ItmayeasilyseemthatwhenwehavediscussedBenevolence，Justice，andtheobservanceofLawandContract，wehaveincludedinourviewthewholesphereofsocialduty，andthatwhateverothermaximswefindacceptedbyCommonSensemustbesubordinatetotheprincipleswhichwehavebeentryingtodefine。
Forwhateverweowedefinitelytoourfellow-men，besidestheobservanceofspecialcontracts，andofpositivelaws，seems——atleastbyaslightextensionofcommonusage——tobenaturallyincludedunderJustice:whilethemoreindefiniteobligationswhichwerecogniseseemtocorrespondtothegoodwillwhichwethinkoughttoexistamongallmembersofthehumanfamily，togetherwiththestrongeraffectionsappropriatetospecialrelationsandcircumstances。AndhenceitmaybethoughtthatthebestwayoftreatingthesubjectwouldhavebeentodivideDutygenerallyintoSocialandSelf-regarding，andagaintosubdividetheformerbranchintotheheadswhichIhavediscussedonebyone；afterwardsaddingsuchminordetailsofdutyashaveobtainedspecialnamesanddistinctrecognition。AndthisisperhapstheproperplacetoexplainwhyIdidnotadoptthiscourse。ThedivisionofdutiesintoSocialandSelf-regarding，thoughobvious，andacceptableenoughasaroughprimafacieclassification，doesnotoncloserexaminationseemexactlyappropriatetotheIntuitionalMethod。Forthesetitlesnaturallysuggestthatthehappinessorwell-being，oftheagentorofothers，isalwaystheendandfinaldeterminantofrightaction:whereastheIntuitionaldoctrineis，thatatleastcertainkindsofconductareprescribedabsolutely，withoutreferencetotheirulteriorconsequences。Andifamoregeneralmeaningbegiventotheterms，andbySocialdutiesweunderstandthosewhichconsistintheproductionofcertaineffectsuponothers，whileintheSelf-regardingweaimatproducingcertaineffectsuponourselves，thedivisionisstillanunsuitableone。
Fortheseconsequencesarenotclearlyrecognisedintheenunciationofcommonrulesofmorality:andinmanycasesweproducemarkedeffectsbothonourselvesandonothers，anditisnoteasytosaywhich(intheviewofCommonSense)aremostimportant:andagain，thisprincipleofdivisionwouldsometimesmakeitnecessarytocutintwotheclassofdutiesprescribedundersomecommonnotion；asthesamerulemaygovernbothoursocialandoursolitaryconduct。Take，forexample，theactsmorallyprescribedundertheheadofCourage。ItseemsclearthattheprominencegiventothisVirtueinhistoricsystemsofmoralityhasbeenduetothegreatsocialimportancethatmustalwaysattachtoit，solongascommunitiesofmenarecontinuallycalledupontofightfortheirexistenceandwell-being:butstillthequalityofbraveryisthesameessentially，whetheritbeexhibitedforselfishorsocialends。
ItisnodoubttruethatwhenweexaminewithaviewtodefinitionthekindsofconductcommendedorprescribedinanylistofVirtuescommonlyrecognised，wefind，toagreatextent，thatthemaximsweobtainareclearlynotabsoluteandindependent:thatthequalitydenotedbyourtermisadmittedlyonlypraiseworthyinsofarasitpromotesindividualorgeneralwelfare，andbecomesblameworthy——thoughremaininginotherrespectsthesame——whenitoperatesadverselytotheseends。
Wehavealreadynoticedthisresultinoneortwoinstances，anditwillbeillustratedatlengthinthefollowingchapters。Butthoughthisisthecasetoagreatextent，itis，forourpresentpurpose，ofspecialimportancetonotethe——realorapparent——exceptionstotherule；becausetheyarespeciallycharacteristicofthemethodthatwecallIntuitionism。
OneofthemostimportantoftheseexceptionsisVeracity:andtheaffinityincertainrespectsofthisduty——inspiteoffundamentaldifferences——tothedutyofGoodFaithorFidelitytoPromisesrendersitconvenienttoexaminethetwoinimmediatesuccession。Undereitherheadacertaincorrespondencebetweenwordsandfactsisprescribed:andhencethequestionsthatarisewhenwetrytomakethemaximsprecisearesomewhatsimilarinbothcases。Forexample，justasthedutyofGoodFaithdidnotlieinconformingouractstotheadmissiblemeaningofcertainwords，[1]buttothemeaningwhichweknewtobeputonthembythepromisee；sothedutyofTruthspeakingisnottoutterwordswhichmight，accordingtocommonusage，produceinothermindsbeliefscorrespondingtoourown，butwordswhichwebelievewillhavethiseffectonthepersonswhomweaddress。Andthisisusuallyaverysimplematter，asthenaturaleffectoflanguageistoconveyourbeliefstoothermen，andwecommonlyknowquitewellwhetherwearedoingthisornot。Acertaindifficultyarises，asinthecaseofpromises，fromtheuseofsetformsimposedeitherbylaworbycustom；towhichmostofthediscussionofthesimilardifficultyintheprecedingchapterapplieswithobviousmodifications。Inthecaseofformulaeimposedbylaw——such(e。g。)asdeclarationsofreligiousbelief——itisdoubtfulwhetherwemayunderstandthetermsinanysensewhichtheycommonlybear，oraretotaketheminthesenseintendedbytheLegislaturethatimposedthem；andagain，adifficultyiscreatedbythegradualdegradationorperversionoftheirmeaning，whichresultsfromthestronginducementsofferedfortheirgeneralacceptance；forthustheyarecontinuallystrainedandstretcheduntilanewgeneralunderstandingseemsgraduallytogrowupastothemeaningofcertainphrases；anditiscontinuallydisputedwhetherwemayveraciouslyusethephrasesinthisnewsignification。Asimilarprocesscontinuallyaltersthemeaningofconventionalexpressionscurrentinpolitesociety。Whenamandeclaresthathe`hasgreatpleasureinaccepting’avexatiousinvitation，oris`theobedientservant’ofonewhomheregardsasaninferior，heusesphraseswhichwereprobablyoncedeceptive。Iftheyaresonolonger，CommonSensecondemnsasover-scrupuloustherefusaltousethemwhereitiscustomarytodoso。ButCommonSenseseemsdoubtfulandperplexedwheretheprocessofdegradationisincomplete，andtherearestillpersonswhomaybedeceived:
asintheuseofthereplythatoneis`notathome’toaninconvenientvisitorfromthecountry。
However，apartfromtheuseofconventionalphrases，therule`tospeakthetruth’isnotgenerallydifficultofapplicationinconduct。Andmanymoralistshaveregardedthis，fromitssimplicityanddefiniteness，asaquiteunexceptionableinstanceofanethicalaxiom。
Ithink，however，thatpatientreflectionwillshowthatthisviewisnotreallyconfirmedbytheCommonSenseofmankind。
Inthefirstplace，itdoesnotseemclearlyagreedwhetherVeracityisanabsoluteandindependentduty，oraspecialapplicationofsomehigherprinciple。Wefind(e。g。)
thatKantregardsitasadutyowedtooneselftospeakthetruth，because`alieisanabandonmentor，asitwere，annihilationofthedignityofman’。Andthisseemstobetheviewinwhichlyingisprohibitedbythecodeofhonour，exceptthatitisnotthought(bymenofhonourassuch)
thatthedignityofmanisimpairedbyanylying:butonlythatlyingforselfishends，especiallyundertheinfluenceoffear，ismeanandbase。Infactthereseemstobecircumstancesunderwhichthecodeofhonourprescribeslying。Here，however，itmaybesaidtobeplainlydivergentfromthemoralityofCommonSense。Still，thelatterdoesnotseemtodecideclearlywhethertruth-speakingisabsolutelyaduty，needingnofurtherjustification:orwhetheritismerelyageneralrightofeachmantohavetruthspokentohimbyhisfellows，whichrighthowevermaybeforfeitedorsuspendedundercertaincircumstances。Justaseachmanisthoughttohaveanaturalrighttopersonalsecuritygenerally，butnotifheishimselfattemptingtoinjureothersinlifeandproperty:
soifwemayevenkillindefenceofourselvesandothers，itseemsstrangeifwemaynotlie，iflyingwilldefendusbetteragainstapalpableinvasionofourrights:andCommonSensedoesnotseemtoprohibitthisdecisively。
Andagain，justastheorderlyandsystematicslaughterwhichwecallwaristhoughtperfectlyrightundercertaincircumstances，thoughpainfulandrevolting:sointheword-contestsofthelaw-courts，thelawyeriscommonlyheldtobejustifiedinuntruthfulnesswithinstrictrulesandlimits:foranadvocateisthoughttobeover-scrupulouswhorefusestosaywhatheknowstobefalse，ifheisinstructedtosayit。Again，wheredeceptionisdesignedtobenefitthepersondeceived，CommonSenseseemstoconcedethatitmaysometimesberight:forexample，mostpersonswouldnothesitatetospeakfalselytoaninvalid，ifthisseemedtheonlywayofconcealingfactsthatmightproduceadangerousshock:nordoIperceivethatanyoneshrinksfronttellingfictionstochildren，onmattersuponwhichitisthoughtwellthattheyshouldnotknowthetruth。Butifthelawfulnessofbenevolentdeceptioninanycasebeadmitted，Idonotseehowwecandecidewhenandhowfaritisadmissible，exceptbyconsiderationsofexpediency；thatis，byweighingthegainofanyparticulardeceptionagainsttheimperilmentofmutualconfidenceinvolvedinallviolationoftruth。
Themucharguedquestionofreligiousdeception(`piousfraud’)naturallysuggestsitselfhere。Itseemsclear，however，thatCommonSensenowpronouncesagainstthebroadrule，thatfalsehoodsmayrightlybetoldintheinterestsofreligion。Butthereisasubtlerforminwhichthesameprincipleisstillmaintainedbymoralpersons。Itissometimessaidthatthemostimportanttruthsofreligioncannotbeconveyedintothemindsofordinarymen，exceptbybeingenclosed，asitwere，inashelloffiction；sothatbyrelatingsuchfictionsasiftheywerefacts，wearereallyperforminganactofsubstantialveracity。Reflectinguponthisargument，weseethatitisnotafterallsoclearwhereinVeracityconsists。Forfromthebeliefsimmediatelycommunicatedbyanysetofaffirmationsinferencesarenaturallydrawn，andwemayclearlyforeseethattheywillbedrawn。Andthoughcommonlyweintendthatboththebeliefsimmediatelycommunicatedandtheinferencesdrawnfromthemshouldbetrue，andapersonwhoalwaysaimsatthisispraisedascandidandsincere:stillwefindrelaxationoftheruleprescribingthisintentionclaimedintwodifferentwaysbyatleastrespectablesectionsofopinion。Forfirst，aswasjustnowobserved，itissometimesheldthatifaconclusionistrueandimportant，andcannotbesatisfactorilycommunicatedotherwise，wemayleadthemindofthehearertoitbymeansoffictitiouspremises。Buttheexactreverseofthisisperhapsacommonerview:viz。
thatitisonlyanabsolutedutytomakeouractualaffirmationstrue:
foritissaidthatthoughtheidealconditionofhumanconverseinvolvesperfectsincerityandcandour，andweoughttorejoiceinexhibitingthesevirtueswherewecan，stillinouractualworldconcealmentisfrequentlynecessarytothewell-beingofsociety，andmaybelegitimatelyeffectedbyanymeansshortofactualfalsehood。Thusitisnotuncommonlysaidthatindefenceofasecretwemaynotindeedlie，[3]i。e。producedirectlybeliefscontrarytofact；butwemay``turnaquestionaside’’，i。e。produceindirectly，bynaturalinferencefromouranswer，anegativelyfalsebelief；or``throwtheinquireronawrongscent’’，i。e。producesimilarlyapositivelyfalsebelief。Thesetwomethodsofconcealmentareknownrespectivelyassuppressioveriandsuggestiofalsi，andmanythinkthemlegitimateundercertaincircumstances:
whileotherssaythatifdeceptionistobepractisedatall，itismereformalismtoobjecttoanyonemodeofeffectingitmorethananother。
Onthewhole，then，reflectionseemstoshowthattheruleofVeracity，ascommonlyaccepted，cannotbeelevatedintoadefinitemoralaxiom:forthereisnorealagreementasto，howfarweareboundtoimparttruebeliefstoothers:andwhileitiscontrarytoCommonSensetoexactabsolutecandourunderallcircumstances，weyetfindnoself-evidentsecondaryprinciple，clearlydefiningwhenitisnottobeexacted。
