaninjury。
Allinequalityindemocraciesoughttobederivedfromthenatureofthegovernment，andevenfromtheprincipleofequality。Forexample，itmaybeapprehendedthatpeoplewhoareobligedtolivebytheirlabourwouldbetoomuchimpoverishedbyapublicemployment，orneglectthedutiesattendingit；thatartisanswouldgrowinsolent，andthattoogreatanumberoffreemenwouldoverpowertheancientcitizens。Inthiscasetheequality[12]inademocracymaybesuppressedforthegoodofthestate。
Butthisisonlyanapparentequality；foramanruinedbyapublicemploymentwouldbeinaworseconditionthanhisfellow—citizens；andthissameman，beingobligedtoneglecthisduty，wouldreducetheresttoaworseconditionthanhimself，andsoon。
6。InwhatMannertheLawsoughttomaintainFrugalityinaDemocracy。
Itisnotsufficientinawell—regulateddemocracythatthedivisionsoflandbeequal；theyoughtalsotobesmall，aswascustomaryamongtheRomans。\"Godforbid，\"saidCuriustohissoldiers，[13]\"thatacitizenshouldlookuponthatasasmallpieceoflandwhichissufficienttomaintainhim。\"
Asequalityoffortunessupportsfrugality，sothelattermaintainstheformer。Thesethings，thoughinthemselvesdifferent，areofsuchanatureastobeunabletosubsistseparately；theyreciprocallyactuponeachother；ifonewithdrawsitselffromademocracy，theothersurelyfollowsit。
Trueisitthatwhenademocracyisfoundedoncommerce，privatepeoplemayacquirevastricheswithoutacorruptionofmorals。
Thisisbecausethespiritofcommerceisnaturallyattendedwiththatoffrugality，economy，moderation，labour，prudence，tranquillity，order，andrule。Solongasthisspiritsubsists，therichesitproduceshavenobadeffect。Themischiefis，whenexcessivewealthdestroysthespiritofcommerce，thenitisthattheinconveniencesofinequalitybegintobefelt。
Inordertosupportthisspirit，commerceshouldbecarriedonbytheprincipalcitizens；thisshouldbetheirsoleaimandstudy；thisthechiefobjectofthelaws：andtheseverylaws，bydividingtheestatesofindividualsinproportiontotheincreaseofcommerce，shouldseteverypoorcitizensofarathiseaseastobeabletoworkliketherest，andeverywealthycitizeninsuchamediocrityastobeobligedtotakesomepainseitherinpreservingoracquiringafortune。
Itisanexcellentlawinatradingrepublictomakeanequaldivisionofthepaternalestateamongthechildren。Theconsequenceofthisisthathowgreatsoeverafortunethefatherhasmade，hischildren，beingnotsorichashe，areinducedtoavoidluxury，andtoworkashehasdone。Ispeakhereonlyoftradingrepublics；astothosethathavenocommerce，thelegislatormustpursuequitedifferentmeasures。[14]
InGreecethereweretwosortsofrepublics：theonemilitary，likeSparta；theothercommercial，asAthens。Intheformer，thecitizenswereobligedtobeidle；inthelatter，endeavourswereusedtoinspirethemwiththeloveofindustryandlabour。Solonmadeidlenessacrime，andinsistedthateachcitizenshouldgiveanaccountofhismannerofgettingalivelihood。And，indeed，inawell—regulateddemocracy，wherepeople’sexpensesshouldextendonlytowhatisnecessary，everyoneoughttohaveit；forhowshouldtheirwantsbeotherwisesupplied？
7。OtherMethodsoffavouringthePrincipleofDemocracy。Anequaldivisionoflandscannotbeestablishedinalldemocracies。Therearesomecircumstancesinwhicharegulationofthisnaturewouldbeimpracticable，dangerous，andevensubversiveoftheconstitution。Wearenotalwaysobligedtoproceedtoextremes。Ifitappearsthatthisdivisionoflands，whichwasdesignedtopreservethepeople’smorals，doesnotsuitthedemocracy，recoursemustbehadtoothermethods。
