Nor，Iconceive，canthisargumentbeevadedbyadoptingtheviewofwhatIhavecalled`Æ；stheticIntuitionism’andregardingVirtuesasexcellencesofconductclearlydiscerniblebytrainedinsight，althoughtheirnaturedoesnotadmitofbeingstatedindefiniteformulæ；。Forournotionsofspecialvirtuesdonotreallybecomemoreindependentbybecomingmoreindefinite:theystillcontain，thoughperhapsmorelatently，thesamereferenceto`Good’or`Wellbeing’asanultimatestandard。Thisappearsclearlywhenweconsideranyvirtueinrelationtothecognatevice——oratleastnon-virtue——intowhichittendstopassoverwhenpushedtoanextremeorexhibitedunderinappropriateconditions。Forexample，CommonSensemayseemtoregardLiberality，Frugality，Courage，Placability，asintrinsicallydesirable:butwhenweconsidertheirrelationrespectivelytoProfusion，Meanness，Foolhardiness，Weakness，wefindthatCommonSensedrawsthelineineachcasenotbyimmediateintuition，butbyreferenceeithertosomedefinitemaximofduty，ortothegeneralnotionof`Good’orWellbeing:andsimilarlywhenweaskatwhatpointCandour，Generosity，Humilityceasetobevirtuesbybecoming`excessive’。Otherqualitiescommonlyadmired，suchasEnergy，Zeal，Self-control，Thoughtfulness，areobviouslyregardedasvirtuesonlywhentheyaredirectedtogoodends。Inshort，theonlyso-calledVirtueswhichcanbethoughttobeessentiallyandalwayssuch，andincapableofexcess，aresuchqualitiesasWisdom，UniversalBenevolence，and(inasense)Justice；ofwhichthenotionsmanifestlyinvolvethisnotionofGood，supposedalreadydeterminate。
WisdomisinsightintoGoodandthemeanstoGood；Benevolenceisexhibitedinthepurposiveactionscalled``doingGood’’:Justice(whenregardedasessentiallyandalwaysaVirtue)liesindistributingGood(orevil)
impartiallyaccordingtorightrules。IfthenweareaskedwhatisthisGoodwhichitisexcellenttoknow，tobestowonothers，todistributeimpartially，itwouldbeobviouslyabsurdtoreplythatitisjustthisknowledge，thesebeneficentpurposes，thisimpartialdistribution。
Nor，again，canIperceivethatthisdifficultyisinanywaymetbyregardingVirtueasaqualityof``character’’ratherthanof``conduct’’，andexpressingthemorallawintheform，``Bethis’’，insteadoftheform``Dothis’’。[2]Fromapracticalpointofview，indeed，Ifullyrecognisetheimportanceofurgingthatmenshouldaimatanidealofcharacter，andconsideractioninitseffectsoncharacter。ButIcannotinferfromthisthatcharacteranditselements——faculties，habits，ordispositionsofanykind——aretheconstituentsofUltimateGood。Itseemstomethattheoppositeisimpliedintheveryconceptionofafacultyordisposition；itcanonlybedefinedasatendencytoactorfeelinacertainwayundercertainconditions；andsuchatendencyappearstomeclearlynotvaluableinitselfbutfortheactsandfeelingsinwhichittakeseffect，orfortheulteriorconsequencesofthese，——whichconsequences，again，cannotberegardedasUltimateGood，solongastheyaremerelyconceivedasmodificationsoffaculties，dispositions，etc。
When，therefore，Isaythateffectsoncharacterareimportant，itisasummarywayofsayingthatbythelawsofourmentalconstitutionthepresentactorfeelingisacausetendingtomodifyimportantlyouractsandfeelingsintheindefinitefuture:thecomparativelypermanentresultsupposedtobeproducedinthemindorsoul，beingatendencythatwillshowitselfinanindefinitenumberofparticularactsandfeelings，mayeasilybemoreimportant，inrelationtotheultimateend，thanasingleactorthetransientfeelingofasinglemoment:butitscomparativepermanenceappearstomenogroundforregardingitasitselfaconstituentofultimategood。
