Butinthusstatingtheproblemweareassumingthatthelattertermofthiscomparisoncanbesatisfactorilydefinedandsufficientlydeveloped；thatwecanframewithadequateprecisionasystemofrules，constitutingthetruemoralcodeforhumanbeingsasdeducedfromUtilitarianprinciples。Andthisseemstohavebeencommonlyassumedbytheschoolwhosemethodwearenowexamining。Butwhenwesetourselvesinearnesttotheconstructionofsuchasystem，wefinditbesetwithseriousdifficulties。For，passingovertheuncertaintiesinvolvedinhedonisticcomparisongenerally，letussupposethatthequantumofhappinessthatwillresultfromtheestablishmentofanyplanofbehaviouramonghumanbeingscanbeascertainedwithsufficientexactnessforpracticalpurposesevenwhentheplanisasyetconstructedinimaginationalone。
Itstillhastobeasked，Whatisthenatureofthehumanbeingforwhomwearetoconstructthishypotheticalschemeofconduct？Forhumanityisnotsomethingthatexhibitsthesamepropertiesalwaysandeverywhere:
whetherweconsidertheintellectofmanorhisfeelings，orhisphysicalconditionandcircumstances，wefindthemsodifferentindifferentagesandcountries，thatitseemsprimafacieabsurdtolaydownasetofidealUtilitarianrulesformankindgenerally。Itmaybesaidthatthesedifferencesafterallrelatechieflytodetails；andthatthereisinanycasesufficientuniformityinthenatureandcircumstancesofhumanlifealwaysandeverywheretorenderpossibleanoutlineschemeofidealbehaviourformankindatlarge，Butitmustbeanswered，thatitiswithdetailsthatwearenowprincipallyconcerned；forthepreviousdiscussionhassufficientlyshownthattheconductapprovedbyCommonSensehasageneralresemblancetothatwhichUtilitarianismwouldprescribe；butwewishtoascertainmoreexactlyhowfartheresemblanceextends，andwithwhatdelicacyandprecisionthecurrentmoralrulesareadaptedtotheactualneedsandconditionsofhumanlife。
Suppose，then，thatwecontractthescopeofinvestigation，andonlyendeavourtoascertaintherulesappropriatetomenasweknowthem，inourownageandcountry。Weareimmediatelymetwithadilemma:
themenwhomweknowarebeingswhoacceptmoreorlessdefinitelyacertainmoralcodeifwetakethemastheyareinthisrespect，wecanhardlyatthesametimeconceivethemasbeingsforwhomacodeisyettobeconstructeddenovo:if，ontheotherhand，wetakeanactualman——letussay，anaverageEnglishman——andabstracthismorality，whatremainsisanentitysopurelyhypothetical，thatitisnotclearwhatpracticalpurposecanbeservedbyconstructingasystemofmoralrulesforthecommunityofsuchbeings。Couldweindeedassumethatthescientificdeductionofsuchasystemwouldensureitsgeneralacceptance；couldwereasonablyexpecttoconvertallmankindatoncetoUtilitarianprinciples，orevenalleducatedandreflectivemankind，。sothatallpreachersandteachersshouldtakeuniversalhappinessasthegoaloftheireffortsasunquestioninglyasphysicianstakethehealthoftheindividualbody；andcouldwebesurethatmen’smoralhabitsandsentimentswouldadjustthemselvesatonceandwithoutanywasteofforcetothesechangedrules，thenperhapsinframingtheUtilitariancodewemightfairlyleaveexistingmoralityoutofaccount。ButIcannotthinkthatwearewarrantedinmakingthesesuppositions；
Ithinkwehavetotakethemoralhabits，impulses，andtastesofmenasamaterialgivenustoworkuponnolessthantherestoftheirnature，andassomethingwhich，asitonlypartlyresultsfromreasoninginthepast，socanonlybepartiallymodifiedbyanyreasoningwhichwecannowapplytoit。ItseemsthereforeclearthatthesolutionofthehypotheticalUtilitarianproblemofconstructinganidealmoralityformenconceivedtobeinotherrespectsasexperienceshowsthemtobe，butwiththeiractualmoralityabstracted，willnotgiveustheresultwhichwepracticallyrequire。
