Inthefirstplace，ithastobedecidedwhetherwearetoincludeinourlistofmotivestheMoralSentiments，orimpulsestowardsparticularkindsofvirtuousconductassuch，e。g。Candour，Veracity，Fortitude。Itseemsunwarrantabletoexcludethem，assuchsentimentsareobservableasdistinctandindependentimpulsesinmostwell-trainedminds，andwesometimesrecognisetheirexistenceinconsiderableintensity，aswhenwespeakofamanbeing`enthusiasticallybrave’，or`intenselyveracious’，oras`havingapassionforjustice’。
Atthesametimetheiradmissionplacesusinthefollowingdilemma。Eithertheobjectsoftheseimpulsesarerepresentedbytheverynotionsthatwehavebeenexamining——inwhichcase，afterwehavedecidedthatanyimpulseisbetterthanitsrival，alltheperplexitiessetforthinthepreviouschapterswillrecur，beforewecanactonourdecision；forwhatavailsittorecognisethesuperiorityoftheimpulsetodojustice，ifwedonotknowwhatitisjusttodo？——orifinanycasetheobjectwhichamoralsentimentpromptsustorealiseisconceivedmoresimply，withoutthequalificationswhichacompletereflectiononCommonSenseforcedustorecognise；then，asthepreviousinvestigationshows，weshallcertainlynotfindagreementastotherelationbetweenthisandotherimpulses。
Forexample，adispute，whethertheimpulsetospeakthetruthoughtoroughtnottobefollowed，willinevitablyarisewhenVeracityseemsopposedeithertothegeneralgood，ortotheinterestsofsomeparticularperson；
thatis，whenitconflictswith`particular’or`universal’benevolence。
Hutchesonexpresslyplacestheselatterimpulsesinahigherrankthan``candour，veracity，fortitude’’；reservingthehighestmoralapprobationfor``themostextensivebenevolence’’or``calm，stable，universalgoodwilltoall’’。[1]Butthisview，whichcoincidespracticallywithUtilitarianism，wouldcertainlybedisputedbymostIntuitionalmoralists。Again，someofthesemoralists(asKant)regardallactionsasbad——ornotgood——whicharenotdonefrompureregardfordutyorchoiceofRightasRight:whileHutcheson，whorepresentstheoppositepoleofIntuitionalEthics，equallydistinguishestheloveofVirtueasaseparateimpulse；buttreatsitasatonceco-ordinateinrankandcoincidentinitseffectswithuniversalBenevolence。
So，again，moralistsdivergewidelyinestimatingtheethicalvalueofSelf-love。
ForButlerseemstoregarditasoneoftwosuperiorandnaturallyauthoritativeimpulses，theotherbeingConscience:nay，inapassagebeforequoted，heevenconcedesthatitwouldbereasonableforConsciencetoyieldtoit，ifthetwocouldpossiblyconflict。Othermoralists(andButlerelsewhere)
appeartoplaceSelf-loveamongvirtuousimpulsesunderthenameofPrudence:
thoughamongthesetheyoftenrankitratherlow，andwouldhaveityieldincaseofconflict，tonoblervirtues。Others，again，excludeitfromVirtuealtogether:e。g。Kant，inoneofhistreatises，saysthattheendofSelf-love，one’sownhappiness，cannotbeanendfortheMoralReason；thattheforceofthereasonablewill，inwhichVirtueconsists，isalwaysexhibitedinresistancetonaturalegoisticimpulses。
Dr。Martineau，whosesystemisframedonthebasisthatIamnowexamining，attemptstoavoidsomeofthedifficultiesjustpointedoutbyrefusingtoadmittheexistenceofanyvirtuousimpulsesexceptthe``preferenceforthesuperiorofthecompetingspringsofactionineachcase’’ofaconflictofmotives。``I
cannotadmit’’，hesays，``eitherthelovesofVirtues——ofcandour，veracity，fortitude——orthevirtuesthemselves，assomanyadditionalimpulsesoverandabovethosefromtheconflictofwhichtheyareformed。
Idonotconfessmyfaultinordertobecandid？unlessIamaprig，Ineverthinkofcandour，aspredicable，orgoingtobepredicable，ofmeatall。’’[4]Iamnot，however，surewhetherDr。MartineaureallymeanstodenytheexistenceofpersonswhoactfromaconsciousdesiretorealiseanidealofCandourorFortitude，orwhetherhemerelymeanstoexpressdisapprovalofsuchpersons:intheformersensehisstatementseemstomeapsychologicalparadox，inconflictwithordinaryexperience:inthelattersenseitseemsanethicalparadox，affordingastrikingexampleofthatdiversityofjudgmentsastotherankofmotives，towhichIamnowdrawingattention。
ButevenifweputoutofsighttheMoralsentimentsandSelf-love，itisstillscarcelypossibletoframeascaleofmotivesarrangedinorderofmerit，forwhichwecouldclaimanythinglikeaclearconsent，evenofcultivatedandthoughtfulpersons。Ononeortwopoints，indeed，weseemtobegenerallyagreed；e。g。thatthebodilyappetitesareinferiortothebenevolentaffectionsandtheintellectualdesires；andperhapsthatimpulsestendingprimarilytothewell-beingoftheindividualarelowerinrankthanthosewhichweclassasextra-regardingordisinterested。Butbeyondafewvaguestatementsofthiskind，itisverydifficulttoproceed。Forexample，whenwecomparepersonalaffectionswiththeloveofknowledgeorofbeauty，orthepassionfortheidealinanyform，muchdoubtanddivergenceofopinionbecomemanifest。Indeed，weshouldhardlyagreeontherelativerankofthebenevolentaffectionstakenbythemselves；forsomewouldpreferthemoreintense，thoughnarrower，whileotherswouldplacethecalmerandwiderfeelingsinthehighestrank。Oragain，sinceLove，aswesaw，isacomplexemotion，andcommonlyincludes，besidesthedesireofthegoodorhappinessofthebeloved，adesireforunionorintimacyofsomekind；somewouldconsideranaffectionmoreelevatedinproportionastheformerelementpredominated，whileotherswouldregardthelatterasatleastequallyessentialtothehighestkindofaffection。
Again，wemaynoticetheloveofFameasanimportantandwidelyoperativemotive，whichwouldberankedverydifferentlybydifferentpersons:forsomewouldplacetheformer``spurthattheclearspiritdothraise’’amongthemostelevatedimpulsesafterthemoralsentiments；
whileothersthinkitdegradingtodependforone’shappinessonthebreathofpopularfavour。
Further，themorewecontemplatetheactualpromptingsthatprecedeanyvolition，themoreweseemtofindcomplexityofmotivetheruleratherthantheexception，atleastinthecaseofeducatedpersons:
andfromthiscompositionofimpulsesthereresultsafundamentalperplexityastotheprinciplesonwhichourdecisionistobemade，evensupposingthatwehaveaclearviewoftherelativeworthoftheelementaryimpulses。
Forthecompoundwillgenerallycontainnoblerandbaserelements，andwecanhardlygetridofthelatter；since——asIhavebeforesaid——thoughwemayfrequentlysuppressandexpelamotivebyfirmlyresistingit，itdoesnotseempossibletoexcludeitifwedotheacttowhichitprompts。
Suppose，then，thatweareimpelledinonedirectionbyacombinationofhighandlowmotives，andinanotherbyanimpulsethatranksbetweenthetwointhescale，howshallwedecidewhichcoursetofollow？Suchacaseisbynomeansuncommon:e。g。aninjuredmanmaybemovedbyanimpulseofpitytosparehisinjurer，whilearegardforjusticeandadesireofrevengecombinedimpelhimtoinflictpunishment。Or，again，aJewofliberalviewsmightberestrainedfromeatingporkbyadesirenottoshockthefeelingsofhisfriends，andmightbemovedtoeatitbythedesiretovindicatetruereligiouslibertycombinedwithalikingforpork。Howarewetodealwithsuchacaseasthis？Foritwillhardlybesuggestedthatweshouldestimatetherelativeproportionsofthedifferentmotivesanddecideaccordingly；——qualitativeanalysisofourmotivesistosomeextentpossibletous，butthequantitativeanalysisthatthiswouldrequireisnotinourpower。
Butevenapartfromthisdifficultyarisingfromcomplexityofmotives，Ithinkitimpossibletoassignadefiniteandconstantethicalvaluetoeachdifferentkindofmotive，withoutreferencetotheparticularcircumstancesunderwhichithasarisen，theextentofindulgencethatitdemands，andtheconsequencestowhichthisindulgencewouldleadinanyparticularcase。Imayconvenientlyillustratethisbyreferencetothetable，drawnupbyDr。Martineau，ofspringsofactionarrangedinorderofmerit。
LOWEST。
SecondaryPassions:——Censoriousness，Vindictiveness，Suspiciousness。
SecondaryOrganicPropensions:——LoveofEaseandSensualPleasure。
PrimaryOrganicPropensions:——Appetites。
PrimaryAnimalPropension:——SpontaneousActivity(unselective)。
LoveofGain(reflectivederivativefromAppetite)。
SecondaryAffections(sentimentalindulgenceofsympatheticfeelings)。
PrimaryPassions:——Antipathy，Fear，Resentment。
Causalenergy:——LoveofPower，orAmbition；LoveofLiberty。
SecondarySentiments:——LoveofCulture。
PrimarySentimentsofWonderandAdmiration。
PrimaryAffections，ParentalandSocial；with(approximately)GenerosityandGratitude。
PrimaryAffectionofCompassion。
PrimarySentimentofReverence。
