Ithinkthatthoughthestrugglemightbeginasaduelbetweenresentmentandcompassion，orbetweenloveofeaseandloveofgain，itwouldnotbefoughtoutinthelistssodrawn；sincehighermotiveswouldinevitablybecalledinastheconflictwenton，regardforjusticeandsocialwell-beingonthesideofresentment，regardforhealthandultimateefficiencyforworkonthesideofloveofease；anditwouldbetheinterventionofthesehighermotivesthatwoulddecidethestruggle，sofarasitwasdecidedrightlyandasweshouldapprove。Thiscertainlyiswhatwouldhappeninmyowncase，ifthesupposedconflictwereatallseriousanditsdecisiondeliberate；andthisconstitutesmyfinalreasonforholdingthatsuchascaleasDr。Martineauhasdrawnup，ofmotivesarrangedaccordingtotheirmoralrank，canneverhavemorethanaverysubordinateethicalimportance。
Iadmitthatitmayservetoindicateinaroughandgeneralwaythekindsofdesireswhichitisordinarilybesttoencourageandindulge，incomparisonwithotherkindswhichareordinarilylikelytocompeteandcollidewiththem；andwemightthussettlesummarilysomeofthecomparativelytriflingconflictsofmotivewhichthevaryingandcomplexplayofneeds，habits，interests，andtheiraccompanyingemotions，continuallystirsinourdailylife。Butifaseriousquestionofconductisraised，Icannotconceivemyselfdecidingitmorallybyanycomparisonofmotivesbelowthehighest:
itseemstomethatthequestionmustinevitablybecarriedupfordecisionintothecourtofwhatevermotiveweregardassupremelyregulative:sothatthecomparisonultimatelydecisivewouldbenotbetweenthelowermotivesprimarilyconflicting，butbetweentheeffectsofthedifferentlinesofconducttowhichtheselowermotivesrespectivelyprompt，consideredinrelationtowhateverweregardastheultimateendorendsofreasonableaction。Andthis，Iconceive，willbethecoursenaturallytakenbythemoralreflectionnotonlyofutilitarians，butofallwhofollowButlerinregardingourpassionsandpropensionsasformingnaturallya``systemorconstitution’’，inwhichtheendsoflowerimpulsesaresubordinateasmeanstotheendsofcertaingoverningmotives，orarecomprehendedaspartsintheselargerends。
Isthere，then，nopossibilityofattaining，byamoreprofoundanddiscriminatingexaminationofourcommonmoralthought，torealethicalaxioms——intuitivepropositionsofrealclearnessandcertainty？
Thisquestionleadsustotheexaminationofthatthirdphaseoftheintuitivemethod，whichwascalledPhilosophicalIntuitionism。Forweconceiveitastheaimofaphilosopher，assuch，todosomewhatmorethandefineandformulatethecommonmoralopinionsofmankind。Hisfunctionistotellmenwhattheyoughttothink，ratherthanwhattheydothink:heisexpectedtotranscendCommonSenseinhispremises，andisallowedacertaindivergencefromCommonSenseinhisconclusions。Itistruethatthelimitsofthisdeviationarefirmly，thoughindefinitely，fixed:thetruthofaphilosopher’spremiseswillalwaysbetestedbytheacceptabilityofhisconclusions:ifinanyimportantpointhebefoundinflagrantconflictwithcommonopinion，hismethodislikelytobedeclaredinvalid。Still，thoughheisexpectedtoestablishandconcatenateatleastthemainpartofthecommonlyacceptedmoralrules，heisnotnecessarilyboundtotakethemasthebasisonwhichhisownsystemisconstructed。Rather，weshouldexpectthatthehistoryofMoralPhilosophy——sofaratleastasthosewhomwemaycallorthodoxthinkersareconcerned——wouldbeahistoryofattemptstoenunciate，infullbreadthandclearness，thoseprimaryintuitionsofReason，bythescientificapplicationofwhichthecommonmoralthoughtofmankindmaybeatoncesystematisedandcorrected。
