WehaveseenthatthevirtueofPracticalWisdomcomprehendsallothers，sofarasvirtuousconductineachdepartmentnecessarilyresultsfromaclearknowledgeandchoiceofthetrueultimateendorendsofaction，andofthebestmeanstotheattainmentofsuchendorends。Fromthispointofviewwemayconsiderthenamesofthespecialvirtuesasdenotingspecialdepartmentsofthisknowledge；whichitisnowourbusinesstoexaminemoreclosely。
When，however，wecontemplatethese，wediscernthatthereareothervirtues，which，indifferentways，mayberegardedasnolesscomprehensivethanWisdom。Especiallyinmoderntimes，sincetherevivalofindependentethicalspeculation，therehavealwaysbeenthinkerswhohavemaintained，insomeform，theviewthatBenevolenceisasupremeandarchitectonicvirtue，
comprehendingandsummingupalltheothers，andfittedtoregulatethemanddeterminetheirproperlimitsandmutualrelations。ThiswidelysupportedclaimtosupremacyseemsanadequatereasonforgivingtoBenevolencethefirstplaceafterWisdom，inourexaminationofthecommonlyreceivedmaximsofDutyandVirtue。
ThegeneralmaximofBenevolencewouldbecommonlysaidtobe，``thatweoughttoloveallourfellow-men’’，or``allourfellow-creatures’’:but，aswehavealreadyseen，thereissomedoubtamongmoralistsastotheprecisemeaningoftheterm``love’’，inthisconnexion:since，accordingtoKantandothers，whatismorallyprescribedastheDutyofBenevolenceisnotstrictlytheaffectionofloveorkindness，sofarasthiscontainsanemotionalelement，butonlythedeterminationofthewilltoseekthegoodorhappinessofothers。
AndIagreethatitcannotbeastrictdutytofeelanemotion，sofarasitisnotdirectlywithinthepoweroftheWilltoproduceitatanygiventime。Still(asIhavesaid)itseemstomethatthisemotionalelementisincludedinourcommonnotionofCharityorPhilanthropy，regardedasaVirtue:andIthinkitparadoxicaltodenythatitraisesthemerebeneficentdispositionofthewilltoahigherdegreeofexcellence，andrendersitseffectsbetter。Ifthisbeso，itwillbeadutytocultivatetheaffectionsofarasitispossibletodoso:andindeedthiswouldseem(nolessthanthepermanentdispositiontodogood)tobeanormaleffectofrepeatedbeneficentresolvesandactions:since，ashasoftenbeenobserved，abenefittendstoexciteloveintheagenttowardstherecipientofthebenefit，nolessthanintherecipienttowardstheagent。Itmustbeadmitted，however，thatthiseffectislesscertainthantheproductionofthebenevolentdisposition；andthatsomemenarenaturallysounattractivetoothersthatthelattercanfeelnoaffection，thoughtheymayentertainbenevolentdispositions，towardstheformer。Atanyrate，itwouldseemtobeadutygenerally，andtillwefindtheeffortfruitless，tocultivatekindaffectionstowardsthosewhomweoughttobenefit；notonlybydoingkindactions，butbyplacingourselvesunderanynaturalinfluenceswhichexperienceshowstohaveatendencytoproduceaffection。
Butwehavestilltoascertainmoreparticularlythenatureoftheactionsinwhichthisaffectionordispositionofwillisshown。Theyaredescribedpopularlyas`doinggood’。
Nowwehavebeforenoticedthatthenotion`good’，inordinarythought，includes，undistinguishedandthereforeunharmonised，thedifferentconceptionsthatmenformoftheultimateendofrationalaction。Itfollowsthatthereisacorrespondingambiguityinthephrase`doinggood’:since，thoughmanywouldunhesitatinglytakeittomeanthepromotionofHappiness，thereareotherswho，holdingthatPerfectionandnotHappinessisthetrueultimateGood，consistentlymaintainthattherealwayto’dogood’topeopleistoincreasetheirvirtueoraidtheirprogresstowardsPerfection。Thereare，however，evenamonganti-Epicureanmoralists，some——suchasKant——who，takeinoppositeview，andarguethatmyneighbour’sVirtueorPerfectioncannotbeanendtome，becauseitdependsuponthefreeexerciseofhisownvolition，whichIcannothelporhinder。ButonthesamegroundsitmightequallywellbearguedthatIcannotcultivateVirtueinmyself，butonlypractiseitfrommomenttomoment:whereasevenKantdoesnotdenythatwecancultivatevirtuousdispositionsinourselves，andthatinotherwaysthanbytheperformanceofvirtuousacts:andCommonSensealwaysassumesthistobepossibleandprescribesitasaduty。Andsurelyitisequallyundeniablethatwecancultivatevirtueinothers:andindeedsuchcultivationisclearlytheobjectnotonlyofeducation，butofalargepartofsocialaction，especiallyofourexpressionofpraiseandblame。AndifVirtueisanultimateendforourselves，tobesoughtforitsownsake，benevolencemustleadustodowhatispossibletoobtainitforourneighbour。Andindeedweseethatinthecaseofintenseindividualaffection，thefriendorlovergenerallylongsthatthebelovedshouldbeexcellentandadmirableaswellashappy:perhaps，however，thisisbecauseloveinvolvespreference，andtheloverdesiresthatthebelovedshouldbereallyworthyofpreferenceaswellasactuallypreferredbyhim，asotherwisethereisaconflictbetweenLoveandReason。
Onthewholethen，Idonotfind，inthecommonviewofwhatBenevolencebidsuspromoteforothers，anyclearselectionindicatedbetweenthedifferentandpossiblyconflictingelementsofGoodascommonlyconceived。Butwemaysay，Ithink，thatthepromotionofHappinessispracticallythechiefpartofwhatCommonSenseconsiderstobeprescribedastheexternaldutyofBenevolence:andforclearness’sakewewillconfineourattentiontothisintheremainderofthediscussion。Itshouldbeobservedthatbyhappinesswearenottounderstandsimplythegratificationoftheactualdesiresofothers，formentoooftendesirewhatwouldtendtotheirunhappinessinthelongrun:
butthegreatestpossibleamountofpleasureorsatisfactionforthemonthewhole——inshort，suchhappinessaswastakentobetherationalendforeachindividualinthesystemofEgoisticHedonism。ItisthisthatRationalBenevolencebidsusprovideforothers；andifonewholovesisledfromaffectionatesympathywiththelongingsofthebelovedtogratifythoselongingsbelievingthatthegratificationwillbeattendedwithanoverplusofpainfulconsequences，wecommonlysaythatsuchaffectionisweakandfoolish。
Itremainstoasktowardswhomthisdispositionoraffectionistobemaintained，andtowhatextent。And，firstly，itisnotquiteclearwhetherweowebenevolencetomenalone，ortootheranimalsalso。Thatis，thereisageneralagreementthatweoughttotreatallanimalswithkindness，sofarastoavoidcausingthemunnecessarypain；butitisquestionedwhetherthisisdirectlyduetosentientbeingsassuch，ormerelyprescribedasameansofcultivatingkindlydispositionstowardsmen。Intuitionalmoralistsofreputehavemaintainedthislatterview:Ithink，however，thatCommonSenseisdisposedtoregardthisasahard-heartedparadox，andtoholdwithBenthamthatthepainofanimalsispersetobeavoided。Passingtoconsiderhowourbenevolenceoughttobedistributedamongourfellow-men，wemayconvenientlymakecleartheIntuitionalviewbycontrastingitwiththatofUtilitarianism。
ForUtilitarianismissometimessaidtoresolveallvirtueintouniversalandimpartialBenevolence:itdoesnot，however，prescribethatweshouldloveallmenequally，butthatweshouldaimatHappinessgenerallyasourultimateend，andsoconsiderthehappinessofanyoneindividualasequallyimportantwiththeequalhappinessofanyother，asanelementofthistotal；andshoulddistributeourkindnesssoastomakethistotalasgreataspossible，inwhateverwaythisresultmaybeattained。Practicallyofcoursethedistributionofanyindividual’sserviceswill，evenonthisview，beunequal:aseachmanwillobviouslypromotethegeneralhappinessbestbyrenderingservicestoalimitednumber，andtosomemorethanothers:
buttheinequality，ontheUtilitariantheory，issecondaryandderivative。
CommonSense，however，seemsrathertoregarditasimmediatelycertainwithoutanysuchdeductionthatweowespecialduesofkindnesstothosewhostandinspecialrelationstous。Thequestionthenis，onwhatprinciples，whenanycaseofdoubtorapparentconflictofdutiesarises，wearetodeterminethenature，andextentofthespecialclaimstoaffectionandkindserviceswhichariseoutoftheseparticularrelationsofhumanbeings。
Areproblemsofthiskindtobesolvedbyconsideringwhichcourseofconductisonthewholemostconducivetothegeneralhappiness，orcanwefindindependentandself-evidentprinciplessufficientlyclearandprecisetofurnishpracticalguidanceinsuchcases？ThedifferentanswersgiventothisfundamentalquestionwillobviouslyconstitutethemaindifferencebetweentheIntuitionalandUtilitarianmethods；sofarasthe`good’whichthebenevolentmandesiresandseekstoconferonothersisunderstoodtobeHappiness。
When，however，wecometoinvestigatethisquestionwearemetwithadifficultyinthearrangementofthesubject，which，likemostdifficultiesofclassification，deservesattentiveconsideration，asitdependsuponimportantcharacteristicsofthematterthathastobearranged。Inanarrowersenseoftheterm，Benevolenceisnotunfrequentlydistinguishedfrom——andevencontrastedwith——Justice；
wemayofcourseexercisebothtowardsthesamepersons，butwecommonlyassumethatthespecialfunctionofBenevolencebeginswhereJusticeends；
anditisratherwiththisspecialfunctionthatweareconcernedinconsideringclaimstoaffection，andtokindservicesnormallypromptedbyaffection。
Atthesametime，ifweconsidertheseservicesasstrictlyduetopersonsincertainrelations，themoralnotionunderwhichthesedutiesarepresentedtousisnoteasilydistinguishablefromthatofJustice；whileyetthesedutiescanhardlybewithdrawnfromthesphereofBenevolenceinthenarrowestsense。ItissometimesgivenasadistinctionbetweenJusticeandBenevolence，thattheserviceswhichJusticeprescribescanbeclaimedasarightbytheirrecipient，whileBenevolenceisessentiallyunconstrained:butwecertainlythink(e。g。)thatparentshavearighttofilialaffectionandtotheservicesthatnaturallyspringfromit。ItisfurthersaidthatthedutiesofAffectionareessentiallyindefinite，whilethoseweclassifyunderthebeadofJusticearepreciselydefined:andnodoubtthisispartlytrue。Wenotonlyfindithardtosayexactlyhowmuchasonoweshisparents，butweareevenreluctanttoinvestigatethis:wedonotthinkthatheoughttoaskforaprecisemeasureofhisduty，inorderthathemaydojustsomuchandnomore；whileagreatpartofJusticeconsistsintheobservanceofstatedagreementsandpreciserules。Atthesametimeitisdifficulttomaintainthisdistinctionasagroundofclassification；
forthedutiesofAffectionareadmittedlyliabletocomeintocompetitionwitheachother，andwithotherduties；andwhenthisapparentconflictofdutiesoccurs，wemanifestlyneedaspreciseadefinitionaspossibleoftheconflictingobligations，inordertomakeareasonablechoiceamongthealternativesofconductpresentedtous。Accordinglyinthefollowingchapter(§；2)IshallshowhowthiscompetitionofclaimsrendersourcommonnotionofJusticeapplicabletothesenolessthantootherduties:
meanwhile，itseemspropertotreathereseparatelyofalldutiesthatariseoutofrelationswhereaffectionnormallyexists，andwhereitoughttobecultivated，andwhereitsabsenceisdeploredifnotblamed。Forallareagreedthattherearesuchduties，thenon-performanceofwhichisagroundforcensure，beyondtheobligationsimposedbylaw，orarisingoutofspecificcontract，whichwillcomeunderadifferenthead。
Beyondtheseduties，again，thereseemstobearegionofperformancewheretheservicesrenderedcannotproperlybeclaimedasofdebt，andblameisnotfelttobeduefornon-performance:
andwithregardtothisregion，too，——whichclearlybelongstoBenevolenceascontrastedwithJustice——thereissomedifficultyinstatingtheviewofCommonSensemorality。Therearetwoquestionstobeconsidered。Wehavetoask，firstly，whetherservicesrenderedfromaffection，overandabovewhatstrictDutyisthoughttorequire，aretobedeemedVirtuous；
andsecondly，whethertheaffectionitselfistobeconsideredworthyofadmirationasamoralexcellence，andthereforeamentalconditionthatweshouldstrivetoattain。IthinkthatCommonSenseclearlyregardsasvirtuousthedispositiontorendersubstantialpositiveservicestomenatlarge，andpromotetheirwell-being，——whethersuchadispositionspringsoutofnaturalkindlinessoffeelingtowardshumanbeingsgenerally，orwhetheritismerelytheresultofmoraleffortandresolve-provideditisaccompaniedbyanadequatedegreeofintellectualenlightenment。Andthesamemaybesaidofthelesscomprehensiveaffectionthatimpelsmentopromotethewell-beingofthecommunityofwhichtheyaremembers；andagainoftheaffectionthatnormallytendstoaccompanytherecognitionofrightfulruleorleadershipinothers。InsomeagesandcountriesPatriotismandLoyaltyhavebeenregardedasalmostsupremeamongthevirtues；andevennowCommonSensegivesthemahighplace。
Butwhenwepasstomorerestricted，and，ordinarilymoreintense，affections，suchasthosewhichwefeelforrelationsandfriends，itbecomesmoredifficulttodeterminewhethertheyaretobeconsideredasmoralexcellencesandcultivatedassuch。
