But，aswasbeforenoticedintheparticularcaseofveracity，wemustadmitanapplicationofthisprinciple，whichimportantlymodifiesitspracticalforce:wemustadmitthecasewherethebeliefthattheactioninquestionwillnotbewidelyimitatedisanessentialqualificationofthemaximwhichtheKantianprincipleisappliedtotest。Forthisprinciple，——atleastsofarasIhaveaccepteditasself-evident——meansnomorethanthatanact，ifrightforanyindividual，mustberightongeneralgrounds，andthereforeforsomeclassofpersons；itthereforecannotpreventusfromdefiningthisclassbytheabove-mentionedcharacteristicofbelievingthattheactwillremainanexceptionalone。Ofcourseifthisbeliefturnsouttobeerroneous，seriousharmmaypossiblyresult；butthisisnomorethanmaybesaidofmanyotherUtilitariandeductions。NorisitdifficulttofindinstancesofconductwhichCommonSenseholdstobelegitimatesolelyonthegroundthatwehavenofearofitsbeingtoowidelyimitated。
Take，forexample，thecaseofCelibacy。AuniversalrefusaltopropagatethehumanspecieswouldbethegreatestofconceivablecrimesfromaUtilitarianpointofview；-thatis，accordingtothecommonlyacceptedbeliefinthesuperiorityofhumanhappinesstothatofotheranimals；——andhencetheprincipleinquestion，appliedwithoutthequalificationabovegiven，wouldmakeitacrimeinanyonetochoosecelibacyasthestatemostconducivetohisownhappiness。ButCommonSense(inthepresentageatleast)regardssuchpreferenceaswithinthelimitsofrightconduct；becausethereisnofearthatpopulationwillnotbesufficientlykeptup，asinfactthetendencytopropagateisthoughttoexistratherinexcessthanotherwise。
Inthiscaseitisanon-moralimpulseontheaveragestrengthofwhichwethinkwemayreckon:buttheredoesnotappeartobeanyformaloruniversalreasonwhythesameprocedureshouldnotbeappliedbyUtilitarianstoanactuallyexistingmoralsentiment。TheresultwouldbeadiscrepancyofapeculiarkindbetweenUtilitarianismandCommon-Sensemorality；astheveryfirmnesswithwhichthelatterisestablishedwouldbetheUtilitariangroundforrelievingtheindividualofitsobligations。
Wearesupposedtoseethatgeneralhappinesswillbeenhanced(justastheexcellenceofametricalcompositionis)byaslightadmixtureofirregularityalongwithageneralobservanceofreceivedrules；andhencetojustifytheirregularconductofafewindividuals，onthegroundthatthesupplyofregularconductfromothermembersofthecommunitymayreasonablybeexpectedtobeadequate。
Itdoesnotseemtomethatthisreasoningcanbeshowntobenecessarilyunsound，asappliedtohumansocietyasatpresentconstituted:butthecasesinwhichitcouldreallybethoughttobeapplicable，byanyonesincerelydesirousofpromotingthegeneralhappiness，mustcertainlyberare。Foritshouldbeobservedthatitmakesafundamentaldifferencewhetherthesentimentinmankindgenerally，onwhichwerelytosustainsufficientlyageneralrulewhileadmittingexceptionsthereto，ismoralornon-moral；becauseamoralsentimentisinseparablefromtheconvictionthattheconducttowhichitpromptsisobjectivelyright——i。e。rightwhetherornotitisthoughtorfelttobeso——foroneselfandallsimilarpersonsinsimilarcircumstances；itcannotthereforecoexistwithapprovalofthecontraryconductinanyoneme，unlessthiscaseisdistinguishedbysomematerialdifferenceotherthanthemerenon-existenceintheagentoftheordinarymoralsentimentagainsthisconduct。Thus，assumingthatgeneralunveracityandgeneralcelibacywouldbothbeevilsoftheworstkind，wemaystillallregarditaslegitimateformeningeneraltoremaincelibateiftheylike，onaccountofthestrengthofthenaturalsentimentspromptingtomarriage，becausetheexistenceofthesesentimentsinordinaryhumanbeingsisnotaffectedbytheuniversalrecognitionofthelegitimacyofcelibacy:butwecannotsimilarlyallregarditaslegitimateformentotellliesiftheylike，howeverstrongtheactuallyexistingsentimentagainstlyingmaybe，becauseassoonasthislegitimacyisgenerallyrecognisedthesentimentmustbeexpectedtodecayandvanish。IfthereforewewereallenlightenedUtilitarians，itwouldbeimpossibleforanyonetojustifyhimselfinmakingfalsestatementswhileadmittingittobeinexpedientforpersonssimilarlyconditionedtomakethem；ashewouldhavenogroundforbelievingthatpersonssimilarlyconditionedwouldactdifferentlyfromhimself。Thecase，nodoubt，isdifferentinsocietyasactuallyconstituted；
itisconceivablethatthepracticallyeffectivemoralityinsuchasociety，restingonabasisindependentofutilitarianoranyotherreasonings，maynotbemateriallyaffectedbytheparticularactorexpressedopinionofaparticularindividual:butthecircumstancesare，Iconceive，veryrare，inwhichareallyconscientiouspersoncouldfeelsosureofthisastoconcludethatbyapprovingaparticularviolationofarule，ofwhichthegeneral(thoughnotuniversal)observanceisplainlyexpedient，hewillnotprobablydoharmonthewhole。Especiallyasalltheobjectionstoinnovation，noticedintheprevioussection，applywithincreasedforceiftheinnovatordoesnotevenclaimtobeintroducinganewandbettergeneralrule。
Itappearstome，therefore，thatthecasesinwhichpracticaldoubtsarelikelytoarise，astowhetherexceptionsshouldbepermittedfromordinaryrulesonUtilitarianprinciples，willmostlybethosewhichIdiscussedinthefirstparagraphofthissection:
wheretheexceptionsarenotclaimedforafewindividuals，onthemeregroundoftheirprobablefewness，buteitherforpersonsgenerallyunderexceptionalcircumstances，orforaclassofpersonsdefinedbyexceptionalqualitiesofintellect，temperament，orcharacter。InsuchcasestheUtilitarianmayhavenodoubtthatinacommunityconsistinggenerallyofenlightenedUtilitarians，thesegroundsforexceptionalethicaltreatmentwouldberegardedasvalid；stillhemay，asIhavesaid，doubtwhetherthemorerefinedandcomplicatedrulewhichrecognisessuchexceptionsisadaptedforthecommunityinwhichheisactuallyliving；andwhethertheattempttointroduceitisnotlikelytodomoreharmbyweakeningcurrentmoralitythangoodbyimprovingitsquality。Supposingsuchadoubttoarise，eitherinacaseofthiskind，orinoneoftherarecasesdiscussedintheprecedingparagraph，itbecomesnecessarythattheUtilitarianshouldconsidercarefullytheextenttowhichhisadviceorexamplearelikelytoinfluencepersonstowhomtheywouldbedangerous:anditisevidentthattheresultofthisconsiderationmaydependlargelyonthedegreeofpublicitywhichhegivestoeitheradviceorexample。Thus，onUtilitarianprinciples，itmayberighttodoandprivatelyrecommend，undercertaincircumstances，whatitwouldnotberighttoadvocateopenly；itmayberighttoteachopenlytoonesetofpersonswhatitwouldbewrongtoteachtoothers；itmaybeconceivablyrighttodo，ifitcanbedonewithcomparativesecrecy，whatitwouldbewrongtodointhefaceoftheworld；andeven，ifperfectsecrecycanbereasonablyexpected，whatitwouldbewrongtorecommendbyprivateadviceorexample。Theseconclusionsareallofaparadoxicalcharacter:thereisnodoubtthatthemoralconsciousnessofaplainmanbroadlyrepudiatesthegeneralnotionofanesotericmorality，differingfromthatpopularlytaught；anditwouldbecommonlyagreedthatanactionwhichwouldbebadifdoneopenlyisnotrenderedgoodbysecrecy。Wemayobserve，however，thattherearestrongutilitarianreasonsformaintaininggenerallythislattercommonopinion；foritisobviouslyadvantageous，generallyspeaking，thatactswhichitisexpedienttorepressbysocialdisapprobationshouldbecomeknown，asotherwisethedisapprobationcannotoperate；sothatitseemsinexpedienttosupportbyanymoralencouragementthenaturaldispositionofmeningeneraltoconcealtheirwrongdoings；
