Letusfirstrecallthedistinctionpreviouslynoticedbetweendutyascommonlyconceived，——thattowhichamanisboundorobliged——，andpraiseworthyorexcellentconduct；since，inconsideringtherelationofUtilitarianismtothemoraljudgmentsofCommonSense，itwillbeconvenienttobeginwiththeformerelementofcurrentmorality，asthemoreimportantandindispensable；i。e。withtheensembleofrulesimposedbycommonopinioninanysociety，whichformakindofunwrittenlegislation，supplementarytoLawproper，andenforcedbythepenaltiesofsocialdisfavourandcontempt。Thislegislation，asitdoesnotemanatefromadefinitebodyofpersonsactinginacorporatecapacity，cannotbealteredbyanyformaldeliberationsandresolutionsofthepersonsonwhoseconsensusitrests；anychangeinitmustthereforeresultfromtheprivateactionofindividuals，whetherdeterminedbyUtilitarianconsiderationsorotherwise。Asweshallpresentlysee，thepracticalUtilitarianproblemisliabletobecomplicatedbytheconflictanddivergencewhichisfoundtosomeextentinallsocietiesbetweenthemoralopinionsofdifferentsectionsofthecommunity:butitwillbeconvenienttoconfineourattentioninthefirstinstancetothecaseofrulesofdutyclearlysupportedby`commonconsent’。Letussupposethenthatafterconsideringtheconsequencesofanysuchrule，aUtilitariancomestotheconclusionthatadifferentrulewouldbemoreconducivetothegeneralhappiness，ifsimilarlyestablishedinasocietyremaininginotherrespectsthesameasatpresent——orinoneslightlydifferent(insofarasourforecastofsocialchangescanbemadesufficientlycleartofurnishanybasisforpractice)。Andfirstwewillsupposethatthisnewrulediffersfromtheoldonenotonlypositivelybutnegatively；thatitdoesnotmerelygobeyondandincludeit，butactuallyconflictswithit。Beforehecandecidethatitisrightforhim(i。e。conducivetothegeneralhappiness)
tosupportthenewruleagainsttheold，byexampleandprecept，heoughttoestimatetheforceofcertaindisadvantagesnecessarilyattendantuponsuchinnovations，whichmayconvenientlybearrangedunderthefollowingheads。
Inthefirstplace，ashisownhappinessandthatofothersconnectedwithhimformapartoftheuniversalendatwhichheaims，hemustconsidertheimportancetohimselfandthemofthepenaltiesofsocialdisapprobationwhichhewillincur:takingintoaccount，besidestheimmediatepainofthisdisapprobation，itsindirecteffectindiminishinghispowerofservingsocietyandpromotingthegeneralhappinessinotherways。Theprospectofsuchpainandlossis，ofcourse，notdecisiveagainsttheinnovation；sinceitmusttosomeextentberegardedastheregularpricethathastobepaidfortheadvantageofthiskindofreformincurrentmorality。Buthere，asinmanyUtilitariancalculations，everythingdependsonthequantityoftheeffectsproduced；whichinthecasesupposedmayvaryverymuch，fromslightdistrustanddisfavourtoseverecondemnationandsocialexclusion。Itoftenseemsthatbyattemptingchangeprematurelyaninnovatormayincurtheseverestformofthemoralpenalty，whereasifhehadwaitedafewyearshewouldhavebeenletoffwiththemildest。
Fortheholdwhichamoralrulehasoverthegeneralmindcommonlybeginstodecayfromthetimethatitisseentobeopposedtothecalculationsofexpediency:anditmaybebetterforthecommunityaswellasfortheindividualthatitshouldnotbeopenlyattacked，untilthisprocessofdecayhasreachedacertainpoint。
