What，then，istheconductwhichPurityforbids(fortheprincipleismoreeasilydiscussedinitsnegativeaspect)？Asthenormalandobviousendofsexualintercourseisthepropagationofthespecies，somehavethoughtthatallindulgenceofappetite，exceptasameanstothisend，shouldbeprohibited。ButthisdoctrinewouldleadtoarestrictionofconjugalintercoursefartoosevereforCommonSense。Shallwesay，then，thatPurityforbidssuchindulgenceexceptundertheconditionsofconjugaluniondefinedbyLaw？Butthisanswer，again，furtherreflectionshowstobeunsatisfactory。For，first，weshouldnot，onconsideration，callaconjugalunionimpure，merelybecausethepartieshadwilfullyomittedtofulfillegalconditions，andhadmadeacontractwhichthelawdeclinedtoenforce。Wemightcondemntheirconduct，butweshouldnotapplytoitthisnotion。And，secondly，wefeelthatpositivelawmaybeunfavourabletoPurity，andthatinfactPurity，likeJustice，issomethingwhichthelawoughttomaintain，butdoesnotalways。Wehavetoask，then，whatkindofsexualrelationswearetocallessentiallyimpure，whethercountenancedornotbyLawandCustom？Thereappeartobenodistinctprinciples，havinganyclaimtoself-evidence，uponwhichthequestioncanbeansweredsoastocommandgeneralassent。Itwouldbedifficulteventostatesuchaprinciplefordeterminingthedegreeofconsanguinitybetweenhusbandandwifewhichconstitutesaunionincestuous；althoughtheaversionwithwhichsuchunionsarecommonlyregardedisapeculiarlyintensemoralsentiment；andthedifficultybecomesindefinitelygreaterwhenweconsidertherationaleofprohibiteddegreesofaffinity。Again，probablyfewwouldstigmatisealegalpolygynousconnexionasimpure，howevertheymightdisapproveofthelawandofthestateofsocietyinwhichsuchalawwasestablished:
butiflegalPolygynyisnotimpure，isPolyandry，whenlegalandcustomary——asisnotunfrequentlythecaseamongthelowerracesofman——tobesocharacterised？
andifnot，onwhatrationalprinciplecanthenotionbeappliedtoinstitutionsandconduct？Again，wheredivorcebymutualconsent，withsubsequentmarriage，islegalised，wedonotcallthisanoffenceagainstPurity:andyetiftheprincipleoffreechangebeonceadmitted，itseemsparadoxicaltodistinguishpurityfromimpuritymerelybylessrapidityoftransition；
andtocondemnasimpureeven`FreeLove’，insofarasitisearnestlyadvocatedasameanstoacompleterharmonyofsentimentbetweenmenandwomen，andnottomeresensuallicense。
Shallwe，then，fallbackuponthepresenceofmutualaffection(asdistinguishedfrommereappetite)asconstitutingtheessenceofpuresexualrelations？Butthis，again，whiletoolaxfromonepointofview，seemsfromanothertoosevereforCommonSense:aswedonotcondemnmarriageswithoutaffectionasimpure，althoughwedisapproveofthemasproductiveofunhappiness。Suchmarriages，indeed，aresometimesstigmatisedas``legalisedprostitution’’，butthephraseisfelttobeextravagantandparadoxical；anditisevendoubtfulwhetherwedodisapproveofthemunderallcircumstances；as(e。g。)inthecaseofroyalalliances。
Again，howshallwejudgeofsuchinstitutionsasthoseofPlato’sCommonwealth，establishingcommunityofwomenandchildren，butatthesametimeregulatingsexualindulgencewiththestrictestreferencetosocialends？Ourhabitualstandardsseeminapplicabletosuchnovelcircumstances。
Thetruthseemstobe，thatreflectiononthecurrentsexualmoralitydiscoverstoustwodistinctgroundsforit:firstandchiefly，themaintenanceofacertainsocialorder，believedtobemostconducivetotheprosperouscontinuanceofthehumanrace:and，secondly，theprotectionofhabitsoffeelinginindividualsbelievedtobegenerallymostimportanttotheirperfectionortheirhappiness。Wecommonlyconceivethatboththeseendsaretobeattainedbythesameregulations:andinanidealstateofsocietythiswouldperhapsbethecase:butinactuallifethereisfrequentlyapartialseparationandincompatibilitybetweenthem。Butfurther，iftherepressionofsexuallicenseisprescribedmerelyasameanstotheseends，itdoesnotseemthatwecanaffirmasself-evidentthatitisalwaysanecessarymeansineithercase:onthecontrary，itseemsclearthatsuchanaffirmationwouldbeunreliableapartfromempiricalconfirmation。Wecannotreasonablybesure，withoutinductionfromsociologicalobservations，thatacertainamountofsexuallicensewillbeincompatiblewiththemaintenanceofpopulationinsufficientnumbersandgoodcondition。
Andifweconsiderthematterinitsrelationtotheindividual’sperfection，itiscertainlyclearthathemissesthehighestandbestdevelopmentofhisemotionalnature，ifhissexualrelationsareofamerelysensualkind:
butwecanhardlyknowapriorithatthislowerkindofrelationinterfereswiththedevelopmentofthehigher(norindeeddoesexperienceseemtoshowthatthisisuniversallythecase)。Andthislatterlineofargumenthasafurtherdifficulty。Forthecommonopinionthatwehavetojustifydoesnotmerelycondemnthelowerkindofdevelopmentincomparisonwiththehigher，butincomparisonwithnoneatall。Sincewedonotpositivelyblameamanforremainingcelibate(thoughweperhapsdespisehimsomewhatunlessthecelibacyisadoptedasameanstoanobleend):itisdifficulttoshowwhyweshouldcondemn——initsbearingontheindividual’semotionalperfectionsolely——theimperfectdevelopmentaffordedbymerelysensualrelations。
MuchmoremightbesaidtoexhibittheperplexitiesinwhichtheattempttodefinetheruleofPurityorChastityinvolvesus。ButIdonotdesiretoextendthediscussionbeyondwhatisnecessaryforthecompletionofmyargument。Itseemstomethattheconclusionannouncedin§；2ofthischapterhasnowbeensufficientlyjustified。Wehaveexaminedthemoralnotionsthatpresentthemselveswithaprimafacieclaimtofurnishindependentandself-evidentrulesofmorality:andwehaveineachcasefoundthatfromsuchregulationofconductastheCommonSenseofmankindreallysupports，nopropositioncanbeelicitedwhich，whenfairlycontemplated，evenappearstohavethecharacteristicofascientificaxiom。ItisthereforescarcelyneedfultoproceedtoasystematicexaminationofthemannerinwhichCommonSenseprovidesfortheco-ordinationoftheseprinciples。Infact，thisquestionseemstohavebeenalreadydiscussedasfarasisprofitable:fortheattempttodefineeachprinciplesinglyhasinevitablyledustoconsidertheirmutualrelations:anditwasinthecaseswheretwomoralprinciplescameintocollisionthatwemostclearlysawthevaguenessandinconsistencywithwhichtheboundariesofeacharedeterminedbyCommonSense。Forexample，thedistinctionbetweenperfectlystringentmoralobligations，andsuchlaxerdutiesasmaybemodifiedbyaman’sownact，isoftentaken:anditisonewhich，aswesaw，iscertainlyrequiredinformulatingtheCommon-Senseviewoftheeffectofapromiseincreatingnewobligations:butitisonewhichwecannotapplywithanypracticalprecision，becauseofthehighdegreeofindeterminatenesswhichwefindinthecommonnotionsofdutiestowhichthehighestdegreeofstringencyisyetcommonlyattributed。
Itonlyremainstoguardmyargumentfrombeingunderstoodinamoresweepingsensethanithasbeenintendedorisproperlyabletobear。NothingthatIhavesaideventendstoshowthatwehavenotdistinctmoralimpulses，claimingauthorityoverallothers，andprescribing，orforbiddingkindsofconductastowhichthereisaroughgeneralagreement，atleastamongeducatedpersonsofthesameageandcountry。Itisonlymaintainedthattheobjectsoftheseimpulsesdonotadmitofbeingscientificallydeterminedbyanyreflectiveanalysisofcommonsense。ThenotionsofBenevolence，Justice，GoodFaith，Veracity，Purity，etc。，arenotnecessarilyemptiedofsignificanceforus，becausewehavefounditimpossibletodefinethemwithprecision。
Themainpartoftheconductprescribedundereachnotionissufficientlyclear:andthegeneralruleprescribingitdoesnotnecessarilyloseitsforcebecausethereisineachcaseamarginofconductinvolvedinobscurityandperplexity，orbecausetheruledoesnotonexaminationappeartobeabsoluteandindependent。Inshort，theMoralityofCommonSensemaystillbeperfectlyadequatetogivepracticalguidancetocommonpeopleincommoncircumstances:buttheattempttoelevateitintoasystemofIntuitionalEthicsbringsitsinevitableimperfectionsintoprominencewithouthelpingustoremovethem。
InthefirstchapterofthisthirdBookI
wascarefultopointoutthatmotives，aswellasintentions，formpartofthesubject-matterofourcommonmoraljudgments:andindeedinournotionof`conscientiousness’thehabitofreflectingonmotives，andjudgingthemtobegoodorbad，isaprominentelement。Itisnecessary，therefore，inordertocompleteourexaminationoftheIntuitionalMethod，toconsiderthiscomparisonofmotives，andascertainhowfaritcanbemadesystematic，andpursuedtoconclusionsofscientificvalue。Andthisseemsaconvenientplacefortreating，ofthispartofthesubject:sinceithasbeenmaintainedbyanimportantschoolofEnglishmoraliststhatDesiresandAffectionsratherthanActsarethepropersubjectsoftheethicaljudgment:anditisnaturaltofallbackuponthisviewwhensystematicreflectiononthemoralityofCommonSensehasshownusthedifficultyofobtainingapreciseandsatisfactorydeterminationofrightnessandwrongnessinexternalconduct。
