Underthesecircumstances，tosaythatallsuchpersonsactrightly——intheobjectivesense——becausetheirmaximsallconformtoKant’sfundamentalrule，wouldobliteratealtogetherthedistinctionbetweensubjectiveandobjectiverightness；itwouldamounttoaffirmingthatwhateveranyonethinksrightisso，unlessheisinerrorastothefactsofthecasetowhichhisjudgmentapplies。Butsuchanaffirmationisinflagrantconflictwithcommonsense；andwouldrendertheconstructionofascientificcodeofmoralityfutile:astheveryobjectofsuchacodeistosupplyastandardforrectifyingmen’sdivergentopinions。
Wemayconcludethenthatthemoraljudgmentswhichthepresentmethodattemptstosystematiseareprimarilyandforthemostpartintuitionsoftherightnessorgoodness(orthereverse)ofparticularkindsofexternaleffectsofhumanvolition，presumedtobeintendedbytheagent，butconsideredindependentlyoftheagent’sownviewastotherightnessorwrongnessofhisintention；thoughthequalityofmotives，asdistinctfromintentions，hasalsotobetakenintoaccount。
Butthequestionmayberaised，whetheritislegitimatetotakeforgranted(asIhavehithertobeendoing)theexistenceofsuchintuitions？And，nodoubt，therearepersonswhodeliberatelydenythatreflectionenablesthemtodiscoveranysuchphenomenonintheirconsciousexperienceasthejudgmentorapparentperceptionthatanactisinitselfrightorgood，inanyothersensethanthatofbeingtherightorfitmeanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorend。Ithink，however，thatsuchdenialsarecommonlyrecognisedasparadoxical，andopposedtothecommonexperienceofcivilisedmen:——atanyrateifthepsychologicalquestion，astotheexistenceofsuchmoraljudgmentsorapparentperceptionsofmoralqualities，iscarefullydistinguishedfromtheethicalquestionastotheirvalidity，andfromwhatwemaycallthe`psychogonical’questionastotheirorigin。Thefirstandsecondofthesequestionsaresometimesconfounded，owingtoanambiguityintheuseoftheterm``intuition’’；
whichhassometimesbeenunderstoodtoimplythatthejudgmentorapparentperceptionsodesignatedistrue。Iwishthereforetosayexpressly，thatbycallinganyaffirmationastotherightnessorwrongnessofactions``intuitive’’，Idonotmeantoprejudgethequestionastoitsultimatevalidity，whenphilosophicallyconsidered:Ionlymeanthatitstruthisapparentlyknownimmediately，andnotastheresultofreasoning。Iadmitthepossibilitythatanysuch``intuition’’mayturnouttohaveanelementoferror，whichsubsequentreflectionandcomparisonmayenableustocorrect；
justasmanyapparentperceptionsthroughtheorganofvisionarefoundtobepartiallyillusoryandmisleading:indeedthesequelwillshowthatIholdthistobetoanimportantextentthecasewithmoralintuitionscommonlysocalled。
Thequestionastothevalidityofmoralintuitionsbeingthusseparatedfromthesimplequestion`whethertheyactuallyexist’，itbecomesobviousthatthelattercanonlybedecidedforeachpersonbydirectintrospectionorreflection。Itmustnotthereforebesupposedthatitsdecisionisasimplematter，introspectionbeingalwaysinfallible:onthecontrary，experienceleadsmetoregardmenasoftenliabletoconfoundwithmoralintuitionsotherstatesoractsofmindessentiallydifferentfromthem，——blindimpulsestocertainkindsofactionorvaguesentimentsofpreferenceforthem，orconclusionsfromrapidandhalf-unconsciousprocessesofreasoning，orcurrentopinionstowhichfamiliarityhasgivenanillusoryairofself-evidence。Butanyerrorsofthiskind，duetocarelessorsuperficialreflection，canonlybecuredbymorecarefulreflection。
Thismayindeedbemuchaidedbycommunicationwithotherminds；itmayalsobeaided，inasubordinateway，byaninquiryintotheantecedentsoftheapparentintuition，whichmaysuggesttothereflectivemindsourcesoferrortowhichasuperficialviewofitisliable。Stillthequestionwhetheracertainjudgmentpresentsitselftothereflectivemindasintuitivelyknowncannotbedecidedbyanyinquiryintoitsantecedentsorcauses。
Itis，however，stillpossibletoholdthataninquiryintotheOriginofmoralintuitionsmustbedecisiveindeterminingtheirValidity。Andinfactithasbeenoftenassumed，bothbyIntuitionistsandtheiropponents，thatifourmoralfacultycanbeshowntobe`derived’
or`developed’outofotherpre-existentelementsofmindorconsciousness，areasonistherebygivenfordistrustingit；whileif，ontheotherhand，itcanbeshowntohaveexistedinthehumanmindfromitsorigin，itstrustworthinessistherebyestablished。Eitherassumptionappearstomedevoidoffoundation。Ontheonehand，Icanseenogroundforsupposingthatafacultythusderived，is，assuch，moreliabletoerrorthanifitsexistenceintheindividualpossessingithadbeendifferentlycaused:
toputitotherwise，Icannotseehowthemereascertainmentthatcertainapparentlyself-evidentjudgmentshavebeencausedinknownanddeterminateways，canbeinitselfavalidgroundfordistrustingthisclassofapparentcognitions。Icannotevenadmitthatthosewhoaffirmthetruthofsuchjudgmentsareboundtoshowintheircausesatendencytomakethemtrue:
indeedtheacceptanceofanysuchonusprobandiwouldseemtometorendertheattainmentofphilosophicalcertitudeimpossible。Forthepremisesoftherequireddemonstrationmustconsistofcausedbeliefs，whichashavingbeencausedwillequallystandinneedofbeingprovedtrue，andsoonadinfinitum:unlessitbeheldthatwecanfindamongthepremisesofourreasoningscertainapparentlyself-evidentjudgmentswhichhavebadnoantecedentcauses，andthatthesearethereforetobeacceptedasvalidwithoutproof。Butsuchanassertionwouldbeanextravagantparadox:and，ifitbeadmittedthatallbeliefsareequallyinthepositionofbeingeffectsofantecedentcauses，itseemsevidentthatthischaracteristicalonecannotservetoinvalidateanyofthem。
Ihold，therefore，thattheonusprobandimustbethrowntheotherway:thosewhodisputethevalidityofmoralorotherintuitionsonthegroundoftheirderivationmustberequiredtoshow，notmerelythattheyaretheeffectsofcertaincauses，butthatthesecausesareofakindthattendtoproduceinvalidbeliefs。Nowitisnot，Iconceive，possibletoprovebyanytheoryofthederivationofthemoralfacultythatthefundamentalethicalconceptions`right’or`whatoughttobedone’，`Good’or`whatitisreasonabletodesireandseek’，areinvalid，andthatconsequentlyallpropositionsoftheform`Xisright’or`good’areuntrustworthy:forsuchethicalpropositions，relatingastheydotomatterfundamentallydifferentfromthatwithwhichphysicalscienceorpsychologydeals，cannotbeinconsistentwithanyphysicalorpsychologicalconclusions。Theycanonlybeshowntoinvolveerrorbybeingshowntocontradicteachother；andsuchademonstrationcannotleaduscogentlytothesweepingconclusionthatallarefalse。Itmay，however，bepossibletoprovethatsomeethicalbeliefshavebeencausedinsuchawayastomakeitprobablethattheyarewhollyorpartiallyerroneous:
anditwillhereafterbeimportanttoconsiderhowfaranyEthicalintuitions，whichwefindourselvesdisposedtoacceptasvalid，areopentoattackonsuchpsychogonicalgrounds。AtpresentIamonlyconcernedtomaintainthatnogeneraldemonstrationofthederivednessordevelopednessofourmoralfacultycansupplyanadequatereasonfordistrustingit。
Ontheotherhand，ifwehavebeenonceledtodistrustourmoralfacultyonothergrounds——as(e。g。)fromthewantofclearnessandconsistencyinthemoraljudgmentsofthesameindividual，andthediscrepanciesbetweenthejudgmentsofdifferentindividuals——itseemstomeequallyclearthatourconfidenceinsuchjudgmentscannotproperlybere-establishedbyademonstrationoftheir`originality’。I
seenoreasontobelievethatthe`original’elementofourmoralcognitioncanbeascertained；butifitcould，Iseenoreasontoholdthatitwouldbeespeciallyfreefromerror。
Howthencanwehopetoeliminateerrorfromourmoralintuitions？Oneanswertothis。questionwasbrieflysuggestedinapreviouschapterwherethedifferentphasesoftheIntuitionalMethodwerediscussed。Itwastheresaidthatinordertosettlethedoubtsarisingfromtheuncertaintiesanddiscrepanciesthatarefoundwhenwecompareourjudgmentsonparticularcases，reflectivepersonsnaturallyappealtogeneralrulesorformulae:anditistosuchgeneralformulaethatIntuitionalMoralistscommonlyattributeultimatecertaintyandvalidity。Andcertainlythereareobvioussourcesoferrorinourjudgmentsrespectingconcretedutywhichseemtobeabsentwhenweconsidertheabstractnotionsofdifferentkindsofconduct；sinceinanyconcretecasethecomplexityofcircumstancesnecessarilyincreasesthedifficultyofjudging，andourpersonalinterestsorhabitualsympathiesareliabletodisturbtheclearnessofourmoraldiscernment。Further，wemustobservethatmostofusfeeltheneedofsuchformulaenotonlytocorrect，butalsotosupplement，ourintuitionsrespectingparticularconcreteduties。Onlyexceptionallyconfidentpersonsfindthattheyalwaysseemtoseeclearlywhatoughttobedoneinanycasethatcomesbeforethem。Mostofus，howeverunhesitatinglywemayaffirmrightnessandwrongnessinordinarymattersofconduct，yetnotunfrequentlymeetwithcaseswhereourunreasonedjudgmentfailsus；andwherewecouldnomoredecidethemoralissueraisedwithoutappealingtosomegeneralformula，thanwecoulddecideadisputedlegalclaimwithoutreferencetothepositivelawthatdealswiththematter。
Andsuchformulaearenotdifficulttofind:itonlyrequiresalittlereflectionandobservationofmen’smoraldiscoursetomakeacollectionofsuchgeneralrules，astothevalidityofwhichtherewouldbeapparentagreementatleastamongmoralpersonsofourownageandcivilisation，andwhichwouldcoverwithapproximatecompletenessthewholeofhumanconduct。Suchacollection，regardedasacodeimposedonanindividualbythepublicopinionofthecommunitytowhichhebelongs，wehavecalledthePositiveMoralityofthecommunity:butwhenregardedasabodyofmoraltruth，warrantedtobesuchbytheconsensusofmankind，——oratleastofthatportionofmankindwhichcombinesadequateintellectualenlightenmentwithaseriousconcernformorality——itismoresignificantlytermedthemoralityofCommonSense。
When，however，wetrytoapplythesecurrentlyacceptedprinciples，wefindthatthenotionscomposingthemareoftendeficientinclearnessandprecision。Forinstance，weshouldallagreeinrecognisingJusticeandVeracityasimportantvirtues；andweshallprobablyallacceptthegeneralmaxims，that`weoughttogiveeverymanhisown’andthat`weoughttospeakthetruth’:butwhenweask(1)whetherprimogenitureisjust，orthedisendowmentofcorporations，orthedeterminationofthevalueofservicesbycompetition，or(2)whetherandhowfarfalsestatementsmaybeallowedinspeechesofadvocates，orinreligiousceremonials，orwhenmadetoenemiesorrobbers，orindefenceoflawfulsecrets，wedonotfindthattheseoranyothercurrentmaximsenableustogiveclearandunhesitatingdecisions。Andyetsuchparticularquestionsare，afterall，thosetowhichwenaturallyexpectanswersfromthemoralist。ForwestudyEthics，asAristotlesays，forthesakeofPractice:andinpracticeweareconcernedwithparticulars。
HenceitseemsthatiftheformulaeofIntuitiveMoralityarereallytoserveasscientificaxioms，andtobeavailableinclearandcogentdemonstrations，theymustfirstberaised——byaneffortofreflectionwhichordinarypersonswillnotmake——toahigherdegreeofprecisionthanattachestotheminthecommonthoughtanddiscourseofmankindingeneral。Wehave，infact，totakeuptheattemptthatSocratesinitiated，andendeavourtodefinesatisfactorilythegeneralnotionsofdutyandvirtuewhichweallincommonuseforawardingapprobationordisapprobationtoconduct。Thisisthetaskuponwhichweshallbeengagedintheninechaptersthatfollow。ImustbegthereadertobearinmindthatthroughoutthesechaptersIamnottryingtoproveordisproveIntuitionism，butmerelybyreflectiononthecommonmoralitywhichIandmyreadershare，andtowhichappealissooftenmadeinmoraldisputes，toobtainasexplicit，exact，andcoherentastatementaspossibleofitsfundamentalrules。