besidesthattheconcealmentwouldinmostcaseshaveimportantlyinjuriouseffectsontheagent’shabitsofveracity。ThustheUtilitarianconclusion，carefullystated，wouldseemtobethis；thattheopinionthatsecrecymayrenderanactionrightwhichwouldnototherwisebesoshoulditselfbekeptcomparativelysecret；andsimilarlyitseemsexpedientthatthedoctrinethatesotericmoralityisexpedientshoulditselfbekeptesoteric。
Orifthisconcealmentbedifficulttomaintain，itmaybedesirablethatCommonSenseshouldrepudiatethedoctrineswhichitisexpedienttoconfinetoanenlightenedfew。AndthusaUtilitarianmayreasonablydesire，onUtilitarianprinciples，thatsomeofhisconclusionsshouldberejectedbymankindgenerally；oreventhatthevulgarshouldkeepalooffromhissystemasawhole，insofarastheinevitableindefinitenessandcomplexityofitscalculationsrenderitlikelytoleadtobadresultsintheirhands。
Ofcourse，asIhavesaid，inanidealcommunityofenlightenedUtilitariansthisswarmofperplexitiesandparadoxeswouldvanish；asinsuchasocietynoonecanhaveanygroundforbelievingthatotherpersonswillactonmoralprinciplesdifferentfromthosewhichbeadopts。AndanyenlightenedUtilitarianmustofcoursedesirethisconsummation；
asallconflictofmoralopinionmustprotantoberegardedasanevil，astendingtoimpairtheforceofmoralitygenerallyinitsresistancetoseductiveimpulses。Stillsuchconflictmaybeanecessaryevilintheactualconditionofcivilisedcommunities，inwhichtherearesomanydifferentdegreesofintellectualandmoraldevelopment。
Wehavethusbeenledtothediscussionofthequestionwhichwereservedinthelastsection，viz。howUtilitarianismshoulddealwiththefactofdivergentmoralopinionsheldsimultaneouslybydifferentmembersofthesamesociety。Forithasbecomeplainthatthoughtwodifferentkindsofconductcannotbothberightunderthesamecircumstances，twocontradictoryopinionsastotherightnessofconductmaypossiblybothbeexpedient；itmayconducemosttothegeneralhappinessthatAshoulddoacertainact，andatthesametimethatB，C，Dshouldblameit。TheUtilitarianofcoursecannotreallyjoininthedisapproval，butbemaythinkitexpedienttoleaveitunshaken；
andatthesametimemaythinkitright，ifplacedinthesupposedcircumstances，todotheactthatisgenerallydisapproved。Andsogenerallyitmaybebestonthewholethatthereshouldbeconflictingcodesofmoralityinagivensocietyatacertainstageofitsdevelopment。And，asIhavealreadyhinted，thesamegeneralreasoning，fromtheprobableoriginofthemoralsenseanditsflexibleadjustmenttothevaryingconditionsofhumanlife，whichfurnishedapresumptionthatCommon-SensemoralityisroughlycoincidentwiththeUtilitariancodeproperformenasnowconstituted，maybeappliedinfavourofthesedivergentcodesalso:itmaybesaidthatthese，too，formpartofthecomplexadjustmentofmantohiscircumstances，andthattheyareneededtosupplementandqualifythemoralityofCommonSense。
Howeverparadoxicalthisdoctrinemayappear，wecanfindcaseswhereitseemstobeimplicitlyacceptedbyCommonSense；
oratleastwhereitisrequiredtomakeCommonSenseconsistentwithitself。
Letusconsider，forexample，thecommonmoraljudgmentsconcerningrebellions。
Itiscommonlythought，ontheonehand，thattheseabruptbreachesoforderaresometimesmorallynecessary；and，ontheotherhand，thattheyoughtalwaystobevigorouslyresisted，andineaseoffailurepunishedbyextremepenaltiesinflictedatleastonthering-leaders；forotherwisetheywouldbeattemptedundercircumstanceswheretherewasnosufficientjustificationforthem:butitseemsevidentthat，intheactualconditionofmen’smoralsentiments，thisvigorousrepressionrequiresthesupportofastrongbodyofopinioncondemningtherebelsaswrong，andnotmerelyasmistakenintheircalculationsofthechancesofsuccess。Forsimilarreasonsitmaypossiblybeexpedientonthewholethatcertainspecialrelaxationsofcertainmoralrulesshouldcontinuetoexistincertainprofessionsandsectionsofsociety，whileatthesametimetheycontinuetobedisapprovedbytherestofthesociety。Theevils，however，whichmustspringfromthispermanentconflictofopinionaresograve，thatanenlightenedUtilitarianwillprobablyinmostcasesattempttoremoveit；byeitheropenlymaintainingtheneedofarelaxationoftheordinarymoralruleunderthespecialcircumstancesinquestion；or，ontheotherhand，endeavouringtogettheordinaryrulerecognisedandenforcedbyallconscientiouspersonsinthatsectionofsocietywhereitsbreachhasbecomehabitual。Andofthesetwocoursesitseemslikelythathewillinmostcasesadoptthelatter；sincesuchrulesaremostcommonlyfoundonexaminationtohavebeenrelaxedratherfortheconvenienceofindividuals，thanintheinterestofthecommunityatlarge。
Finally，letasconsiderthegeneralrelationofUtilitarianismtothatpartofcommonmoralitywhichextendsbeyondtherangeofstrictduty；thatis，totheIdealofcharacterandconductwhichinanycommunityatanygiventimeiscommonlyadmiredandpraisedasthesumofExcellencesorPerfections。Tobegin，itmustbeallowedthatthisdistinctionbetweenExcellenceandStrictDutydoesnotseemproperlyadmissibleinUtilitarianism——exceptsofarassomeexcellencesareonlypartiallyandindirectlywithinthecontrolofthewill，andwerequiretodistinguishtherealisationoftheseinconductfromtheperformanceofDutyproper，whichisalwayssomethingthatcanbedoneatanymoment。
ForaUtilitarianmustholdthatitisalwayswrongforamanknowinglytodoanythingotherthanwhathebelievestobemostconducivetoUniversalHappiness。Still，itseemspracticallyexpedient，——andthereforeindirectlyreasonableonUtilitarianprinciples，——toretain，injudgingeventhestrictlyvoluntaryconductofothers，thedistinctionbetweenapartthatispraiseworthyandadmirableandapartthatismerelyright:becauseitisnaturaltoustocompareanyindividual’scharacterorconduct，notwithourhighestideal——Utilitarianorotherwise——butwithacertainaveragestandardandtoadmirewhatrisesabovethestandard；anditseemsultimatelyconducivetothegeneralhappinessthatsuchnaturalsentimentsofadmirationshouldbeencouragedanddeveloped。Forhumannatureseemstorequirethedoublestimulusofpraiseandblamefromothers，inordertothebestperformanceofdutythatitcanatpresentattain:sothatthe`socialsanction’wouldbelesseffectiveifitbecamepurelypenal。
Indeed，sincethepainsofremorseanddisapprobationareinthemselvestobeavoided，itisplainthattheUtilitarianconstructionofaJuralmoralityisessentiallyself-limiting；thatis，itprescribesitsownavoidanceofanydepartmentofconductinwhichtheadditionthatcanbemadetohappinessthroughtheenforcementofrulessustainedbysocialpenaltiesappearsdoubtfulorinconsiderable。Insuchdepartments，however，theæ；stheticphaseofmoralitymaystillreasonablyfindaplace；wemayproperlyadmireandpraisewhereitwouldbeinexpedienttojudgeandcondemn。Wemayconclude，then，thatitisreasonableforaUtilitariantopraiseanyconductmorefelicificinitstendencythanwhatanaveragemanwoulddounderthegivencircumstances:——beingawareofcoursethatthelimitdowntowhichpraiseworthinessextendsmustberelativetotheparticularstateofmoralprogressreachedbymankindgenerallyinhisageandcountry；andthatitisdesirabletomakecontinualeffortstoelevatethisstandard。Similarly，theUtilitarianwillpraisetheDispositionsorpermanentqualitiesofcharacterofwhichfelicificconductisconceivedtobetheresult，andtheMotivesthatareconceivedtoprompttoitwhenitwouldbeacleargaintothegeneralhappinessthattheseshouldbecomemorefrequent:and，aswehaveseen，hemaywithoutinconsistencyadmiretheDispositionorMotiveifitisofakindwhichitisgenerallydesirabletoencourage，evenwhilehedisapprovesoftheconducttowhichithasledinanyparticularcase。
PassingnowtocomparethecontentsoftheUtilitarianIdealofcharacterwiththevirtuesandotherexcellencesrecognisedbyCommonSense，wemayobserve，first，thatgeneralcoincidencebetweenthetwoonwhichHumeandothershaveinsisted。Noqualityhaseverbeenpraisedasexcellentbymankindgenerallywhichcannotbeshowntohavesomemarkedfelicificeffect，andtobewithinproperlimitsobviouslyconducivetothegeneralhappiness。Still，itdoesnotfollowthatsuchqualitiesarealwaysfosteredandencouragedbysocietyintheproportionwhichaUtilitarianwoulddesire:infact，itisacommonobservationtomake，incontemplatingthemoralityofsocietiesotherthanourown，thatsomeusefulqualitiesareundulyneglected，whileothersareover-prizedandevenadmiredwhentheyexistinsuchexcessastobecome，onthewhole，infelicific。TheconsistentUtilitarianmaythereforefinditnecessarytorectifytheprevalentmoralidealinimportantparticulars。
AndhereitscarcelyseemsthathewillfindanysuchUtilitarianrestrictionsoninnovation，asappearedtoexistinthecaseofcommonlyreceivedrulesofduty。FortheCommon-Sensenotionsofthedifferentexcellencesofconduct(consideredasextendingbeyondtherangeofstrictduty)aregenerallysovagueastoofferatleastnodefiniteresistancetoaUtilitarianinterpretationoftheirscope:byteachingandactinguponsuchaninterpretationamanisinnodangerofbeingbroughtintoinfelicificdiscordwithCommonSense:
especiallysincetheidealofmoralexcellenceseemstovarywithinthelimitsofthesamecommunitytoamuchgreaterextentthanthecodeofstrictduty。Forexample，amanwhoinanagewhenexcessiveasceticismispraised，setsanexampleofenjoyingharmlessbodilypleasures，orwhoincircleswhereuselessdaringisadmired，preferstoexhibitandcommendcautionanddiscretion，attheworstmissessomepraisethathemightotherwisehaveearned，andisthoughtalittledullorunaspiring:hedoesnotcomeintoanypatentconflictwithcommonopinion。PerhapswemaysaygenerallythatanenlightenedUtilitarianislikelytolaylessstressonthecultivationofthosenegativevirtues，tendenciestorestrictandrefrain，whichareprominentintheCommonSenseidealofcharacter；andtosetmorevalueincomparisononthosequalitiesofmindwhicharethedirectsourceofpositivepleasuretotheagentortoothers——someofwhichCommonSensescarcelyrecognisesasexcellences:still，hewillnotcarrythisinnovationtosuchapitchastoincurgeneralcondemnation。FornoenlightenedUtilitariancanignorethefundamentalimportanceoftherestrictiveandrepressivevirtues，orthinkthattheyaresufficientlydevelopedinordinarymenatthepresenttime，sothattheymayproperlybeexcludedfrommoraladmiration；
thoughhemayholdthattheyhavebeentooprominent，totheneglectofothervaluablequalities，inthecommonconceptionofmoralPerfection。
Nay，wemayevenventuretosaythat，undermostcircumstances，amanwhoearnestlyandsuccessfullyendeavourstorealisetheUtilitarianIdeal，howeverhemaydeviatefromthecommonlyreceivedtypeofaperfectcharacter，islikelytowinsufficientrecognitionandpraisefromCommonSense。For，whetheritbetrueornotthatthewholeofmoralityhassprungfromtherootofsympathy，itiscertainthatself-loveandsympathycombinedaresufficientlystronginaveragementodisposethemtogratefuladmirationofanyexceptionaleffortstopromotethecommongood，eventhoughtheseeffortsmaytakeasomewhatnovelform。Toanyexhibitionofmoreextendedsympathyormoreferventpublicspiritthanisordinarilyshown，andanyattempttodevelopthesequalitiesinothers，CommonSenseisrarelyunresponsive；
provided，ofcourse，thattheseimpulsesareaccompaniedwithadequateknowledgeofactualcircumstancesandinsightintotherelationofmeanstoends，andthattheydonotruncountertoanyrecognisedrulesofduty。
AnditseemstobeprincipallyinthisdirectionthattherecentspreadofUtilitarianismhaspositivelymodifiedtheidealofoursociety，andislikelytomodifyitfurtherinthefuture。HencethestresswhichUtilitariansareapttolayonsocialandpoliticalactivityofallkinds，andthetendencywhichUtilitarianethicshavealwaysshowntopassoverintopolitics。
Foronewhovaluesconductinproportiontoitsfelicificconsequences，willnaturallysetahigherestimateoneffectivebeneficenceinpublicaffairsthanonthepurestmanifestationofvirtueinthedetailsofprivatelife:whileontheotherhandanIntuitionist(thoughnodoubtvaguelyrecognisingthatamanoughttodoallthegoodhecaninpublicaffairs)
stillcommonlyholdsthatvirtuemaybeasfullyandasadmirablyexhibitedonasmallasonalargescale。AsincereUtilitarian，therefore，islikelytobeaneagerpolitician:butonwhatprincipleshispoliticalactionoughttobedetermined，itscarcelylieswithinthescopeofthistreatisetoinvestigate。
Inthegreaterpartofthetreatiseofwhichthefinalchapterhasnowbeenreached，wehavebeenemployedinexaminingthreemethodsofdeterminingrightconduct，whichareforthemostpartfoundmoreorlessvaguelycombinedinthepracticalreasoningsofordinarymen，butwhichithasbeenmyaimtodevelopasseparatelyaspossible。
Acompletesynthesisofthesedifferentmethodsisnotattemptedinthepresentwork:atthesametimeitwouldhardlybesatisfactorytoconcludetheanalysisofthemwithoutsomediscussionoftheirmutualrelations。
Indeedwehavealreadyfounditexpedienttodothistoaconsiderableextent，inthe，courseofourexaminationoftheseparatemethods。Thus，inthepresentandprecedingBookswehavedirectlyorindirectlygonethroughaprettyfullexaminationofthemutualrelationsoftheIntuitionalandUtilitarianmethods。WehavefoundthatthecommonantithesisbetweenIntuitionistsandUtilitariansmustbeentirelydiscarded:sincesuchabstractmoralprinciplesaswecanadmittobereallyself-evidentarenotonlynotincompatiblewithaUtilitariansystem，butevenseemrequiredtofurnisharationalbasisforsuchasystem。ThuswehaveseenthattheessenceofJusticeorEquity(insofarasitisclearandcertain)，isthatdifferentindividualsarenottobetreateddifferently，exceptongroundsofuniversalapplication；andthatsuchgrounds，again，aresuppliedbytheprincipleofUniversalBenevolence，thatsetsbeforeeachmanthehappinessofallothersasanobjectofpursuitnolessworthy，thanhisown；whileothertime-honouredvirtuesseemtobefitlyexplainedasspecialmanifestationsofimpartialbenevolenceundervariouscircumstancesofhumanlife，orelseashabitsanddispositionsindispensabletothemaintenanceofprudentorbeneficentbehaviourundertheseductiveforceofvariousnon-rationalimpulses。