Ifapermanentbodybeestablishedtoserveasaruleandpatternofmanners；asenate，towhichyears，virtue，gravity，andeminentservicesprocureadmittance；thesenators，bybeingexposedtopublicviewlikethestatuesofthegods，mustnaturallyinspireeveryfamilywithsentimentsofvirtue。
Aboveall，thissenatemuststeadilyadheretotheancientinstitutions，andmindthatthepeopleandthemagistratesneverswervefromthem。
Thepreservationoftheancientcustomsisaveryconsiderablepointinrespecttomanners。Sinceacorruptpeopleseldomperformanymemorableactions，seldomestablishsocieties，buildcities，orenactlaws；onthecontrary，sincemostinstitutionsarederivedfrompeoplewhosemannersareplainandsimple，tokeepuptheancientcustomsisthewaytopreservetheoriginalpurityofmorals。
Besides，ifbysomerevolutionthestatehashappenedtoassumeanewform，thisseldomcanbeeffectedwithoutinfinitepainsandlabour，andhardlyeverbyidleanddebauchedpersons。Eventhosewhohadbeentheinstrumentsoftherevolutionweredesirousitshouldberelished，whichisdifficulttocompasswithoutgoodlaws。Henceitisthatancientinstitutionsgenerallytendtoreformthepeople’smanners，andthoseofmoderndatetocorruptthem。Inthecourseofalongadministration，thedescenttoviceisinsensible；butthereisnoreascendingtovirtuewithoutmakingthemostgenerousefforts。
Ithasbeenquestionedwhetherthemembersofthesenatewearespeakingofoughttobeforlifeoronlychosenforatime。Doubtlesstheyoughttobeforlife，aswasthecustomatRome，[15]atSparta，[16]andevenatAthens。ForwemustnotconfoundthesenateatAthens，whichwasabodythatchangedeverythreemonths，withtheAreopagus，whosemembers，asstandingpatterns，wereestablishedforlife。
Letthisbethereforeageneralmaxim；thatinasenatedesignedtobearule，andthedepository，asitwere，ofmanners，themembersoughttobechosenforlife：inasenateintendedfortheadministrationofaffairs，themembersmaybechanged。
Thespirit，saysAristotle，waxesoldaswellasthebody。Thisreflectionholdsgoodonlyinregardtoasinglemagistrate，butcannotbeappliedtoasenatorialassembly。
AtAthens，besidestheAreopagus，therewereguardiansofthepublicmorals，aswellasofthelaws。[17]AtSparta，alltheoldmenwerecensors。AtRome，thecensorshipwascommittedtotwoparticularmagistrates。Asthesenatewatchedoverthepeople，thecensorsweretohaveaneyeoverthepeopleandthesenate。Theirofficewastoreformthecorruptionsoftherepublic，tostigmatiseindolence，tocensureneglects，andtocorrectmistakes；astoflagrantcrimes，thesewerelefttothepunishmentofthelaws。
ThatRomanlawwhichrequiredtheaccusationsincasesofadulterytobepublicwasadmirablywellcalculatedforpreservingthepurityofmorals；itintimidatedmarriedwomen，aswellasthosewhoweretowatchovertheirconduct。
Nothingcontributesmoretothepreservationofmoralsthananextremesubordinationoftheyoungtotheold。Thustheyarebothrestrained，theformerbytheirrespectforthoseofadvancedage，andthelatterbytheirregardforthemselves。
Nothinggivesagreaterforcetothelawthanaperfectsubordinationbetweenthecitizensandthemagistrate。\"ThegreatdifferencewhichLycurgusestablishedbetweenSpartaandtheothercities，\"saysXenophon，[18]\"consistschieflyintheobediencethecitizensshowtotheirlaws；theyrunwhenthemagistratecallsthem。ButatAthensarichmanwouldbehighlydispleasedtobethoughtdependentonthemagistrate。\"
Paternalauthorityislikewiseofgreatusetowardsthepreservationofmorals。Wehavealreadyobservedthatinarepublicthereisnotsocoerciveaforceasinothergovernments。Thelawsmustthereforeendeavourtosupplythisdefectbysomemeansorother；andthisisdonebypaternalauthority。
FathersatRomehadthepoweroflifeanddeathovertheirchildren。[19]
