LetuspassnowtowhatIhavecalledthedutiesoftheAffections，therulesthatprescribeeitherloveitselfinsomedegree，ortheservicesthatnaturallyspringfromitinthoserelationswhereitisexpectedanddesired。Here，inthefirstplace，thequestionhowfarweareboundtorendertheseserviceswhenwedonotfeeltheaffectionisanswereddifferentlyinmanycasesbydifferentpersons，andnodeterminationofthelimitseemsself-evident。Andsimilarlyifweaskwhetheraffectionitselfisaduty；forontheonehanditisatleastonlypartiallywithinthecontrolofthewill，andinsofarasitcanbeproducedbyvoluntaryeffort，thereisthoughttobesomethingunsatisfactoryandunattractiveintheresult；andontheotherhand，incertainrelationsitseemstobecommonlyregardedasaduty。OnthosepointsthedoctrineofCommonSenseisratheraroughcompromisebetweenconflictinglinesofthoughtthancapableofbeingdeducedfromaclearanduniversallyacceptedprinciple。AndifweconfineourselvestothespecialrelationswhereCommonSenseadmitsnodoubtastothebroadmoralobligationofatleastrenderingsuchservicesasaffectionnaturallyprompts，stilltherecognisedrulesofexternaldutyintheserelationsare，inthefirstplace，wantingindefinitenessandprecision:andsecondly，theydonot，whenrigorouslyexamined，appeartobe，ortobereferableto，independentintuitionssofarastheparticularityofthedutiesisconcerned。
Letustake，forexample，thedutyofparentstochildren。Wehavenodoubtaboutthisdutyasapartofthepresentorderofsociety，bywhichtheduegrowthandtrainingoftherisinggenerationisdistributedamongtheadults。Butwhenwereflectonthisarrangementitself，wecannotseeintuitivelythatitisthebestpossible。Itmaybeplausiblymaintainedthatchildrenwouldbebettertrained，physicallyandmentally，iftheywerebroughtupunderthesupervisionofphysiciansandphilosophers，inlargeinstitutionsmaintainedoutofthegeneraltaxes。Wecannotdecideaprioriwhichofthesealternativesispreferable；wehavetorefertopsychologicalandsociologicalgeneralisations，obtainedbyempiricalstudyofhumannatureinactualsocieties。If，however，weconsiderthedutyofparentsbyitself，outofconnexionwiththissocialorder，itiscertainlynotself-evidentthatweowemoretoourownchildrenthantootherswhosehappinessequallydependsonourexertions。Togetthequestionclear，letussupposethatIamthrownwithmyfamilyuponadesertisland，whereIfindanabandonedorphan。IsitevidentthatIamlessboundtoprovidethischild，asfarasliesinmypower，withthemeansofsubsistence，thanIamtoprovideformyownchildren？Accordingtosome，myspecialdutytothelatterwouldarisefromthefactthatIhavebroughtthemintobeing:but，ifso，itwouldseemthatonthisprincipleIhavearighttodiminishtheirhappiness，providedIdonotturnitintoanegativequantity；since，aswithoutmetheywouldnothaveexistedatall，theycan，asmychildren，havenoclaimuponmeformorethananexistenceonthewholeabovezeroinrespectofhappiness。Wemightevendeduceaparentalright(sofarasthisspecialclaimisconcerned)toextinguishchildrenpainlesslyatanypointoftheirexistence，ifonlytheirlifeuptothatpointhasbeenonthewholeworthhaving；forhowcanpersonswhowouldhavehadnolifeatallbutformefairlycomplainthattheyarenotallowedmorethanacertainquantity？[1]IdonotmeantoassertthatthesedoctrinesareevenimplicitlyheldbyCommonSense:butmerelytoshowthathere，aselsewhere，thepursuitofanirrefragableintuitionmayleadusunawareintoanestofparadoxes。
Itseems，then，thatwecannot，afterall，saythatthespecialdutyofparentstochildren，consideredbyitself，possessesclearself-evidence:anditwaseasytoshow(cf。chap。iv。)thatasrecognisedbyCommonSenseitslimitsareindeterminate。
Theruleprescribingthedutyofchildrentoparentsneednotdetainus；fortoCommonSenseitcertainlyseemsdoubtfulwhetherthisisnotmerelyaparticularcaseofgratitude；
andwecertainlyhavenoclearintuitionofwhatisduetoparentswhodonotdeservegratitude。Again，themoralrelationofhusbandandwifeseemstodependchieflyuponcontractanddefiniteunderstanding。Itis，nodoubt，usuallythoughtthatMorality，aswellaslawprescribescertainconditionsforallconnubialcontracts:andinourownageandcountryitisheldthattheyshouldbe(1)monogamicand(2)permanent。Butitseemsclearthatneitheroftheseopinionswouldbemaintainedtobeaprimaryintuition。WhethertheseoranyotherlegalregulationsoftheunionofthesexescanbededucedfromsomeintuitiveprincipleofPurity，wewillpresentlyconsider:butasforsuchconjugaldutiesasarenotprescribedbyLaw，probablynooneatthepresentdaywouldmaintainthatthereisanysuchgeneralagreementastowhattheseare，aswouldsupportthetheorythattheymaybeknownapriori。[2]
If，then，inthesedomesticrelations——wherethedutiesofaffectionarecommonlyrecognisedassoimperativeandimportant——wecanfindnoreallyindependentandself-evidentprinciplesfordeterminingthem，Ineednotperhapsspendtimeinshowingthatthesameisthecaseinrespectofthelessintimateties(ofkindred，neighbourhood，etc。)
thatbindustootherhumanbeings。Indeed，thiswasmadesufficientlymanifestinourpreviousdiscussionofthoseotherduties。
Nodoubttherearecertainobligationstowardshumanbeingsgenerallywhichare，speakingbroadly，unquestionable:as，forexample，thenegativedutyofabstainingfromcausingpaintoothersagainsttheirwill，exceptbywayofdeservedpunishment(whetherthisistobeplacedundertheheadofJusticeorBenevolence)；andofmakingreparationforanypainwhichwemayhavecaused。Still，whenweconsidertheextentofthesedutiesandtrytodefinetheirlimits，——whenweaskhowfarwemaylegitimatelycausepaintoothermen(orothersentientbeings)inordertoobtainhappinessforourselvesorthirdpersons，oreventoconferagreatergoodonthesuffererhimself，ifthepainbeinflictedagainsthiswill，——wedonotseemabletoobtainanyclearandgenerallyacceptedprinciplefordecidingthispoint，unlesstheUtilitarianformulabeadmittedassuch。Again，asregardsReparation，thereis，aswehaveseen，afundamentaldoubthowfarthisisdueforharmthathasbeeninvoluntarilycaused。
Similarly，alladmitthatwehaveageneraldutyofrenderingservicestoourfellow-menandespeciallytothosewhoareinspecialneed，andthatweareboundtomakesacrificesforthem，whenthebenefitthatwetherebyconferverydecidedlyoutweighsthelosstoourselvesbutwhenweaskhowfarweareboundtogiveupourownhappinessinordertopromotethatofourfellows，whileitcanhardlybesaidthatCommonSensedistinctlyacceptstheUtilitarianprinciple，ityetdoesnotdefinitelyaffirmanyother。
AndeventhecommonprincipleofGratitude，thoughitsstringencyisimmediatelyanduniversallyfelt，seemsyetessentiallyindeterminate:owingtotheunsolvedquestionwhethertherequitalofabenefitoughttobeproportionatetowhatitcostthebenefactor，ortowhatitisworthtotherecipient。
WhenwepasstoconsiderthatelementofJusticewhichpresenteditselfasGratitudeuniversalised，thesamedifficultyrecursinamorecomplicatedform。Forhere，too，wehavetoaskwhethertheRequitalofGoodDesertoughttobeproportionedtothebenefitrendered，ortotheeffortmadetorenderit。AndifwescrutinisecloselythecommonmoralnotionofRetributiveJustice，itappears，strictlytaken，toimplythemetaphysicaldoctrineofFreeWill；since，accordingtothisconception，thereasonablenessofrewardingmeritisconsideredsolelyinrelationtothepast，withoutregardtothefuturebadconsequencestobeexpectedfromleavingmeritwithoutencouragement:andifeveryexcellenceinanyone’sactionsorproductionsseemsreferableultimatelytocausesotherthanhimself，theindividual’sclaimtorequital，fromthispointofview，appearstovanish。OntheotherhanditisobviouslyparadoxicalinestimatingDeserttoomitthemoralexcellencesduetohereditarytransmissionandeducation:orevenintellectualexcellences，sincegoodintentionwithoutforesightiscommonlyheldtoconstituteaveryimperfectmerit。EvenifwecutthroughthisspeculativedifficultybyleavingtheultimaterewardofrealDeserttoDivineJustice，westillseemunabletofindanyclearprinciplesforframingascaleofmerit。Andmuchthesamemaybesaid，mutatismutandis，ofthescaleofDemeritwhichCriminalJusticeseemstorequire。
Andevenifthesedifficultieswereovercome，weshouldstillbeonlyatthecommencementoftheperplexitiesinwhichthepracticaldeterminationofJusticeonself-evidentprinciplesisinvolved。Fortheexaminationofthecontentsofthisnotion，whichweconductedinchap。v。，furnishedusnotwithasingledefiniteprinciple，butwithawholeswarmofprinciples，whichare，unfortunatelyliabletocomeintoconflictwitheachother；andofwhicheventhosethatwhensinglycontemplatedhavetheairofbeingself-evidenttruths，donotcertainlycarrywiththemanyintuitivelyascertainabledefinitionoftheirmutualboundariesandrelations。Thus，forexample，inconstructinganideallyperfectdistributionofthemeansofhappiness，itseemsnecessarytotakeintoaccountthenotion(asIcalledit)ofFitness，which，thoughoftenconfoundedwithDesert，seemsessentiallydistinctfromit。Forthesocial`distribuend’includesnotmerelythemeansofobtainingpleasurablepassivefeelings，butalsofunctionsandinstruments，whichareimportantsourcesofhappiness，butwhichitisobviouslyreasonabletogivetothosewhocanperformandusethem。Andevenasregardsthematerialmeansofcomfortandluxury——wealth，inshort——wedonotfindthatthesameamountproducesthesameresultofhappinessineverycase:anditseemsreasonablethatthemeansofrefinedandvariedpleasureshouldbeallottedtothosewhohavethecorrespondingcapacitiesforenjoyment。Andyetthesemaynotbethemostdeserving，sothatthisprinciplemayclearlyconflictwiththatofrequitingDesert。
Andeitherprinciple，aswesaw，isliabletocomeintocollisionwiththewidely-accepteddoctrinethattheproperultimateendofLawistosecurethegreatestpossibleFreedomofactiontoallmembersofthecommunity:andthatallthatanyindividual，strictlyspeaking，owestoanyotherisnoninterference，exceptsofarashehasfurtherboundhimselfbyfreecontract。Butfurther，whenwecometoexaminethisprincipleinitsturn，wefindthat，inordertobecapableatallofaffordingapracticalbasisforsocialconstruction，itneedslimitationsandqualificationswhichmakeitlooklesslikeanindependentprinciplethana``middleaxiom’’
ofUtilitarianism；andthatitcannotwithoutapalpablestrainbemadetocoverthemostimportantrightswhichPositiveLawsecures。Forexample，thejustificationofpermanentappropriationissurelyratherthatitsuppliestheonlyadequatemotiveforlabourthanthatit，strictlyspeaking，realisesFreedom:norcanthequestionsthatariseindeterminingthelimitsoftherightofproperty——suchaswhetheritincludestherightofbequest——besettledbyanydeductionsfromthissupposedfundamentalprinciple。Noragain，caneventheenforcementofcontractsbefairlysaidtobearealisationofFreedom；foramanseems，strictlyspeaking，freerwhennooneofhisvolitionsisallowedtocauseanexternalcontrolofanyother。Andifwedisregardthisasaparadoxicalsubtlety，wearemetontheoppositesidebytheperplexitythatifabstractFreedomisconsistentwithanyengagementoffutureservices，itmustonthesamegroundsbeconsistentwithsuchasareperpetualandunqualified，andsoevenwithactualslavery。
AndthisquestionbecomesespeciallyimportantwhenweconsiderthatthedutyofobeyingpositivelawshasbymanybeenreconciledwiththeabstractrightofFreedom，bysupposinga`tacitcompact’orunderstandingbetweeneachindividualandtherestofhiscommunity。ThisCompact，however，seemsonexaminationtooclearlyfictitioustobeputforwardasabasisofmoralduty:asisfurtherevidentfromtheindefinitelyvariousqualificationsandreservationswithwhichthe`understanding’hasbydifferentthinkersbeensupposedtobeunderstood。Hencemanywhomaintainthe`BirthrightofFreedom’considerthattheonlyabstractedlyjustifiablesocialorderisoneinwhichnolawsareimposedwithouttheexpressconsentofthosewhoaretoobeythem。Butwefounditimpossiblereallytoconstructsocietyuponthisbasis:andsuchRepresentativeGovernmentsashaveactuallybeenestablishedonlyappeartorealisethisideabymeansofsweepinglimitationsandtransparentfictions。Itwasmanifest，too，thatthemaximumofwhatmaybecalledConstitutionalFreedom——i。e。themostperfectconformitybetweentheactionofagovernmentandthewishesofthemajorityofitssubjects——needbynomeansresultintherealisationofthemaximumofCivilFreedominthesocietysogoverned。
Butevenifwecoulddelineatetooursatisfactionanidealsocialorder，includinganidealformofgovernment，wehavestilltoreconcilethedutyofrealisingthiswiththeconformityduetotheactualorderofsociety。Forwehaveastrongconvictionthatpositivelawsought，generallyspeaking，tobeobeyed:and，again，ournotionofJusticeseemedtoincludeageneraldutyofsatisfyingtheexpectationsgeneratedbycustomandprecedent。Yetiftheactualorderofsocietydeviatesverymuchfromwhatwethinkoughttoexist，thedutyofconformingtoitseemstobecomeobscureanddoubtful。AndapartfromthiswecannotsaythatCommonSenseregardsitasanaxiomthatLawsoughttobeobeyed。