Andthisistosomeextentthecase。ButMoralPhilosophy，orphilosophyasappliedtoMorality，hashadothertaskstooccupyit，evenmoreprofoundlydifficultthanthatofpenetratingtothefundamentalprinciplesofDuty。Inmoderntimesespecially，ithasadmittedthenecessityofdemonstratingtheharmonyofDutywithInterest；thatis，withtheHappinessorWelfareoftheagentonwhomthedutyineachcaseisimposed。IthasalsoundertakentodeterminetherelationofRightorGoodgenerallytotheworldofactualexistence:ataskwhichcouldhardlybesatisfactorilyaccomplishedwithoutanadequateexplanationoftheexistenceofEvil。Ithasfurtherbeendistractedbyquestionswhich，inmyview，areofpsychologicalratherthanethicalimportance，astothe`innateness’ofournotionsofDuty，andtheoriginofthefacultythatfurnishesthem。Withtheirattentionconcentratedonthesedifficultsubjects，eachofwhichhasbeenmixedupinvariouswayswiththediscussionoffundamentalmoralintuitions，philosophersharetooeasilybeenledtosatisfythemselveswithethicalformulaewhichimplicitlyacceptthemoralityofCommonSenseenbloc，ignoringitsdefects；andmerelyexpressacertainviewoftherelationofthismoralitytotheindividualmindortotheuniverseofactualexistence。Perhapsalsotheyhavebeenhamperedbythefear(not，aswehaveseen，unfounded)oflosingthesupportgivenby`generalassent’iftheysetbeforethemselvesandtheirreaderstoorigidastandardofscientificprecision。Still，inspiteofallthesedrawbacks，wefindthatphilosophershaveprovideduswithaconsiderablenumberofcomprehensivemoralpropositions，putforwardascertainandself-evident，andsuchasatfirstsightmayseemwelladaptedtoserveasthefirstprinciplesofscientificmorality。
Buthereawordofcautionseemsrequired，whichhasbeensomewhatanticipatedinearlierchapters，butonwhichitisparticularlyneedfultolaystressatthispointofourdiscussion:
againstacertainclassofsham-axioms，whichareveryapttoofferthemselvestothemindthatisearnestlyseekingforaphilosophicalsynthesisofpracticalrules，andtodeludetheunwarywithatemptingaspectofclearselfevidence。Theseareprincipleswhichappearcertainandself-evidentbecausetheyaresubstantiallytautological:because，whenexamined，theyarefoundtoaffirmnomorethanthatitisrighttodothatwhichis——inacertaindepartmentoflife，undercertaincircumstancesandconditions——righttobedone。Oneimportantlessonwhichthehistoryofmoralphilosophyteachesisthat，inthisregion，evenpowerfulintellectsareliabletoacquiesceintautologiesofthiskind；sometimesexpandedintocircularreasonings，sometimeshiddenintherecessesofanobscurenotion，oftenlyingsonearthesurfacethat，whenoncetheyhavebeenexposed，itishardtounderstandhowtheycouldeverhavepresentedthemselvesasimportant。
Letusturn，forillustration’ssake，tothetime-honouredCardinalVirtues。IfwearetoldthatthedictatesofWisdomandTemperancemaybesummedupinclearandcertainprinciples，andthatthesearerespectively，
Itisrighttoactrationally，
ItisrightthattheLowerpartsofournatureshouldbegovernedbytheHigher，
wedonotatfirstfeelthatwearenotobtainingvaluableinformation。
Butwhenwefind(cf。ante，chap。xi。§；3)that``actingrationally’’
ismerelyanotherphrasefor``doingwhatweseetoberight’’，and，again，thatthe``higherpart’’ofournaturetowhichtherestaretosubmitisexplainedtobeReason，sothat``actingtemperately’’isonly``actingrationally’’undertheconditionofspecialnon-rationalimpulsesneeding，toberesisted，thetautologyofour``principles’’isobvious。SimilarlywhenweareaskedtoacceptastheprincipleofJustice``thatweoughttogiveeverymanhisown’’，thedefinitionseemsplausible——untilitappearsthatwecannotdefine``hisown’’exceptasequivalentto``thatwhichitisrightheshouldhave’’。