AtSparta，everyfatherhadarighttocorrectanotherman’schild。
PaternalauthorityendedatRometogetherwiththerepublic。Inmonarchies，wheresuchapurityofmoralsisnotrequired，theyarecontrolledbynootherauthoritythanthatofthemagistrates。
TheRomanlaws，whichaccustomedyoungpeopletodependence，establishedalongminority。Perhapswearemistakeninconformingtothiscustom；
thereisnonecessityforsomuchconstraintinmonarchies。
Thisverysubordinationinarepublicmightmakeitnecessaryforthefathertocontinueinthepossessionofhischildren’sfortuneduringlife，aswasthecustomatRome。Butthisisnotagreeabletothespiritofmonarchy。
8。InwhatMannertheLawsshouldrelatetothePrincipleofGovernmentinanAristocracy。Ifthepeoplearevirtuousinanaristocracy，theyenjoyverynearlythesamehappinessasinapopulargovernment，andthestategrowspowerful。Butasagreatshareofvirtueisveryrarewheremen’sfortunesaresounequal，thelawsmusttendasmuchaspossibletoinfuseaspiritofmoderation，andendeavourtore—establishthatequalitywhichwasnecessarilyremovedbytheconstitution。
Thespiritofmoderationiswhatwecallvirtueinanaristocracy；itsuppliestheplaceofthespiritofequalityinapopularstate。
Asthepompandsplendourwithwhichkingsaresurroundedformapartoftheirpower，somodestyandsimplicityofmannersconstitutethestrengthofanaristocraticnobility。[20]Whentheyaffectnodistinction，whentheymixwiththepeople，dresslikethem，andwiththemsharealltheirpleasures，thepeopleareapttoforgettheirsubjectionandweakness。
Everygovernmenthasitsnatureandprinciple。Anaristocracymustnotthereforeassumethenatureandprincipleofmonarchy；whichwouldbethecasewerethenoblestobeinvestedwithpersonalprivilegesdistinctfromthoseoftheirbody；privilegesoughttobeforthesenate，andsimplerespectforthesenators。
Inaristocraticgovernmentstherearetwoprincipalsourcesofdisorder：
excessiveinequalitybetweenthegovernorsandthegoverned；andthesameinequalitybetweenthedifferentmembersofthebodythatgoverns。
Fromthesetwoinequalities，hatredsandjealousiesarise，whichthelawsoughtevertopreventorrepress。
Thefirstinequalityischieflywhentheprivilegesofthenobilityarehonourableonlyastheyareignominioustothepeople。SuchwasthelawatRomebywhichthepatricianswereforbiddentomarryplebeians；[21]alawthathadnoothereffectthantorenderthepatriciansontheonesidemorehaughty，andontheothermoreodious。Thereadermayseewhatadvantagesthetribunesderivedthenceintheirharangues。
Thisinequalityoccurslikewisewhentheconditionofthecitizensdifferswithregardtotaxes，whichmayhappeninfourdifferentways：
whenthenoblesassumetheprivilegeofpayingnone；whentheycommitfraudstoexemptthemselves；[22]whentheyengrossthepublicmoney，underpretenceofrewardsorappointmentsfortheirrespectiveemployments；infine，whentheyrenderthecommonpeopletributary，anddivideamongtheirownbodytheprofitsarisingfromtheseveralsubsidies。Thislastcaseisveryrare；anaristocracysoinstitutedwouldbethemostintolerableofallgovernments。
WhileRomeinclinedtowardsaristocracy，sheavoidedalltheseinconveniences。Themagistratesneverreceivedanyemolumentsfromtheiroffice。Thechiefmenoftherepublicweretaxedliketherest，nay，moreheavily；andsometimesthetaxesfelluponthemalone。Infine，farfromsharingamongthemselvestherevenuesofthestate，alltheycoulddrawfromthepublictreasure，andallthewealththatfortuneflungintotheirlaps，theybestowedfreelyonthepeople，tobeexcusedfromacceptingpublichonours。[23]
