ofreason。Butgrantingtheallegeddifference，Idonotseethatitconstitutesanargumentagainsttheviewheremaintained，sincetheindividualisessentiallyandfundamentallydifferentfromthelargerwhole——theuniverseofsentientbeings——ofwhichheisconsciousofbeingapart；justbecausehehasaknownrelationtosimilarpartsofthesamewhole，whilethewholeitselfhasnosuchrelation。Iaccordinglyseenoinconsistencyinholdingthatwhileitwouldbereasonablefortheaggregateofsentientbeings，ifitcouldactcollectively，toaimatitsownhappinessonlyasanultimateend——andwouldbereasonableforanyindividualtodothesame，ifheweretheonlysentientbeingintheuniverse——itmayyetbeactuallyreasonableforanindividualtosacrificehisownGoodorhappinessforthegreaterhappinessofothers。
AtthesametimeIadmitthat，intheearlierageofethicalthoughtwhichGreekphilosophyrepresents，mensometimesjudgedanacttobe`good’fortheagent，evenwhilerecognisingthatitsconsequenceswouldbeonthewholepainfultohim，——as(e。g。)aheroicexchangeofalifefullofhappinessforapainfuldeathatthecallofduty。Iattributethispartlytoaconfusionofthoughtbetweenwhatitisreasonableforanindividualtodesire，whenheconsidershisownexistencealone，andwhathemustrecogniseasreasonablytobedesired，whenhetakesthepointofviewofalargerwhole:partly，again，toafaithdeeplyrootedinthemoralconsciousnessofmankind，thattherecannotbereallyandultimatelyanyconflictbetweenthetwokindsofreasonableness。Butwhen`ReasonableSelf-love’hasbeenclearlydistinguishedfromConscience，asitisbyButlerandhisfollowers，wefinditisnaturallyunderstoodtomeandesireforone’sownHappiness:sothatinfacttheinterpretationof`one’sowngood’，whichwasalmostpeculiarinancientthoughttotheCyrenaicandEpicureanheresies，isadoptedbysomeofthemostorthodoxofmodernmoralists。
Indeeditoftendoesnotseemtohaveoccurredtotheselatterthatthisnotioncanhaveanyotherinterpretation。[4]If，then，whenanyonehypotheticallyconcentrateshisattentiononhimself，GoodisnaturallyandalmostinevitablyconceivedtobePleasure，wemayreasonablyconcludethattheGoodofanynumberofsimilarbeings，whatevertheirmutualrelationsmaybe，cannotbeessentiallydifferentinquality。
IV。Butlastly，fromtheuniversalpointofviewnolessthanfromthatoftheindividual，itseemstruethatHappinessislikelytobebetterattainediftheextenttowhichwesetourselvesconsciouslytoaimatitbecarefullyrestricted。Andthisnotonlybecauseactionislikelytobemoreeffectiveifoureffortistemporarilyconcentratedontherealisationofmorelimitedends——thoughthisisnodoubtanimportantreason:——butalsobecausethefullestdevelopmentofhappylifeforeachindividualseemstorequirethatheshouldhaveotherexternalobjectsofinterestbesidesthehappinessofotherconsciousbeings。Andthuswemayconcludethatthepursuitoftheidealobjectsbeforementioned，Virtue，Truth，Freedom，Beauty，etc。，fortheirownsakes，isindirectlyandsecondarily，thoughnotprimarilyandabsolutely，rational；onaccountnotonlyofthehappinessthatwillresultfromtheirattainment，butalsoofthatwhichspringsfromtheirdisinterestedpursuit。Whileyetifweaskforafinalcriterionofthecomparativevalueofthedifferentobjectsofmen’senthusiasticpursuit，andofthelimitswithinwhicheachmaylegitimatelyengrosstheattentionofmankind，weshallnonethelessconceiveittodependuponthedegreeinwhichtheyrespectivelyconducetoHappiness。
If，however，thisviewberejected，itremainstoconsiderwhetherwecanframeanyothercoherentaccountofUltimateGood。IfwearenottosystematisehumanactivitiesbytakingUniversalHappinessastheircommonend，onwhatotherprinciplesarewetosystematisethem？Itshouldbeobservedthattheseprinciplesmustnotonlyenableustocompareamongthemselvesthevaluesofthedifferentnon-hedonisticendswhichwehavebeenconsidering，butmustalsoprovideacommonstandardforcomparingthesevalueswiththatofHappiness；unlesswearepreparedtoadopttheparadoxicalpositionofrejectinghappinessasabsolutelyvalueless。ForwehaveapracticalneedofdeterminingnotonlywhetherweshouldpursueTruthratherthanBeauty，orFreedomorsomeidealconstitutionofsocietyratherthaneither，orperhapsdesertalloftheseforthelifeofworshipandreligiouscontemplation；butalsobowfarweshouldfollowanyoftheselinesofendeavour，whenweforeseeamongitsconsequencesthepainsofhumanorothersentientbeings，oreventhelossofpleasuresthatmightotherwisehavebeenenjoyedbythem。
Ihavefailedtofind——andamunabletoconstruct——anysystematicanswertothisquestionthatappearstomedeservingofseriousconsideration:andhenceIamfinallyledtotheconclusion(whichatthecloseofthelastchapterseemedtobepremature)
thattheIntuitionalmethodrigorouslyappliedyieldsasitsfinalresultthedoctrineofpureUniversalisticHedonism，——whichitisconvenienttodenotebythesingleword，Utilitarianism。
ThetermUtilitarianismis，atthepresentday，incommonuse，andissupposedtodesignateadoctrineormethodwithwhichweareallfamiliar。Butoncloserexamination，itappearstobeappliedtoseveraldistincttheories，havingnonecessaryconnexionwithoneanother，andnotevenreferringtothesamesubject-matter。Itwillbewell，therefore，todefine，ascarefullyaspossible，thedoctrinethatistobedenotedbytheterminthepresentBook:atthesametimedistinguishingthisfromotherdoctrinestowhichusagewouldallowthenametobeapplied，andindicating，sofarasseemsnecessary，itsrelationtothese。
ByUtilitarianismisheremeanttheethicaltheory，thattheconductwhich，underanygivencircumstances，isobjectivelyright，isthatwhichwillproducethegreatestamountofhappinessonthewhole；
thatis，takingintoaccountallwhosehappinessisaffectedbytheconduct。
Itwouldtendtoclearnessifwemightcallthisprinciple，andthemethodbaseduponit，bysomesuchnameas``UniversalisticHedonism’’；andI
havethereforesometimesventuredtousethisterm，inspiteofitscumbrousness。
Thefirstdoctrinefromwhichitseemsnecessarytodistinguishthis，istheEgoisticHedonismexpoundedanddiscussedinBookii。ofthistreatise。Thedifference，however，betweenthepropositions(1)thateachoughttoseekhisownhappiness，and(2)thateachoughttoseekthehappinessofall，issoobviousandglaring，thatinsteadofdwellinguponitweseemrathercalledupontoexplainhowthetwoevercametobeconfounded，orinanywayincludedunderonenotion。Thisquestionandthegeneralrelationbetweenthetwodoctrineswerebrieflydiscussedinaformerchapter。Amongotherpointsitwastherenoticedthattheconfusionbetweenthesetwoethicaltheorieswaspartlyassistedbytheconfusionwithbothofthepsychologicaltheorythatinvoluntaryactionseveryagentdoes，universallyornormally，seekhisownindividualhappinessorpleasure。Nowthereseemstobenonecessaryconnexionbetweenthislatterpropositionandanyethicaltheory:butinsofarasthereisanaturaltendencytopassfrompsychologicaltoethicalHedonism，thetransitionmustbe——atleastprimarily——totheEgoisticphaseofthelatter。Forclearly，fromthefactthateveryoneactuallydoesseekhisownhappinesswecannotconclude，asanimmediateandobviousinference，thatheoughttoseekthehappinessofotherpeople。
Nor，again，isUtilitarianism，asanethicaldoctrine，necessarilyconnectedwiththepsychologicaltheorythatthemoralsentimentsarederived，by``associationofideas’’orotherwise，fromexperiencesofthenon-moralpleasuresandpainsresultingtotheagentortoothersfromdifferentkindsofconduct。AnIntuitionistmightacceptthistheory，sofarasitiscapableofscientificproof，andstillholdthatthesemoralsentiments，beingfoundinourpresentconsciousnessasindependentimpulses，oughttopossesstheauthoritythattheyseemtoclaimoverthemoreprimarydesiresandaversionsfromwhichtheyhavesprung:andanEgoistontheotherhandmightfullyadmitthealtruisticelementofthederivation，andstillholdthattheseandallotherimpulses(includingevenUniversalBenevolence)areproperlyundertheruleofRationalSelf-love:andthatitisreallyonlyreasonabletogratifytheminsofaraswemayexpecttofindourprivatehappinessinsuchgratification。
