noticed，astothechoicebetweenSubjectiveandObjectiverightnessintheexceptionalcaseinwhichalonethetwocanbepresentedasalternatives，——i。e。whenweareconsideringwhetherweshallinfluenceanothertoactcontrarytohisconvictionastowhatisright。Autilitarianwoulddecidethequestionbyweighingthefelicificconsequencesoftheparticularrightactagainsttheinfelicificresultstobeapprehendedhereafterfromthemoraldeteriorationofthepersonwhoseconscientiousconvictionswereoverbornebyothermotives:
unlesstheformereffectswereveryimportanthewouldreasonablyregardthedangertocharacterasthegreater:butiftheother’smistakensenseofdutythreatenedtocauseagravedisaster，hewouldnothesitatetooverbearitbyanymotiveswhichitwasinhispowertoapply。AndinpracticeIthinkthattheCommonSenseofmankindwouldcometosimilarconclusionsbymorevagueandsemi-consciousreasoningofthesamekind。
Inorder，however，toformapreciseestimateoftheextenttowhichUtilitarianismagreesordisagreeswithCommonSense，itseemsbesttoexaminethemoredefinitejudgmentsofrightandwronginconduct，undertheparticularheadsrepresentedbyourcommonnotionsofvirtuesandduties。Imaybeginbypointingoutoncemorethatsofarasanyadequatelyprecisedefinitionsofthesenotionsarefoundtoinvolve，implicitlyorexplicitly，thenotionof`good’orof`right’supposedalreadydeterminate，theycanaffordnogroundforopposingaUtilitarianinterpretationofthesefundamentalconceptions。Forexample，wesawthistobethecasewiththechiefoftheintellectualexcellencesdiscussedinBookiii。chap。
iii。Wisdom，ascommonlyconceived，isnotexactlythefacultyofchoosingtherightmeanstotheendofuniversalhappiness；rather，aswesaw，itsnotioninvolvesanuncriticalsynthesisofthedifferentendsandprinciplesthataredistinguishedandseparatelyexaminedinthepresenttreatise。
ButifitsimportisnotdistinctlyUtilitarian，itiscertainlynotanythingelseasdistinctfromUtilitarian:ifwecanonlydefineitasthefacultyorhabitofchoosingtherightorbestmeanstotherightorbestend，forthatveryreasonourdefinitionleavesitquiteopentoustogivethenotions`good’and`right’aUtilitarianimport。
LetusthenexaminefirstthegroupofvirtuesanddutiesdiscussedinBookiii。chap。iv。，undertheheadofBenevolence。Asregardsthegeneralconceptionoftheduty，thereis，Ithink，nodivergencethatweneedconsiderbetweentheIntuitionalandUtilitariansystems。ForthoughBenevolencewouldperhapsbemorecommonlydefinedasadispositiontopromotetheGoodofone’sfellow-creatures，ratherthantheirHappiness(asdefinitelyunderstoodbyUtilitarians)；still，asthechiefelementinthecommonnotionofgood(besideshappiness)ismoralgoodorVirtue，ifwecanshowthattheothervirtuesare——speakingbroadly——allqualitiesconducivetothehappinessoftheagenthimselforofothers，itisevidentthatBenevolence，whetheritpromptsustopromotethevirtueofothersortheirhappiness，willaimdirectlyorindirectlyattheUtilitarianend。[2]
Nor，further，doesthecomprehensiverangewhichUtilitariansgivetoBenevolence，instatingastheirultimateendthegreatesthappinessofallsentientbeings，seemtobereallyopposedtoCommonSense；forinsofarascertainIntuitionalmoralistsrestrictthescopeofthedirectdutyofBenevolencetohumanbeings，andregardourdutiestobruteanimalsasmerelyindirectandderived``fromthedutyofSelf-culture’’，theyratherthantheirUtilitarianopponentsappearparadoxical。Andif，inlayingdownthateachagentistoconsiderallotherhappinessasequallyimportantwithhisown，UtilitarianismseemstogobeyondthestandardofdutycommonlyprescribedundertheheadofBenevolence，ityetcallscarcelybesaidtoconflictwithCommonSenseonthispoint。ForthepracticalapplicationofthistheoreticalimpartialityofUtilitarianismislimitedbyseveralimportantconsiderations。Inthefirstplace，generallyspeaking，eachmanisbetterabletoprovideforhisownhappinessthanforthatofotherpersons，fromhismoreintimateknowledgeofhisowndesiresandneeds，andhisgreateropportunitiesofgratifyingthem。Andbesides，itisunderthestimulusofself-interestthattheactiveenergiesofmostmenaremosteasilyandthoroughlydrawnout:andifthiswereremoved，generalhappinesswouldbediminishedbyaseriouslossofthosemeansofhappinesswhichareobtainedbylabour；
andalso，tosomeextent，bythediminutionofthelabouritself。Forthesereasonsitwouldnotunderactualcircumstancespromotetheuniversalhappinessifeachmanweretoconcernhimselfwiththehappinessofothersasmuchaswithhisown。WhileifIconsiderthedutyabstractlyandideally，evenCommonSensemoralityseemstobidme``lovemyneighbourasmyself’’。
Itmightindeedbeplausiblyobjected，ontheotherhand，thatunderthenotionsofGenerosity，Self-sacrifice，etc。，CommonSensepraises(thoughitdoesnotprescribeasobligatory)asuppressionofegoismbeyondwhatUtilitarianismapproves:forweperhapsadmireasvirtuousamanwhogivesuphisownhappinessforanother’ssake，evenwhenthehappinessthatheconfersisclearlylessthanthatwhichheresigns，sothatthereisadiminutionofhappinessonthewhole。But(1)itseemsverydoubtfulwhetherwedoaltogetherapprovesuchconductwhenthedisproportionbetweenthesacrificeandthebenefitisobviousandstriking:and(2)
aspectatorisoftenunabletojudgewhetherhappinessislostonthewhole，as(a)hecannottellhowfarhewhomakesthesacrificeiscompensatedbysympatheticandmoralpleasure，and(b)theremoterfelicificconsequencesflowingfromthemoraleffectsofsuchasacrificeontheagentandonothershavetobetakenintoaccount:while(3)eveniftherebealossintheparticularcase，stillouradmirationofself-sacrificewilladmitofacertainUtilitarianjustification，becausesuchconductshowsadispositionfarabovetheaverageinitsgeneraltendencytopromotehappiness，anditisperhapsthisdispositionthatweadmireratherthantheparticularact。
Ithasbeensaid，however，thatthespecialclaimsanddutiesbelongingtospecialrelations，bywhicheachmanisconnectedwithafewoutofthewholenumberofhumanbeings，areexpresslyignoredbytherigidimpartialityoftheUtilitarianformula:
andhencethat，thoughUtilitarianismandCommonSensemayagreeinthepropositionthatallrightactionisconducivetothehappinessofsomeoneorother，andsofarbeneficent，stilltheyareirreconcileablydivergentontheradicalquestionofthedistributionofbeneficence。
Here，however，itseemsthatevenfair-mindedopponentshavescarcelyunderstoodtheUtilitarianposition。TheyhaveattackedBentham’swell-knownformula，``everymantocountforone，nobodyformorethanone’’，onthegroundthatthegeneralhappinesswillbebestattainedbyinequalityinthedistributionofeachone’sservices。Butsofarasitisclearthatitwillbebestattainedinthisway，Utilitarianismwillnecessarilyprescribethiswayofaimingatit；andBentham’sdictummustbeunderstoodmerelyasmakingtheconceptionoftheultimateendprecise——layingdownthatoneperson’shappinessistobecountedforasmuchasanother’s(supposedequalindegree)asanelementofthegeneralhappiness——notasdirectlyprescribingtherulesofconductbywhichthisendwillbebestattained。Andthereasonswhyitis，generallyspeaking，conducivetothegeneralhappinessthateachindividualshoulddistributehisbeneficenceinthechannelsmarkedoutbycommonlyrecognisedtiesandclaims，aretolerablyobvious。
Forfirst，inthechiefrelationsdiscussedinchap。iv。ofBookiii——thedomestic，andthoseconstitutedbyconsanguinity，friendship，previouskindnesses，andspecialneeds，——theserviceswhichCommonSenseprescribesasdutiesarecommonlypromptedbynaturalaffection，whileatthesametimetheytendtodevelopandsustainsuchaffection。
NowthesubsistenceofbenevolentaffectionsamonghumanbeingsisitselfanimportantmeanstotheUtilitarianend，because(asShaftesburyandhisfollowersforciblyurged)themostintenseandhighlyvaluedofourpleasuresarederivedfromsuchaffections；forboththeemotionitselfishighlypleasurable，anditimpartsthisqualitytotheactivitieswhichitpromptsandsustains，andthehappinessthusproducediscontinuallyenhancedbythesympatheticechoofthepleasuresconferredonothers。
Andagain，wheregenuineaffectionsubsists，thepracticalobjectionstospontaneousbeneficence，whichwerebeforenoticed，aremuchdiminishedinforce。Forsuchaffectiontendstobereciprocated，andthekindnesseswhichareitsoutcomeandexpressioncommonlywinarequitalofaffection:
andinsofarasthisisthecase，theyhavelesstendencytoweakenthespringsofactivityinthepersonbenefited；andmayevenstrengthenthembyexcitingothersourcesofenergythantheegoistic——personalaffection，andgratitude，andthedesiretodeservelove，andthedesiretoimitatebeneficence。Andhenceithasbeenoftenobservedthattheinjuriouseffectsofalmsgivingareatleastmuchdiminishedifthealmsarebestowedwithunaffectedsympathyandkindliness，andinsuchawayastoelicitagenuineresponseofgratitude。Andfurther，thebeneficencethatspringsfromaffectionislesslikelytobefrustratedfromdefectofknowledge:fornotonlyarewepowerfullystimulatedtostudytherealconditionsofthehappinessofthosewhomwelove，butalsosuchstudyisrenderedmoreeffectivefromthesympathywhichnaturallyaccompaniesaffection。
OnthesegroundstheUtilitarianwillevidentlyapproveofthecultivationofaffectionandtheperformanceofaffectionateservices。Itmaybesaid，however，thatwhatweoughttoapproveisnotsomuchaffectionforspecialindividuals，butratherafeelingmoreuniversalinitsscope-charity，philanthropy，or(asithasbeencalled)the`EnthusiasmofHumanity’。Andcertainlyallspecialaffectionstendoccasionallytocomeintoconflictwiththeprincipleofpromotingthegeneralhappiness:
andUtilitarianismmustthereforeprescribesuchacultureofthefeelingsaswill，sofaraspossible，counteractthistendency。Butitseemsthatmostpersonsareonlycapableofstrongaffectionstowardsafewhumanbeingsincertaincloserelations，especiallythedomestic:andthatiftheseweresuppressed，whattheywouldfeeltowardstheirfellow-creaturesgenerallywouldbe，asAristotlesays，``butawaterykindness’’andaveryfeeblecounterpoisetoself-love:sothatsuchspecialisedaffectionsasthepresentorganisationofsocietynormallyproducesaffordthebestmeansofdevelopinginmostpersonsamoreextendedbenevolence，tothedegreetowhichtheyarecapableoffeelingit。Besides，eachpersonisforthemostpart，fromlimitationeitherofpowerorknowledge，notinapositiontodomuchgoodtomorethanaverysmallnumberofpersons；
itthereforeseems，onthisgroundalone，desirablethathischiefbenevolentimpulsesshouldbecorrespondinglylimited。
Andthisleadsustoconsider，secondly，thereasonswhy，affectionapart，itisconducivetothegeneralhappinessthatspecialclaimstoservicesshouldbecommonlyrecognisedasattachingtospecialrelations；soastomodifythatimpartialityinthedistributionofbeneficencewhichUtilitarianismprimafacieinculcates。Forclearness’sakeitseemsbesttotakethisargumentseparately，thoughitcannoteasilybedividedfromtheformerone，becausetheservicesinquestionareoftensuchascannotsowellberenderedwithoutaffection。
Insuchcases，aswesaw，CommonSenseregardstheaffectionitselfasaduty，insofarasitiscapableofbeingcultivated:butstillprescribestheperformanceoftheserviceseveniftheaffectionbeunhappilyabsent。
Indeedwemayproperlyconsidertheservicestowhichwearecommonlypromptedbythedomesticaffections，andalsothosetowhichwearemovedbygratitudeandpity，asanintegralpartofthesystemofmutualaidbywhichthenormallifeandhappinessofsocietyismaintained，underexistingcircumstances；
beinganindispensablesupplementtothestillmoreessentialserviceswhicharedefinitelyprescribedbyLaw，orrenderedoncommercialtermsasapartofanexpressbargain。Aspoliticaleconomistshaveexplained，themeansofhappinessareimmenselyincreasedbythatcomplexsystemofco-operationwhichhasbeengraduallyorganisedamongcivilisedmen:andwhileitisthoughtthatundersuchasystemitwillbegenerallybestonthewholetoleteachindividualexchangesuchservicesasheisdisposedtorenderforsuchreturnashecanobtainforthembyfreecontract，stilltherearemanylargeexceptionstothisgeneralprinciple。Ofthesethemostimportantisconstitutedbythecaseofchildren。Itisnecessaryforthewell-beingofmankindthatineachgenerationchildrenshouldbeproducedinadequatenumbers，neithertoomanynortoofew；andthat，astheycannotbelefttoprovideforthemselves，theyshouldbeadequatelynourishedandprotectedduring，theperiodofinfancy；andfurther，thattheyshouldbecarefully
