andexperienceseemstoshowusmanyexamplesofpersonswhoatleastapproximateascloselytothistypeasanyoneelsedoestotheidealoftheorthodoxmoralist。HenceiftheregulationofConsciencebedemonstrablythebestmeanstotheindividual’shappiness，itmustbebecausetheorderkeptbySelf-loveinvolvesasacrificeofpleasureonthewhole，ascomparedwiththeorderkeptbyConscience。Andifthisisthecase，itwouldseemthatitcanonlybeonaccountofthespecialemotionalpleasureattendingthesatisfactionofthemoralsentiments，orspecialpainorlossofhappinessconsequentontheirrepressionandviolation。
Before，however，weproceedfurther，afundamentaldifficultymustberemovedwhichhasprobablysometimesincesuggesteditselftothereader。Ifamanthinksitreasonabletoseekhisowninterest，itisclearthathecannothimselfdisapproveofanyconductthatcomesunderthisprincipleorapproveoftheopposite。AndhenceitmayappearthatthepleasuresandpainsofconsciencecannotenterintothecalculationwhetheracertaincourseofconductisorisnotinaccordancewithRationalEgoism，becausetheycannotattachthemselvesintheegoist’smindtoanymodesofactionwhichhavenotbeenalreadydecided，onothergrounds，tobereasonableorthereverse。Andthisistoacertainextenttrue；
butwemusthererecurtothedistinction(indicatedinBooki。chap。iii，§；1)betweenthegeneralimpulsetodowhatwebelievetobereasonable，andspecialsentimentsoflikingoraversionforspecialkindsofconduct，independentoftheirreasonableness。Inthemoralsentimentsastheyexistinordinarymen，thesetwokindsoffeelingareindistinguishablyblended；
becauseitiscommonlybelievedthattherulesofconducttowhichthecommonmoralsentimentsareattachedareinsomewayorotherreasonable。
Wecan，however，conceivethetwoseparated:andinfact，aswasbeforesaid，wehaveexperienceofsuchseparationwheneveramanisledbyaprocessofthoughttoadoptadifferentviewofmoralityfromthatinwhichhehasbeentrained；forinsuchacasetherewillalwaysremaininhismindsomequasi-morallikingsandaversions，nolongersustainedbyhisdeliberatejudgmentofrightandwrong。Andthusthereiseveryreasontobelievethatmostmen，howeverfirmlytheymightadopttheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonism，wouldstillfeelsentimentspromptingtotheperformanceofsocialduty，ascommonlyrecognisedintheirsociety，independentlyofanyconclusionthattheactionspromptedbysuchsentimentswerereasonableandright。Forsuchsentimentswouldalwaysbepowerfullysupportedbythesympathyofothers，andtheirexpressionsofpraiseandblame，likingandaversion:andsinceitisagreedthattheconductcommonlyrecognisedasvirtuousisgenerallycoincidentwiththatwhichenlightenedself-lovewoulddictate，arationalegoist’shabitsofconductwillbesuchasnaturallyto，fosterthese(forhim)`quasi-moral’feelings。Thequestionthereforearises——notwhethertheegoistshouldcherishandindulgethesesentimentsuptoacertainpoint，whichallwouldadmit——butwhetherhecanconsistentlyencouragethemtogrowtosuchapitchthattheywillalwaysprevailoverthestrongestopposingconsiderations；or，toputitotherwise，whetherprudencerequireshimtogivethemthereinandletthemcarryhimwhithertheywill。WehavealreadyseengroundforbelievingthatRationalSelf-lovewillbestattainitsendbylimitingitsconsciousoperationandallowingfreeplaytodisinterestedimpulses:canweacceptthefurtherparadoxthatitisreasonableforittoabdicatealtogetheritssupremacyoversomeoftheseimpulses？
Onacarefulconsiderationofthematter，itwillappear，Ithink，thatthisabdicationofself-loveisnotreallyapossibleoccurrenceinthemindofasaneperson，whostillregardshisowninterestasthereasonableultimateendofhisactions。Suchamanmay，nodoubt，resolvethathewilldevotehimselfunreservedlytothepracticeofvirtue，withoutanyparticularconsiderationofwhatappearstohimtobehisinterest:
hemayperformaseriesofactsinaccordancewiththisresolution，andthesemaygraduallyforminhimstronghabitualtendenciestoactsofasimilarkind。Butitdoesnotseemthatthesehabitsofvirtuecaneverbecomesostrongastogainirresistiblecontroloverasaneandreasonablewill。Whentheoccasioncomesonwhichvirtuedemandsfromsuchamananextremesacrifice——theimprudenceofwhichmustforceitselfuponhisnotice，howeverlittlehemaybeinthehabitofweighinghisownpleasuresandpains——hemustalwaysbeabletodeliberateafresh，andtoact(asfarasthecontrolofhiswillextends)withoutreferencetohispastactions。
Itmay，however，besaidthat，thoughanegoistretaininghisbeliefinrationalegoismcannotthusabandonhiswilltotheswayofmoralenthusiasm，still，supposingitpossibleforhimtochangehisconvictionandpreferdutytointerest，——orsupposingwecomparehimwithanothermanwhomakesthischoice——weshallfindthatagaininhappinessonthewholeresultsfromthispreference。Itmaybeheldthatthepleasurableemotionsattendantuponsuchvirtuousorquasi-virtuoushabitsasarecompatiblewithadhesiontoegoisticprinciplesaresoinferiortotherapturesthatattendtheunreservedandpassionatesurrenderofthesoultovirtue，thatitisreallyaman’sinterest——evenwithaviewtothepresentlifeonly——toobtain，ifhecan，theconvictionsthatrenderthissurrenderpossible；althoughundercertaincircumstancesitmustnecessarilyleadhimtoactinamannerwhich，consideredbyitself，wouldbeundoubtedlyimprudent。Thisiscertainlyatenableproposition，andIamquitedisposedtothinkittrueofpersonswithspeciallyrefinedmoralsensibilities。But——thoughfromtheimperfectionsofthehedonisticcalculusthepropositioncannotinanycasebeconclusivelydisproved-==itseems，asIhavesaid，tobeopposedtothebroadresultsofexperience，sofarasthegreatmajorityofmankindareconcerned。Observationwouldleadmetosupposethatmostmenaresoconstitutedastofeelfarmorekeenlypleasures(andpains)arisingfromsomeothersourcethantheconscience；eitherfromthegratificationsofsense，orfromthepossessionofpowerandfame，orfromstronghumanaffections，orfromthepursuitofscience，art，etc。；sothatinmanycasesperhapsnotevenearlytrainingcouldhavesucceededingivingtothemoralfeelingstherequisitepredominance:
andcertainlywherethistraininghasbeenwanting，itseemshighlyimprobablethatamerechangeofethicalconvictioncoulddeveloptheirmoralsusceptibilitiessofarastomakeitclearlytheirearthlyinteresttoresolveonfacingallsacrificesforthefulfilmentofduty。
Tosumup:althoughtheperformanceofdutiestowardsothersandtheexerciseofsocialvirtueseemtobegenerallythebestmeanstotheattainmentoftheindividual’shappiness，anditiseasytoexhibitthiscoincidencebetweenVirtueandHappinessrhetoricallyandpopularly；still，whenwecarefullyanalyseandestimatetheconsequencesofVirtuetothevirtuousagent，itappearsimprobablethatthiscoincidenceiscompleteanduniversal。WemayconceivethecoincidencebecomingperfectinaUtopiawheremenwereasmuchinaccordonmoralastheyarenowonmathematicalquestions，whereLawwasinperfectharmonywithMoralOpinion，andalloffenceswerediscoveredanddulypunished:orwemayconceivethesameresultattainedbyintensifyingthemoralsentimentsofallmembersofthecommunity，withoutanyexternalchanges(whichindeedwouldthenbeunnecessary)。Butjustinproportionasexistingsocietiesandexistingmenfallshortofthisideal，rulesofconductbasedontheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonismseemliabletodivergefromthosewhichmostmenareaccustomedtorecogniseasprescribedbyDutyandVirtue。
Intheprecedingchapterwehaveseenreasontoconcludethat，whileobediencetorecognisedrulesofdutytends，underordinarycircumstances，topromotethehappinessoftheagent，thereareyetnoadequateempiricalgroundsforregardingtheperformanceofdutyasauniversalorinfalliblemeanstotheattainmentofthisend。Even，however，ifitwereotherwise，evenifitweredemonstrablyreasonablefortheegoisttochoosedutyatallcostsunderallcircumstances，thesystematicendeavourtorealisethisprinciplewouldnot——accordingtocommonnotionsofmorality——solveorsupersedetheproblemofdeterminingtherightmethodforseekinghappiness。Forthereceivedmoralcodeallowswithinlimitsthepursuitofourownhappiness，andevenseemstoregarditasmorallyprescribed；andstillmoreemphaticallyinculcatesthepromotionofthehappinessofotherindividuals，withwhomweareinvariouswaysspeciallyconnected:sothat，undereitherhead，thequestionsthatwehavebeforeconsideredastothedeterminationandmeasurementoftheelementsofhappinesswouldstillrequiresomekindofanswer。
Itremainstoaskhowfarascientificinvestigationofthecausesofpleasureandpaincanassistusindealingwiththispracticalproblem。
Nowitisobviousthatfordecidingwhichoftwocoursesofactionispreferableonhedonisticgrounds，werequirenotonlytomeasurepainsandpleasuresofdifferentkinds，butalsotoascertainhowtheymaybeproducedoraverted。Inmostimportantprudentialdecisions，complexchainsofconsequencesareforeseenasinterveningbetweenthevolitionweareimmediatelytoinitiateandthefeelingswhichconstitutetheultimateendofourefforts；andthedegreeofaccuracywithwhichweforecasteachlinkofthesechainsobviouslydependsuponourknowledge，implicitorexplicit，oftherelationsofcauseandeffectamongvariousnaturalphenomena。Butifwesupposethediflerentelementsandimmediatesourcesofhappinesstohavebeendulyascertainedandvalued，theinvestigationoftheconditionsofproductionofeachhardlybelongstoageneraltreatiseonthemethodofethicsbutrathertosomeoneorotherofthespecialartssubordinatetothegeneralartofconduct。Ofthesesubordinateartssomehaveamoreorlessscientificbasis，whileothersareinamerelyempiricalstage；thusifwehavedecidedhowfarhealthistobesought，itbelongstothesystematicartofhygiene，basedonphysiologicalscience，tofurnishadetailedplanofseekingit；sofar，ontheotherhand，asweaimatpowerorwealthordomestichappiness，suchinstructionastheexperienceofotherscangivewillbechieflyobtainedinanunsystematicform，eitherfromadvicerelativetoourownspecialcircumstances，orfromaccountsofsuccessandfailureinanalogoussituations。Ineithermetheexpositionofsuchspecialartsdoesnotappeartocomewithinthescopeofthepresenttreatise；norcouldithelpusindealingwiththedifficultiesofmeasuringpleasuresandpainswhichwehaveconsideredinthepreviouschapters。
Itmay，however，bethoughtthataknowledgeofthecausesofpleasureandpainmaycarryusbeyondthedeterminationofthemeansofgainingparticularkindsofpleasureandavoidingparticularkindsofpain；andenableustosubstitutesomedeductivemethodofevaluingtheelementsofhappinessfortheempirical-reflectivemethodofwhichwehaveseenthedefects。[2]
Ahedonisticmethod，indeed，thatwoulddispensealtogetherwithdirectestimatesofthepleasurableandpainfulconsequencesofactionsisalmostasinconceivableasamethodofastronomythatwoulddispensewithobservationsofthestars。Itis，however，conceivablethatbyinductionfromcasesinwhichempiricalmeasurementiseasywemayobtaingeneralisationsthatwillgiveusmoretrustworthyguidancethansuchmeasurementcandoincomplicatedcases；wemaybeabletoascertainsomegeneralpsychicalorphysicalconcomitantorantecedentofpleasureandpain，moreeasytorecognise，foresee，measure，andproduceoravertinsuchcases，thanpleasureandpainthemselves。IamwillingtohopethatthisrefugefromthedifficultiesofEmpiricalHedonismmaysometimeorotherbeopentous:butIcannotperceivethatitisatpresentavailable。Thereisatpresent，sofarasIcanjudge，nosatisfactorilyestablishedgeneraltheoryofthecausesofpleasureandpain；andsuchtheoriesashavegainedacertaindegreeofacceptance，aspartiallytrueorprobable，aremanifestlynotadaptedforthepracticalapplicationthatwehererequire。
Thechiefdifficultyoffindingauniversallyapplicabletheoryofthecausesofpleasuresandpainsiseasilyexplained。Pleasuresandpainsmaybeassumedtohaveuniversally——likeotherpsychicalfacts——certaincerebralnerve-processes，specificallyunknown，astheirinseparableconcomitants:
accordingly，wemayseektheircauseseitherinantecedentphysicalorantecedentpsychicalfacts。Butinoneimportantclassofcasesthechiefcognisableantecedentsareobviouslyoftheformerkind，whileinanotherimportantclasstheyareobviouslyofthelatterkind:thedifficultyistoestablishanytheoryequallyapplicabletobothclasses，ortobringtheresultsofthetwolinesofinquiryunderasinglegeneralisationwithoutpalpablyunsupportedhypotheses。Inthecaseofpleasuresandpains——especiallypains——connectedwithsensationthemostimportantcognisableantecedentsareclearlyphysical。Idonotdenythat，whenthepainisforeseen，theattitudeofmindinwhichitismetmaymateriallyinfluenceitsmagnitude:
indeed，inthehypnoticconditionofthebrain，thefeelingofpainmaybeapparentlyaltogetherpreventedbyanantecedentbeliefthatitwillnotbefelt。Stillinthemain，underordinaryconditions，thepainsofsensation——probablytheintensestintheexperienceofmostpersons——invadeandinterruptourpsychicallifefromwithout；anditwouldbeidletolookforthechiefcausesoftheirintensityorqualityamongantecedentpsychicalfacts。Thisisnotequallytrueofthemostprominentpleasuresofsense:sinceantecedentdesire，ifnotanabsolutelyindispensableconditionofsuchpleasures，seemsatanyratenecessarytotheirattainingahighdegreeofintensity。Stillthechiefcausesofthesedesiresthemselvesareclearlyphysicalstatesandprocesses——notmerelyneural——intheorganismofthesentientindividual:andthisisalsotrueofamoreindefinitekindofpleasure，whichisanimportantelementofordinaryhumanhappiness，——the``well-feeling’’thataccompaniesandisasignofphysicalwell-being。
Ontheotherhand，whenweinvestigatethecausesofthepleasuresandpainsthatbelongtointellectualexercisesortheplayofpersonalaffections，——orofthepleasures(andtosomeextentpains)thatbelongtothecontemplationofbeauty(oritsopposite)inartornature，——nophysiologicaltheorycancarryusfar，owingtoourignoranceoftheneuralprocessesthataccompanyorantecedethesefeelings。
Thisismygeneralconclusion:thegroundsforwhichIproposetoillustrateandexplainfurtherinthepresentchapter。
Itwould，however，seemtobequitebeyondmylimitstoattemptanythinglikeanexhaustivediscussionofeitherpsychologicalorphysiologicaltheoriesofthecausesofpleasureandpain。Ishallconfinemyselftocertainleadinggeneralisations，whichseemtohaveaspecialinterestforstudentsofethics；eitherbecauseethicalmotiveshavehadashareincausingtheiracceptance；orbecause——thoughinadequatelygroundedasgeneraltheories——theyappeartohaveapartialandlimitedvalueforpracticalguidance。
