Amonglatermoralists，Kantisespeciallynotedforhisrigourinseparatingthepurelyrationalelementofthemoralcode:andhisethicalviewalsoappearstometocoincidetoaconsiderableextent，ifnotcompletely，withthatsetforthintheprecedingsection。Ihavealreadynoticedthathisfundamentalprincipleofdutyisthe`formal’ruleof``actingonamaximthatonecanwilltobelawuniversal’’；which，dulyrestricted，isanimmediatepracticalcorollaryfromtheprinciplethatIfirstnoticedintheprecedingsection。Andwefindthatwhenhecomestoconsidertheendsatwhichvirtuousactionisaimed，theonlyreallyultimateendwhichhelaysdownistheobjectofRationalBenevolenceascommonlyconceived——thehappinessofothermen。[7]Heregardsitasevidentapriorithateachmanasarationalagentisboundtoaimatthehappinessofothermen:indeed，inhisview，itcanonlybestatedasadutyformetoseekmyownhappinesssofarasIconsideritasapartofthehappinessofmankindingeneral。Idisagreewiththenegativesideofthisstatement，asIholdwithButlerthat``one’sownhappinessisamanifestobligation’’
independentlyofone’srelationtoothermen；but，regardedonitspositiveside，Kant’sconclusionappearstoagreetoagreatextentwiththeviewofthedutyofRationalBenevolencethatIhavegiven:——thoughIamnotaltogetherabletoassenttotheargumentsbywhichKantarrivesathisconclusion。
1mustnowpointout——ifithasnotlongbeenapparenttothereader——thattheself-evidentprincipleslaiddownin§；3donotspeciallybelongtoIntuitionisminthe，restrictedsensewhich，forcleardistinctionofmethods，Igavetothistermattheoutsetofourinvestigation。TheaxiomofPrudence，asIhavegivenit，isaself-evidentprinciple，impliedinRationalEgoismascommonlyaccepted。
Again，theaxiomofJusticeorEquityasabovestated——`thatsimilarcasesoughttobetreatedsimilarly’——belongsinallitsapplicationstoUtilitarianismasmuchastoanysystemcommonlycalledIntuitional:whiletheaxiomofRationalBenevolenceis，inmyview，requiredasarationalbasisfortheUtilitariansystem。
Accordingly，IfindthatIarrive，inmysearchforreallyclearandcertainethicalintuitions，atthefundamentalprincipleofUtilitarianism。Imust，however，admitthatthethinkerswhoinrecenttimeshavetaughtthislattersystem，havenot，forthemostpart，expresslytriedtoexhibitthetruthoftheirfirstprinciplebymeansofanysuchprocedureasthatabovegiven。Still，whenIexaminethe``proof’’ofthe``principleofUtility’’presentedbythemostpersuasiveandprobablythemostinfluentialamongEnglishexpositorsofUtilitarianism，——J。S。
Mill，——Ifindtheneedofsomesuchproceduretocompletetheargumentveryplainandpalpable。
Millbeginsbyexplainingthatthough``questionsofultimateendsarenotamenable’’
to``proofintheordinaryandpopularmeaningoftheterm’’，thereisalargermeaningofthewordproof’’inwhichtheyareamenabletoit。
Thesubject’’，hesays，is``withinthecognisanceoftherationalfaculty？onsiderationsmaybepresentedcapableofdeterminingtheintellecttoaccept’’theUtilitarianformula。HesubsequentlymakesclearthatbyacceptanceoftheUtilitarianformula’’hemeanstheacceptance，notoftheagent’sowngreatesthappiness，butof``thegreatestamountofhappinessaltogether’’astheultimate``endofhumanaction’’and``standardofmorality’’:topromotewhichis，intheUtilitarianview，thesupremedirectiveruleofhumanconduct’’。Thenwhenhecomestogivetheproof’’——inthelargersensebeforeexplained——ofthisruleorformula，heoffersthefollowingargument。``Thesoleevidenceitispossibletoproducethatanythingisdesirable，isthatpeopledoactuallydesireit？Noreasoncanbegivenwhythegeneralhappinessisdesirable，exceptthateachperson，sofarashebelievesittobeattainable，desireshisownhappiness。This，however，beingafact，wehavenotonlyalltheproofwhichthecaseadmitsof，butallwhichitispossibletorequire，thathappinessisagood:
thateachperson’shappinessisagoodtothatperson，andthegeneralhappiness，therefore，agoodtotheaggregateofpersons。’’[2]Hethengoesontoarguethatpleasure，andpleasurealone，iswhatallmenactuallydodesire。
Now，aswehaveseen，itisasa``standardofrightandwrong’’，or``directiveruleofconduct’’，thattheutilitarianprincipleisputforwardbyMill:hence，ingivingasastatementofthisprinciplethat``thegeneralhappinessisdesirable’’，hemustbeunderstoodtomean(andhiswholetreatiseshowsthathedoesmean)thatitiswhateachindividualoughttodesire，oratleast——inthestrictersenseof`ought’——toaimatrealisinginaction。ButthispropositionisnotestablishedbyMill’sreasoning，evenifwegrantthatwhatisactuallydesiredmaybelegitimatelyinferredtobeinthissensedesirable。Foranaggregateofactualdesires，eachdirectedtowardsadifferentpartofthegeneralhappiness，doesnotconstituteanactualdesireforthegeneralhappiness，existinginanyindividual；andMillwouldcertainlynotcontendthatadesirewhichdoesnotexistinanyindividualcanpossiblyexistinanaggregateofindividuals。Therebeingthereforenoactualdesire——sofarasthisreasoninggoes——forthegeneralhappiness，thepropositionthatthegeneralhappinessisdesirablecannotbeinthiswayestablished:sothatthereisagapintheexpressedargument，whichcan，Ithink，onlybefilledbysomesuchpropositionasthatwhichIhaveabovetriedtoexhibitastheintuitionofRationalBenevolence。
UtilitarianismisthuspresentedasthefinalformintowhichIntuitionismtendstopass，whenthedemandforreallyself-evidentfirstprinciplesisrigorouslypressed。Inorder，however，tomakethistransitionlogicallycomplete，werequiretointerpret`UniversalGood’as`UniversalHappiness’。Andthisinterpretationcannot，inmyview，bejustifiedbyarguing，asMilldoes，fromthepsychologicalfactthatHappinessisthesoleobjectofmen’sactualdesires，totheethicalconclusionthatitaloneisdesirableorgood；becauseinBooki。chap。iv。ofthistreatiseIhaveattemptedtoshowthatHappinessorPleasureisnottheonlyobjectthateachforhimselfactuallydesires。
TheidentificationofUltimateGoodwithHappinessisproperlytobereached，Ithink，byamoreindirectmodeofreasoning；whichIwillendeavourtoexplaininthenextChapter。{Note。}
MEBook3Chapter13Section5Note5
ThegreatinfluenceatpresentexercisedbyKant’steachingmakesitworthwhiletostatebrieflytheargumentsbywhichheattemptstoestablishthedutyofpromotingthehappinessofothers，andthereasonswhyIamunabletoregardtheseargumentsascogent。
Insomepassagesheattemptstoexhibitthisdutyasanimmediatedeductionfromhisfundamentalformula——``actfromamaximthatthoucanstwilltobeuniversallaw’’——whenconsideredincombinationwiththedesireforthekindservicesofotherswhich(asheassumes)theexigenciesoflifemustarouseineveryman。Themaxim，hesays，``thateachshouldbelefttotakecareofhimselfwithouteitheraidorinterference’’，isonethatwemightindeedconceiveexistingasauniversallaw:butitwouldbeimpossibleforustowillittobesuch。``Awillthatresolvedthiswouldbeinconsistentwithitself，formanycasesmayariseinwhichtheindividualthuswillingneedsthebenevolenceandsympathyofothers’’(Grundlegung，p。50[Rosenkrantz])。Similarlyelsewhere(Metaph。Anfangsgr。d。Tugendlehre，Einleit。§；8and§；30)
heexplainsatmorelengththattheSelf-lovewhichnecessarilyexistsineveryoneinvolvesthedesireofbeinglovedbyothersandreceivingaidfromthemincaseofneed。Wethusnecessarilyconstituteourselvesanendforothers，andclaimthattheyshallcontributetoourhappiness:
andso，accordingtoKant’sfundamentalprinciple，wemustrecognisethedutyofmakingtheirhappinessourend。
NowIcannotregardthisreasoningasstrictlycogent。Inthefirstplace，thateverymaninneedwishesfortheaidofothersisanempiricalpropositionwhichKantcannotknowapriori。Wecancertainlyconceiveamaninwhomthespiritofindependenceandthedistasteforincurringobligationswouldbesostrongthathewouldchoosetoendureanyprivationsratherthanreceiveaidfromothers。Butevengrantingthateveryone，intheactualmomentofdistress，mustnecessarilywishfortheassistanceofothers；stillastrongman，afterbalancingthechancesoflife，mayeasilythinkthatheandsuchashehavemoretogain，onthewhole，bythegeneraladoptionoftheegoisticmaxim；benevolencebeinglikelytobringthemmoretroublethanprofit。
Inotherpassages，however，Kantreachesthesameconclusionbyanapparentlydifferentlineofargument。Helaysdownthat，asallactionofrationalbeingsisdoneforsomeend，theremustbesomeabsoluteend，correspondingtotheabsoluterulebeforegiven，thatimposesonourmaximstheformofuniversallaw。Thisabsoluteend，prescribedbyReasonnecessarilyandaprioriforallrationalbeingsassuch，canbenothingbutReasonitself，ortheUniverseofRationals；forwhattheruleinculcatesis，infact，thatweshouldactasrationalunitsinauniverseofrationalbeings(andthereforeonprinciplesconceivedandembracedasuniversallyapplicable)。Oragain，wemayreachthesameresultnegatively。Forallparticularendsatwhichmenaimareconstitutedsuchbytheexistenceofimpulsesdirectedtowardssomeparticularobject。Nowwecannottellapriorithatanyoneofthesespecialimpulsesformspartoftheconstitutionofallmen:andthereforewecannotstateitasanabsolutedictateofReasonthatweshouldaimatanysuchspecialobject。If，then，wethusexcludeallparticularempiricalends，thereremainsonlytheprinciplethat``allRationalbeingsassuchareendstoeach’’:or，asKantsometimesputsit，that``humanityexistsasanendinitself’’。