Sofar，however，Ihavebeenspeakingonlyofparticularvirtues，asexhibitedinconductjudgedtobeobjectivelyright:anditmaybearguedthatthisistooexternalaviewoftheVirtuethatclaimstoconstituteUltimateGood。ItmaybesaidthatthedifficultythatIhavebeenurgingvanishesifwepenetratebeyondtheparticularvirtuestotherootandessenceofvirtueingeneral，——thedeterminationofthewilltodowhateverisjudgedtoberightandtoaimatrealisingwhateverisjudgedtobebest——；sincethissubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofwill，beingindependentofknowledgeofwhatisobjectivelyrightorgood，isindependentofthatpresuppositionofGoodasalreadyknownanddetermined，whichwehaveseentobeimpliedinthecommonconceptionsofvirtueasmanifestedinoutwardacts。IadmitthatifsubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofWillisaffirmedtobetheUltimateGood，theaffirmationdoesnotexactlyinvolvethelogicaldifficultythatIhavebeenurging。
NonethelessisitfundamentallyopposedtoCommonSense；sincetheverynotionofsubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofwillimpliesanobjectivestandard，whichitdirectsustoseek，butdoesnotprofesstosupply。
Itwouldbeapalpableandviolentparadoxtosetbeforetheright-seekingmindnoendexceptthisright-seekingitself，andtoaffirmthistobethesoleUltimateGood，denyingthatanyeffectsofrightvolitioncanbeinthemselvesgood，exceptthesubjectiverightnessoffuturevolitions，whetherofselforofothers。Itistruethatnorulecanberecognised，byanyreasonableindividual，asmoreauthoritativethantheruleofdoingwhathejudgestoberight——for，indeliberatingwithaviewtomyownimmediateaction，Icannotdistinguishbetweendoingwhatisobjectivelyright，andrealisingmyownsubjectiveconceptionofrightness。Butwearecontinuallyforcedtomakethedistinctionasregardstheactionsofothersandtojudgethatconductmaybeobjectivelywrongthoughsubjectivelyright:andwecontinuallyjudgeconducttobeobjectivelywrongbecauseittendstocausepainandlossofhappinesstoothers，——apartfromanyeffectonthesubjectiverightnessoftheirvolitions。Itisassojudgingthatwecommonlyrecognisethemischiefanddangeroffanaticism:meaningbyafanaticamanwhoresolutelyandunswervinglycarriesouthisownconceptionofrightness，whenitisaplainlymistakenconception。
Thesameresultmaybereachedevenwithoutsupposingsopalpableadivorcebetweensubjectiveandobjectiverightnessofvolitionasisimpliedinthenotionoffanaticism。AsIhavealreadypointedout，thoughthe`dictatesofReason’arealwaystobeobeyed，itdoesnotfollowthat`thedictationofReason’——thepredominanceofconsciouslymoralovernon-moralmotives——istobepromotedwithoutlimits；
andindeedCommonSenseappearstoholdthatsomethingsarelikelytobebetterdone，iftheyaredonefromothermotivesthanconsciousobediencetopracticalReasonorConscience。ItthusbecomesapracticalquestionhowfarthedictationofReason，thepredominanceofmoralchoiceandmoraleffortinhumanlife，isaresulttobeaimedat:andtheadmissionofthisquestionimpliesthatconsciousrightnessofvolitionisnotthesoleultimategood。Onthewhole，then，wemayconcludethatneither(1)subjectiverightnessorgoodnessofvolition，asdistinctfromobjective，nor(2)
virtuouscharacter，exceptasmanifestedorrealisedinvirtuousconduct，canberegardedasconstitutingUltimateGood:while，again，weareprecludedfromidentifyingUltimateGoodwithvirtuousconduct，becauseourconceptionsofvirtuousconduct，underthedifferentheadsoraspectsdenotedbythenamesoftheparticularvirtues，havebeenfoundtopresupposethepriordeterminationofthenotionofGood——thatGoodwhichvirtuousconductisconceivedasproducingorpromotingorrightlydistributing。
AndwhathasbeensaidofVirtue，seemstomestillmoremanifestlytrueoftheothertalents，gifts，andgraceswhichmakeupthecommonnotionofhumanexcellenceorPerfection。Howeverimmediatelytheexcellentqualityofsuchgiftsandskillsmayberecognisedandadmired，reflectionshowsthattheyareonlyvaluableonaccountofthegoodordesirableconsciouslifeinwhichtheyareorwillbeactualised，orwhichwillbesomehowpromotedbytheirexercise。
