Letusproceed，then，toconsiderhowfarthesocialsanctioninsuchcasessuppliesthedefectsofthelegal。Nodoubtthehopeofpraiseandlikingandservicesfromone’sfellow-men，andthefearofforfeitingtheseandincurringinsteadaversion，refusalofaid，andsocialexclusion，areconsiderationsoftenimportantenoughtodeterminetherationalegoisttolaw-observance，evenindefaultofadequatelegalpenalties。Stillthesesanctionsareliabletofailjustwherethelegalpenaltiesaredefective；socialnolessthanlegalpenaltiesareevadedbysecretcrimes；andincasesofcriminalrevolutionaryviolence，theefficacyofthesocialsanctionisapttobeseriouslyimpairedbythepartyspiritenlistedonthesideofthecriminal。Forithastobeobservedthattheforceofthesocialsanctiondiminishesveryrapidly，inproportiontothenumberofdissidentsfromthecommonopinionthatawardsit。Disapprobationthatisatonceintenseandquiteuniversalwouldbesosevereapenaltyasperhapstooutweighanyimaginableadvantages；
sinceitseemsimpossibleforahumanbeingtolivehappily，whateverothergoodshemayenjoy，withoutthekindlyregardsofsomeofhisfellows:
andso，incontemplatingtheconventionalportraitofthetyrant，whoisrepresentedasnecessarilysuspiciousofthosenearesthim，evenofthemembersofhisownfamily，wefeelpreparedtoadmitthatsuchalifemustinvolvetheextremeofunhappiness。Butwhenweturntocontemplatetheactualtyrannicalusurpers，wickedstatesmen，successfulleadersofunwarrantedrebellion，and，speakinggenerally，thegreatcriminalswhosepositionraisesthemoutofthereachoflegalpenalties，itdoesnotappearthatthemoralodiumunderwhichtheyliemustnecessarilycountformuchinanegoisticcalculationofthegainandlossresultingfromtheirconduct。
Forthisdisesteemisonlyexpressedbyaportionofthecommunity:anditsutteranceisoftendrownedintheloud-voicedapplauseofthemultitudewhoseadmirationislargelyindependentofmoralconsiderations。Noraretherewantingphilosophersandhistorianswhosejudgmentmanifestsasimilarindependence。
Itseems，then，impossibletoaffirmthattheexternalsanctionsofmen’slegaldutieswillalwaysbesufficienttoidentifydutywithinterest。AndacorrespondingassertionwouldbestillmoreunwarrantedinrespectofmoraldutiesnotincludedwithinthesphereofLaw。Insayingthis，IamfullysensibleoftheforceofwhatmaybecalledthePrincipleofReciprocity，bywhichcertainutilitarianshaveendeavouredtoprovethecoincidenceofanyindividual’sinterestwithhissocialduties。Virtues(theysay)arequalitieseitherusefulordirectlyagreeabletoothers:
thustheyeitherincreasethemarketvalueofthevirtuousman’sservices，andcauseotherstopurchasethematahigherrateandtoallottohimmoredignifiedandinterestingfunctions；ortheydisposementopleasehim，bothoutofgratitudeandinordertoenjoythepleasuresofhissocietyinreturn:andagain——sincemanisanimitativeanimal——theexhibitionofthesequalitiesisnaturallyrewardedbyareciprocalmanifestationofthemonthepartofothers，throughthemereinfluenceofexample。I
donotdoubtthattheprospectoftheseadvantagesisanadequatemotiveforcultivatingmanyvirtuesandavoidingmuchvice。Thusonsuchgroundsarationalegoistwillgenerallybestrictandpunctualinthefulfilmentofallhisengagements，andtruthfulinhisassertions，inordertowintheconfidenceofothermen；andhewillbezealousandindustriousinhiswork，inordertoobtaingraduallymoreimportantandthereforemorehonourableandlucrativeemployment；andhewillcontrolsuchofhispassionsandappetitesasarelikelytointerferewithhisefficiency；andwillnotexhibitviolentangeroruseunnecessaryharshnesseventowardsservantsandsubordinates；andtowardshisequalsandsuperiorsinrankliewillbegenerallypoliteandcomplaisantandgood-humoured，andprompttoshowthemallsuchkindnessascostsbutlittleinproportiontothepleasureitgives。Still，reflectionseemstoshowthattheconductrecommendedbythislineofreasoningdoesnotreallycoincidewithmoralduty。For，first，whatonerequiresforsocialsuccessisthatoneshouldappear，ratherthanbe，usefultoothers:andhencethismotivewillnotrestrainonefromdoingsecretharmtoothers，orevenfromactingopenlyinawaythatisreallyharmful，thoughnotperceivedtobeso。Andagain，amanisnotusefultoothersbyhisvirtueonly，butsometimesratherbyhisvice；ormoreoftenbyacertainadmixtureofunscrupulousnesswithhisgoodandusefulqualities。Andfurther，moralityprescribestheperformanceofdutiesequallytowardsall，andthatweshouldabstainasfaraspossiblefromharminganybutontheprincipleofReciprocityweshouldexhibitourusefulqualitieschieflytowardstherichandpowerful，andabstainfrominjuringthosewhocanretaliate；whilewemayreasonablyomitourdutiestothepoorandfeeble，ifwefindamaterialadvantageinsodoing，unlesstheyareabletoexcitethesympathyofpersonswhocanharmus。
Moreover，somevices(asforexample，manykindsofsensualityandextravagantluxury)donotinflictanyimmediateorobviousinjuryonanyindividual，thoughtheytendinthelong-runtoimpairthegeneralhappiness:hencefewpersonsfindthemselvesstronglymovedtocheckorpunishthiskindofmischief。
Doubtlessinthelast-mentionedcasesthemeredisreputeinevitablyattachingtoopenimmoralityisanimportantconsideration。
ButIdonotthinkthatthiswillbeseriouslymaintainedtobesufficientalwaystoturnthescalesofprudenceagainstvice——atleastbyanyonewhohasdulyanalysedtheturbidandfluctuatingstreamsofsocialopinionuponwhichthegoodorillreputeofindividualsmainlydepends，andconsideredtheconflictinganddivergentelementsthattheycontain。ManymoralistshavenoticedthediscrepancyinmodernEuropebetweentheLawofHonour(orthemoreimportantrulesmaintainedbythesocialsanctionofpolitepersons)andthemoralityprofessedinsocietyatlarge。Thisis，however，bynomeanstheonlyinstanceofaspecialcode，divergentincertainpointsfromthemoralrulesgenerallyacceptedinthecommunitywhereitexists。
Mostreligioussectsandparties，andprobablythemajorityoftradesandprofessions，exhibitthisphenomenoninsomedegree。Idonotmeanmerelythatspecialrulesofbehaviourareimposeduponmembersofeachprofession，correspondingtotheirspecialsocialfunctionsandrelations:Imeanthatapeculiarmoralopinionisapttogrowup，conflictingtoacertainextentwiththeopinionofthegeneralpublic。Themoststrikingpartofthisdivergenceconsistsgenerallyintheapprovalorexcusalofpracticesdisapprovedbythecurrentmorality:as(e。g。)licenceamongsoldiers，briberyamongpoliticiansincertainagesandcountries，unveracityofvariousdegreesamongpriestsandadvocates，fraudindifferentformsamongtradesmen。
Insuchcasestherearegenerallystrongnaturalinducementstodisobeythestricterrule(infactitwouldseemtobetothecontinualpressureoftheseinducementsthattherelaxationoftherulehasbeendue):whileatthesametimethesocialsanctionisweakenedtosuchanextentthatitissometimeshardtosaywhetheritoutweighsasimilarforceontheotherside。Foramanwho，underthesecircumstances，conformstothestricterrule，ifhedoesnotactuallymeetwithcontemptandaversionfromthoseofhiscalling，isatleastliabletobecalledeccentricandfantastic:
andthisisstillmorethecaseifbysuchconformityheforegoesadvantagesnotonlytohimselfbuttohisrelativesorfriendsorparty。Veryoftenthisprofessionalorsectarianexcusalofimmoralityofwhichwearespeakingisnotsoclearandexplicitastoamounttotheestablishmentofarule，conflictingwiththegenerallyreceivedrule:butisstillsufficienttoweakenindefinitelythesocialsanctioninfavourofthelatter。And，apartfromthesespecialdivergences，wemaysaygenerallythatinmostcivilisedsocietiestherearetwodifferentdegreesofpositivemorality，bothmaintainedinsomesortbycommonconsent；astrictercodebeingpubliclytaughtandavowed，whilealaxersetofrulesisprivatelyadmittedastheonlycodewhichcanbesupportedbysocialsanctionsofanygreatforce。Byrefusingtoconformtothestrictercodeamanisoftennotliabletoincurexclusionfromsocialintercourse，oranymaterialhindrancetoprofessionaladvancement，orevenseriousdislikeonthepartofanyofthepersonswhosesocietyhewillmostnaturallyseek；andundersuchcircumstancesthemerelossofacertainamountofreputationisnotlikelytobefeltasaverygraveevil，exceptbypersonspeculiarlysensitivetothepleasuresandpainsofreputation。Andtherewouldseemtobemanymenwhosehappinessdoesnotdependontheapprobationordisapprobationofthemoralist——andofmankindingeneralinsofarastheysupportthemoralist——tosuchanextentastomakeitprudentforthemtopurchasethispraisebyanygreatsacrificeofothergoods。
Wemustconclude，then，thatiftheconductprescribedtotheindividualbytheavowedlyacceptedmoralityofthecommunityofwhichheisamember，canbeshowntocoincidewiththattowhichRationalSelf-lovewouldprompt，itmustbe，inmanycases，solelyorchieflyonthescoreoftheinternalsanctions。Inconsideringtheforceofthesesanctions，Ishalleliminatethosepleasuresandpainswhichlieintheanticipationofrewardsandpunishmentsinafuturelife:foraswearenowsupposingthecalculationsofRationalEgoismtobeperformedwithouttakingintoaccountanyfeelingsthatarebeyondtherangeofexperience，itwillbemoreconsistenttoexcludealsothepleasurableorpainfulanticipationsofsuchfeelings。
Letus，then，contemplatebyitselfthesatisfactionthatattendstheperformanceofdutyassuch(withouttakingintoconsiderationanyulteriorconsequences)，andthepainthatfollowsonitsviolation。AfterthediscussionsofthetwoprecedingchaptersIshallnotofcourseattempttoweighexactlythesepleasuresandpainsagainstothers；butIseenoempiricalgroundsforbelievingthatsuchfeelingsarealwayssufficientlyintensetoturnthebalanceofprospectivehappinessinfavourofmorality。Thiswillhardlybedeniedifthequestionisraisedinrespectofisolatedactsofduty。
Letustakeanextremecase，whichisyetquitewithinthelimitsofexperience。
Thecallofdutyhasoftenimpelledasoldierorotherpublicservant，ortheadherentofapersecutedreligion，tofacecertainandpainfuldeath，undercircumstanceswhereitmightbeavoidedwithlittleornolossevenofreputation。Toprovesuchconductalwaysreasonablefromanegoisticpointofview，wehavetoassumethat，inallcaseswheresuchadutycouldexistandberecognised，themerepainthatwouldfollowonevasionofdutywouldbesogreatastorenderthewholeremainderoflifehedonisticallyworthless。Surelysuchallassumptionwouldbeparadoxicalandextravagant。
Nothingthatweknowofthemajorityofpersonsinanysocietywouldleadustoconcludethattheirmoralfeelingstakenaloneformsopreponderantailelementoftheirhappiness。Andasimilarconclusionseemsirresistibleeveninmoreordinarycases，whereamaniscalledontogiveup，forvirtue’ssake，notlife，butaconsiderableshareoftheordinarysourcesofhumanhappiness。Canwesaythatall，orevenmost，menaresoconstitutedthatthesatisfactionsofagoodconsciencearecertaintorepaythemforsuchsacrifices，orthatthepainandlossinvolvedinthemwouldcertainlybeoutweighedbytheremorsethatwouldfollowtherefusaltomakethem？
Perhaps，however，somuchasthishasscarcelyeverbeenexpresslymaintained。WhatPlatoinhisRepublicandotherwritersonthesamesidehaverathertriedtoprove，isnotthatatanyparticularmomentdutywillbe，toeveryoneonwhomitmaydevolve，productiveofmorehappinessthananyothercourseofconduct；butratherthatitiseveryone’sinterestonthewholetochoosethelifeofthevirtuousman。Buteventhisitisverydifficulteventorenderprobable:aswillappear，Ithink，ifweexaminethelinesofreasoningbywhichitiscommonlysupported。
TobeginwithPlato’sargument。Herepresentsthesoulofthevirtuousmanasawell-orderedpolityofimpulses，inwhicheverypassionandappetiteisdulyobedienttotherightfulsovereigntyofreason，andoperatesonlywithinthelimitslaiddownbythelatter。
Hethencontraststhetranquilpeaceofsuchamindwiththedisorderofonewhereasuccessionofbaserimpulses，orsomerulingpassion，lordsitoverreason:andaskswhichisthehappiest，evenapartfromexternalrewardsandpunishments。ButwemaygrantallthatPlatoclaims，andyetbenofurtheradvancedtowardsthesolutionofthequestionbeforeus。
ForheretheissuedoesnotliebetweenReasonandPassion，butrather——inButler’slanguage——betweenRationalSelf-loveandConscience。WearesupposingtheEgoisttohaveallhisimpulsesundercontrol，andareonlyaskinghowthiscontrolistobeexercised。Nowwehaveseenthattheregulationandorganisationoflifebestcalculatedtoattaintheendofself-interestappearsprimafaciedivergentatcertainpointsfromthattowhichmeningeneralarepromptedbyasenseofduty。InordertomaintainPlato’spositionithastobeshownthatthisappearanceisfalse；andthatasystemofself-government，whichundercertaincircumstancesleadsustopain，loss，anddeath，isstillthatwhichself-interestrequires。Itcanscarcelybesaidthatournatureissuchthatonlythisanti-egoistickindofregulationispossible；thatthechoiceliesbetweenthisandnoneatall。Itiseasytoimaginearationalegoist，strictlycontrollingeachofhispassionsandimpulses——includinghissocialsentiments——withinsuchlimitsthatitsindulgenceshouldnotinvolvethesacrificeofsomegreatergratification:
