Ithasbeenbeforeobserved(Booki。chap。vi。)thatthetwosidesofthedoublerelationinwhichUtilitarianismstandstotheMoralityofCommonSensehavebeenrespectivelyprominentattwodifferentperiodsinthehistoryofEnglishethicalthought。SinceBenthamwehavebeenchieflyfamiliarwiththenegativeoraggressiveaspectoftheUtilitariandoctrine。
ButwhenCumberland，replyingtoHobbes，putforwardthegeneraltendencyofthereceivedmoralrulestopromotethe``commonGoodofallRationals’’
hisaimwassimplyConservative:itneveroccurstohimtoconsiderwhethertheserulesascommonlyformulatedareinanywayimperfect，andwhetherthereareanydiscrepanciesbetweensuchcommonmoralopinionsandtheconclusionsofRationalBenevolence。SoinShaftesbury’ssystemthe``Moral’’
or``ReflexSense’’issupposedtobealwayspleasedwiththat``balance’’
oftheaffectionswhichtendstothegoodorhappinessofthewhole，anddispleasedwiththeopposite。InHume’streatisethiscoincidenceisdrawnoutmoreindetail，andwithamoredefiniteassertionthattheperceptionofutility(orthereverse)isineachcasethesourceofthemorallikings(oraversions)whichareexcitedinusbydifferentqualitiesofhumancharacterandconduct。AndwemayobservethatthemostpenetratingamongHume’scontemporarycritics，AdamSmith，admitsunreservedlytheobjectivecoincidenceofRightnessorApprovednessandUtility:thoughhemaintains，inoppositiontoHume，that``itisnottheviewofthisutilityorhurtfulness，whichiseitherthefirstortheprincipalsourceofourapprobationordisapprobation’’。AfterstatingHume’stheorythat``noqualitiesofthemindareapprovedofasvirtuous，butsuchasareusefuloragreeableeithertothepersonhimselfortoothers，andnoqualitiesaredisapprovedofasviciousbutsuchashaveacontrarytendency’’；heremarksthat``Natureseemsindeedtohavesohappilyadjustedoursentimentsofapprobationanddisapprobationtotheconveniencybothoftheindividualandofthesociety，thatafterthestrictestexaminationitwillbefound，Ibelieve，thatthisisuniversallythecase。’’
AndnoonecanreadHume’sInquiryintotheFirstPrinciplesofMoralswithoutbeingconvincedofthisatleast，thatifalistweredrawnupofthequalitiesofcharacterandconductthataredirectlyorindirectlyproductiveofpleasuretoourselvesortoothers，itwouldincludeallthatarecommonlyknownasvirtues。Whateverbetheoriginofournotionofmoralgoodnessorexcellence，thereisnodoubtthat``Utility’’isageneralcharacteristicofthedispositionstowhichweapplyit:andthat，sofar，theMoralityofCommonSensemaybetrulyrepresentedasatleastunconsciouslyUtilitarian。Butitmaystillbeobjected，thatthiscoincidenceismerelygeneralandqualitative，andthatitbreaksdownwhenweattempttodrawitoutindetail，withthequantitativeprecisionwhichBenthamintroducedintothediscussion。
Andnodoubtthereisagreatdifferencebetweentheassertionthatvirtueisalwaysproductiveofhappiness，andtheassertionthattherightactionisunderallcircumstancesthatwhichwillproducethegreatestpossiblehappinessonthewhole。ButitmustbeborneinmindthatUtilitarianismisnotconcernedtoprovetheabsolutecoincidenceinresultsoftheIntuitionalandUtilitarianmethods。Indeed，ifitcouldsucceedinprovingasmuchasthis，itssuccesswouldbealmostfataltoitspracticalclaims；astheadoptionoftheUtilitarianprinciplewouldthenbecomeamatterofcompleteindifference。UtilitariansarerathercalledupontoshowanaturaltransitionfromtheMoralityofCommonSensetoUtilitarianism，somewhatlikethetransitioninspecialbranchesofpracticefromtrainedinstinctandempiricalrulestothetechnicalmethodthatembodiesaridappliestheconclusionsofscience:sothatUtilitarianismmaybepresentedasthescientificallycompleteandsystematicallyreflectiveformofthatregulationofconduct，whichthroughthewholecourseofhumanhistoryhasalwaystendedsubstantiallyinthesamedirection。Forthispurposeitisnotnecessarytoprovethatexistingmoralrulesaremoreconducivetothegeneralhappinessthananyothers:butonlytopointoutineachcasesomemanifestfelicifictendencywhichtheypossess。
Hume’sdissertation，however，incidentallyexhibitsmuchmorethanasimpleandgeneralharmonybetweenthemoralsentimentswithwhichwecommonlyregardactionsandtheirforeseenpleasurableandpainfulconsequences。And，infact，theUtilitarianargumentcannotbefairlyjudgedunlesswetakefullyintoaccountthecumulativeforcewhichitderivesfromthecomplexcharacterofthecoincidencebetweenUtilitarianismandCommonSense。
Itmaybeshown，Ithink，thattheUtilitarianestimateofconsequencesnotonlysupportsbroadlythecurrentmoralrules，butalsosustainstheirgenerallyreceivedlimitationsandqualifications:
that，again，itexplainsanomaliesintheMoralityofCommonSense，whichfromanyotherpointofviewmustseemunsatisfactorytothereflectiveintellect；andmoreover，wherethecurrentformulaisnotsufficientlyprecisefortheguidanceofconduct，whileatthesametimedifficultiesandperplexitiesariseintheattempttogiveitadditionalprecision，theUtilitarianmethodsolvesthesedifficultiesandperplexitiesingeneralaccordancewiththevagueinstinctsofCommonSense，andisnaturallyappealedtoforsuchsolutioninordinarymoraldiscussions。Itmaybeshownfurther，thatitnotonlysupportsthegenerallyreceivedviewoftherelativeimportanceofdifferentduties，butisalsonaturallycalledinasarbiter，whererulescommonlyregardedasco-ordinatecomeintoconflict:that，again，whenthesameruleisinterpretedsomewhatdifferentlybydifferentpersons，eachnaturallysupportshisviewbyurgingitsUtility，howeverstronglyhemaymaintaintheruletobeself-evidentandknownapriori:
thatwherewemeetwithmarkeddiversityofmoralopiniononanypoint，inthesameageandcountry，wecommonlyfindmanifestandimpressiveutilitarianreasonsonbothsides:andthatfinallytheremarkablediscrepanciesfoundincomparingthemoralcodesofdifferentagesandcountriesareforthemostpartstrikinglycorrelatedtodifferencesintheeffectsofactionsonhappiness，orinmen’sforesightof，orconcernfor，sucheffects。MostofthesepointsarenoticedbyHume，thoughinasomewhatcasualandfragmentaryway:andmanyofthemhavebeenincidentallyillustratedinthecourseoftheexaminationofCommonSenseMorality，withwhichwewereoccupiedintheprecedingBook。Butconsideringtheimportanceofthepresentquestion，itmaybewelltoexhibitinsystematicdetailthecumulativeargumentwhichhasjustbeensummedup，evenattheriskofrepeatingtosomeextenttheresultspreviouslygiven。
WemaybeginbyreplyingtoanobjectionwhichisfrequentlyurgedagainstUtilitarianism。How，itisasked，ifthetruegroundofthemoralgoodnessorbadnessofactionsliesintheirutilityorthereverse，canweexplainthebroaddistinctiondrawnbyCommonSensebetweenthemoralandotherpartsofournature？
WhyistheexcellenceofVirtuesostronglyfelttobedifferentinkind，notmerelyfromtheexcellenceofamachine，orafertilefield，butalsofromthephysicalbeautiesandaptitudes，theintellectualgiftsandtalentsofhumanbeings。Ishouldanswerthat——aswasarguedinanearlierchapter(Bookiii。chap。ii。)——qualitiesthatare，inthestrictestsenseoftheterm，Virtuous，arealwayssuchasweconceivecapableofbeingimmediatelyrealisedbyvoluntaryeffort，atleasttosomeextent；sothattheprominentobstacletovirtuousactionisabsenceofadequatemotive。Henceweexpectthatthejudgmentsofmoralgoodnessorbadness，passedeitherbytheagenthimselforbyothers，will——bythefreshmotivewhichtheysupplyonthesideofvirtue——haveanimmediatepracticaleffectincausingactionstobeatleastexternallyvirtuous:andthehabitualconsciousnessofthiswillaccountforalmostanydegreeofdifferencebetweenmoralsentimentsandthepleasureandpainthatwederivefromthecontemplationofeitherextra-humanornon-voluntaryutilitiesandinutilities。Tothis，however，itisreplied，thatamongthetendenciestostrictlyvoluntaryactionstherearemanynotcommonlyregardedasvirtuous，whichareyetnotonlyusefulbutonthewholemoreusefulthanmanyvirtues。``Theselfishinstinctthatleadsmentoaccumulateconfersultimatelymoreadvantageontheworldthanthegenerousinstinctthatleadsmentogive？Itisscarcelydoubtfulthatamodest，diffident，andretiringnature，distrustfulofitsownabilities，andshrinkingwithhumilityfromconflict，producesonthewholelessbenefittotheworldthantheself-assertionofanaudaciousandarrogantnature，whichisimpelledtoeverystruggle，anddevelopseverycapacity。Gratitudehasnodoubtdonemuchtosoftenandsweetentheintercourseoflife，butthecorrespondingfeelingofrevengewasforcenturiestheonebulwarkagainstsocialanarchy，andisevennowoneofthechiefrestraintstocrime。Onthegreattheatreofpubliclife，especiallyinperiodsofgreatconvulsionswherepassionsarefiercelyroused，itisneitherthemanofdelicatescrupulosityandsincereimpartiality，noryetthesingle-mindedreligiousenthusiast，incapableofdissimulationorprocrastination，whoconfersmostbenefitontheworld。Itismuchrathertheastutestatesman，earnestabouthisends，butunscrupulousabouthismeans，equallyfreefromthetrammelsofconscienceandfromtheblindnessofzeal，whogovernsbecausehepartlyyieldstothepassionsandtheprejudicesofhistime。But？ithasscarcelyyetbeencontendedthatthedelicateconsciencewhichinthesecasesimpairsutilityconstitutesvice。’’[1]
Theseobjectionsareforciblyurged；buttheyappeartomenotverydifficulttoanswer，itbeingalwaysborneinmindthatthepresentargumentdoesnotaim。atprovinganexactcoincidencebetweenUtilitarianinferencesandtheintuitionsofCommonSense，butratherseekstorepresentthelatterasinchoatelyandimperfectlyUtilitarian。
Inthefirstplace，wemustcarefullydistinguishbetweentherecognitionofgoodnessindispositions，andtherecognitionofrightnessinconduct。AnactthataUtilitarianmustcondemnaslikelytodomoreharmthangoodmayyetshowadispositionortendencythatwillonthewholeproducemoregoodthanharm。Thisiseminentlythecasewithscrupulouslyconscientiousacts。Howevertrueitmaybethatunenlightenedconscientiousnesshasimpelledmentofanaticalcruelty，mistakenasceticism，andotherinfelicificconduct，IsupposenoIntuitionistwouldmaintainthatcarefulnessinconformingtoacceptedmoralruleshasnot，onthewhole，atendencytopromotehappiness。Itmaybeobserved，however，thatwhenweperceivetheeffectsofadispositiongenerallyfelicifictobeinanyparticularcaseadversetohappiness，weoftenapplytoit，assooperating，sometermofcondemnation:thuswespeak，inthecaseabovenoticed，of`over-scrupulousness’or`fanaticism’。Butinsofarasweperceivethatthesamedispositionwouldgenerallyproducegoodresults，itisnotinconsistentstilltoregardit，abstractingfromtheparticularcase，asagoodelementofcharacter。Secondly，although，intheviewofaUtilitarian，onlytheusefulispraiseworthy，heisnotboundtomaintainthatitisnecessarilyworthyofpraiseinproportionasitisuseful。
FromaUtilitarianpointofview，ashasbeenbeforesaid，wemustmeanbycallingaquality`deservingofpraise’，thatitisexpedienttopraiseit，withaviewtoitsfutureproduction:accordingly，indistributingourpraiseofhumanqualities，onutilitarianprinciples，wehavetoconsiderprimarilynottheusefulnessofthequality，buttheusefulnessofthepraise:anditisobviouslynotexpedienttoencouragebypraisequalitieswhicharelikelytobefoundinexcessratherthanindefect。Hence(e。g。)
howevernecessaryself-loveorresentmentmaybetosociety，itisquiteinharmonywithUtilitarianismthattheyshouldnotberecognisedasvirtuesbyCommonSense，insofarasitisreasonablythoughtthattheywillalwaysbefoundoperatingwithatleastsufficientintensity。Wefind，however，thatwhenself-lovecomesintoconflictwithimpulsesseentobeonthewholepernicious，itispraisedasPrudence:andthatwhenamanseemsclearlydeficientinresentment，heiscensuredfortameness:thoughasmalevolentimpulsesaremuchmoreobviouslyproductiveofpainthanpleasure，itisnotunnaturalthattheiroccasionalutilityshouldbesomewhatoverlooked。
ThecaseofHumilityandDiffidencemaybetreatedinasomewhatsimilarway。Aswesaw，itisonlyinadvertentlythatCommonSensepraisesthetendencytounderrateone’sownpowers:onreflectionitisgenerallyadmittedthatitcannotbegoodtobeinerroronthisoranyotherpoint。ButthedesiresofSuperiorityandEsteemaresostronginmostmen，thatarroganceandself-assertionarebothmuchcommonerthantheoppositedefects，andatthesametimearefaultspeculiarlydisagreeabletoothers:sothathumilitygivesusanagreeablesurprise，andhenceCommonSenseiseasilyledtooverlookthemorelatentandremotebadconsequencesofundueself-distrust。
WemayobservefurtherthattheperplexitywhichweseemedtofindintheMoralityofCommonSense，astotherelationofmoralexcellencetomoraleffort，issatisfactorilyexplainedandremovedwhenweadoptaUtilitarianpointofview:forontheonehanditiseasytoseehowcertainacts——suchaskindservices——arelikelytobemorefelicificwhenperformedwithouteffort，andfromothermotivesthanregardforduty:whileontheotherhandapersonwhoindoingsimilaractsachievesatriumphofdutyoverstrongseductiveinclinations，exhibitstherebyacharacterwhichwerecogniseasfelicificinamoregeneralway，astendingtoageneralperformanceofdutyinalldepartments。Soagain，thereisasimpleandobviousutilitariansolutionofanotherdifficultywhichI
