Itfurtherappearstomethatinthecaseofmanyimportantvirtueswedonotcommonlyconsidertheultimatespringofaction——whetheritbesomeemotionalimpulseortherationalchoiceofdutyasduty——inattributingaparticularvirtuetoparticularpersons:whatweregardasindispensableismerelyasettledresolvetowillacertainkindofexternaleffects。Thuswecallamanveraciousifhisspeechexhibits，inanoteworthydegree，asettledendeavourtoproduceinthemindsofothersimpressionsexactlycorrespondenttothefacts，whateverhismotivemaybeforsodoing:
whetherheismoved，solelyormainly，byaregardforvirtue，orasenseofthedegradationoffalsehood，oraconvictionthattruth-speakingisinthelongrunthebestpolicy，orasympatheticaversiontotheinconvenienceswhichmisleadingstatementscausetootherpeople。Idonotmeanthatweregardthesemotivesasofequalmoralvalue:butthatthepresenceorabsenceofanyoneorotherofthemisnotimpliedinourattributionofthevirtueofveracity。SimilarlyweattributeJustice，ifamanhasasettledhabitofweighingdiverseclaimsandfulfillingthemintheratiooftheirimportance；GoodFaithifhehasasettledhabitofstrictlykeepingexpressortacitengagements:andsoforth。Evenwhereweclearlytakemotivesintoaccount，injudgingofthedegreeofvirtueitisoftenrathertheforceofseductivemotivesresistedthantheparticularnatureoftheprevailingspringsofactionwhichweconsider。Thuswecertainlythinkvirtuehasbeenmanifestedinahigherdegreeinjustorveraciousconduct，whentheagenthadstrongtemptationstobeunjustorunveracious；andinthesamewaytherearecertaindispositionsorhabitstendingtogoodconductwhicharecalledvirtueswhentherearepowerfulseductivemotivesoperatingandnototherwise；e。g。whenweattributethevirtueoftemperancetoamanwhoeatsanddrinksaproperamount，itisbecausewealsoattributetohimappetitespromptingtoexcess。
AtthesametimeIadmitthatCommonSenseseemsliabletosomeperplexityastotherelationofvirtuetothemoraleffortrequiredforresistingunvirtuousimpulses。Ontheonehandageneralassentwouldbegiventothepropositionthatvirtueisespeciallydrawnoutandexhibitedinasuccessfulconflictwithnaturalinclination:andperhapseventothemoreextremestatementthatthereisnovirtueindoingwhatonelikes。OntheotherhandweshouldsurelyagreewithAristotlethatVirtueisimperfectsolongastheagentcannotdothevirtuousactionwithoutaconflictofimpulses；sinceitisfromawrongbentofnaturalimpulsethatwefindithardtodowhatisbest，anditseemsabsurdtosaythatthemorewecureourselvesofthiswrongbent，thelessvirtuouswegrow。PerhapswemaysolvethedifficultybyrecognisingthatourcommonideaofVirtueincludestwodistinctelements，theonebeingthemostperfectidealofmoralexcellencethatweareabletoconceiveforhumanbeings，whiletheotherismanifestedintheeffortofimperfectmentoattainthisideal。Thusinproportionasamancomestolikeanyparticularkindofgoodconductandtodoitwithoutmoraleffort，weshallnotsaythathisconductbecomeslessvirtuousbutrathermoreinconformitywithatruemoralideal；whileatthesametimeweshallrecognisethatinthisdepartmentofhislifehehaslessroomtoexhibitthatotherkindofvirtuewhichismanifestedinresistancetoseductiveimpulses，andintheenergeticstrivingofthewilltogetnearertoidealperfection。
SofarIhavebeenconsideringthemanifestationofvirtueinemotionsandvolitions，andhavenotexpresslyadvertedtotheintellectualconditionsofvirtuousacts:thoughinspeakingofsuchactsitisofcourseimpliedthatthevolitionisaccompaniedwithanintellectualrepresentationoftheparticulareffectswilled。Itisnot，however，impliedthatinwillingsucheffectswemustnecessarilythinkofthemasrightorgood:andIdonotmyselfthinkthat，intheviewofcommonsense，thisisanindispensableconditionofthevirtuousnessofanact；foritseemsthatsomekindsofvirtuousactsmaybedonesoentirelywithoutdeliberationthatnomoraljudgmentwaspassedonthembytheagent。Thismightbethecase，forinstance，withanactofheroiccourage，promptedbyanimpulseofsympathywithafellow-creatureinsuddenperil。Butitis，Iconceive，clearlynecessarythatsuchanactshouldnotbeevenvaguelythoughttobebad。AsIhavealreadysaid，itismoredoubtfulhowfaranactwhichisconceivedbytheagenttobegood，butwhichisreallybad，iseverjudgedbycommonsensetobevirtuous:butifweagreetorestrictthetermtoactswhichweregardasright，itisagainobviousthattherealisationofvirtuemaynotbeinthepowerofanygivenpersonatanygiventime，throughlackoftherequisiteintellectualconditions。
TosumuptheresultsofarathercomplicateddiscussionIconsiderVirtueasaqualitymanifestedintheperformanceofduty(orgoodactsgoingbeyondstrictduty):itisindeedprimarilyattributedtothemindorcharacteroftheagent；butitisonlyknowntousthroughitsmanifestationsinfeelingsandacts。Accordingly，inendeavouringtomakepreciseourconceptionsoftheparticularvirtues，wehavetoexaminethestatesofconsciousnessinwhichtheyaremanifested。Examiningthese，wefindthattheelementofvolitionisprimarilyimportant，andinsomecasesalmostofsoleimportance，butyetthattheelementofemotioncannotbealtogetherdiscardedwithoutpalpabledivergencefromcommonsense。
Again，concentratingourattentiononthevolitionalelement，wefindthatinmostcaseswhatweregardasmanifestationsofvirtuearethevolitionstoproducecertainparticulareffects；thegeneraldeterminationtodorightasright，dutyforduty’ssake，isindeedthoughttobeoffundamentalimportanceasagenerallynecessaryspringofvirtuousaction；butitisnotthoughttobeanindispensableconditionoftheexistenceofvirtueinanyparticularcase。Similarlyinconsideringtheemotionalelement，thoughanardentloveofvirtueoraversiontovicegenerallyisavaluablestimulustovirtuousconduct，itisnotauniversallynecessaryconditionofit:andinthecaseofsomeactsthepresenceofotheremotions——suchaskindaffection——makestheactsbetterthaniftheyweredonefromapurelymoralmotive。Suchemotions，however，cannotbecommandedatwill:
andthisisalsotrueoftheknowledgeofwhatoughttobedoneinanyparticularcase，——which，ifwerestricttheterm`virtuous’torightacts，isobviouslyrequiredtorenderconductperfectlyvirtuous。FortheseandotherreasonsIconsiderthatthoughVirtueisdistinguishedbyusfromotherexcellencesbythecharacteristicofvoluntariness——itmustbetosomeextentcapableofbeingrealisedatwillwhenoccasionarises——thisvoluntarinessattachestoitonlyinacertaindegree；andthat，thoughamancanalwaysdohisDutyifheknowsit，hecannotalwaysrealisevirtueinthehighestdegree。
Itshould，however，beobservedthatevenwhenitisbeyondourpowertorealisevirtueimmediatelyatwill，werecogniseadutyofcultivatingitandseekingtodevelopit:
andthisdutyofcultivationextendstoallvirtuoushabitsordispositionsinwhichwearefoundtobedeficient，sofaraswecanthusincreaseourtendencytodothecorrespondingactsinfuture；howevercompletelysuchactsmayoneachoccasionbewithinthecontrolofthewill。Itistruethatforactsofthislatterkind，sofarastheyareperfectlydeliberate，wedonotseemtoneedanyspecialvirtuoushabits；ifonlywehaveknowledgeofwhatisrightandbesttobedone，togetherwithasufficientlystrongwishtodoit。But，inordertofulfilourdutiesthoroughly，weareobligedtoactduringpartofourlivessuddenlyandwithoutdeliberation:onsuchoccasionsthereisnoroomformoralreasoning，andsometimesnotevenforexplicitmoraljudgment；sothatinordertoactvirtuously，werequiresuchparticularhabitsanddispositionsasaredenotedbythenamesofthespecialvirtues:anditisadutytofosteranddeveloptheseinwhateverwayexperienceshowsthistobepossible。
Thecomplicatedrelationofvirtuetoduty，asabovedetermined，mustbeborneinmindthroughoutthediscussionoftheparticularvirtues，towhichIshallproceedinthefollowingchapters。
But，aswehaveseen，themainpartofthemanifestationofvirtueinconductconsistsinvoluntaryactions，whichitiswithinthepowerofanyindividualtodo——sofarastheyarerecognisedbyhimasright，——andwhichthereforecomewithinourdefinitionofDuty，asabovelaiddown；itwillnotthereforebenecessary，duringthegreaterpartoftheensuingdiscussion，todistinguishbetweenprinciplesofvirtuousconductandprinciplesofduty；sincethedefinitionsofthetwowillcoincide。
Here，however，aremarkisnecessary，whichtosomeextentqualifieswhatwassaidintheprecedingchapter，whereIcharacterisedthecommonnotionsofparticularvirtues——justice，etc——astoovaguetofurnishexactdeterminationsoftheactionsenjoinedunderthem。Ithereassumedthatrulesofdutyoughttoadmitofprecisedefinitioninauniversalform:andthisassumptionnaturallybelongstotheordinaryorjuralviewofEthicsasconcernedwithamoralcode:sinceweshouldagreethatifobligationsareimposedonanyonelieoughtatleasttoknowwhattheyare，andthatalawindefinitelydrawnmustbeabadlaw。
Butsofaraswecontemplatevirtueassomethingthatgoesbeyondstrictdutyandisnotalwayscapableofbeingrealisedatwill，thisassumptionisnotsoclearlyappropriate:sincefromthispointofviewwenaturallycompareexcellenceofconductwithbeautyintheproductsoftheFineArts。
Ofsuchproductswecommonlysay，thatthoughrulesanddefiniteprescriptionsmaydomuch，theycanneverdoall；thatthehighestexcellenceisalwaysduetoaninstinctortactthatcannotbereducedtodefiniteformulae。
Wecandescribethebeautifulproductswhentheyareproduced，andtosomeextentclassifytheirbeauties，givingnamestoeach；butwecannotprescribeanycertainmethodforproducingeachkindofbeauty。So，itmaybesaid，standsthecasewithvirtues:andhencetheattempttostateanexplicitmaxim，byapplyingwhichwemaybesureofproducingvirtuousactsofanykind，mustfail:wecanonlygiveageneralaccountofthevirtue——adescription，notadefinition——andleaveittotrainedinsighttofindinanyparticularcircumstancestheactthatwillbestrealiseit。Onthisview，whichI
maydistinguishasÆ；stheticIntuitionism，Ishallhavesomethingtosayhereafter。’ButIconceivethatourprimarybusinessistoexaminethelargerclaimsofthoseRationalorJuralIntuitionists，whomaintainthatEthicsadmitsofexactandscientifictreatment，havingforitsfirstprinciplesthegeneralrulesofwhichwehavespoken，orthemostfundamentalofthem:andwhothusholdouttousahopeofgettingridofthefluctuationsanddiscrepanciesofopinion，inwhichweacquiesceinaestheticdiscussions，butwhichtendtoendangerseriouslytheauthorityofethicalbeliefs。
Andwecannot，Ithink，decideonthevalidityofsuchclaimswithoutexaminingindetailthepropositionswhichhavebeenputforwardasethicalaxioms，andseeinghowfartheyprovetobeclearandexplicit，orhowfarothersmaybesuggestedpresentingthesequalities。Foritwouldnotbemaintained，atleastbythemorejudiciousthinkersofthisschool，thatsuchaxiomsarealwaystobefoundwithproperexactnessofformbymereobservationofthecommonmoralreasoningsofmen；butratherthattheyareatleastimpliedinthesereasonings，andthatwhenmadeexplicittheirtruthisself-evident，andmustbeacceptedatoncebyanintelligentandunbiassedmind。Justassomemathematicalaxiomsarenotandcannotbeknowntothemultitude，astheircertaintycannotbeseenexceptbymindscarefullyprepared，——butyet，whentheirtermsareproperlyunderstood，theperceptionoftheirabsolutetruthisimmediateandirresistible。Similarly，ifwearenotabletoclaimforaproposedmoralaxiom，initspreciseform，anexplicitandactualassentof``orbisterrarum’’，itmaystillbeatruthwhichmenbeforevaguelyapprehended，andwhichtheywillnowunhesitatinglyadmit。
Inthisinquiryitisnotofgreatimportanceinwhatorderwetakethevirtues。Wearenottoexaminethesystemofanyparticularmoralist，buttheMorality(asitwascalled)ofCommonSense；
andthediscussionofthegeneralnotionsofDutyandVirtue，inwhichwehavebeenengagedinthepresentchapter，willhaveshownincidentallythegreatdifficultyofelicitingfromCommonSenseanyclearprincipleofclassificationoftheparticulardutiesandvirtues。HenceIhavethoughtitbesttoreservewhatIhavetosayonthesubjectofclassificationtillalaterperiodofthediscussion；andinthefirstplacetotakethemattertobeinvestigatedquiteempirically，aswefinditinthecommonthoughtexpressedinthecommonlanguageofmankind。Thesystemsofmoralistscommonlyattempttogivesomedefinitearrangementtothiscrudematerial:
butinsofarastheyaresystematictheygenerallyseemforcedtotranscendCommonSense，anddefinewhatithasleftdoubtful；asIshallhereaftertrytoshow。
Forthepresent，then，itseemsbest，inthisempiricalinvestigation，totakethevirtuesratherintheorderoftheirimportance；
and，astherearesomethatseemtohaveaspecialcomprehensivenessofrange，andtoincludeunderthem，inamanner，allormostoftheothers，itwillbeconvenienttobeginwiththese。OftheseWisdomisperhapsthemostobvious:inthenextchapter，therefore，IproposetoexamineourcommonconceptionsofWisdom，andcertainothercognateorconnectedvirtuesorexcellences。