Itisafundamentalmaximthatlargessesarepernicioustothepeopleinademocracy，butsalutaryinanaristocraticgovernment。Theformermakethemforgettheyarecitizens，thelatterbringthemtoasenseofit。
Iftherevenuesofthestatearenotdistributedamongthepeople，theymustbeconvincedatleastoftheirbeingwelladministered：tofeasttheireyeswiththepublictreasureiswiththemthesamethingalmostasenjoyingit。ThegoldenchaindisplayedatVenice，therichesexhibitedatRomeinpublictriumphs，thetreasurespreservedinthetempleofSaturn，wereinrealitythewealthofthepeople。
Itisaveryessentialpointinanaristocracythatthenoblesthemselvesshouldnotlevythetaxes。ThefirstorderofthestateinRomeneverconcernedthemselveswithit；thelevyingofthetaxeswascommittedtothesecond，andeventhisinprocessoftimewasattendedwithgreatinconveniences。Inanaristocracyofthiskind，wherethenoblesleviedthetaxes，theprivatepeoplewouldbeallatthediscretionofpersonsinpublicemployments；andtherewouldbenosuchthingasasuperiortribunaltochecktheirpower。Themembersappointedtoremovetheabuseswouldratherenjoythem。Thenobleswouldbeliketheprincesofdespoticgovernments，whoconfiscatewhateverestatestheyplease。
Soonwouldtheprofitshencearisingbeconsideredasapatrimony，whichavaricewouldenlargeatpleasure。Thefarmswouldbelowered，andthepublicrevenuesreducedtonothing。Thisisthereasonthatsomegovernments，withouthavingeverreceivedanyremarkableshock，havedwindledawaytosuchadegreeasnotonlytheirneighbours，buteventheirownsubjects，havebeensurprisedatit。
Thelawsshouldlikewiseforbidthenoblesallkindsofcommerce：
merchantsofsuchunboundedcreditwouldmonopolisealltothemselves。
Commerceisaprofessionofpeoplewhoareuponanequality；henceamongdespoticstatesthemostmiserablearethoseinwhichtheprinceapplieshimselftotrade。
ThelawsofVenicedebar[24]thenoblesfromcommerce，bywhichtheymighteveninnocentlyacquireexorbitantwealth。
Thelawsoughttoemploythemosteffectualmeansformakingthenoblesdojusticetothepeople。Iftheyhavenotestablishedatribune，theyoughttobeatribunethemselves。
Everysortofasyluminoppositiontotheexecutionofthelawsdestroysaristocracy，andissoonsucceededbytyranny。Theyoughtalwaystomortifythelustofdominion。Thereshouldbeeitheratemporaryorperpetualmagistratetokeepthenoblesinawe，astheEphoriatSpartaandtheStateInquisitorsatVenice——magistratessubjecttonoformalities。Thissortofgovernmentstandsinneedofthestrongestsprings：thusamouthofstone[25]isopentoeveryinformeratVenice——amouthtowhichonewouldbeapttogivetheappellationoftyranny。
Thesearbitrarymagistratesinanaristocracybearsomeanalogytothecensorshipindemocracies，whichofitsownnatureisequallyindependent。And，indeed，thecensorsoughttobesubjecttonoinquiryinrelationtotheirconductduringtheiroffice；theyshouldmeetwithathoroughconfidence，andneverbediscouraged。InthisrespectthepracticeoftheRomansdeservedadmiration；magistratesofalldenominationswereaccountablefortheiradministration，[26]exceptthecensors。[27]
Therearetwoveryperniciousthingsinanaristocracy——excesseitherofpoverty，orofwealthinthenobility。Topreventtheirpoverty，itisnecessary，aboveallthings，toobligethemtopaytheirdebtsintime。Tomoderatetheexcessofwealth，prudentandgradualregulationsshouldbemade；butnoconfiscations，noagrarianlaws，noexpungingofdebts；theseareproductiveofinfinitemischief。
Thelawsoughttoabolishtherightofprimogenitureamongthenobles[28]totheendthatbyacontinualdivisionoftheinheritancestheirfortunesmaybealwaysuponalevel。
Thereshouldbenosubstitutions，nopowersofredemption，norightsofMajorasgo，oradoption。Thecontrivancesforperpetuatingthegrandeuroffamiliesinmonarchicalgovernmentsoughtnevertobeemployedinaristocracies。[29]
Whenthelawshavecompassedtheequalityoffamilies，thenextthingistopreserveaproperharmonyandunionamongthem。Thequarrelsofthenobilityoughttobequicklydecided；otherwisethecontestsofindividualsbecomethoseoffamilies。Arbitersmayterminate，orevenprevent，theriseotdisputes。
Infine，thelawsmustnotfavourthedistinctionsraisedbyvanityamongfamilies，underpretencethattheyaremorenobleorancientthanothers。Pretencesofthisnatureoughttoberankedamongtheweaknessesofprivatepersons。
WehaveonlytocastaneyeuponSparta；therewemayseehowtheEphoricontrivedtocheckthefoiblesofthekings，aswellasthoseofthenobilityandcommonpeople。
9。InwhatMannertheLawsareinrelationtotheirPrincipleinMonarchies。Ashonouristheprincipleofamonarchicalgovernment，thelawsoughttobeinrelationtothisprinciple。
Theyshouldendeavourtosupportthenobility，inrespecttowhomhonourmaybe，insomemeasure，deemedbothchildandparent。
Theyshouldrenderthenobilityhereditary，notasaboundarybetweenthepoweroftheprinceandtheweaknessofthepeople，butasthelinkwhichconnectsthemboth。
Inthisgovernment，substitutionswhichpreservetheestatesoffamiliesundividedareextremelyuseful，thoughinothersnotsoproper。
Herethepowerofredemptionisofservice，asitrestorestonoblefamiliesthelandsthathadbeenalienatedbytheprodigalityofaparent。
Thelandofthenobilityoughttohaveprivilegesaswellastheirpersons。Themonarch’sdignityisinseparablefromthatofhiskingdom；
and—thedignityofthenoblemanfromthatofhisfief。
Alltheseprivilegesmustbepeculiartothenobility，andincommunicabletothepeople，unlessweintendtoactcontrarytotheprincipleofgovernment，andtodiminishthepowerofthenoblestogetherwiththatofthepeople。
Substitutionsarearestrainttocommerce，thepowerofredemptionproducesaninfinitenumberofprocesses；everyestateinlandthatissoldthroughoutthekingdomisinsomemeasurewithoutanownerforthespaceofayear。Privilegesannexedtofiefsgiveapowerveryburdensometothosegovernmentswhichtoleratethem。Thesearetheinconveniencesofnobility——inconveniences，however，thatvanishwhenconfrontedwithitsgeneralutility：butwhentheseprivilegesarecommunicatedtothepeople，everyprincipleofgovernmentiswantonlyviolated。
Inmonarchiesapersonmayleavethebulkofhisestatetooneofhischildren——apermissionimproperinanyothergovernment。
Thelawsoughttofavourallkindsofcommerce[30]consistentwiththeconstitution，totheendthatthesubjectsmay，withoutruiningthemselves，beabletosatisfythecontinualcravingsoftheprinceandhiscourt。
Theyshouldestablishsomeregulationthatthemannerofcollectingthetaxesmaynotbemoreburdensomethanthetaxesthemselves。
Theweightofdutiesproduceslabour，labourweariness，andwearinessthespiritofindolence。
10。OftheExpeditionpeculiartotheExecutivePowerinMonarchies。
Greatistheadvantagewhichamonarchicalgovernmenthasoverarepublic：asthestateisconductedbyasingleperson，theexecutivepoweristherebyenabledtoactwithgreaterexpedition。Butasthisexpeditionmaydegenerateintorapidity，thelawsshouldusesomecontrivancetoslackenit。Theyoughtnotonlytofavourthenatureofeachconstitution，butlikewisetoremedytheabusesthatmightresultfromthisverynature。
CardinalRichelieu[31]advisesmonarchstopermitnosuchthingsassocietiesorcommunitiesthatraisedifficultiesuponeverytrifle。Ifthisman’shearthadnotbeenbewitchedwiththeloveofdespoticpower，stillthesearbitrarynotionswouldhavefilledhishead。