Inshort，whatisoftencalledthe``utilitarian’’theoryoftheoriginofthemoralsentimentscannotbyitselfprovideaproofoftheethicaldoctrinetowhichIinthistreatiserestrictthetermUtilitarianism。
Ishall，however，hereaftertrytoshowthatthispsychologicaltheoryhasanimportantthoughsubordinateplaceintheestablishmentofEthicalUtilitarianism。
Finally，thedoctrinethatUniversalHappinessistheultimatestandardmustnotbeunderstoodtoimplythatUniversalBenevolenceistheonlyrightoralwaysbestmotiveofaction。For，aswehavebeforeobserved，itisnotnecessarythattheendwhichgivesthecriterionofrightnessshouldalwaysbetheendatwhichweconsciouslyaim:andifexperienceshowsthatthegeneralhappinesswillbemoresatisfactorilyattainedifmenfrequentlyactfromothermotivesthanpureuniversalphilanthropy，itisobviousthattheseothermotivesarereasonablytobepreferredonUtilitarianprinciples。
Letusnowexaminetheprincipleitselfsomewhatcloser。Ihavealreadyattempted(Bookii。chap。i。)torenderthenotionofGreatestHappinessasclearanddefiniteaspossible；andtheresultsthereobtainedareofcourseasapplicabletothediscussionofUniversalisticastothatofEgoisticHedonism。Weshallunderstand，then，thatbyGreatestHappinessismeantthegreatestpossiblesurplusofpleasureoverpain，thepainbeingconceivedasbalancedagainstanequalamountofpleasure，sothatthetwocontrastedamountsannihilateeachotherforpurposesofethicalcalculation。Andofcourse，hereasbefore，theassumptionisinvolvedthatallpleasuresincludedinourcalculationarecapableofbeingcomparedquantitativelywithoneanotherandwithallpains；thateverysuchfeelinghasacertainintensivequantity，positiveornegative(or，perhaps，zero)，inrespectofitsdesirableness，andthatthisquantitymaybetosomeextentknown:sothateachmaybeatleastroughlyweighedinidealscalesagainstanyother。ThisassumptionisinvolvedintheverynotionofMaximumHappiness；astheattempttomake`asgreataspossible’asumofelementsnotquantitativelycommensurablewouldbeamathematicalabsurdity。Thereforewhateverweightistobeattachedtotheobjectionsbroughtagainstthisassumption(whichwasdiscussedinchap。iii。ofBookii。)mustofcoursetellagainstthepresentmethod。
Wehavenexttoconsiderwhothe``all’’are，whosehappinessistobetakenintoaccount。Arewetoextendourconcerntoallthebeingscapableofpleasureandpainwhosefeelingsareaffectedbyourconduct？orarewetoconfineourviewtohumanhappiness？TheformerviewistheoneadoptedbyBenthamandMill，and(Ibelieve)bytheUtilitarianschoolgenerally:andisobviouslymostinaccordancewiththeuniversalitythatischaracteristicoftheirprinciple。ItistheGoodUniversal，interpretedanddefinedas`happiness’or`pleasure，’atwhichaUtilitarianconsidersithisdutytoaim:anditseemsarbitraryandunreasonabletoexcludefromtheend，assoconceived，anypleasureofanysentientbeing。
Itmaybesaidthatbygivingthisextensiontothenotion，weconsiderablyincreasethescientificdifficultiesofthehedonisticcomparison，whichhavealreadybeenpointedout(Bookii。chap。iii。):forifitbedifficulttocomparethepleasuresandpainsofothermenaccuratelywithourown，acomparisonofeitherwiththepleasuresandpainsofbrutesisobviouslystillmoreobscure。Still，thedifficultyisatleastnotgreaterforUtilitariansthanitisforanyothermoralistswhorecoilfromtheparadoxofdisregardingaltogetherthepleasuresandpainsofbrutes。Butevenifwelimitourattentiontohumanbeings，theextentofthesubjectsofhappinessisnotyetquitedeterminate。Inthefirstplace，itmaybeasked，Howfarwearetoconsidertheinterestsofposteritywhentheyseemtoconflictwiththoseofexistinghumanbeings？
Itseems，however，clearthatthetimeatwhichamanexistscannotaffectthevalueofhishappinessfromauniversalpointofview；andthattheinterestsofposteritymustconcernaUtilitarianasmuchasthoseofhiscontemporaries，exceptinsofarastheeffectofhisactionsonposterity——andeventheexistenceofhumanbeingstobeaffected——mustnecessarilybemoreuncertain。Butafurtherquestionariseswhenweconsiderthatwecantosomeextentinfluencethenumberoffuturehuman(orsentient)beings。