Andalthoughthereareotherruleswhichourcommonmoralsensewhenfirstinterrogatedseemstoenunciateasabsolutelybinding；ithasappearedthatcarefulandsystematicreflectiononthisveryCommonSense，asexpressedinthehabitualmoraljudgmentsofordinarymen，resultsinexhibitingtherealsubordinationoftheserulestothefundamentalprinciplesabovegiven。Then，further，thismethodofsystematisingparticularvirtuesanddutiesreceivesverystrongsupportfromacomparativestudyofthehistoryofmorality；asthevariationsinthemoralcodesofdifferentsocietiesatdifferentstagescorrespond，inagreatmeasure，todifferencesintheactualorbelievedtendenciesofcertainkindsofconducttopromotethegeneralhappinessofdifferentportionsofthehumanrace:while，again，themostprobableconjecturesastothepre-historicconditionandoriginalderivationofthemoralfacultyseemtobeentirelyinharmonywiththisview。Nodoubt，evenifthissynthesisofmethodsbecompletelyaccepted，therewillremainsomediscrepancyindetailsbetweenourparticularmoralsentimentsandunreasonedjudgmentsontheonehand，andtheapparentresultsofspecialutilitariancalculationsontheother；andwemayoftenhavesomepracticaldifficultyinbalancingthelatteragainstthemoregeneralutilitarianreasonsforobeyingtheformer:butthereseemstobenolongeranytheoreticalperplexityastotheprinciplesfordeterminingsocialduty。
ItremainsforustoconsidertherelationofthetwospeciesofHedonismwhichwehavedistinguishedasUniversalisticandEgoistic。Inchap。ii。ofthisBookwehavediscussedtherationalprocess(calledbyastretchoflanguage`proof’)bywhichonewhoholdsitreasonabletoaimathisowngreatesthappinessmaybedeterminedtotakeUniversalHappinessinstead，ashisultimatestandardofrightconduct。Wehaveseen，however，thattheapplicationofthisprocessrequiresthattheEgoistshouldaffirm，implicitlyorexplicitly，thathisowngreatesthappinessisnotmerelytherationalultimateendforhimself，butapartofUniversalGood:andhemayavoidtheproofofUtilitarianismbydecliningtoaffirmthis。ItwouldbecontrarytoCommonSensetodenythatthedistinctionbetweenanyoneindividualandanyotherisrealandfundamental，andthatconsequently``I’’amconcernedwiththequalityofmyexistenceasanindividualinasense，fundamentallyimportant，inwhichIamnotconcernedwiththequalityoftheexistenceofotherindividuals:andthisbeingso，Idonotseehowitcanbeprovedthatthisdistinctionisnottobetakenasfundamentalindeterminingtheultimateendofrationalactionforanindividual。AnditmaybeobservedthatmostUtilitarians，howeveranxioustheyhavebeentoconvincemenofthereasonablenessofaimingathappinessgenerally，havenotcommonlysoughttoattainthisresultbyanylogicaltransitionfromtheEgoistictotheUniversalisticprinciple。
TheyhavereliedalmostentirelyontheSanctionsofUtilitarianrules；
thatis，onthepleasuresgainedorpainsavoidedbytheindividualconformingtothem。Indeed，ifanEgoistremainsimpervioustowhatwehavecalledProof，theonlywayofrationallyinducinghimtoaimatthehappinessofall，istoshowhimthathisowngreatesthappinesscanbebestattainedbysodoing。Andfurther，evenifamanadmitstheself-evidenceoftheprincipleofRationalBenevolence，hemaystillholdthathisownhappinessisanendwhichitisirrationalforhimtosacrificetoanyother；andthatthereforeaharmonybetweenthemaximofPrudenceandthemaximofRationalBenevolencemustbesomehowdemonstrated，ifmoralityistobemadecompletelyrational。Thislatterview，indeed(asIhavebeforesaid)，appearstome，onthewhole，theviewofCommonSense:anditisthatwhichImyselfhold。Itthusbecomesneedfultoexaminehowfarandinwhatwaytherequireddemonstrationcanbeeffected。