Itis，however，ofmoreimportancetopointoutcertaingeneralreasonsfordoubtingwhetheranapparentimprovementwillreallyhaveabeneficialeffectonothers。Itispossiblethatthenewrule，thoughitwouldbemorefelicificthantheoldone，ifitcouldgetitselfequallyestablished，maybenotsolikelytobeadopted，orifadopted，notsolikelytobeobeyed，bythemassofthecommunityinwhichitisproposedtoinnovate。Itmaybetoosubtleandrefined，ortoocomplexandelaborate:itmayrequireagreaterintellectualdevelopment，orahigherdegreeofself-control，thanistobefoundinanaveragememberofthecommunity，oranexceptionalqualityorbalanceoffeelings。Norcanitbesaidinreply，thatbythehypothesistheinnovator’sexamplemustbegoodtowhateverextentit，operates，sinceprotantoittendstosubstituteabetterruleforaworse。Forexperienceseemstoshowthatanexampleofthiskindismorelikelytobepotentnegativelythanpositively；thathere，aselsewhereinhumanaffairs，itiseasiertopulldownthantobuildup；easiertoweakenordestroytherestrainingforcethatamoralrule，habituallyandgenerallyobeyed，hasovermen’sminds，thantosubstituteforitanewrestraininghabit，notsimilarlysustainedbytraditionandcustom。Hencetheeffectofanexampleintrinsicallygoodmaybeonthewholebad，becauseitsdestructiveoperationprovestobemorevigorousthanitsconstructive。Andagain，suchdestructiveeffectmustbeconsiderednotonlyinrespectoftheparticularruleviolated，butofallotherrules。Forjustasthebreakingofanypositivelawhasaninevitabletendencytoencouragelawlessnessgenerally，sotheviolationofanygenerallyrecognisedmoralruleseemstogiveacertainaidtotheforcesthatarealwaystendingtowardsmoralanarchyinanysociety。
Normustweneglectthereactionwhichanybreachwithcustomarymoralitywillhaveontheagent’sownmind。Fortheregulativehabitsandsentimentswhicheachmanhasreceivedbyinheritanceortrainingconstituteanimportantforceimpellinghiswill，inthemain，toconductsuchashisreasonwoulddictate；anaturalauxiliary，asitwere，toReasoninitsconflictwithseductivepassionsandappetites；anditmaybepracticallydangeroustoimpairthestrengthoftheseauxiliaries。Ontheotherhand，itwouldseemthatthehabitofactingrationallyisthebestofallhabits，andthatitoughttobetheaimofareasonablebeingtobringallhisimpulsesandsentimentsintomoreandmoreperfectharmonywithReason。
Andindeedwhenamanhasearnestlyacceptedanymoralprinciple，thoseofhispre-existingregulativehabitsandsentimentsthatarenotinharmonywiththisprincipletendnaturallytodecayanddisappear；anditwouldperhapsbescarcelyworthwhiletotakethemintoaccount，exceptforthesupportthattheyderivefromthesympathyofothers。
Butthislastisaconsiderationofgreatimportance。
Forthemoralimpulsesofeachindividualcommonlydrawalargepartoftheireffectiveforcefromthesympathyofotherhumanbeings。Idonotmerelymeanthatthepleasuresandpainswhicheachderivessympatheticallyfromthemorallikingsandaversionsofothersareimportantasmotivestofelicificconductnolessthanaselementsoftheindividual’shappiness:
Imeanfurtherthatthedirectsympatheticechoineachmanofthejudgmentsandsentimentsofothersconcerningconductsustainshisownsimilarjudgmentsandsentiments。Throughthistwofoldoperationofsympathyitbecomespracticallymucheasierformostmentoconformtoamoralruleestablishedinthesocietytowhichtheybelongthantoonemadebythemselves。Andanyactbywhichamanweakenstheeffectonhimselfofthisgeneralmoralsympathytendsprotantotomaketheperformanceofdutymoredifficultforhim。Ontheotherhand，wehavetotakeintoaccount——besidestheintrinsicgainoftheparticularchange——thegeneraladvantageofofferingtomankindastrikingexampleofconsistentUtilitarianism；since，inthiscaseasinothers，amangivesastrongerproofofgenuineconvictionbyconductinoppositiontopublicopinionthanhecanbyconformity。Inorder，however，thatthiseffectmaybeproduced，itisalmostnecessarythatthenon-conformityshouldnotpromotetheinnovator’spersonalconvenience；forinthatcaseitwillalmostcertainlybeattributedtoegoisticmotives，howeverplausibletheUtilitariandeductionofitsrightnessmayseem。
Theexactforceofthesevariousconsiderationswilldifferindefinitelyindifferentcases；anditdoesnotseemprofitabletoattemptanygeneralestimateofthem:butonthewhole，itwouldseemthatthegeneralargumentswhichwehavenoticedconstituteanimportantrationalcheckuponsuchUtilitarianinnovationsonCommon-Sensemoralityasareofthenegativeordestructivekind。
Ifnowweconsidersuchinnovationsasaremerelypositiveandsupplementary，andconsistinaddinganewruletothosealreadyestablishedbyCommonSense；itwillappearthatthereisreallynocollisionofmethods，sofarastheUtilitarian’sownobservanceofthenewruleisconcerned。For，aseverysuchruleis，exhypothesi，believedbyhimtobeconducivetothecommongood，heismerelygivingaspecialandstricterinterpretationtothegeneraldutyofUniversalBenevolence，whereCommonSenseleavesitlooseandindeterminate。Hencetherestrainingconsiderationsaboveenumerateddonotapplytothiscase。Andwhateveritisrightforhimtodohimself，itisobviouslyrightforhimtoapproveandrecommendtootherpersonsinsimilarcircumstances。Butitisadifferentquestionwhetherheoughttoseektoimposehisnewruleonothers，byexpresscondemnationofallwhoarenotpreparedtoadoptit；asthisinvolvesnotonlytheimmediateeviloftheannoyancegiventoothers，butalsothefurtherdangerofweakeningthegeneralgoodeffectofhismoralexample，throughthereactionprovokedbythisaggressiveattitude。Onthispointhisdecisionwilllargelydependontheprospect，asfarashecanestimateit，thathisinnovationwillmeetwithsupportandsympathyfromothers。
Itshouldbeobserved，however，thatagreatpartofthereforminpopularmorality，whichaconsistentUtilitarianwilltrytointroduce，willprobablylienotsomuchinestablishingnewrules(whetherconflictingwiththeoldormerelysupplementary)asinenforcingoldones。Forthereisalwaysaconsiderablepartofmoralityintheconditionofreceivingformalrespectandacceptance，whileyetitisnotreallysustainedbyanyeffectiveforceofpublicopinion:andthedifferencebetweenthemoralitiesofanytwosocietiesisoftenmorestrikinglyexhibitedinthedifferentemphasisattachedtovariousportionsofthemoralcodeineach，thanindisagreementastotheruleswhichthecodeshouldinclude。
Inthecaseweareconsidering，itischieflyconductwhichshowsawantofcomprehensivesympathyorofpublicspirit，towhichtheUtilitarianwilldesiretoattachaseverercondemnationthanisatpresentdirectedagainstit。Thereismuchconductofthissort，ofwhichtheimmediateeffectistogiveobviouspleasuretoindividualswhilethefargreateramountofharmthatitmoreremotelyandindirectlycausesisbutdimlyrecognisedbyCommonSense。Suchconduct，therefore，evenwhenitisallowedtobewrong，isverymildlytreatedbycommonopinion；especiallywhenitispromptedbysomeimpulsenotself-regarding。Still，inallsuchcases，wedonotrequirethepromulgationofanynewmoraldoctrine，butmerelyabracingandsharpeningofthemoralsentimentsofsociety，tobringthemintoharmonywiththegreatercomprehensivenessofviewandthemoreimpartialconcernforhumanhappinesswhichcharacterisetheUtilitariansystem。
Wehavehithertosupposedthattheinnovatorisendeavouringtointroduceanewruleofconduct，notforhimselfonly，butforothersalso，asmoreconducivetothegeneralhappinessthantherulerecognisedbyCommonSense。ItmayperhapsbethoughtthatthisisnottheissuemostcommonlyraisedbetweenUtilitarianismandCommonSense:
butratherwhetherexceptionsshouldbeallowedtoruleswhichbothsidesacceptasgenerallyvalid。Fornoonedoubtsthatitis，generallyspeaking，conducivetothecommonhappinessthatmenshouldbeveracious，faithfultopromises，obedienttolaw，disposedtosatisfythenormalexpectationsofothers，havingtheirmalevolentimpulsesandtheirsensualappetitesunderstrictcontrol:butitisthoughtthatanexclusiveregardtopleasurableandpainfulconsequenceswouldfrequentlyadmitexceptionstoruleswhichCommonSenseimposesasabsolute。Itshould，however，beobservedthattheadmissionofanexceptionongeneralgroundsismerelytheestablishmentofamorecomplexanddelicaterule，insteadofonethatisbroaderandsimpler；forifitisconducivetothegeneralgoodthatsuchanexceptionbeadmittedinonecase，itwillbeequallysoinallsimilarcases。Suppose(e。g。)thataUtilitarianthinksitongeneralgroundsrighttoanswerfalselyaquestionastothemannerinwhichbehasvotedatapoliticalelectionwherethevotingisbysecretballot。HisreasonswillprobablybethattheUtilitarianprohibitionoffalsehoodisbasedon(1)theharmdonebymisleadingparticularindividuals，and(2)thetendencyoffalsestatementstodiminishthemutualconfidencethatmenoughttohaveineachother’sassertions:andthatinthisexceptionalcaseitis(1)expedientthatthequestionershouldbemisled；while(2)，insofarasthefalsehoodtendstoproduceageneraldistrustofallassertionsastothemannerinwhichamanhasvoted，itonlyfurtherstheendforwhichvotinghasbeenmadesecret。Itisevident，thatifthesereasonsarevalidforanyperson，theyarevalidforallpersons；infact，thattheyestablishtheexpediencyofanewgeneralruleinrespectoftruthandfalsehood，morecomplicatedthantheoldone；arulewhichtheUtilitarian，assuch，shoulddesiretobeuniversallyobeyed。
Thereare，ofcourse，somekindsofmoralinnovationwhich，fromthenatureofthecase，arenotlikelytooccurfrequently；
aswhereUtilitarianreasoningleadsamantotakepartinapoliticalrevolution，ortosupportapublicmeasureinoppositiontowhatCommonSenseregardsasJusticeorGoodFaith。Still，insuchcasesarationalUtilitarianwillusuallyproceedongeneralprinciples，whichhewoulddesireallpersonsinsimilarcircumstancestocarryintoeffect。
Wehave，however，toconsideranotherkindofexceptions，differingfundamentallyfromthis，whichUtilitarianismseemstoadmit；
wheretheagentdoesnotthinkitexpedientthattheruleonwhichhehimselfactsshouldbeuniversallyadopted，andyetmaintainsthathisindividualactisright，asproducingagreaterbalanceofpleasureoverpainthananyotherconductopentohimwouldproduce。
Nowwecannotfairlyarguethat，becausealargeaggregateofactswouldcausemoreharmthangood，thereforeanysingleactofthekindwillproducethiseffect。Itmayevenbeastrainingoflanguagetosaythatithasatendencytoproduceit:noone(e。g。)
wouldsaythatbecauseanarmywalkingoverabridgewouldbreakitdown’
thereforethecrossingofasingletravellerhasatendencytodestroyit。Andjustasaprudentphysicianingivingrulesofdietrecommendsanoccasionaldeviationfromthem，asmoreconducivetothehealthofthebodythanabsoluteregularity；sotheremayberulesofsocialbehaviourofwhichthegeneralobservanceisnecessarytothewell-beingofthecommunity，whileyetacertainamountofnon-observanceisratheradvantageousthanotherwise。
Here，however，weseembroughtintoconflictwithKant’sfundamentalprinciple，thatarightactionmustbeoneofwhichtheagentcould``willthemaximtobelawuniversal’’。[1]