Toavoidconfusion，itshouldbeobservedthattheterm`motive’iscommonlyusedintwoways。Itissometimesappliedtothoseamongtheforeseenconsequencesofanyactwhichtheagentdesiredinwilling:andsometimestothedesire，orconsciousimpulseitself。Thetwomeaningsareinamannercorrespondent，as，whereimpulsesaredifferent，theremustalwaysbesomesortofdifferenceintheirrespectiveobjects。Butforourpresentpurposeitismoreconvenienttotakethelattermeaning:asitisourownimpulsivenaturethatwehavepracticallytodealwith，inthewayofcontrolling，resisting，indulgingthedifferentimpulses；andthereforeitistheethicalvalueofthesethatweareprimarilyconcernedtoestimate:andweoftenfindthattwoimpulses，whichwouldbeplacedveryfarapartinanypsychologicallist，aredirectedtowardsanendmateriallyidentical，thoughregardedfromadifferentpointofviewineachcase。As(e。g。)bothappetiteandRationalself-lovemayimpelamantoseekaparticularsensualgratification；
thoughinthelattercaseitisregardedunderthegeneralnotionofpleasure，andasformingpartofasumcalledHappiness。Inthischapter，then，I
shallusethetermMotivetodenotethedesiresofparticularresults，believedtobeattainableasconsequencesofourvoluntaryacts，bywhichdesireswearestimulatedtowillthoseacts。[1]
Thefirstpointtonoticeinconsideringtheethicalresultofacomprehensivecomparisonofmotivesis，thattheissueinanyinternalconflictisnotusuallythoughttobebetweenpositivelygoodandbad，butbetweenbetterandlessgood，moreorlessestimableorelevatedmotives。Theonlykindofmotivewhich(ifany)wecommonlyjudgetobeintrinsicallybad，apartfromthecircumstancesunderwhichitoperates，ismalevolentaffection；thatis，thedesire，howeveraroused，toinflictpainorharmonsomeothersentientbeing。Andreflectionshows(aswesawinchap。viii。ofthisBook)thatCommonSensedoesnotpronounceeventhiskindofimpulseabsolutelybad:sincewecommonlyrecognisetheexistenceof`legitimateresentment’and`righteousindignation’；andthoughmoraliststrytodistinguishbetweenangerdirected`againsttheact’and`againsttheagent’，andbetweentheimpulsetoinflictpainandthedesireoftheantipatheticpleasurethattheagentwillreapfromthisinfliction，itmaybefairlydoubtedwhetheritiswithinthecapacityofordinaryhumannaturetomaintainthesedistinctionsinpractice。AtanyratethereisnoothermotiveexceptdeliberatemalevolencewhichCommonSensecondemnsasabsolutelybad。Theothermotivesthatarecommonlyspokenofin`dyslogistic’
termsseemtobemostproperlycalled(inBentham’slanguage)’Seductive’
ratherthanbad。Thatis，theyprompttoforbiddenconductwithconspicuousforceandfrequency:butwhenweconsiderthemcarefullywefindthattherearecertainlimits，howevernarrow，withinwhichtheiroperationislegitimate。
Thequestion，then，ishowfartheintuitiveknowledgethatourcommonjudgmentsseemtoimplyoftherelativegoodnessofdifferentkindsofmotivesisfoundonreflectiontosatisfytheconditionslaiddownintheprecedingchapter。Ihavebeforearguedthatitisincorrecttoregardthiscomparisonofmotivesasthenormalformofourcommonmoraljudgments，nordoIseeanygroundforholdingittobetheoriginalform。Ithinkthatinthenormaldevelopmentofman’smoralconsciousness，bothintheindividualandintherace，moraljudgmentsarefirstpassedonoutwardacts，andthatmotivesdonotcometobedefinitelyconsideredtilllater；justasexternalperceptionofphysicalobjectsprecedesintrospection。
Atthesametime，inmyview，itdoesnotthereforefollowthatthecomparisonofmotivesisnotthefinalandmostperfectformofthemoraljudgment。
Itmightapproveitselfassuchbythesystematicclearnessandmutualconsistencyoftheresultstowhichitled，whenpursuedbydifferentthinkersindependently:andbyitsfreedomfromthepuzzlesanddifficultiestowhichotherdevelopmentsoftheIntuitionalMethodseemtobeexposed。
Itappears，however，onexaminationthat，ontheonehand，many(ifnotall)ofthedifficultieswhichhaveemergedintheprecedingdiscussionofthecommonlyreceivedprinciplesofconductarereproducedinadifferentformwhenwetrytoarrangeMotivesinorderofexcellence:andontheotherhand，suchaconstructionpresentsdifficultiespeculiartoitself，andtheattempttosolvetheseexhibitsgreaterandmorefundamentaldifferencesamongIntuitivemoralists，asregardsRankofMotive，thanwefoundtoexistasregardsRightnessofoutwardacts。