Thedefinitionsquotedmaybefoundinmodernwriters:butitseemsworthyofremarkthatthroughouttheethicalspeculationofGreece，suchuniversalaffirmationsasarepresentedtousconcerningVirtueorGoodconductseemalmostalwaystobepropositionswhichcanonlybedefendedfromthechargeoftautology，iftheyareunderstoodasdefinitionsoftheproblemtobesolved，andnotasattemptsatitssolution。Forexample，PlatoandAristotleappeartoofferasconstructivemoraliststhescientificknowledgeonethicalmattersofwhichSocratesproclaimedtheabsence；knowledge，thatis，oftheGoodandBadinhumanlife。AndtheyseemtobeagreedthatsuchGoodascanberealisedintheconcretelifeofmenandcommunitiesischieflyVirtue，——or(asAristotlemorepreciselyputsit)theexerciseofVirtue:sothatthepracticalpartofethicalsciencemustconsistmainlyintheknowledgeofVirtue。
If，however，weaskbowwearetoascertainthekindofconductwhichisproperlytobecalledVirtuous，itdoesnotseemthatPlatocantellusmoreofeachvirtueinturnthanthatitconsistsin(1)theknowledgeofwhatisGoodincertaincircumstancesandrelations，and(2)suchaharmonyofthedifferentelementsofman’sappetitivenature，thattheirresultantimpulsemaybealwaysinaccordancewiththisknowledge。Butitisjustthisknowledge(oratleastitsprinciplesandmethod)thatweareexpectinghimtogiveus:andtoexplaintousinsteadthedifferentexigenciesunderwhichweneedit，innowaysatisfiesourexpectation。
Nor，again，doesAristotlebringusmuchnearersuchknowledgebytellingusthattheGoodinconductistobefoundsomewherebetweendifferentkindsofBad。ThisatbestonlyindicatesthewhereaboutsofVirtue:itdoesnotgiveusamethodforfindingit。
OntheStoicsystem，asconstructedbyZenoandChrysippus，itisperhapsunfairtopronouncedecisively，fromtheaccountsgivenofitbyadversarieslikePlutarch，andsuchsemi-intelligentexpositorsasCicero，DiogenesLaertius，andStobæ；us。But，asfaraswecalljudgeofit，wemustpronouncetheexpositionofitsgeneralprinciplesacomplicatedenchainmentofcircularreasonings，bywhichtheinquireriscontinuallydeludedwithanapparentapproachtopracticalconclusions，andcontinuallyledbacktothepointfromwhichhesetout。
ThemostcharacteristicformulaofStoicismseemstohavebeenthatdeclaring`LifeaccordingtoNature’
tobetheultimateendofaction。Thespringofthemotionthatsustainedthislifewasinthevegetablecreationamereunfeltimpulse:inanimalsitwasimpulseaccompaniedwithsensation:inmanitwasthedirectionofReason，whichinhimwasnaturallysupremeoverallmerelyblindirrationalimpulses。WhatthendoesReasondirect？`ToliveaccordingtoNature’isoneanswer:andthuswegetthecircularexpositionofethicaldoctrineinitssimplestform。Sometimes，however，wearetoldthatitis`LifeaccordingtoVirtue’:whichleadsusintothecirclealreadynoticedinthePlatonic-Aristotelianphilosophy；asVirtue，bytheStoicsalso，isonlydefinedasknowledgeofGoodandBadindifferentcircumstancesandrelations。Indeed，thislattercircleisgivenbytheStoicsmoreneatlyandperfectly:forwithPlatoandAristotleVirtuewasnotthesole，butonlythechiefcontentofthenotionGood，initsapplicationtohumanlife:butintheviewofStoicismthetwonotionsareabsolutelycoincident。Theresult，then，isthatVirtueisknowledgeofwhatisgoodandoughttobesoughtorchosen，andofwhatisbadandoughttobeshunnedorrejected:whileatthesametimethereisnothinggoodorproperlychoice-worthy，nothingbadortrulyformidable，exceptVirtueandVicerespectively。ButifVirtueisthusdeclaredtobeasciencethathasnoobjectexceptitself，thenotionisinevitablyemptiedofallpracticalcontent。Inorder，therefore，toavoidthisresultandtoreconciletheirSystemwithcommonsense，theStoicsexplainedthattherewereotherthingsinhumanlifewhichwereinamannerpreferable，thoughnotstrictlygood，includinginthisclasstheprimaryobjectsofmen’snormalimpulses。Onwhatprinciplethenarewetoselecttheseobjectswhenourimpulsesareconflictingorambiguous？
Ifwecangetananswertothisquestion，weshallatlengthhavecometosomethingpractical。ButhereagaintheStoiccouldfindnoothergeneralanswerexcepteitherthatweweretochoosewhatwasReasonable，orthatweweretoactinaccordancewithNature:eachofwhichanswersobviouslybringsusbackintotheoriginalcircleatadifferentpoint。[3]
InButler’suseoftheStoicformula，thiscircularreasoningseemstobeavoided:butitissoonlysolongastheintrinsicreasonablenessofrightconductisignoredorsuppressed。ButlerassumeswithhisopponentsthatitisreasonabletoliveaccordingtoNature，andarguesthatConscienceorthefacultythatimposesmoralrulesisnaturallysupremeinman。ItisthereforereasonabletoobeyConscience。ButaretherulesthatConsciencelaysdownmerelyknowntousasthedictatesofarbitraryauthority，andnotasinthemselvesreasonable？Thiswouldgiveasurelydangerousabsolutenessofauthoritytothepossiblyunenlightenedconscienceofanyindividual:andButlerismuchtoocautioustodothis:infact，inmorethanonepassageoftheAnalogyheexpresslyadoptsthedoctrineofClarke，thatthetruerulesofmoralityareessentiallyreasonable。ButifConscienceis，afterall，ReasonappliedtoPractice，thenButler’sargumentseemstobenditselfintotheoldcircle:`itisreasonabletoliveaccordingtoNature，anditisnaturaltoliveaccordingtoReason。’
InthenextchapterIshallhavetocallattentiontoanotherlogicalcircleintowhichweareliabletoslide，ifwerefertotheGoodorPerfection，whetheroftheagentorofothers，ingivinganaccountofanyspecialvirtue；ifweallowourselves，inexplainingGoodorPerfection，tousethegeneralnotionofvirtue(whichiscommonlyregardedasanimportantelementofeither)。MeanwhileIhavealreadygiven，perhaps，morethansufficientillustrationofoneofthemostimportantdangersthatbesetthestudentsofEthics。Inthelaudableattempttoescapefromthedoubtfulness，disputableness，andapparentarbitrarinessofcurrentmoralopinions，heisliabletotakerefugeinprinciplesthatareincontrovertiblebuttautologicalandinsignificant。
Canwethen，betweenthisScyllaandCharybdisofethicalinquiry，avoidingontheonehanddoctrinesthatmerelybringusbacktocommonopinionwithallitsimperfections，andontheotherhanddoctrinesthatleadusroundinacircle，findanywayofobtainingself-evidentmoralprinciplesofrealsignificance？ItwouldbedishearteningtohavetoregardasaltogetherillusorythestronginstinctofCommonSensethatpointstotheexistenceofsuchprinciples，andthedeliberateconvictionsofthelonglineofmoralistswhohaveenunciatedthem。Atthesametime，themoreweextendourknowledgeofmanandhisenvironment，themorewerealisethevastvarietyofhumannaturesandcircumstancesthathaveexistedindifferentagesandcountries，thelessdisposedwearetobelievethatthereisanydefinitecodeofabsoluterules，applicabletoallhumanbeingswithoutexception。Andweshallfind，Ithink，thatthetruthliesbetweenthesetwoconclusions。Therearecertainabsolutepracticalprinciples，thetruthofwhich，whentheyareexplicitlystated，ismanifest；buttheyareoftooabstractanature，andtoouniversalintheirscope，toenableustoascertainbyimmediateapplicationofthemwhatweoughttodoinanyparticularease；particulardutieshavestilltobedeterminedbysomeothermethod。
