Ifnowweturnagaintothepoliticalquestion，fromwhichwediverged，weseethatwehaveobtainedfromtheprecedingdiscussiononeofthecriteriaofthejusticeoflawswhichwewereseeking——viz。thattheymustavoidrunningcountertonaturalandnormalexpectations——:butweseeatthesametimethatthecriterioncannotbemadedefiniteinitsapplicationtoprivateconduct，anditiseasytoshowthatthereisthesameindefinitenessandconsequentdifficultyinapplyingittolegislation。ForLawitselfisamainsourceofnaturalexpectations；and，sinceinordinarytimesthealterationsinlawareverysmallinproportiontotheamountunaltered，thereisalwaysanaturalexpectationthattheexistinglawswillbemaintained:andalthoughthisis，ofcourse，anindefiniteanduncertainexpectationinasocietylikeours，wherelawsarecontinuallybeingalteredbylawfulauthority，itissufficientforpeopleingeneraltorelyuponinarrangingtheirconcerns，investingtheirmoney，choosingtheirplaceofabode，theirtradeandprofession，etc。Hencewhensuchexpectationsaredisappointedbyachangeinthelaw，thedisappointedpersonscomplainofinjustice，anditistosomeextentadmittedthatjusticerequiresthattheyshouldbecompensatedforthelossthusincurred。Butsuchexpectationsareofalldegreesofdefinitenessandimportance，andgenerallyextendmorewidelyastheydecreaseinvalue，liketheripplesmadebythrowingastoneintoapond，sothatitispracticallyimpossibletocompensatethemall:atthesametime，Iknownointuitiveprinciplebywhichwecouldseparatevalidclaimsfrominvalid，anddistinguishinjusticefromsimplehardship。
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Butevenifthisdifficultywereovercomefurtherreflectionmust，Ithink，showthatthecriterionabovegivenisincompleteorimperfectlystated:otherwiseitwouldappearthatnooldlawcouldbeunjust，sincelawsthathaveexistedforalongtimemustcreatecorrespondingexpectations。ButthisiscontrarytoCommonSense:aswearecontinuallybecomingconvincedthatoldlawsareunjust(e。g。lawsestablishingslavery):indeed，thiscontinuallyrecurringconvictionseemstobeoneofthegreatsourcesofchangeinthelawsofaprogressivesociety。
Perhapswemaysaythattherearenaturalexpectationswhichgrowupfromotherelementsofthesocialorder，independentofandsopossiblyconflictingwithlaws:andthatwecallrulesunjustwhichgocountertothese。Thuse。g。primogenitureappearstomanyunjust，becauseallthelandowner’schildrenarebroughtupinequallyluxurioushabits，andshareequallythepaternalcareandexpenditure，andsotheinequalityofinheritanceseemsparadoxicalandharsh。Still，wecannotexplaineverycaseinthisway:forexample，theconvictionthatslaveryisunjustcanhardlybetracedtoanythingintheestablishedorderoftheslave-holdingsociety，butseemstoariseinadifferentway。
Thetruthis，thisnotionof`naturalexpectations’isworsethanindefinite:theambiguityofthetermconcealsafundamentalconflictofideas，whichappearsmoreprofoundandfar-reachinginitsconsequencesthemoreweexamineit。Fortheword`natural’，asusedinthisconnexion，coversandconcealsthewholechasmbetweentheactualandtheideal——whatisandwhatoughttobe。Aswebeforenoticed，thetermseems，asordinarilyused，tocontainthedistinctideasof(1)thecommonasopposedtotheexceptional，and(2)theoriginalorprimitiveascontrastedwiththeresultoflaterconventionsandinstitutions。
Butitisalsousedtosignify，inmoreorlessindefinitecombinationwithoneorotherofthesemeanings，`whatwouldexistinanidealstateofsociety’。Anditiseasytoseehowthesedifferentmeaningshavebeenblendedandconfounded。Forsinceby`Nature’menhavereallymeantGod，orGodviewedinaparticularaspect——God，wemaysay，asknowntousinexperience——whentheyhavecometoconceiveabetterstateofthingsthanthatwhichactuallyexists，theyhavenotonlyregardedthisidealstateasreallyexhibitingtheDivinepurposesmorethantheactual，andasbeingsofarmore`natural’:buttheyhavegonefurther，andsupposedmoreorlessdefinitelythatthisidealstateofthingsmustbewhatGodoriginallycreated，andthatthedefectsrecognisableinwhatnowexistsmustbeduetothedeterioratingactionofmen。Butifwedismissthislatterview，asunsupportedbyhistoricalevidence，werecognisemoreplainlythecontrastandconflictbetweentheothertwomeaningsof`natural’，andthecorrespondingdiscrepancybetweenthetwoelementsofthecommonnotionofJustice。For，fromonepointofview，wearedisposedtothinkthatthecustomarydistributionofrights，goods，andprivileges，aswellasburdensandpains，isnaturalandjust，andthatthisoughttobemaintainedbylaw，asitusuallyis:while，fromanotherpointofview，weseemtorecogniseanidealsystemofrulesofdistributionwhichoughttoexist，butperhapshaveneveryetexisted，andweconsiderlawstobejustinproportionastheyconformtothisideal。ItisthereconciliationbetweenthesetwoviewswhichisthechiefproblemofpoliticalJustice。
Onwhatprinciples，then，istheidealtobedetermined？
Thisis，infact，thequestionwhichhasbeenchieflyinviewfromtheoutsetofthechapter；butwecouldnotsatisfactorilydiscussituntilwehaddistinguishedthetwoelementsofJustice，ascommonlyconceived-oneconservativeoflawandcustom，andtheothertendingtoreformthem。Itisonthislatterthatweshallnowconcentrateourattention。
When，however，weexaminethisideal，asitseemstoshowitselfinthemindsofdifferentmenindifferentagesandcountries，weobservevariousformsofit，whichitisimportanttodistinguish。
Inthefirstplace，itmustbenoticedthatanidealconstitutionofsocietymaybeconceivedandsoughtwithmanyotherendsinviewbesidestherightdistributionofgoodandevilamongtheindividualsthatcomposeit:as(e。g。)withaviewtoconquestandsuccessinwar，ortothedevelopmentofindustryandcommerce，ortothehighestpossiblecultivationoftheartsandsciences。Butanysuchpoliticalidealasthisisbeyondtherangeofourpresentconsideration，asitisnotconstructedonthebasisofourcommonnotionofJustice。Ourpresentquestionis，Arethereanyclearprinciplesfromwhichwemayworkoutanideallyjustdistributionofrightsandprivileges，burdensandpains，amonghumanbeingsassuch？Thereisawide-spreadview，thatinordertomakesocietyjustcertainNaturalRightsshouldbeconcededtoallmembersofthecommunity，andthatpositivelawshouldatleastembodyandprotectthese，whateverotherregulationsitmaycontain:butitisdifficulttofindinCommonSenseanydefiniteagreementintheenumerationoftheseNaturalRights，stilllessanyclearprinciplesfromwhichtheycanbesystematicallydeduced。
Thereis，however，onemodeofsystematisingtheseRightsandbringingthemunderoneprinciple，whichhasbeenmaintainedbyinfluentialthinkers；andwhich，thoughnowperhapssomewhatantiquated，isstillsufficientlycurrenttodeservecarefulexamination。IthasbeenheldthatFreedomfrominterferenceisreallythewholeofwhathumanbeings，originallyandapartfromcontracts，canbestrictlysaidtoowetoeachother:atanyrate，thattheprotectionofthisFreedom(includingtheenforcementofFreeContract)isthesoleproperaimofLaw，i。e。ofthoserulesofmutualbehaviourwhicharemaintainedbypenaltiesinflictedundertheauthorityofGovernment。AllnaturalRights，onthisview，maybesummedupintheRighttoFreedom；sothatthecompleteanduniversalestablishmentofthisRightwouldbethecompleterealisationofJustice，——theEqualityatwhichJusticeisthoughttoaimbeinginterpretedasEqualityofFreedom。
NowwhenIcontemplatethisasanabstractformula，thoughIcannotsaythatitisself-evidenttomeasthetruefundamentalprincipleofIdealLaw，Iadmitthatitcommendsitselfmuchtomymind；
andImightperhapspersuademyselfthatitisowingtothedefectofmyfacultyofmoral(orjural)intuitionthatIfailtoseeitsself-evidence。
ButwhenIendeavourtobringitintocloserrelationtotheactualcircumstancesofhumansociety，itsooncomestowearadifferentaspect。
Inthefirstplace，itseemsobviouslyneedfultolimittheextentofitsapplication。Foritinvolvesthenegativeprinciplethatnooneshouldbecoercedforhisowngoodalone；butnoonewouldgravelyarguethatthisoughttobeappliedtothecaseofchildren，orofidiots，orinsanepersons。Butifso，canweknowapriorithatitoughttobeappliedtoallsaneadults？sincetheabove-mentionedexceptionsarecommonlyjustifiedonthegroundthatchildren，etc。，willmanifestlybebetteroffiftheyareforcedtodoandabstainasothersthinkbestforthem；anditis，atleast，notintuitivelycertainthatthesameargumentdoesnotapplytothemajorityofmankindinthepresentstateoftheirintellectualprogress。Indeed，itisoftenconcededbytheadvocatesofthisprinciplethatitdoesnotboldeveninrespectofadultsinalowstateofcivilisation。Butifso，whatcriterioncanbegivenforitsapplication，exceptthatitmustbeappliedwhereverhumanbeingsaresufficientlyintelligenttoprovideforthemselvesbetterthanotherswouldprovideforthem？andthustheprinciplewouldpresentitselfnotasabsolute，butmerelyasubordinateapplicationofthewiderprincipleofaimingatthegeneralhappinessorwell-beingofmankind。
But，again，thetermFreedomisambiguous。Ifweinterpretitstrictly，asmeaningFreedomofActionalone，theprincipleseemstoallowanyamountofmutualannoyanceexceptconstraint。ButobviouslynoonewouldbesatisfiedwithsuchFreedomasthis。If，however，weincludeintheideaabsenceofpainandannoyanceinflictedbyothers，itbecomesatonceevidentthatwecannotprohibitallsuchannoyanceswithoutrestrainingfreedomofactiontoadegreethatwouldbeintolerable；sincethereisscarcelyanygratificationofaman’snaturalimpulseswhichmaynotcausesomeannoyancetoothers。Henceindistinguishingthemutualannoyancesthatoughttobeallowedfromthosethatmustbeprohibitedweseemforcedtobalancetheevilsofconstraintagainstpainandlossofadifferentkind:whileifweadmittheUtilitariancriterionsofar，itisdifficulttomaintainthatannoyancetoindividualsisnevertobepermittedinordertoattainanypositivegoodresult，butonlytopreventmoreseriousannoyance。
Thirdly，inordertorenderasocialconstructionpossibleonthisbasis，wemustassumethatthelighttoFreedomincludestherighttolimitone’sfreedombycontract；andthatsuchcontracts，iftheyarereallyvoluntaryandnotobtainedbyfraudorforce，andiftheydonotviolatethefreedomofothers，aretobeenforcedbylegalpenalties。ButIcannotseethatenforcementofContractsisstrictlyincludedinthenotionofrealisingFreedom；foramanseemstobemostcompletelyfreewhennooneofhisvolitionsisallowedtohaveanyeffectincausingtheexternalcoercionofanyother。If，again，thisrightoflimitingFreedomisitselfunlimited，amanmightthusfreelycontracthimselfoutoffreedomintoslavery，sothattheprincipleoffreedomwouldturnoutsuicidal；andyettodeducefromthisprinciplealimitedrightoflimitingfreedombycontractseemsclearlyimpossible。
Butifitbedifficulttodefinefreedomasanidealtoberealisedinthemerelypersonalrelationsofhumanbeings，thedifficultyisincreasedwhenweconsidertherelationofmentothematerialmeansoflifeandhappiness。
Foritiscommonlythoughtthattheindividual’srighttoFreedomincludestherightofappropriatingmaterialthings。But，ifFreedombeunderstoodstrictly，Idonotseethatitimpliesmorethanhisrighttonon-interferencewhileactuallyusingsuchthingsascanonlybeusedbyonepersonatoncetherighttopreventothersfromusingatanyfuturetimeanythingthatanindividualhasonceseizedseemsaninterferencewiththefreeactionofothersbeyondwhatisneededtosecurethefreedom，strictlyspeaking，oftheappropriator。
Itmayperhapsbesaidthataman，inappropriatingaparticularthing，doesnotinterferewiththefreedomofothers，becausetherestoftheworldisstillopentothem，Butothersmaywantjustwhathehasappropriated:
andtheymaynotbeabletofindanythingsogoodatall，oratleastwithoutmuchlabourandsearch；formanyoftheinstrumentsandmaterialsofcomfortablelivingarelimitedinquantity。Thisargumentappliesespeciallytopropertyinland:anditistobeobservedthat，inthiscase，thereisafurtherdifficultyindetermininghowmuchamanistobeallowedtoappropriateby`firstoccupation’。Ifitbesaidthatamanistobeunderstoodtooccupywhatheisabletouse，theanswerisobviousthattheuseoflandbyanyindividualmayvaryalmostindefinitelyinextent，whilediminishingproportionallyinintensity。Forinstance，itwouldsurelybeaparadoxicaldeductionfromtheprincipleofFreedomtomaintainthatanindividualhadarighttoexcludeothersfrompasturingsheeponanypartofthelandoverwhichhishuntingexpeditionscouldextend。Butifsocanitbeclearthatashepherdhassucharightagainstonewhowishestotilltheland，orthatonewhoisusingthesurfacehasarighttoexcludeawould-beminer？Idonotseehowthedeductionistobemadeout。Again，itmaybedisputedwhethertherightofProperty，asthusderived，istoincludetherightofcontrollingthedisposalofone’spossessionsafterdeath。
Forthistomostpersonsseemsnaturallyboundupwithownership:yetitisparadoxicaltosaythatweinterferewithaman’sfreedomofactionbyanythingthatwemaydoafterhisdeathtowhatheownedduringhislife:andjuristshaveoftentreatedthisrightaspurelyconventionalandnotthereforeincludedin`naturallaw’。