ShallwethensaythatUltimateGoodisGoodorDesirableconsciousorsentientLife——ofwhichVirtuousactionisoneelement，butnotthesoleconstituent？ThisseemsinharmonywithCommonSense；andthefactthatparticularvirtuesandtalentsandgiftsarelargelyvaluedasmeanstoulteriorgooddoesnotnecessarilypreventusfromregardingtheirexerciseasalsoanelementofUltimateGood:justasthefactthatphysicalaction，nutrition，andrepose，dulyproportionedandcombined，aremeanstothemaintenanceofouranimallife，doesnotpreventusfromregardingthemasindispensableelementsofsuchlife。Stillitseemsdifficulttoconceiveanykindofactivityorprocessasbothmeansandend，frompreciselythesamepointofviewandinrespectofpreciselythesamequality:
andinboththecasesabovementioneditis，Ithink，easytodistinguishtheaspectinwhichtheactivitiesorprocessesinquestionaretoberegardedasmeansfromthatinwhichtheyaretoberegardedasinthemselvesgoodordesirable。Letusexaminethisfirstinthecaseofthephysicalprocesses。
Itisintheirpurelyphysicalaspect，ascomplexprocessesofcorporealchange，thattheyaremeanstothemaintenanceoflife:butsolongasweconfineourattentiontotheircorporealaspect，——regardingthemmerelyascomplexmovementsofcertainparticlesoforganisedmatter——itseemsimpossibletoattributetothesemovements，consideredinthemselves，eithergoodnessorbadness。Icannotconceiveittobeanultimateendofrationalactiontosecurethatthesecomplexmovementsshouldbeofonekindratherthananother，orthattheyshouldbecontinuedforalongerratherthanashorterperiod。Inshort，ifacertainqualityofhumanLifeisthatwhichisultimatelydesirable，itmustbelongtohumanLiferegardedonitspsychicalside，or，briefly，Consciousness。
Butagain:itisnotallliferegardedonitspsychicalsidewhichwecanjudgetobeultimatelydesirable:sincepsychicallifeasknowntousincludespainaswellaspleasure，andsofarasitispainfulitisnotdesirable。Icannotthereforeacceptaviewofthewellbeingorwelfareofhumanbeings——asofotherlivingthings——whichissuggestedbycurrentzoologicalconceptionsandapparentlymaintainedwithmoreorlessdefinitenessbyinfluentialwriters；accordingtowhich，whenweattributegoodnessorbadnesstothemannerofexistenceofanylivingorganism，weshouldbeunderstoodtoattributetoitatendencyeither(1)toself-preservation，or(2)tothepreservationofthecommunityorracetowhichitbelongs——sothatwhat``Wellbeing’’addstomere``Being’’isjustpromiseoffuturebeing。Itappearstomethatthisdoctrineneedsonlytobedistinctlycontemplatedinordertoberejected。Ifalllifewereaslittledesirableassomeportionsofithavebeen，inmyownexperienceandinthat(Ibelieve)
ofallormostmen，Ishouldjudgealltendencytothepreservationofittobeunmitigatedlybad。Actually，nodoubt，aswegenerallyholdthathumanlife，evenasnowlived，hasontheaverage，abalanceofhappiness，weregardwhatispreservativeoflifeasgenerallygood，andwhatisdestructiveoflifeasbad:andIquiteadmitthatamostfundamentallyimportantpartofthefunctionofmoralityconsistsinmaintainingsuchhabitsandsentimentsasarenecessarytothecontinuedexistence，infullnumbers，ofasocietyofhumanbeingsundertheiractualconditionsoflife。Butthisisnotbecausethemereexistenceofhumanorganisms，evenifprolongedtoeternity，appearstomeinanywaydesirable；itisonlyassumedtobesobecauseitissupposedtobeaccompaniedbyConsciousnessonthewholedesirable；
itisthereforethisDesirableConsciousnesswhichwemustregardasultimateGood。
Inthesameway，sofaraswejudgevirtuousactivitytobepartofUltimateGood，itis，Iconceive，becausetheconsciousnessattendingitisjudgedtobeinitselfdesirableforthevirtuousagent；
thoughatthesametimethisconsiderationdoesnotadequatelyrepresenttheimportanceofVirtuetohumanwellbeing，sincewehavetoconsideritsvalueasameansaswellasitsvalueasanend。WemaymakethedistinctionclearerbyconsideringwhetherVirtuouslifewouldremainonthewholegoodforthevirtuousagent，ifwesupposeitcombinedwithextremepain。
TheaffirmativeanswertothisquestionwasstronglysupportedinGreekphilosophicaldiscussion:butitisaparadoxfromwhichamodernthinkerwouldrecoil:bewouldhardlyventuretoassertthattheportionoflifespentbyamartyrintortureswasinitselfdesirable，——thoughitmightbehisdutytosufferthepainwithaviewtothegoodofothers，andevenhisinteresttosufferitwithaviewtohisownultimatehappiness。
