Iamnotnowconcernedtocriticiseit，——mypointisthatifweacceptthisviewofFreedomatall，itmustobviouslybeNeutralFreedom:itmustexpresstherelationofanoü；menonthatmanifestsitselfasascoundreltoaseriesofbadvolitions，inwhichthemorallawisviolated，nolessthantherelationofanoü；menonthatmanifestsitselfasasainttogoodorrationalvolitions，inwhichthemorallaworcategoricalimperativeisobeyed。And，asIbeforesaid，Kantinthispassage——beingespeciallyconcernedtoexplainthepossibilityofmoralimputation，andjustifythejudicialsentencesofconsciencespeciallytakesashisillustrationsnoü；menathatexhibitbadphenomena。Thequestionheexpresslyraisesis``Howamanwhocommitsatheft’’can``becalledquitefree’’atthemomentofcommittingit？andanswersthatitisinvirtueofhis``transcendentalfreedom’’that``therationalbeingcanjustlysayofeveryunlawfulactionthatheperformsthathecouldverywellhaveleftitundone’’，althoughasphenomenonitisdeterminedbyantecedents，andsonecessary；
``forit，withallthepastwhichdeterminesit，belongstotheonesinglephenomenonofhischaracterwhichhemakesforhimself，inconsequenceofwhichheimputestohimself’’thebadactionsthatresultnecessarilyfromhisbadcharactertakeninconjunctionwithothercauses。Hence，howeverhemayaccountforhiserrorfrombadhabitswhichhehasallowedtogrowonhim，whateverarthemayusetopainttohimselfanunlawfulactheremembersassomethinginwhichhewascarriedawaybythestreamofphysicalnecessity，thiscannotprotecthimfromself-reproach:——notevenifhehaveshowndepravitysoearlythathemayreasonablybethoughttohavebeenborninamorallyhopelesscondition——hewillstillberightlyjudged，andwilljudgehimself``justasresponsibleasanyotherman’’:sinceinrelationtohisnoü；menalselfhislifeasawhole，fromfirsttolast，istoberegardedasasinglephenomenonresultingfromanabsolutelyfreechoice。
Ineednotlabourthispointfurther；itisevidentthatthenecessitiesofKant’smetaphysicalexplanationofmoralresponsibilitymakehimexpresswithpeculiaremphasisandfulnessthenotionofwhatIhavecalledNeutralFreedom，akindofcausalitymanifestedinbadandirrationalvolitionsnolessthaninthegoodandrational。
Ontheotherhand，itisnolesseasytofindpassagesinwhichthetermFreedomseemstomemostdistinctlytostandforGoodorRationalFreedom。Indeed，suchpassagesare，Ithink，morefrequentthanthoseinwhichtheothermeaningisplainlyrequired。Thus，hetellsusthat``afreewillmustfinditsprincipleofdeterminationinthe[moral]`Law’’’，[3]andthat``freedom，whosecausalitycanbedeterminedonlybythelaw，consistsjustinthis，thatitrestrictsallinclinationsbytheconditionofobediencetopurelaw’’。[4]Whereas，intheargumentpreviouslyexamined，hiswholeeffortwastoprovethatthenoü；menonorsupersensiblebeing，ofwhicheachvolitionisaphenomenon，exercises``freecausality’’inunlawfulacts，hetellsuselsewhere，inthesametreatise，thatthe``supersensiblenature’’ofrationalbeings，whohavealsoa``sensiblenature’’，istheir``existenceaccordingtolawswhichareindependentofeveryempiricalcondition，andthereforebelongtotheautonomyofpure[practical]reason’’。[5]
Similarly，inanearlierwork，heexplainsthat``sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws？thoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws，yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless；
onthecontrary，itmustbeacausalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws，butofapeculiarkind；otherwise，afreewillwouldbeachimæ；ra(Unding)’’。[6]
Andthisimmutablelawofthe``free’’or``autonomous’’willis，ashegoesontosay，thefundamentalprincipleofmorality，``sothatafreewillandawillsubjecttomorallawsareoneandthesame’’。
Ihavequotedthislastphrase，notbecauseitclearlyexhibitsthenotionofRationalFreedom，——onthecontrary，itrathershowshoweasilythisnotionmaybeconfoundedwiththeother。
Awillsubjecttoitsownmorallawsmaymeanawillthat，sofarasfree，conformstotheselaws；butitalsomaybeconceivedascapableoffreelydisobeyingtheselaws——exercisingNeutralFreedom。ButwhenFreedomissaidtobea``causalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws’’theambiguityisdispelled；forthisevidentlycannotmeanmerelyafacultyoflayingdownlawswhichmayormaynotbeobeyed；itmustmeanthatthewill，quâ；free，actsinaccordancewiththeselaws；——thehumanbeing，doubtless，oftenactscontrarytothem；butthen，accordingtothisview，itschoiceinsuchactionsisdeterminednot``freely’’but``mechanically’’，by``physical’’