Thisscaleseemstomeopentomuchcriticism，bothfromapsychologicalandfromanethicalpointofview:[3]but，grantingthatitcorrespondsbroadlytothejudgmentsthatmencommonlypassastothedifferentelevationofdifferentmotives，itseemstomeinthehighestdegreeparadoxicaltolaydownthateachclassofmotivesisalwaystobepreferredtotheclassbelowit，withoutregardtocircumstancesandconsequences。Sofarasitistruethat``theconsciencesaystoeveryone，`Donoteattillyouarehungryandstopwhenyouarehungrynomore’’’，itisnot，Iventuretothink，becausea``regulativerightisclearlyvestedinprimaryinstinctiveneeds，relativelytotheirsecondaries’’，butbecauseexperiencehasshownthattoseekthegratificationofthepalateapartfromthesatisfactionofhungerisgenerallydangeroustophysicalwell-being；anditisinviewofthisdangerthattheconscienceoperates。Ifwecondemn``ashipcaptain’’，who，``caughtinafogoffaleeshore，neglects，throughindolenceandloveofease，toslackenspeedandtakecautioussoundingsandopenhissteam-whistle’’，itisnotbecauseweintuitivelydiscernFeartobeahighermotivethanLoveofEase，butbecausetheconsequencesdisregardedarejudgedtobeindefinitelymoreimportantthanthegratificationobtained:ifwetookacaseinwhichfearwasnotsimilarlysustainedbyprudence，ourjudgmentwouldcertainlybedifferent。
TheviewofCommonSenseappearsrathertobethatmostnaturalimpulseshavetheirproperspheres，withinwhichtheyshouldbenormallyoperative，andthereforethequestionwhetherinanycaseahighermotiveshouldyieldtoaloweronecannotbeanswereddecisivelyinthegeneralwayinwhichDr。Martineauanswersit:theanswermustdependontheparticularconditionsandcircumstancesoftheconflict。Werecogniseitaspossiblethatamotivewhichwecommonlyrankashighermaywronglyintrudeintothepropersphereofonewhichwerankaslower，justasthelowerisliabletoencroachonthehigher；onlysincethereisverymuchlessdangeroftheformerintrusion，itnaturallyfallsintothebackgroundinethicaldiscussionsandexhortationsthathaveapracticalaim。Thematteriscomplicatedbythefurtherconsiderationthatasthecharacterofamoralagentbecomesbetter，themotivesthatwerankas``higher’’
tendtobedeveloped，sothattheirnormalsphereofoperationisenlargedattheexpenseofthelower。Hencetherearetwodistinctaimsinmoralregulationandculture，sofarastheyrelatetomotives:(1)tokeepthe``lower’’motivewithinthelimitswithinwhichitsoperationisconsideredtobelegitimateandgoodonthewhole，solongaswecannotsubstituteforittheequallyeffectiveoperationofahighermotiveandatthesametime(2)toeffectthissubstitutionof``higher’’for``lower’’gradually，asfarascanbedonewithoutdanger，uptoalimitwhichwecannotdefinitelyfix，butwhichwecertainlyconceive，forthemostpart，asfallingshortofcompleteexclusionofthelowermotive。
ImayillustratebyreferencetothepassionofresentmentofwhichIbeforespoke。Theviewofreflectivecommonsenseis，Ithink，thatthemalevolentimpulsesodesignated，aslongasitisstrictlylimitedtoresentmentagainstwrongandoperatesinaidofjustice，hasalegitimatesphereofactioninthesociallifeofhumanbeingsasactuallyconstituted:that，indeed，itssuppressionwouldbegravelymischievous，unlesswecouldatthesametimeintensifytheordinaryman’sregardforjusticeorforsocialwell-beingsothatthetotalstrengthofmotivespromptingtothepunishmentofcrimeshouldnotbediminished。Itis，nodoubt，``tobewished’’，asButlersays，thatmenwouldrepresswrongfromthesehighermotivesratherthanfrompassionateresentment；butwecannothopetoeffectthischangeinhumanbeingsgenerallyexceptbyaslowandgradualprocessofelevationofcharacter:thereforesupposingaconflictbetween``Compassion’’，whichishighestbutoneinDr。Martineau’sscale，and’’Resentment’’，whichheplacesaboutthemiddle，itisbynomeanstobelaiddownasageneralrulethatcompassionoughttoprevail。Weoughtrather——withButler——toregardresentmentasasalutary``balancetotheweaknessofpity’’，whichwouldbeliabletopreventtheexecutionofjusticeifresentmentwereexcluded。
Orwemightsimilarlytaketheimpulsewhichcomeslowest(amongthosenotcondemnedaltogether)inDr。Martineau’sscale——the``LoveofEaseandSensualPleasure’’。Nodoubtthisimpulse，orgroupofimpulses，iscontinuallyleadingmentoshirkorscamptheirstrictduty，ortofallinsomelessdefinitewaybelowtheirownidealofconduct；
hencetheattitudehabituallymaintainedtowardsitbypreachersandpracticalmoralistsisthatofrepression。Still，commonsensesurelyrecognisesthattherearecasesinwhicheventhisimpulseoughttoprevailoverimpulsesrankedaboveitinDr。Martineau’sscale；weoftenfindmenprompted——sayby``loveofgain’’——toshortenundulytheirhoursofrecreation；andinthecaseofaconflictofmotivesundersuchcircumstancesweshouldjudgeitbestthatvictoryshouldremainonthesideofthe“loveofeaseandpleasure’’，andthattheencroachmentof``loveofgain’’shouldberepelled。
Idonot，however，thinkthatineitheroftheseinstancestheconflictofmotiveswouldremainsuchasIhavejustdescribed:
