Otherdifficultiesmightberaised:butweneednotpursuethem，forifFreedombetakensimplytomeanthatoneman’sactionsaretobeaslittleaspossiblerestrainedbyothers，itisobviouslymorefullyrealisedwithoutappropriation。Andifitbesaidthatitincludes，besidethis，facilityandsecurityinthegratificationofdesires，andthatitisFreedominthissensethatwethinkshouldbeequallydistributed，andthatthiscannotberealisedwithoutappropriation；thenitmaybereplied，thatinasocietywherenearlyallmaterialthingsarealreadyappropriated，thiskindofFreedomisnotandcannotbeequallydistributed。Amanbornintosuchasociety，withoutinheritance，isnotonlyfairlessfreethanthosewhopossessproperty，butheislessfreethaniftherehadbeennoappropriation。Itmaybesaidthat，havingfreedomofcontract，hewillgivehisservicesinexchangefortilemeansofsatisfyinghiswants；andthatthisexchangemustnecessarilygivehimmorethanhecouldhavegotifhehadbeenplacedintheworldbyhimself；that，infact，anyhumansocietyalwaysrendersthepartoftheearththatitinhabitsmorecapableofaffordinggratificationofdesirestoeachandallofitslater-bornmembersthanitwouldotherwisebe。Buthowevertruethismaybeasageneralrule，itisobviouslynotsoinallcases:asmenaresometimesunabletoselltheirservicesatall，andoftencanonlyobtaininexchangeforthemaninsufficientsubsistence。And，evengrantingittobetrue，itdoesnotprovethatsociety，byappropriation，hasnotinterferedwiththenaturalfreedomofitspoorer。members:butonlythatitcompensatesthemforsuchinterference，andthatthecompensationisadequate:anditmustbeevidentthatifcompensationintheformofmaterialcommoditiescanbejustlygivenforanencroachmentonFreedom，therealisationofFreedomcannotbetheoneultimateendofdistributiveJustice。
Itseems，then，thatthoughFreedomisanobjectofkeenandgeneraldesire，andanimportantsourceofhappiness，bothinitselfandindirectlyfromthesatisfactionofnaturalimpulseswhichitallows，theattempttomakeitthefundamentalnotionoftheoreticalJurisprudenceisattendedwithinsuperabledifficulties:
andthateventheNaturalRightswhichitclaimstocovercannotbebroughtunderitexceptinaveryforcedandarbitrarymanner。Butfurther，evenifthiswereotherwise，anequaldistributionofFreedomdoesnotseemtoexhaustournotionofJustice。IdealJustice，aswecommonlyconceiveit，seemstodemandthatnotonlyFreedombutallotherbenefitsandburdensshouldbedistributed，ifnotequally，atanyratejustly，——JusticeindistributionbeingregardedasnotidenticalwithEquality，butmerelyexclusiveofarbitraryinequality。
How，then，shallwefindtheprincipleofthishighestandmostcomprehensiveideal？
Weshallbeledtoit，Ithink，byreferringagaintooneofthegroundsofobligationtorenderservices，whichwasnoticedinthelastchapter:theclaimofGratitude。Itthereappearedthatwehavenotonlyanaturalimpulsetorequitebenefits，butalsoaconvictionthatsuchrequitalisaduty，anditsomissionblameworthy，tosomeextentatleast；thoughwefinditdifficulttodefinetheextent。
Nowitseemsthatwhenwe，sotosay，universalisethisimpulseandconviction，wegettheelementinthecommonviewofJustice，whichwearenowtryingtodefine。Forifwetaketheproposition`thatgooddonetoanyindividualoughttoberequitedbyhim’，andleaveouttherelationtotheindividualineithertermoftheproposition，weseemtohaveanequallystrongconvictionofthetruthofthemoregeneralstatement`thatgooddeedsoughttoberequited’。Andifwetakeintoconsiderationallthedifferentkindsanddegreesofservices，uponthemutualexchangeofwhichsocietyisbased，wegettheproposition`thatmenoughttoberewardedinproportiontotheirdeserts’。AndthiswouldbecommonlyheldtobethetrueandsimpleprincipleofdistributioninanycasewheretherearenoclaimsarisingfromContractorCustomtomodifyitsoperation。
Forexample，itwouldbeadmittedthat——iftherehasbeennopreviousarrangement——theprofitsofanyworkorenterpriseshouldbedividedamongthosewhohavecontributedtoitssuccessinproportiontotheworthoftheirservices。Anditmaybeobserved，thatsomethinkersmaintainthepropositiondiscussedintheprevioussection——thatLawoughttoaimatsecuringthegreatestpossibleFreedomforeachindividual——notasabsoluteandaxiomatic，butasderivativefromtheprinciplethatDesertoughttoberequited；onthegroundthatthebestwayofprovidingfortherequitalofDesertistoleavemenasfreeaspossibletoexertthemselvesforthesatisfactionoftheirowndesires，andsotowineachhisownrequital。
AndthisseemstobereallytheprincipleuponwhichtheRightofPropertyisrested，whenitisjustifiedbythepropositionthateveryonehasanexclusiverighttotheproduceofhislabour。Foronreflectionitisseenthatnolabourreally`produces’anymaterialthing，butonlyaddstoitsvalue:andwedonotthinkthatamancanacquirearighttoamaterialthingbelongingtoanotherbyspendinghislabouronit——evenifhedoessointhebonafidebeliefthatitishisownproperty——butonlytoadequatecompensationforhislabour；this，therefore，iswhatthepropositionjustquotedmustmean。Theprincipleis，indeed，sometimesstretchedtoexplaintheoriginalrightofpropertyinmaterials，asbeinginasense`produced’(i。e。found)bytheirfirstdiscoverer；buthereagain，reflectionshowsthatCommonSensedoesnotgrantthis(asamoralright)absolutely，butonlyinsofarasitappearstobenotmorethanadequatecompensationforthediscoverer’strouble。Forexample，weshouldnotconsiderthatthefirstfinderofalargeuninhabitedregionhadamoralrighttoappropriatethewholeofit。Hencethisjustificationoftherightofpropertyrefersusultimatelytotheprinciple`thateverymanoughttoreceiveadequaterequitalforhislabour’。So，again，whenwespeakoftheworldasjustlygovernedbyGod，weseemtomeanthat，ifwecouldknowthewholeofhumanexistence，weshouldfindthathappinessisdistributedamongmenaccordingtotheirdeserts。AndDivineJusticeisthoughttobeapatternwhichHumanJusticeistoimitateasfarastheconditionsofhumansocietyallow。
ThiskindofJustice，ashasbeensaid，seemslikeGratitudeuniversalised:andthesameprincipleappliedtopunishmentmaysimilarlyberegardedasResentmentuniversalised；thoughthe，parallelisincomplete，ifweareconsideringthepresentstateofourmoralconceptions。
Historyshowsusatimeinwhichitwasthoughtnotonlyasnatural，butasclearlyrightandincumbentonaman，torequiteinjuriesastorepaybenefits:butasmoralreflectiondevelopedinEuropethisnotionwasrepudiated，sothatPlatotaughtthatitcouldneverberightreallytoharmanyone，howeverhemayhaveharmedus。AndthisistheaccepteddoctrineinChristiansocieties，asregardsrequitalbyindividualsofpersonalwrongs。ButinitsuniversalisedformtheoldconvictionstilllingersinthepopularviewofCriminalJustice:itseemsstilltobewidelyheldthatJusticerequirespaintobeinflictedonamanwhohasdonewrong，evenifnobenefitresulteithertohimortoothersfromthepain。Personally，IamsofarfromholdingthisviewthatIhaveaninstinctiveandstrongmoralaversiontoit:andIhesitatetoattributeittoCommonSense，sinceIthinkthatitisgraduallypassingawayfromthemoralconsciousnessofeducatedpersonsinthemostadvancedcommunities:butIthinkitisstillperhapsthemoreordinaryview。
This，then，isoneelementofwhatAristotlecallsCorrectiveJustice，whichisembodiedincriminallaw。ItmustnotbeconfoundedwiththeprincipleofReparation，onwhichlegalawardsofdamagesarebased。WehavealreadynoticedthisasasimpledeductionfromthemaximofgeneralBenevolence，whichforbidsustodoharmtoourfellow-creatures:forifwehaveharmedthem，wecanyetapproximatelyobeythemaximbygivingcompensationfortheharm。Thoughherethequestionariseswhetherweareboundtomakereparationforharmthathasbeenquiteblamelesslycaused:anditisnoteasytoansweritdecisively。Onthewhole，Ithinkweshouldcondemnamanwhodidnotoffersomereparationforanyseriousinjurycausedbyhimtoanother——evenifquiteinvoluntarilycaused，andwithoutnegligence:
butperhapsweregardthisratherasadutyofBenevolence——arisingoutofthegeneralsympathythateachoughttohaveforothers，intensifiedbythisspecialoccasion——thanasadutyofstrictJustice。If，however，welimittherequirementofReparation，undertheheadofstrictJustice，tocasesinwhichthemischiefrepairedisduetoactsoromissionsinsomedegreeculpable，adifficultyarisesfromthedivergencebetweenthemoralviewofculpability，andthatwhichsocialsecurityrequires。OfthisIwillspeakpresently。InanycasethereisnownodangerofconfusionorcollisionbetweentheprincipleofReparativeandthatofRetributiveJustice，astheoneismanifestlyconcernedwiththeclaimsoftheinjuredparty，andtheotherwiththedesertsofthewrongdoer:thoughintheactualadministrationofLawtheobligationofpayingcompensationforwrongmaysometimesbetreatedasasufficientpunishmentforthewrongdoer。
When，however，weturnagaintotheotherbranchofRetributiveJustice，whichisconcernedwiththerewardofservices，wefindanothernotion，whichIwillcallFitness，oftenblendedindistinguishablywiththenotionofDesert，andsoneedingtobecarefullyseparatedfromit；andwhenthedistinctionhasbeenmade，weseethatthetwoareliabletocomeintocollision。Idonotfeelsurethattheprincipleof`distributionaccordingtoFitness’isfound，strictlyspeaking，intheanalysisoftheordinarynotionofJustice:butitcertainlyentersintoourcommonconceptionoftheidealorperfectlyrationalorderofsociety，asregardsthedistributionbothofinstrumentsandfunctions，and(tosomeextentatleast)ofothersourcesofhappiness。Wecertainlythinkitreasonablethatinstrumentsshouldbegiventothosewhocanusethembest，andfunctionsallottedtothosewhoaremostcompetenttoperformthem:butthesemaynotbethosewhohaverenderedmostservicesinthepast。Andagain，wethinkitreasonablethatparticularmaterialmeansofenjoymentshouldfalltothelotofthosewhoaresusceptibleoftherespectivekindsofpleasure；asnoonewouldthinkofallottingpicturestoablindman，orrarewinestoonewhohadnotaste:henceweshouldprobablythinkitfittingthatartistsshouldhavelargersharesthanmechanicsinthesocialdistributionofwealth，thoughtheymaybebynomeansmoredeserving。ThusthenotionsofDesertandFitnessappearatleastoccasionallyconflicting；butperhaps，asIhavesuggested，Fitnessshouldratherberegardedasautilitarianprincipleofdistribution，inevitablylimitingtherealisationofwhatisabstractlyjust，thanasapartoftheinterpretationofJusticeproper:anditiswiththelatterthatweareatpresentconcerned。
AtanyrateitistheRequitalofDesertthatconstitutesthechiefelementofIdealJustice，insofarasthisimportssomethingmorethanmereEqualityandImpartiality。LetusthenexaminemorecloselywhereinDesertconsists；
andwewillbeginwithGoodDesertorMerit，asbeingofthemostfundamentalandpermanentimportance；forwemayhopethatcrimeanditspunishmentwilldecreaseandgraduallydisappearastheworldimproves，buttherightorbestdistributionofthemeansofwellbeingisanobjectthatwemustalwaysbestrivingtorealise。
Andfirst，thequestionwhichwehadtoconsiderindefiningGratitudeagainrecurs:whether，namely，wearetoapportiontherewardtotheeffortmade，ortotheresultsattained。Foritmaybesaidthattheactualutilityofanyservicemustdependmuchuponfavourablecircumstancesandfortunateaccidents，notduetoanydesertoftheagent:oragain，maybeduetopowersandskillswhichwereconnate，orhavebeendevelopedbyfavourableconditionsoflife，orbygoodeducation，andwhyshouldwerewardhimforthese？(forthelast-mentionedweoughtrathertorewardthosewhohaveeducatedhim)。AndcertainlyitisonlyinsofarasmoralexcellencesareexhibitedinhumanachievementsthattheyarecommonlythoughttobesuchasGodwillreward。Butbydrawingthislinewedonotyetgetridofthedifficulty。Foritmaystillbesaidthatgoodactionsaredueentirely，ortoagreatextent，togooddispositionsandhabits，andthatthesearepartlyinheritedandpartlyduetothecareofparentsandteachers；sothatinrewardingthesewearerewardingtheresultsofnaturalandaccidentaladvantages，anditisunreasonabletodistinguishthesefromothers，suchasskillandknowledge，andtosaythatitisevenideallyjusttorewardtheoneandnottheother。Shallwesay，then，thattherewardshouldbeproportionatetotheamountofvoluntaryeffortforagoodend？ButDeterministswillsaythateventhisisultimatelytheeffectofcausesextraneoustotheman’sself。OntheDeterministview，then，itwouldseemtobeideallyjust(ifanythingisso)thatallmenshouldenjoyequalamountsofhappiness:forthereseemstobenojusticeinmakingAhappierthanB，merelybecausecircumstancesbeyondhisowncontrolhavefirstmadehimbetter。Butwhyshouldwenot，insteadof’allmen’，say’allsentientbeings’？forwhyshouldmenhavemorehappinessthananyotheranimal？ButthusthepursuitofidealjusticeseemstoconductustosuchaprecipiceofparadoxthatCommonSenseislikelytoabandonit。AtanyratetheordinaryideaofDeserthasthusaltogethervanished。Andthusweseemtobeledtothe