Itwillperhapsbesaid，``NodoubtsuchanidealUtilitarianmoralitycanonlybegradually，andperhapsafterallimperfectly，introduced；butstillitwillbeusefultoworkitoutasapatterntowhichwemayapproximate。’’But，inthefirstplace，itmaynotbereallypossibletoapproximatetoit:sinceanyparticularexistingmoralrule，thoughnottheideallybestevenforsuchbeingsasexistingmenundertheexistingcircumstances，mayyetbethebestthattheycanbegottoobey:sothatitwouldbefutiletoproposeanyother，orevenharmful，asitmighttendtoimpairoldmoralhabitswithouteffectivelyreplacingthembynewones。Andsecondly，theendeavourgraduallytoapproximatetoamoralityconstructedonthesuppositionthatthenon-moralpartofexistinghumannatureremainsunchanged，mayleaduswrong:becausethestateofmen’sknowledgeandintellectualfaculties，andtherangeoftheirsympathies，andthedirectionandstrengthoftheirprevailingimpulses，andtheirrelationstotheexternalworldandtoeachother，arecontinuallybeingaltered，andsuchalterationistosomeextentunderourcontrolandmaybefelicificinahighdegree:andanymaterialmodificationsinimportantelementsandconditionsofhumanlifemayrequirecorrespondingchangesinestablishedmoralrulesandsentiments，inorderthatthegreatestpossiblehappinessmaybeattainedbythehumanbeingwhoselifeisthusmodified。Inshort，theconstructionofaUtilitariancode，regardedasanidealtowardswhichwearetoprogress，ismetbyaseconddilemma:——Thenatureofmanandtheconditionsofhislifecannotusefullybeassumedtobeconstant，unlessweareconfiningourattentiontothepresentorproximatefuture；whileagain，ifweareconsideringtheminthepresentorproximatefuture，wemusttakeintoaccountmen’sactualmoralhabitsandsentiments，asapartoftheirnaturenotmateriallymoremodifiablethantherest。
Nor，again，canIagreewithMr。Spencerinthinkingthatitispossibletosolvetheproblemsofpracticalethicsbyconstructingthefinalperfectformofsociety，towardswhichtheprocessofhumanhistoryistending；
anddeterminingtherulesofmutualbehaviourwhichoughttobe，andwillbe，observedbythemembersofthisperfectsociety。For，firstly，grantingthatwecanconceiveaspossibleahumancommunitywhichisfromautilitarianpointofviewperfect；andgrantingalsoMr。Spencer’sdefinitionofthisperfection——viz。thatthevoluntaryactionsofallthememberscause``pleasureunalloyedbypainanywhere’’toallwhoareaffectedbythem——；[2]itstillseemstomequiteimpossibletoforecastthenaturesandrelationsofthepersonscomposingsuchacommunity，withsufficientclearnessandcertaintytoenableustodefineeveninoutlinetheirmoralcode。Andsecondly，evenifitwereotherwise，evenifwecouldconstructscientificallyMr。Spencer’sidealmorality，Idonotthinksuchaconstructionwouldbeofmuchavailinsolvingthepracticalproblemsofactualhumanity。
Forasocietyinwhich——totakeonepointonly——thereisnosuchthingaspunishment，isnecessarilyasocietywithitsessentialstructuresounlikeourown，thatitwouldbeidletoattemptanycloseimitationofitsrulesofbehaviour。Itmightpossiblybebestforustoconformapproximatelytosomeoftheserules；butthiswecouldonlyknowbyexaminingeachparticularruleindetail；wecouldhavenogeneralgroundsforconcludingthatitwouldbebestforustoconformtothemasfaraspossible。Forevensupposingthatthisidealsocietyisultimatelytoberealised，itmustatanyratebeseparatedfromusbyaconsiderableintervalofevolution；henceitisnotunlikelythatthebestwayofprogressingtowardsitwillbesomeotherthantheapparentlydirectestway，andthatweshallreachitmoreeasilyifwebeginbymovingawayfromit。Whetherthisissoornot，andtowhatextent，canonlybeknownbycarefullyexaminingtheeffectsofconductonactualhumanbeings，andinferringitsprobableeffectsonthehumanbeingswhomwemayexpecttoexistintheproximatefuture。
OtherthinkersoftheevolutionistschoolsuggestthatthedifficultiesofUtilitarianmethodmightbeavoided，inawaymoresimplethanMr。Spencer’s，byadopting，asthepracticallyultimateendandcriterionofmorality，``health’’or``efficiency’’ofthesocialorganism，insteadofhappiness。
Thisviewismaintained，forinstance，inMr。LeslieStephen’sScienceofEthics；[1]anddeservescarefulexamination。AsIunderstandMr。
Stephen，hemeansby``health’’thatstateofthesocialorganismwhichtendstoitspreservationundertheconditionsofitsexistence，astheyareknownorcapableofbeingpredicted；andhemeansthesameby``efficiency’’；——sincetheworkforwhich，inhisview，thesocialorganismhastobe``efficient’’
issimplytheworkofliving，thefunctionof``goingon’’。Isaythisbecause``efficiency’’mightbeunderstoodtoimplysome`taskofhumanity’
whichthesocialorganismhastoexecute，beyondthetaskofmerelyliving；
andsimilarly``health’’mightbetakentomeanastatetendingtothepreservationnotofexistencemerely，butofdesirableexistence——desirabilitybeinginterpretedinsomenon-hedonisticmanner:andinthiscaseanexaminationofeithertermwouldleadusagainoverthegroundtraversedinthediscussiononUltimateGood(inchap。xiv。oftheprecedingBook)。[2]ButIdonotunderstandthatanysuchimplicationswereinMr。Stephen’smind；andtheycertainlywouldnotbeinharmonywiththegeneraldriftofhisargument。
Thequestion，therefore，iswhether，ifGeneralHappinessbeadmittedtobethereallyultimateendinasystemofmorality，itisneverthelessreasonabletotakePreservationofthesocialorganismasthepracticallyultimate``scientificcriterion’’ofmoralrules。
Myreasonsforansweringthisquestioninthenegativearetwo-fold。InthefirstplaceIknownoadequategroundsforsupposingthatifweaimexclusivelyatthepreservationofthesocialorganismweshallsecurethemaximumattainablehappinessofitsindividualmembers:indeed，sofarasIknow，oftwosocialstateswhichequallytendtobepreservedonemaybeindefinitelyhappierthantheother。Ashasbeenbeforeobserved，alargepartofthepleasureswhichcultivatedpersonsvaluemosthighly——æ；stheticpleasures——arederivedfromactsandprocessesthathavenomaterialtendencytopreservetheindividual’slife:[3]andthestatementremainstrueifwesubstitutethesocialorganismfortheindividual。AndImayaddthatmuchrefinedmoralityisconcernedwiththepreventionofpainswhichhavenodemonstrabletendencytothedestructionoftheindividualorofsociety。Hence，whileIquiteadmitthatthemaintenanceofpreservativehabitsandsentimentsisthemostindispensablefunctionofutilitarianmorality——andperhapsalmostitssolefunctionintheearlierstagesofmoraldevelopment，whentoliveatallwasadifficulttaskforhumancommunities——Idonotthereforethinkitreasonablethatweshouldbecontentwiththemeresecuringofexistenceforhumanitygenerally，andshouldconfineoureffortstopromotingtheincreaseofthissecurity，insteadofseekingtomakethesecuredexistencemoredesirable。
But，secondly，IdonotseeonwhatgroundsMr。
Stephenholdsthatthecriterionof`tendencytothepreservationofthesocialorganism’isnecessarilycapableofbeingappliedwithgreaterprecisionthanthatof`tendencytogeneralhappiness’，evensofarasthetwoendsarecoincident:andthattheformer``satisfiestheconditionsofascientificcriterion’’。Ishouldadmitthatthiswouldprobablybethecase，iftheSociologythatweknowwereascienceactuallyconstructed，andnotmerelythesketchofapossiblefuturescience:butMr。Stephenhashimselftoldusthatsociologyatpresent``consistsofnothingmorethanacollectionofunverifiedguessesandvaguegeneralisations，disguisedunderamoreorlesspretentiousapparatusofquasi-scientificterminology’’。ThislanguageisstrongerthanIshouldhaveventuredtouse；butIagreegenerallywiththeviewthatitexpresses；anditappearstomedifficultforawriterwhoholdsthisviewtomaintainthattheconceptionof``socialhealth’’，regardedasacriterionandstandardofrightconduct，isinanyimportantdegreemore``scientific’’thantheconceptionof``generalhappiness’’。
HoldingthisestimateofthepresentconditionofSociology，Iconsiderthat，fromtheutilitarianpointofview，thereareequallydecisivereasonsagainsttheadoptionofanysuchnotionas``development’’ofthesocialorganism——insteadofmerepreservation——asthepracticallyultimateendandcriterionofmorality。
Ontheonehand，ifby``development’’ismeantanincreasein``efficiency’’
orpreservativequalities，thisnotionisonlyanoptimisticspecialisationofthatjustdiscussed(involvingthe——Ifear——unwarrantedassumptionthatthesocialorganismtendstobecomecontinuallymoreefficient)；sothatnofreshargumentsneedbeurgedagainstit。If，however，somethingdifferentismeantbydevelopment——as(e。g。)adiscipleofMr。
Spencermightmeananincreasein``definitecoherentheterogeneity’’:
whetherornotsuchincreasewaspreservative——thenIknownoscientificgroundsforconcludingthatweshallbestpromotegeneralhappinessbyconcentratingoureffortsontheattainmentofthisincrease。Idonotaffirmittobeimpossiblethateveryincreaseinthedefinitecoherentheterogeneityofasocietyofhumanbeingsmaybeaccompaniedorfollowedbyanincreaseintheaggregatehappinessofthemembersofthesociety:
butIdonotperceivethatMr。Spencer，oranyoneelse，hasevenattemptedtofurnishthekindofproofwhichthispropositionrequires。[4]
Tosumup:Iholdthattheutilitarian，intheexistingstateofourknowledge，cannotpossiblyconstructamoralitydenovoeitherformanasheis(abstractinghismorality)，orformanasheoughttobeandwillbe。Hemuststart，speakingbroadly，withtheexistingsocialorder，andtheexistingmoralityasapartofthatorder:
