Andifwesaythattheheinousnessofthecrimedependsonthelossofhappinessthatwouldgenerallybecausedbysuchactsiftheywereallowedtogounpunished，andthatwemustsupposethecriminaltobeawareofthis；weseemtobeendeavouringtoforceautilitariantheoryintoanintuitionalformbymeansofalegalfiction。
Wehavehithertospokenofintentionalwrong-doing:
butpositivelawawardspunishmentalsoforharmthatisduetorashnessornegligence；andthejustificationofthisinvolvesusinfurtherdifficulties。
Somejuristsseemtoregardrashnessandnegligenceaspositivestatesofmind，inwhichtheagentconsciouslyrefusestheattentionorreflectionwhichheknowsheoughttogive；andnodoubtthissortofwilfulrecklessnessdoessometimesoccur，andseemsasproperlypunishableasiftheresultingharmhadbeenpositivelyintended。Butthelawasactuallyadministereddoesnotrequireevidencethatthiswastheagent’sstateofmind(whichindeedinmostcasesitwouldbeimpossibletogive):butiscontentwithproofthattheharmmighthavebeenpreventedbysuchcareasanaveragemanwouldhaveshownunderthecircumstances。Andmostcommonlyby`carelessness’
wesimplymeanapurelynegativepsychologicalfact，i。e。thattheagentdidnotperformcertainprocessesofobservationorreflection；itisthereforeatthetimestrictlyinvoluntary，andsoscarcelyseemstoinvolveill-desert。Itmaybesaidperhapsthatthoughthepresentcarelessnessisnotblameworthy，thepastneglecttocultivatehabitsofcareisso。
Butinmanyindividualinstanceswecannotreasonablyinfereventhispastneglect；andinsuchcasestheutilitariantheoryofpunishment，whichregardsitasameansofpreventingsimilarharmfulactsinthefuture，seemsaloneapplicable。Similardifficultiesarise，aswasbeforehinted(p。282)，indeterminingthelimitswithinwhichReparationisdue；thatis，ontheviewthatitisnotincumbentonustomakecompensationforallharmcausedbyourmuscularactions，butonlyforharmwhich-ifnotintentional-wasduetoourrashnessornegligence。
TheresultsofthisexaminationofJusticemaybesummedupasfollows。TheprominentelementinJusticeasordinarilyconceivedisakindofEquality:thatis，Impartialityintheobservanceorenforcementofcertaingeneralrulesallottinggoodoreviltoindividuals。Butwhenwehaveclearlydistinguishedthiselement，weseethatthedefinitionofthevirtuerequiredforpracticalguidanceisleftobviouslyincomplete。Inquiringfurtherfortherightgeneralprinciplesofdistribution，wefindthatourcommonnotionofJusticeincludes——besidestheprincipleofReparationforinjury——twoquitedistinctanddivergentelements。Theone，whichwemaycallConservativeJustice，isrealised(1)intheobservanceofLawandContractsanddefiniteunderstandings，andintheenforcementofsuchpenaltiesfortheviolationoftheseashavebeenlegallydeterminedandannounced；and(2)inthefulfilmentofnaturalandnormalexpectations。Thislatterobligation，however，isofasomewhatindefinitekind。Buttheotherelement，whichwehavecalledIdealJustice，isstillmoredifficulttodefine；forthereseemtobetwoquitedistinctconceptionsofit，embodiedrespectivelyinwhatwehavecalledtheIndividualisticandtheSocialisticIdealsofapoliticalcommunity。ThefirstofthesetakestherealisationofFreedomastheultimateendandstandardofrightsocialrelations:butonexaminingitcloserwefindthatthenotionofFreedomwillnotgiveapracticablebasisforsocialconstructionwithoutcertainarbitrarydefinitionsandlimitations:
andevenifweadmitthese，stillasocietyinwhichFreedomisrealisedasfarasisfeasibledoesnotcompletelysuitoursenseofJustice。Primafacie，thisismoresatisfiedbytheSocialisticIdealofDistribution，foundedontheprincipleofrequitingDesert:butwhenwetrytomakethisprincipleprecise，wefindourselvesagaininvolvedingravedifficulties；
andsimilarperplexitiesbesettheworkingoutofrulesofCriminalJusticeonthesameprinciple。
InthediscussionofJusticethemoralobligationsofobediencetoLawandobservanceofContracthavebeenincluded，andhave，indeed，appearedtobethemostdefinitepartofthecomplexsystemofprivatedutiescommonlyincludedunderthatterm。Atthesametime，aswehaveseen，therearesomelaws，theviolationofwhichdoesnotinterferewiththerightsofothers，andthereforehasnotthecharacteristicsofanactofInjustice。Whileagain，thedutyofFidelitytopromisesisalsocommonlyconceivedasindependentofanyinjurythatmightbedonetothepromiseebybreakingit:for(e。g。)menordinarilyjudgethatpromisestothedead，thoughtheyarebeyondthereachofinjury，oughttobekept:
indeed，somewouldregardthemasevenmoresacredthanpromisesmadetotheliving。Itseemsthereforedesirabletoexaminethepropositions`thatLawoughttobeobeyed’and`thatpromisesoughttobekept’，consideredasindependentprinciples。
Tobeginwiththeformer:howarewetoascertainwhattheLawiswhich，asiscommonlythought，wearemorallyboundtoobey，assuch？ItisplainthatwecannotheredistinguishLegalfromotherrulesbyconsideringthesanctionsactuallyattachedtothem，aswehadoccasiontodoinapreviouschapter。Forcommandsissuedbyrebelsandusurpersareheldtohaveassuchnogeneralbindingness，thoughtheymaybeenforcedbyjudicialpenalties；itwouldbegenerallyagreedthatsofarasitisourdutytoobeysuchcommandsthisissolelyinordertoavoidthegreaterevilswhichmightresulttoourselvesandothersfromourdisobedience；andthattheextentofsuchadutymustbedeterminedbyconsiderationsofexpediency。Nor，again，canwesaythatallcommandsevenofalegitimatesovereignaretoberegardedasLawsinthesenseinwhichthetermmustbetakeninthepropositionthat`lawsoughttobeobeyed’:sinceweallrecognisethatarightfulsovereignmaycommandhissubjectstodowhatiswrong，andthatitisthentheirdutytodisobeyhim。ItseemsthereforethatforourpresentpurposewemustdefineLawstobeRulesofConductlaiddownbyaRightfulAuthority，commandingwithinthelimitsofitsauthority。
Therearethereforetwoquestionstobesettled，ifthepropositionthatlawsoughttobeobeyedistofurnishpracticalguidance:(1)howwearetodistinguishtheRightfulLawmaker——whetherindividualorbody，and(2)howwearetoascertainthelimitsofthislawmaker’sauthority。Thequestionsshouldbedistinguished；but，asweshallsee，theycanonlybepartiallyseparated。Beginningwiththefirstquestion，wemayassumethattheauthoritytomakelawsresidesinsomelivingmanormen。Nodoubtinsomesocieties，atsomestagesoftheirdevelopment，thewholeorapartofthecodeoflawshabituallyobserved，oratleastrecognisedasbinding，hasbeenbelievedtobeofdivineorsemi-divineinstitution；orperhapsfrommereantiquitytopossessasanctitysuperiortothatofanylivingauthority，soastobenotlegitimatelyalterable。ButwehardlyfindthisviewintheCommonSenseofcivilisedEurope，uponwhichwearenowreflecting:atanyrateinoursocietiesthereisnotthoughttobeanyportionofthedefiniteprescriptionsofpositivelawwhich，invirtueofitsorigin，isbeyondthereachofalterationbyanylivingauthority。
Wherethenisthisauthoritytobefound？
Intheanswerscommonlygiventothisquestion，theconflictbetweentheIdealandtheTraditionalorCustomary，whichhasperplexedusinseekingthedefinitionofJustice，meetsusagaininanevenmorecomplicatedform。Fornotonlydosomesaythatobedienceisalwaysduetothetraditionallylegitimateauthorityinanycountry，whileothersmaintainthatanauthorityconstitutedinaccordancewithcertainabstractprinciplesisessentiallylegitimate，andthatanationhasarighttoclaimthatsuchanauthorityshallbeestablished，evenattheriskofcivilstrifeandbloodshed:butoften，too，theauthorityactuallyestablishedisnoteventraditionallylegitimate。Sothatwehave，todistinguishthreeclaimstoauthority，eachofwhichmaycomeintoconflictwitheitheroftheothertwo:(1)thatoftheGovernmentheldtobeideallyorabstractlyright，andsuchasoughttobeestablished:(2)thatoftheGovernmentdejure，accordingtotheconstitutionaltraditionsinanygivencountry:and(3)thatofthedefactoGovernment。
LetusbeginbyconsideringtheIdeal。HereIdonotproposetoconsiderallviewsastotherightconstitutionofsupremeauthoritywhichspeculativethinkershaveputforward；butonlysuchashaveaprimafacieclaimtoexpresstheCommonSenseofmankindonthesubject。Ofthesethemostimportant，andthemostwidelyurgedandadmitted，istheprinciplethattheSovereigninanycommunitycanonlyberightlyconstitutedbytheConsentoftheSubjects。This，aswasnoticedintheprecedingchapter，isinvolvedintheadoptionofFreedomastheultimateendofpoliticalorder:ifnooneoriginallyowesanythingtoanotherexceptnoninterference，heclearlyoughtonlytobeplacedintherelationofSubjecttoSovereignbyhisownconsent。Andthus，inordertoreconciletheoriginalrightofFreedomwiththeactualdutyofLaw-observance，somesuppositionofasocialcompactappearsnecessary；bymeansofwhichObediencetoLawbecomesmerelyaspecialapplicationofthedutyofkeepingcompacts。
Inwhatway，then，arethetermsofthisfundamentalcompacttobeknown？Noonenowmaintainstheoldviewthatthetransitionfromthe`natural’tothe`political’stateactuallytookplacebymeansofan``originalcontract’’，whichconferredindeliblelegitimacyonsomeparticularformofsocialorganisation。Shallwesay，then，thatamanbyremainingamemberofacommunityentersintoa`tacitundertaking’
toobeythelawsandothercommandsimposedbytheauthoritygenerallyrecognisedaslawfulinthatcommunity？InthiswayhowevertheIdeallapsesintotheCustomary:andthemostunlimiteddespotism，ifestablishedandtraditional，mightclaimtorestonfreeconsentaswellasanyotherformofgovernment:sothattheprincipleofabstractFreedomwouldleadtothejustificationofthemostunqualifiedconcretetyrannyandservitude；
andthusourtheorywouldendbyrivetingmen’schainsunderpretenceofexaltingtheirfreedom。Iftoavoidthisresult，wesupposethatcertain`NaturalRights’areinalienable——ortacitlyreservedinthetacitcompactandthatlawsarenotstrictlylegitimatewhichdepriveamanofthese，weareagainmetbythedifficultyofdeducingtheseinalienablerightsfromanyclearandgenerallyacceptedprinciples。Forinstance，aswehaveseen，awidelyacceptedopinionisthatallsuchrightsmaybesummedupinthenotionofFreedom；butwehavealsoseenthatthisprincipleisambiguous，andespeciallythattherightofprivatepropertyascommonlyrecognisedcannotbeclearlydeducedfromit；andifsoitwouldcertainlybemostparadoxicaltomaintainthatnogovernmentcanlegitimatelyclaimobedienceforanycommandsexceptsuchascarryouttheprincipleofprotectingfrominterferencetheFreedomoftheindividualsgoverned。Ithasbeenthoughtthatwecanavoidthisdifficultybyconstitutingthesupremeorganofgovernmentsothatanylawlaiddownbyitwillalwaysbealawtowhicheverypersoncalledontoobeyitwillhaveconsentedpersonallyorbyhisrepresentatives:andthatagovernmentsoconstituted，inwhich——toadoptRousseau’sphrase——everyone``obeyshimselfalone’’，willcompletelyreconcilefreedomandorder。Buthowisthisresulttobeattained？Rousseauheldthatitcouldbeattainedbypuredirectdemocracy，eachindividualsubordinatinghisprivatewilltothe``generalwill’’ofthesovereignpeopleofwhichallareequallymembers。Butthis``generalwill’’mustbepracticallythewillofthemajority:anditisparadoxicaltoaffirmthatthefreedomandnaturalrightsofadissentientminorityareeffectivelyprotectedbyestablishingtheconditionthattheoppressorsmustexceedtheoppressedinnumber。Again，iftheprinciplebeabsoluteitoughttoapplytoallhumanbeingsalike:andiftoavoidthisabsurdityweexcludechildren，anarbitrarylinehastobedrawn:andtheexclusionofwomen，whicheventhosewhoregardthesuffrageasanaturalrightareoftendisposedtomaintain，seemsaltogetherindefensible。Andtosuppose——assomehavedone——thattheidealof``obeyingoneselfalone’’canbeevenapproximatelyrealisedbyRepresentativeDemocracy，isevenmorepatentlyabsurd。ForaRepresentativeassemblyisnormallychosenonlybyapartofthenation，andeachlawisapprovedonlybyapartoftheassembly:anditwouldberidiculoustosaythatamanhasassentedtoalawpassedbyameremajorityofanassemblyagainstonememberofwhichhehasvoted。
