Indeed，allareagreedthattheyoughttobedisobeyedwhentheycommandwhatiswrong:thoughwedonotseemabletoelicitanycleargeneralviewastowhatremainswrongafterithasbeencommandedbythesovereign。
And，again，thepositivelawsthatoughttobeobeyedassuchmustbethecommandsissuedbya(morally)rightfulauthority:andthoughthesewillordinarilycoincidewiththecommandslegallyenforced，wecannotsaythatthisisalwaysthecaseforthecourtsmaybetemporarilysubservienttoausurper；or，again，thesovereignhithertohabituallyobeyedmaybeoneagainstwhomithasbecomerighttorebel(sinceitisgenerallyadmittedthatthisissometimesright)。Werequire，then，principlesfordeterminingwhenusurpationbecomeslegitimateandwhenrebellionisjustifiable:andwedonotseemabletoelicitthesefromCommonSense——exceptsofarasitmaybefairlysaidthatonthiswholesubjectCommonSenseinclinesmoretotheUtilitarianmethodthanitdoesinmattersofprivatemorality。
Stilllesscanwestatethegeneraldutyofsatisfying`naturalexpectations’——i。e。suchexpectationsasanaveragemanwouldformundergivencircumstances——intheformofaclearandprecisemoralaxiom。Nodoubtajustmanwillgenerallysatisfycustomaryclaims:
butitcanhardlybemaintainedthatthemereexistenceofacustomrendersitclearlyobligatorythatanyoneshouldconformtoitwhohasnotalreadypromisedtodoso；especiallysincebadcustomscanonlybeabolishedbyindividualsventuringtodisregardthem。
Wehavestilltoexamine(whetherasabranchofJusticeorunderaseparatehead)thedutyoffulfillingexpresspromisesanddistinctunderstandings。Thepeculiarconfidencewhichmoralistshavegenerallyfeltinthisprincipleisstrikinglyillustratedbythoseendeavourstoextenditsscopewhichwehavejusthadoccasiontonotice:anditcertainlyseemstosurpassinsimplicity，certainty，anddefinitenessthemoralrulesthatwehavehithertodiscussed。Here，then，ifanywhere，weseemlikelytofindoneofthoseethicalaxiomsofwhichweareinsearch。NowwesawthatthenotionofaPromiserequiresseveralqualificationsnotcommonlynoticedtomakeitprecise:butthisaloneisnoreasonwhyitmaynotbefitlyusedinframingamaxim，whichwhenenunciatedandunderstoodwillproperlyclaimuniversalacceptanceasself-evident。Forsimilarlytheuninstructedmajorityofmankindcouldnotdefineacircleasafigureboundedbyalineofwhicheverypointisequidistantfromthecentre:butnevertheless，whenthedefinitionisexplainedtothem，theywillacceptitasexpressingtheperfecttypeofthatnotionofroundnesswhichtheyhavelonghadintheirminds。Andthesamepotentialuniversalityofacceptancemay，Ithink，befairlyclaimedforthepropositionsthatthepromisewhichtheCommonSenseofmankindrecognisesasbindingmustbeunderstoodbypromiserandpromiseeinthesamesenseatthetimeofpromising，andthatitisrelativetothepromiseeandcapableofbeingannulledbyhim，andthatitcannotoverridedeterminatepriorobligations。
Butthecaseisdifferentwiththeotherqualificationswhichwehadtodiscuss。Whenoncethequestionofintroducingthesehasbeenraised，weseethatCommonSenseisclearlydividedastotheanswer。Ifweask(e。g。)howfarourpromiseisbindingifitwasmadeinconsequenceoffalsestatements，onwhich，however，itwasnotunderstoodtobeconditional；orifimportantcircumstanceswereconcealed，orwewereinanywayledtobelievethattheconsequencesofkeepingthepromisewouldbedifferentfromwhattheyturnouttobe；
orifthepromisewasgivenundercompulsion；orifcircumstanceshavemateriallyalteredsinceitwasgiven，andwefindthattheresultsoffulfillingitwillbedifferentfromwhatweforesawwhenwepromised；
orevenifitbeonlyourknowledgeofconsequenceswhichhasaltered，andwenowseethatfulfilmentwillentailonusasacrificeoutofproportiontothebenefitreceivedbythepromisee；orperhapsseethatitwillevenbeinjurioustohimthoughhemaynotthinksodifferentconscientiouspersonswouldanswertheseandotherquestions(bothgenerallyandinparticularcases)indifferentways:andthoughwecouldperhapsobtainadecidedmajorityforsomeofthesequalificationsandagainstothers，therewouldnotinanycasebeaclearconsensuseitherway。And，moreover，themerediscussionofthesepointsseemstomakeitplainthattheconfidencewithwhichthe``unsophisticatedconscience’’assertsunreservedly``thatpromisesoughttobekept’’，isduetoinadvertence；andthatwhenthequalificationstowhichwereferredarefairlyconsidered，thisconfidenceinevitablychangesintohesitationandperplexity。Itshouldbeadded，thatsomeofthesequalificationsthemselvessuggestareferencetothemorecomprehensiveprincipleofUtilitarianism，asonetowhichthisparticularruleisnaturallysubordinate。
Again，reflectionupontheplaceofthisdutyinaclassifiedsystemofmoralobligationstendstoconfirmourdistrustoftheordinaryenunciationsofCommonSenseinrespectofit。For，aswasseen，FidelitytopromisesisverycommonlyrankedwithVeracity；asthoughthemerefactofmyhavingsaidthatIwoulddoathingwerethegroundofmydutytodoit。Butonreflectionweperceivethattheobligationmustberegardedascontingentonthereliancethatanotherhasplacedonmyassertion:that，infact，thebreachofdutyisconstitutedbythedisappointmentofexpectationsvoluntarilyraised。Andwhenweseethiswebecomelessdisposedtomaintaintheabsolutenessoftheduty:itseemsnowtodependupontheamountofharmdonebydisappointingexpectations；
andwe，shrinkfromsayingthatthepromiseoughttobekept，ifthekeepingitwouldinvolveanamountofharmthatseemsdecidedlytooutweighthis。
ThecaseofVeracitywemaydismisssomewhatmorebriefly，ashereitwasstillmoreeasytoshowthatthecommonenunciationoftheunqualifieddutyofTruth-speakingismadewithoutfullconsideration，andcannotapproveitselftothereflectivemindasanabsolutefirstprinciple。
For，inthefirstplace，wefoundnoclearagreementastothefundamentalnatureoftheobligation；orastoitsexactscope，i。e。whetheritisouractualaffirmationasunderstoodbytherecipientwhichweareboundtomakecorrespondenttofact(asfaraswecan)，orwhateverinferencesweforeseethatheislikelytodrawfromthis，orboth。TorealiseperfectCandourandSincerity，wemustaimatboth:andwenodoubtadmiretheexhibitionofthesevirtues:butfewwillmaintainthattheyoughttobeexhibitedunderallcircumstances。And，secondly，itseemstobeadmittedbyCommonSense，thoughvaguelyandreluctantly，thattheprinciple，howeverdefined，isnotofuniversalapplication；atanyrateitisnotthoughttobeclearlywrongthatuntruthsshouldbetoldtochildren，ormadmen，orinvalids，orbyadvocates，ortoenemiesorrobbers，oreventopersonswhoaskquestionswhichtheyhavenorighttoask(ifamererefusaltoanswerwouldpracticallyrevealanimportantsecret)。Andwhenweconsiderthelimitationsgenerallyadmitted，itseemsstillmoreplainthaninthelastcase，thattheyareverycommonlydeterminedbyutilitarianreasonings，implicitorexplicit。
If，then，theprescriptionsofJustice，GoodFaith，andVeracity，aslaiddownbyCommonSense，appearsolittlecapableofbeingconvertedintofirstprinciplesofscientificEthics，itseemsscarcelynecessarytoinquirewhethersuchaxiomscanbeextractedfromminormaximsofsocialbehaviour，suchasthemaximofLiberalityortherulesrestrainingtheMalevolentAffections:or，again，fromsuchvirtuesasCourageandHumility，whichwefounditdifficulttoclassaseithersocialorself-regarding。Indeed，itwasmadeplaininchap。viii。thatasregardstheproperregulationofresentment，CommonSensecanonlybesavedfrominconsistencyorhopelessvaguenessbyadoptingthe`interestofsociety’astheultimatestandard:andinthesamewaywecannotdefinitelydistinguishCouragefromFoolhardinessexceptbyareferencetotheprobabletendencyofthedaringacttopromotethewellbeingoftheagentorofothers，ortosomedefiniteruleofdutyprescribedundersomeothernotion。
Itistruethatamongwhatarecommonlycalled``dutiestoself’’wefindthedutyofself-preservationprescribedwithapparentabsoluteness，——atleastsofarasthesacrificeofone’slifeisnotimperativelyrequiredforthepreservationofthelivesofothers，orfortheattainmentofsomeresultconceivedtobeveryimportanttosociety。Ithink，however，thatwhenconfrontedwiththequestionofpreservingalifewhichwecanforeseewillbebothmiserableandburdensometoothers——e。g。thelifeofamanstrickenwithafataldiseasewhichprecludesthepossibilityofworkofanykind，duringtheweeksormonthsofagonythatremaintohim，——thoughCommonSensewouldstilldenythelegitimacyofsuicide，evenundertheseconditions，itwouldalsoadmitthenecessityoffindingreasonsforthedenial。Thisadmissionwouldimplythattheuniversalwrongnessofsuicideisatanyratenotself-evident。AndthereasonsthatwouldbefoundsofarastheydidnotultimatelydependuponpremisesdrawnfromRevelationalTheology——would，Ithink，turnouttobeutilitarian，inabroadsenseoftheterm:itwouldbeurgedthatifanyexceptionstotheruleprohibitingsuicidewereallowed，dangerousencouragementwouldbegiventothesuicidalimpulseinothercasesinwhichsuicidewouldreallybeaweakandcowardlyderelictionofsocialduty:itwouldalsoprobablybeurgedthatthetolerationofsuicidewouldfacilitatesecretmurders。Inshort，theindependentaxiomofwhichweareinsearchseemstodisappearoncloseexaminationinthiscasenolessthaninothers。
Soagain，reflectionseemstoshowthatthedutiesofTemperance，Self-control，andothercognatevirtues，areonlyclearanddefiniteinsofarastheyareconceivedassubordinateeithertoPrudence(asisordinarilythecase)，ortoBenevolenceorsomedefiniteruleofsocialduty，oratleasttosomeendsuchas`furtheranceofmoralprogress’——ofwhichtheconceptioninvolvesthenotionofdutysupposedtobealreadydeterminate。CertainlytheauthorityofCommonSensecannotbefairlyclaimedforanyrestrictionevenofthebodilyappetitesforfoodanddrink，thatisnotthussubordinated。
Inthecase，however，ofthesexualappetite，aspecialregulationseemstobeprescribedonsomeindependentprincipleunderthenotionofPurityorChastity。Inchap。ix。ofthisBook，whereweexaminedthisnotion，itappearedthatCommonSenseisnotonlynotexplicit，butactuallyaversetoexplicitness，onthissubject。Asmyaimintheprecedingchapterswastogive，aboveallthings，afaithfulexpositionofthemoralityofCommonSense，Iallowedmyinquirytobecheckedbythis(asitseemed)clearlyrecognisablesentiment。Butwhenitbecomesourprimaryobjecttotesttheintuitiveevidenceofthemoralprinciplescommonlyaccepted，itseemsnecessarytooverridethisaversion:forwecanhardlyascertainwhetherrationalconvictionisattainableastotheactsallowedandforbiddenunderthisnotionanditsopposite，withoutsubjectingittothesameclosescrutinythatwehaveendeavouredtogivetotheotherleadingnotionsofEthics。Herethebriefestaccountofsuchascrutinywillbesufficient。IamawarethatingivingeventhisIcannotbutcauseacertainoffencetomindstrainedingoodmoralhabits:butItrustImayclaimthesameindulgenceasiscommonlygrantedtothephysiologist，whoalsohastodirectthestudent’sattentiontoobjectswhichahealthymindisnaturallydisinclinedtocontemplate。