Now，saysKant，solongasIconfinemyselftomerenon-interferencewithothers，IdonotpositivelymakeHumanitymyend；myaimsremainselfish，thoughrestrictedbythisconditionofnon-interferencewithothers。Myaction，therefore，isnottrulyvirtuous；forVirtueisexhibitedandconsistsintheefforttorealisetheendofReasoninoppositiontomereselfishimpulses。Therefore``theendsofthesubject，whichisitselfanend，mustofnecessitybemyends，iftherepresentationofHumanityasanendinitselfistohaveitsfullweightwithme’’(Grundlegung，p。
59)，andmyactionistobetrulyrationalandvirtuous。
Here，again，IcannotaccepttheformofKant’sargument，Theconceptionof``humanityasanendinitself’’isperplexing:becausebyanEndwecommonlymeansomethingtoberealised，whereas``humanity’’is，asKantsays，``aself-subsistentend’’:moreover，thereseemstobeasortofparalogisminthedeductionoftheprincipleofBenevolencebymeansofthisconception。ForthehumanitywhichKantmaintainstobeanendinitselfisMan(ortheaggregateofmen)insofarasrational。Butthesubjectiveendsofothermen，whichBenevolencedirectsustotakeasourownends，wouldseem，accordingtoKant’sownview，todependuponandcorrespondtotheirnon-rationalimpulses——theirempiricaldesiresandaversions。Itishardtoseewhy，ifmanasarationalbeingisanabsoluteendtootherrationalbeings，theymustthereforeadopthissubjectiveaimsasdeterminedbyhisnon-rationalimpulses，MEBook3AttheoutsetofthistreatiseInoticedthattherearetwoformsinwhichtheobjectofethicalinquiryisconsidered；itissometimesregardedasaRuleorRulesofConduct，`theRight’，sometimesasanendorends，`theGood’。IpointedoutthatinthemoralconsciousnessofmodernEuropethetwonotionsareprimafaciedistinct；sincewhileitiscommonlythoughtthattheobligationtoobeymoralrulesisabsolute，itisnotcommonlyheldthatthewholeGoodofmanliesinsuchobedience；thisview，wemaysay，is——vaguelyandrespectfullybutunmistakably——repudiatedasaStoicalparadox。TheultimateGoodorWellbeingofmanisratherregardedasanulteriorresult，theconnexionofwhichwithhisRightConductisindeedcommonlyheldtobecertain，butisfrequentlyconceivedassupernatural，andsobeyondtherangeofindependentethicalspeculation。Butnow，iftheconclusionsoftheprecedingchaptersaretobetrusted，itwouldseemthatthepracticaldeterminationofRightConductdependsonthedeterminationofUltimateGood。Forwehaveseen(a)thatmostofthecommonlyreceivedmaximsofDuty——evenofthosewhichatfirstsightappearabsoluteandindependent——arefoundwhencloselyexaminedtocontainanimplicitsubordinationtothemoregeneralprinciplesofPrudenceandBenevolence:and(b)thatnoprinciplesexceptthese，andtheformalprincipleofJusticeorEquitycanbeadmittedasatonceintuitivelyclearandcertain；while，again，theseprinciplesthemselves，sofarastheyareself-evident，maybestatedaspreceptstoseek(1)one’sowngoodonthewhole，repressingallseductiveimpulsespromptingtounduepreferenceofparticulargoods，and(2)others’
goodnolessthanone’sown，repressinganyunduepreferenceforoneindividualoveranother。ThuswearebroughtroundagaintotheoldquestionwithwhichethicalspeculationinEuropebegan，`WhatistheUltimateGoodforman？’——thoughnotintheegoisticforminwhichtheoldquestionwasraised。
When，however，weexaminethecontroversiestowhichthisquestionoriginallyled，weseethattheinvestigationwhichhasbroughtusroundtoithastendeddefinitelytoexcludeoneoftheanswerswhichearlymoralreflectionwasdisposedtogivetoit。Fortosaythat`GeneralGood’consistssolelyingeneralVirtue，——ifwemeanbyVirtueconformitytosuchprescriptionsandprohibitionsasmakeupthemainpartofthemoralityofCommonSense——wouldobviouslyinvolveusinalogicalcircle；sincewehaveseenthattheexactdeterminationoftheseprescriptionsandprohibitionsmustdependonthedefinitionofthisGeneralGood。