Thebodiesentrustedwiththedepositionofthelawsarenevermoreobedientthanwhentheyproceedslowly，andusethatreflectionintheprince’saffairswhichcanscarcelybeexpectedfromtheignoranceofacourt，orfromtheprecipitationofitscouncils。[32]
Whatwouldhavebecomeofthefinestmonarchyintheworldifthemagistrates，bytheirdelays，theircomplaints，andentreaties，hadnotcheckedtherapidityevenoftheirprinces’virtues，whenthesemonarchs，consultingonlythegenerousimpulseoftheirminds，wouldfainhavegivenaboundlessrewardtoservicesperformedwithanunlimitedcourageandfidelity？
11。OftheExcellenceofaMonarchicalGovernment。Monarchyhasagreatadvantageoveradespoticgovernment。Asitnaturallyrequiresthereshouldbeseveralordersorranksofsubjects，thestateismorepermanent，theconstitutionmoresteady，andthepersonofhimwhogovernsmoresecure。
Ciceroisofopinionthattheestablishingofthetribunespreservedtherepublic。\"Andindeed，\"sayshe，\"theviolenceofaheadlesspeopleismoreterrible。Achieforheadissensiblethattheaffairdependsuponhimself，andthereforehethinks；butthepeopleintheirimpetuosityareignorantofthedangerintowhichtheyhurrythemselves。\"Thisreflectionmaybeappliedtoadespoticgovernment，whichisapeoplewithouttribunes；andtoamonarchy，wherethepeoplehavesomesortoftribunes。
Accordinglyitisobservablethatinthecommotionsofadespoticgovernment，thepeople，hurriedawaybytheirpassions，areapttopushthingsasfarastheycango。Thedisorderstheycommitareallextreme；
whereasinmonarchiesmattersareseldomcarriedtoexcess。Thechiefsareapprehensiveontheirownaccount；theyareafraidofbeingabandoned，andtheintermediatedependentpowersdonotchoosethatthepopulaceshouldhavetoomuchtheupperhand。Itrarelyhappensthatthestatesofthekingdomareentirelycorrupted：theprinceadherestothese；andtheseditious，whohaveneitherwillnorhopestosubvertthegovernment，haveneitherpowernorwilltodethronetheprince。
Inthesecircumstancesmenofprudenceandauthorityinterfere；moderatemeasuresarefirstproposed，thencompliedwith，andthingsatlengthareredressed；thelawsresumetheirvigour，andcommandsubmission。
Thusallourhistoriesarefullofcivilwarswithoutrevolutions，whilethehistoriesofdespoticgovernmentsaboundwithrevolutionswithoutcivilwars。
Thewritersofthehistoryofthecivilwarsofsomecountries，eventhosewhofomentedthem，sufficientlydemonstratethelittlefoundationprinceshavetosuspecttheauthoritywithwhichtheyinvestparticularbodiesofmen；since，evenundertheunhappycircumstanceoftheirerrors，theysighedonlyafterthelawsandtheirduty；andrestrained，morethantheywerecapableofinflaming，theimpetuosityoftherevolted。[33]CardinalRichelieu，reflectingperhapsthathehadtoomuchreducedthestatesofthekingdom，hasrecoursetothevirtuesoftheprinceandofhisministersforthesupport[34]ofgovernment：butherequiressomanythings，thatindeedthereisnonebutanangelcapableofsuchattention，suchresolutionandknowledge；andscarcelycanweflatterourselvesthatweshalleverseesuchaprinceandministerswhilemonarchysubsists。
Aspeoplewholiveunderagoodgovernmentarehappierthanthosewhowithoutruleorleaderswanderabouttheforests，somonarchswholiveunderthefundamentallawsoftheircountryarefarhappierthandespoticprinceswhohavenothingtoregulate，neithertheirownpassionsnorthoseoftheirsubjects。
12。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Letusnotlookformagnanimityindespoticgovernments；theprincecannotimpartagreatnesswhichhehasnothimself；withhimthereisnosuchthingasglory。