and``empirical’’springsofaction。
IfanyfurtherargumentisnecessarytoshowthatKantian``Freedom’’mustsometimesbeunderstoodasRationalorGoodFreedom，ImayquoteoneortwoofthenumerouspassagesinwhichKant，eitherexpresslyorbyimplication，identifiesWillandReason；forthisidentificationobviouslyexcludesthepossibilityofWill’schoosingbetweenReasonandnon-rationalimpulses。
ThusintheGrundlegungzurMetaphysikderSitten，hetellsusthat``asReasonisrequiredtodeduceactionsfromlaws，Willisnothingbutpurepracticalreason’’；[7]and，similarly，intheKritikderpraktischenVernunft，hespeaksofthe``objectiverealityofapureWillor，whichisthesamething，apurepracticalreason’’。[8]Accordingly，whereasinsomepassages[9]the``autonomy’’whichheidentifieswith``Freedom’’
isspokenofas``autonomyofwill’’，inotherswearetoldthatthe``morallawexpressesnothingelsethanautonomyofthepurepracticalreason:
thatis，Freedom’’。[10]
IthinkthatIhavenowestablishedtheverbalambiguitythatIundertooktobringhometoKant’saccountofFreeWill；
Ihaveshownthatinhisexpositionthisfundamentaltermoscillatesbetweenincompatiblemeanings。Butitmay，perhaps，bethoughtthatthedefectthuspointedoutcanbecuredbyamerelyverbalcorrection:thatthesubstanceofKant’sethicaldoctrinemaystillbemaintained，andmaystillbeconnectedwithhismetaphysicaldoctrine。ItmaystillbeheldthatReasondictatesthatweshouldatalltimesactfromamaximthatwecanwilltobeauniversallaw，andthatweshoulddothisfrompureregardforreasonandreason’slaw，admittingthatitisalawwhichwearefreetodisobey；anditmaystillbeheldthattherealityofthismoralfreedomistobereconciledwiththeuniversalityofphysicalcausationbyconceivingitasarelationbetweentheagentsnoü；menalself——independentoftime-conditions——andhischaracterasmanifestedintime；theonlycorrectionrequiredbeingtoavoididentifyingFreedomandGoodnessorRationalityasattributesofagentsoractions。
IshouldquiteadmitthatthemostimportantpartsbothofKant’sdoctrineofmorality，andofhisdoctrineofFreedommaybesaved:——orIshouldperhapsrathersaythatthelattermaybelefttoconductanunequalstrugglewiththemodernnotionsofheredityandevolution:atanyrateIadmitthatitisnotfundamentallyaffectedbymypresentargument。ButIthinkthatagooddealmorewillhavetogofromacorrectededitionofKantismthanmerelythe``word’’Freedomincertainpassages，iftheconfusionintroducedbytheambiguityofthiswordistobeeliminatedinthemannerthatIhavesuggested。Ithinkthatthewholetopicofthe``heteronomy’’ofthewill，whenityieldstoempiricalorsensibleimpulses，willhavetobeabandonedorprofoundlymodified。
AndIamafraidthatmostreadersofKantwillfeelthelosstobeserious；
sincenothinginKant’sethicalwritingismorefascinatingthantheidea——whichheexpressesrepeatedlyinvariousforms——thatamanrealisestheaimofhistrueselfwhenheobeysthemorallaw，whereas，whenhewronglyallowshisactiontobedeterminedbyempiricalorsensiblestimuli，bebecomessubjecttophysicalcausation，tolawsofabruteouterworld。
ButifwedismisstheidentificationofFreedomandRationality，andacceptdefinitelyandsinglyKant’sothernotionofFreedomasexpressingtherelationofthehumanthing-in-itselftoitsphenomenon，Iamafraidthatthisspirit-stirringappealtothesentimentofLibertymustbedismissedasidlerhetoric。Forthelifeofthesaintmustbeasmuchsubject——inanyparticularportionofit——tothenecessarylawsofphysicalcausationasthelifeofthescoundrel:andthescoundrelmustexhibitandexpresshischaracteristicself-hoodinhistranscendentalchoiceofabadlife，asmuchasthesaintdoesinhistranscendentalchoiceofagoodone。If，ontheotherhand，toavoidthisresult，wetaketheotherhornofthedilemma，andidentifyinnerfreedomwithrationality，thanamoreseriousexcisionwillberequired。For，alongwith`Neutral’or`Moral’Freedom，thewholeKantianviewoftherelationofthenoü；menontotheempiricalcharacterwillhavetobedropped，andwithitmustgothewholeKantianmethodofmaintainingmoralresponsibilityandmoralimputation:infact，allthathasmadeKant’sdoctrineinterestingandimpressivetoEnglishadvocatesofFreeWill(intheordinarysense)，evenwhentheyhavenotbeenconvincedofitssoundness，
