trainedingoodhabits，intellectual，moral，andphysical:anditiscommonlybelievedthatthebestoreventheonlyknownmeansofattainingtheseendsinevenatolerabledegreeisaffordedbytheexistinginstitutionoftheFamily，restingasitdoesonabasisoflegalandmoralrulescombined。ForLawfixesaminimumofmutualservicesanddrawsthebroadoutlinesofbehaviourforthedifferentmembersofthefamily，imposingontheparentslifelongunionandcompletemutualfidelityandthedutyofprovidingfortheirchildrenthenecessariesoflifeuptoacertainage；inreturnforwhichitgivesthemthecontroloftheirchildrenforthesameperiod，andsometimeslaysonthelattertheburdenofsupportingtheirparentswhenagedanddestitute:sothatMorality，ininculcatingacompleterharmonyofinterestsandanamplerinterchangeofkindnesses，ismerelyfillingintheoutlinesdrawnbyLaw。
Wefound，however，inattemptingtoformulatethedifferentdomesticdutiesasrecognisedbyCommonSense，thatthereseemedtobeinmostcasesalargevaguemarginwithrespecttowhichgeneralagreementcouldnotbeaffirmed，andwhich，infact，formsanarenaforcontinualdisputes。ButwehavenowtoobservethatitisjustthismarginwhichrevealsmostclearlythelatentUtilitarianismofcommonmoralopinion:forwhenthequestionisonceraisedastotheprecisemutualduties(e。g。)ofhusbandsandwives，orofparentsandchildren，eachdisputantcommonlysupportshisviewbyaforecastoftheeffectsonhumanhappinesstobeexpectedfromthegeneralestablishmentofanyproposedrule；thisseemstobethestandardtowhichthematteris，bycommonconsent，referred。
Similarlytheclaimtoservicesthatarisesoutofspecialneed(whichnaturalsympathymovesustorecognise)mayobviouslyberestedonanutilitarianbasis:indeedtheproperfulfilmentofthisdutyseemssoimportanttothewell-beingofsociety，thatithasinmoderncivilisedcommunitiesgenerallybeenbroughttosomeextentwithinthesphereofGovernmentalaction。Wenoticedthatthemainutilitarianreasonwhyitisnotrightforeveryrichmantodistributehissuperfluouswealthamongthepoor，isthatthehappinessofallisonthewholemostpromotedbymaintaininginadultsgenerally(exceptmarriedwomen)，theexpectationthateachwillbethrownonhisownresourcesforthesupplyofhisownwants。ButifIammadeawarethat，owingtoasuddencalamitythatcouldnothavebeenforeseen，another’sresourcesaremanifestlyinadequatetoprotecthimfrompainorseriousdiscomfort，thecaseisaltered；mytheoreticalobligationtoconsiderhishappinessasmuchasmyownbecomesatoncepractical；andIamboundtomakeasmuchefforttorelievehimaswillnotentailagreaterlossofhappinesstomyselforothers。If，however，thecalamityisonewhichmighthavebeenforeseenandavertedbypropercare，mydutybecomesmoredoubtful:forthenbyrelievinghimIseemtobeindangerofencouragingimprovidenceinothers。InsuchacaseaUtilitarianhastoweighthisindirectevilagainstthedirectgoodofremovingpainanddistress:anditisnowmoreandmoregenerallyrecognisedthatthequestionofprovidingforthedestitutehastobetreatedasautilitarianproblemofwhichthesearetheelements，——whetherweareconsideringtheminimumthatshouldbesecuredtothembylaw，orthepropersupplementaryactionofprivatecharity。
Poverty，however，isnottheonlycaseinwhichitisconducivetothegeneralhappinessthatonemanshouldrenderunboughtservicestoanother。Inanyconditionorcallingamanmayfindhimselfunabletowardoffsomeevil，ortorealisesomelegitimateorworthyend，withoutassistanceofsuchkindashecannotpurchaseontheordinarycommercialterms；——assistancewhich，ontheonehand，willhavenobadeffectonthereceiver，fromtheexceptionalnatureoftheemergency，whileatthesametimeitmaynotbeburdensometothegiver。Here，again，somejuristshavethoughtthatwheretheservicetoberenderedisgreat，andtheburdenofrenderingitveryslight，itmightproperlybemadematteroflegalobligation:sothat(e。g。)ifIcouldsaveamanfromdrowningbymerelyholdingoutahand，IshouldbelegallypunishableifIomittedtheact。But，howeverthismaybe，themoralrulecondemningtherefusalofaidinsuchemergenciesisobviouslyconducivetothegeneralhappiness。
Further，besidesthese——sotosay——accidentallyunboughtservices，therearesomeforwhichthereisnormallynomarket-price；
suchascounselandassistanceintheintimateperplexitiesoflife，whichoneisonlywillingtoreceivefromgenuinefriends。Itmuchpromotesthegeneralhappinessthatsuchservicesshouldbegenerallyrendered。Onthisground，aswellasthroughtheemotionalpleasureswhichdirectlyspringfromit，weperceiveFriendshiptobeanimportantmeanstotheUtilitarianend。AtthesametimewefeelthatthecharmofFriendshipislostiftheflowofemotionisnotspontaneousandunforced。ThecombinationofthesetwoviewsseemstobeexactlyrepresentedbythesympathythatisnotquiteadmirationwithwhichCommonSenseregardsallcloseandstrongaffections；
andtheregretthatisnotquitedisapprovalwithwhichitcontemplatestheirdecay。
Inallcaseswhereitisconducivetothegeneralhappinessthatunboughtservicesshouldberendered，Gratitude(ifwemeanbythisasettleddispositiontorepaythebenefitinwhateverwayonecanonafittingopportunity)isenjoinedbyUtilitarianismnolessthanbyCommonSense；forexperiencewouldleadustoexpectthatnokindofonerousserviceswillbeadequatelyrenderedunlessthereisageneraldispositiontorequitethem。InfactwemaysaythatageneralunderstandingthatallserviceswhichitisexpedientthatAshouldrendertoBwillbeinsomewayrepaidbyB，isanaturalsupplementofthemoredefinitecontractsbywhichthemainpartofthegreatsocialinterchangeofservicesisarranged。Indeedtheonekindofrequitalmergesintheother，andnosharplinecanbedrawnbetweenthetwo:wecannotalwayssaydistinctlywhethertherequitalofabenefitisapureactofgratitudeorthefulfilmentofatacitunderstanding。
Thereis，however，acertaindifficultyinthisviewofgratitudeasanalogoustothefulfilmentofabargain。Foritmaybesaidthatoftheservicespeculiartofriendshipdisinterestednessisanindispensablecharacteristic；
andthatinallcasesbenefitsconferredwithoutexpectationofrewardhaveapeculiarexcellence，andareindeedpeculiarlyadaptedtoarousegratitude；butiftheyareconferredinexpectationofsuchgratitude，theylosethisexcellence；andyet，again，itwouldbeverydifficulttotreatasafriendonefromwhomgratitudewasnotexpected。Thisseems，atfirstsight，aninextricableentanglement:buthere，asinothercases，anapparentethicalcontradictionisfoundtoreduceitselftoapsychologicalcomplexity。Formostofouractionsaredonefromseveraldifferentmotives，eithercoexistingorsucceedingoneanotherinrapidalternation:thusamanmayhaveaperfectlydisinteresteddesiretobenefitanother，andonewhichmightpossiblyprevailoverallconflictingmotivesifallhopeofrequitalwerecutoff，andyetitmaybewellthatthisgenerousimpulseshouldbesustainedbyavaguetrustthatrequitalwillnotbewithheld。
AndinfacttheapparentpuzzlereallyaffordsanotherillustrationofthelatentUtilitarianismofCommonSense。For，ontheonehand，Utilitarianismprescribesthatweshouldrenderserviceswheneveritisconducivetothegeneralhappinesstodoso，whichmayoftenbethecasewithouttakingintoaccountthegaintooneselfwhichwouldresultfromtheirrequital:
andontheotherhand，sincewemayinferfromtheactualselfishnessofaveragementhatsuchserviceswouldnotbeadequatelyrenderedwithoutexpectationofrequital，itisalsoconducivetothegeneralhappinessthatmenshouldrecogniseamoralobligationtorepaythem。
Wehavediscussedonlythemostconspicuousofthedutiesofaffection:butitisprobablyobviousthatsimilarreasoningswouldapplyinthecaseoftheothers。
Inallsuchcasestherearethreedistinctlinesofargumentwhichtendtoshowthatthecommonlyreceivedviewofspecialclaimsanddutiesarisingoutofspecialrelations，thoughprimafacieopposedtotheimpartialuniversalityoftheUtilitarianprinciple，isreallymaintainedbyawell-consideredapplicationofthatprinciple。First，moralityishereinamannerprotectingthenormalchannelsandcoursesofnaturalbenevolentaffections；andthedevelopmentofsuchaffectionsisofthehighestimportancetohumanhappiness，bothasadirectsourceofpleasure，andasanindispensablepreparationforamoreenlarged``altruism’’。
Andagain，themerefactthatsuchaffectionsarenormal，causesanexpectationoftheservicesthataretheirnaturalexpression；andthedisappointmentofsuchexpectationsisinevitablypainful。Whilefinally，apartfromtheseconsiderations，wecanshowineachcarestrongutilitarianreasonswhy，generallyspeaking，servicesshouldberenderedtothepersonscommonlyrecognisedashavingsuchclaimsratherthantoothers。
Wehavetoobserve，inconclusion，thatthedifficultieswhichwefoundinthewayofdeterminingbytheIntuitionalmethodthelimitsandtherelativeimportanceofthesedutiesarereducedintheUtilitariansystem，todifficultiesofhedonisticcomparison。Foreachoftheprecedingargumentshasshownusdifferentkindsofpleasuresgainedandpainsavertedbythefulfilmentoftheclaimsinquestion。Thereare，first，thosewhichtheserviceclaimedwoulddirectlypromoteoravert:
secondly，thereisthepainandsecondaryharmofdisappointedexpectation，iftheservicebenotrendered:thirdly，wehavetoreckonthevariouspleasuresconnectedwiththeexerciseofnaturalbenevolentaffections，especiallywhenreciprocated，includingtheindirecteffectsontheagent’scharacterofmaintainingsuchaffections。Allthesedifferentpleasuresandpainscombinedifferently，andwithalmostinfinitevariationascircumstancesvary，intoutilitarianreasonsforeachoftheclaimsinquestion；noneofthesereasonsbeingabsoluteandconclusive，buteachhavingitsownweight，whileliabletobeoutweighedbyothers。
Ipasstoconsideranothergroupofduties，oftencontrastedwiththoseofBenevolence，underthecomprehensivenotionofJustice。
``ThatJusticeisusefultosociety’’，saysHume，``itwouldbeasuperfluousundertakingtoprove’’:
whatheendeavourstoshowatsomelengthis``thatpublicutilityisthesoleoriginofJustice’’:andthesamequestionoforiginhasoccupiedthechiefattentionofJ。S。Mill。Here，however，wearenotsomuchconcernedwiththegrowthofthesentimentofJusticefromexperiencesofutility，aswiththeUtilitarianbasisofthematurenotion；whileatthesametimeiftheanalysispreviouslygivenbecorrect，theJusticethatiscommonlydemandedandinculcatedissomethingmorecomplexthanthesewritershaverecognised。WhatHume(e。g。)meansbyJusticeisratherwhatIshouldcallOrder，understoodinitswidestsense:theobservanceoftheactualsystemofrules，whetherstrictlylegalorcustomary，whichbindtogetherthedifferentmembersofanysocietyintoanorganicwhole，checkingmalevolentorotherwiseinjuriousimpulses，distributingthedifferentobjectsofmen’sclashingdesires，andexactingsuchpositiveservices，customaryorcontractual，asarecommonlyrecognisedasmattersofdebt。AndthoughtherehaverarelybeenwantingplausibleempiricalargumentsfortherevolutionaryparadoxquotedbyPlato，that``lawsareimposedintheinterestofrulers’’，itremainstruethatthegeneralconducivenesstosocialhappinessofthehabitofOrderorLaw-observance，is，asHumesays，tooobvioustoneedproof；indeeditisofsuchparamountimportancetoacommunity，thatevenwhereparticularlawsareclearlyinjuriousitisusuallyexpedienttoobservethem，apartfromanypenaltywhichtheirbreachmightentailontheindividual。Wesaw，however，thatCommonSensesometimesbidsusrefuseobediencetobadlaws，because``weoughttoobeyGodratherthanmen’’
(thoughthereseemstobenoclearintuitionastothekindordegreeofbadnessthatjustifiesresistance)；andfurtherallowsus，inspecialemergencies，toviolaterulesgenerallygood，for``necessityhasnolaw’’，and``saluspopulisupremalex’’。
TheseandsimilarcommonopinionsseematleasttosuggestthatthelimitsofthedutyofLaw-observancearetobedeterminedbyutilitarianconsiderations。While，again，theUtilitarianviewgetsridofthedifficultiesinwhichtheattempttodefineintuitivelythetrulylegitimatesourceoflegislativeauthorityinvolvedus；atthesametimethatitjustifiestosomeextenteachofthedifferentviewscurrentastotheintrinsiclegitimacyofgovernments。For，ontheonehand，itfindsthemoralbasisofanyestablishedpoliticalorderprimarilyinitseffectsratherthanitscauses；sothat，generallyspeaking，obediencewillseemduetoanydefactogovernmentthatisnotgoverningverybadly。Ontheotherhand，insofaraslawsoriginatinginaparticularwayarelikelytobe(1)better，or(2)morereadilyobserved，itisaUtilitariandutytoaimatintroducingthismodeoforigination:andthusinacertainstageofsocialdevelopmentitmayberightthat(e。g。)
a`representativesystem’shouldbepopularlydemanded，orpossibly(inextremecases)evenintroducedbyforce:while，again，thereisexpediencyinmaintaininganancientmodeoflegislation，becausemenreadilyobeysuch:andloyaltytoadispossessedgovernmentmaybeonthewholeexpedient，evenatthecostofsometemporarysufferinganddisorder，inorderthatambitiousmenmaynotfindusurpationtooeasy。Here，aselsewhere，Utilitarianismatoncesupportsthedifferentreasonscommonlyputforwardasabsolute，andalsobringsthemtheoreticallytoacommonmeasure，sothatinanyparticularcasewehaveaprincipleofdecisionbetweenconflictingpoliticalarguments。
Aswasbeforesaid，thisLaw-observance，insofaratleastasitaffectstheinterestsofotherindividuals，iswhatwefrequentlymeanbyJustice。Itseems，however，thatthenotionofJustice，exhaustivelyanalysed，includesseveraldistinctelementscombinedinasomewhatcomplexmanner:wehavetoinquire，therefore，whatlatentutilitiesarerepresentedbyeachoftheseelements。
