wemustthereforeconceive，asatleastideallypossible，apointoftransitioninconsciousnessatwhichwepassfromthepositivetothenegative。Itisnotabsolutelynecessarytoassumethatthisstrictlyindifferentorneutralfeelingeveractuallyoccurs。Stillexperienceseemstoshowthatastateatanyrateverynearlyapproximatingtoitisevencommon:andwecertainlyexperiencecontinualtransitionsfrompleasuretopainandviceversa，andthus(unlessweconceiveallsuchtransitionstobeabrupt)wemustexistatleastmomentarily，inthisneutralstate。
InwhatIhavejustsaid，IhavebyimplicationdeniedtheparadoxofEpicurusthatthestateofpainlessnessisequivalenttothehighestpossiblepleasure；sothatifwecanobtainabsolutefreedomfrompain，thegoalofHedonismisreached，afterwhichwemayvary，butcannotincrease，ourpleasure。Thisdoctrineisopposedtocommonsenseandcommonexperience。Butitwould，Ithink，beequallyerroneous，ontheotherhand，toregardthisneutralfeeling——hedonisticzero，asIhavecalledit——asthenormalconditionofourconsciousness，outofwhichweoccasionallysinkintopain，andoccasionallyriseintopleasure。Naturehasnotbeensoniggardlytomanasthis:solongashealthisretained，andpainandirksometoilbanished，themereperformanceoftheordinaryhabitualfunctionsoflifeis，accordingtomyexperience，afrequentsourceofmoderatepleasures，alternatingrapidlywithstatesnearlyorquiteindifferent。Thuswemayventuretosaythatthe`apathy’
whichsolargeaproportionofGreekmoralistsinthepost-Aristotelianperiodregardedastheidealstateofexistence，wasnotreallyconceivedbythemas``withoutonepleasureandwithoutonepain’’；butratherasastateofplacidintellectualcontemplation，whichinphilosophicmindsmighteasilyreachahighdegreeofpleasure。
Wehaveyettogivetothenotionsofpleasureandpaintheprecisionrequiredforquantitativecomparison。Indealingwiththispoint，andintherestofthehedonisticdiscussion，itwillbeconvenientforthemostparttospeakofpleasureonly，assumingthatpainmayberegardedasthenegativequantityofpleasure，andthataccordinglyanystatementsmadewithrespecttopleasuremaybeatonceapplied，byobviouschangesofphrase，topain。
TheequivalentphraseforPleasure，accordingtoMr。Spencer，is``afeelingwhichweseektobringintoconsciousnessandretainthere’’；andsimilarly，Mr。Bainsaysthat``pleasureandpain，intheactualorrealexperience，aretobeheldasidenticalwithmotivepower’’。But——grantingthatpleasuresnormallyexcitedesire——itstilldoesnotseemtomethatIjudgepleasurestobegreaterandlessexactlyinproportionastheystimulatethewilltoactionstendingtosustainthem。OfcourseneitherMr。BainnorMr。Spencermustbeunderstoodtolaydownthatallpleasureswhenactuallyfeltactuallystimulatetoexertionofsomekind——sincethisisobviouslynottrueofthepleasuresofrepose，awarmbath，etc。Thestimulusmustinsuchcasesbeunderstoodtobelatentandpotential；onlybecomingactualwhenactionisrequiredtopreventthecessationordiminutionofthepleasure。Thusamanenjoyingrestafterfatigueisvaguelyconsciousofastrongclingingtohisactualcondition，andofalatentreadinesstoresistanyimpulsetochangeit。
Further，thestimulusofmoderatepleasuresandpainsmaybecomeunfeltthroughhabitualrepression。Forinstance，inahabituallytemperatemanthestimulustoprolongthepleasureofeatingordrinkingusuallyceasesbeforethepleasureceases:itisonlyoccasionallythathefeelstheneedofcontrollinganimpulsetoeatordrinkuptothepointofsatiety。Soagain，aprotractedpainofmoderateintensityandfreefromalarm——suchasadullprolongedtoothache——seemssometimestoloseitsfeltstimulustoactionwithoutlosingitscharacteraspain。Hereagainthestimulusmaybeproperlyconceivedaslatent:sinceifaskedwhetherweshouldliketogetridofevenamildtoothache，weshouldcertainlyansweryes。
Butevenifweconfineourattentiontocaseswherethestimulusispalpableandstrong，Mr。Bain’sidentificationof``pleasureandpain’’withmotivepowerdoesnotappeartometoaccordexactlywithourcommonempiricaljudgments。Hehimselfcontraststhe``disproportionatestrainofactivepowersinonedirection’’，towhich``anysuddenandgreatdelightmaygiverise’’，withthe``properframeofmindunderdelight’’，whichis``toinspirenoendeavoursexceptwhatthecharmofthemomentjustifies’’。
[2]Andheelsewhereexplainsthat``ourpleasurableemotionsareallliabletodetainthemindunduly’’，throughthe``atmosphereofexcitement’’withwhichtheyaresurrounded，carryingthemind``beyondtheestimateofpleasureandpain，tothestatenamed`passion’，’’inwhichamanisnot``movedsolelybythestrictvalueofthepleasure’’，butalsoby``theengrossingpoweroftheexcitement’’。[3]ItistruethatinsuchcasesMr。Bainseemstoholdthatthese``disturbancesandanomaliesofthewillscarcelybegintotellintheactualfeeling’’[4]，butitseemstomeclearthatexcitingpleasuresareliabletoexercise，evenwhenactuallyfelt，avolitionalstimulusoutofproportiontotheirintensityaspleasures；andMr。Bainhimselfseemstorecognisethisinapassagewherehesaysthat``acutepleasuresandpainsstimulatethewillperhapsmorestronglythananequivalentstimulationofthemassivekind’’。[5]Ialsofindthatsomefeelingswhichstimulatestronglytotheirownremovalareeithernotpainfulatalloronlyslightlypainful:——e。g。ordinarilythesensationofbeingtickled。Ifthisbeso，itisobviouslyinexacttodefinepleasure，forpurposesofmeasurement，asthekindoffeelingthatweseektoretaininconsciousness。Shallwethensaythatthereisameasurablequalityoffeelingexpressedbytheword``pleasure’’，whichisindependentofitsrelationtovolition，andstrictlyundefinablefromitssimplicity？——likethequalityoffeelingexpressedby``sweet’’，ofwhichalsoweareconsciousinvaryingdegreesofintensity。Thisseemstobetheviewofsomewriters:
but，formyownpart，whenIreflectonthenotionofpleasure，——usingtheterminthecomprehensivesensewhichIhaveadopted，toincludethemostrefinedandsubtleintellectualandemotionalgratifications，nolessthanthecoarserandmoredefinitesensualenjoyments，——theonlycommonqualitythatIcanfindinthefeelingssodesignatedseemstobethatrelationtodesireandvolitionexpressedbythegeneralterm``desirable’’，inthesensepreviouslyexplained。IproposethereforetodefinePleasure——whenweareconsideringits``strictvalue’’forpurposesofquantitativecomparison——asafeelingwhich，whenexperiencedbyintelligentbeings，isatleastimplicitlyapprehendedasdesirableor——incasesofcomparison——preferable。
Here，however，anewquestioncomesintoview。
WhenIstatedintheprecedingchapter，asafundamentalassumptionofHedonism，thatitisreasonabletopreferpleasuresinproportiontotheirintensity，andnottoallowthisgroundofpreferencetobeoutweighedbyanymerelyqualitativedifference，Iimpliedthatthepreferenceofpleasuresongroundsofqualityasopposedtoquantity——as`higher’or`nobler’——isactuallypossible:andindeedsuchnon-hedonisticpreferenceiscommonlythoughttobeoffrequentoccurrence。Butifwetakethedefinitionofpleasurejustgiven——thatitisthekindoffeelingwhichweapprehendtobedesirableorpreferable——itseemstobeacontradictionintermstosaythatthelesspleasantfeelingcaneverbethoughtpreferabletothemorepleasant。
Thiscontradictionmaybeavoidedasfollows。Itwillbegenerallyadmittedthatthepleasantnessofafeelingisonlydirectlycognisablebytheindividualwhofeelsitatthetimeoffeelingit。Thus，though(asIshallpresentlyargue)，insofarasanyestimateofpleasantnessinvolvescomparisonwithfeelingsonlyrepresentedinidea，itisliabletobeerroneousthroughimperfectionsintherepresentation——still，nooneisinapositiontocontrovertthepreferenceofthesentientindividual，sofarasthequalityofthepresentfeelingaloneisconcerned。When，however，wejudgeofthepreferablequality(as`elevation’or`refinement’)ofastateofconsciousnessasdistinctfromitspleasantness，weseemtoappealtosomecommonstandardwhichotherscanapplyaswellasthesentientindividual。HenceIshouldconcludethatwhenonekindofpleasureisjudgedtobequalitativelysuperiortoanother，althoughlesspleasant，itisnotreallythefeelingitselfthatispreferred，butsomethinginthementalorphysicalconditionsorrelationsunderwhichitarises，regardedascognisableobjectsofourcommonthought。
ForcertainlyifIinthoughtdistinguishanyfeelingfromallitsconditionsandconcomitants——andalsofromallitseffectsonthesubsequentfeelingsofthesameindividualorofothers——andcontemplateitmerelyasthetransientfeelingofasinglesubject；itseemstomeimpossibletofindinitanyotherpreferablequalitythanthatwhichwecallitspleasantness，thedegreeofwhichisonlycognisabledirectlybythesentientindividual。
Itshouldbeobservedthatifthisdefinitionofpleasurebeaccepted，andif，asbeforeproposed，`UltimateGood’betakenasequivalentto`whatisultimatelydesirable’，thefundamentalpropositionofethicalHedonismhaschieflyanegativesignificance；forthestatementthat`PleasureistheUltimateGood’willonlymeanthatnothingisultimatelydesirableexceptdesirablefeeling，apprehendedasdesirablebythesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingit。Thisbeingso，itmaybeurgedagainstthedefinitionthatitcouldnotbeacceptedbyamoralistofstoicalturn，whowhilerecognisingpleasureasafactrefusedtorecogniseitasinanydegreeultimatelydesirable。ButIthinksuchamoralistoughttoadmitanimpliedjudgmentthatafeelingispersedesirabletobeinseparablyconnectedwithitsrecognitionaspleasure；whileholdingthatsoundphilosophyshowstheillusorinessofsuchjudgments。This，infact，seemstohavebeensubstantiallytheviewoftheStoicschool。
Howeverthismaybe，IconceivethatthepreferencewhichpureHedonismregardsasultimatelyrational，shouldbedefinedasthepreferenceoffeelingvaluedmerelyasfeeling，accordingtotheestimateimplicitlyorexplicitlymadebythesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingit；withoutanyregardtotheconditionsandrelationsunderwhichitarises。AccordinglywemaystateasthefundamentalassumptionofwhatIhavecalledQuantitativeHedonism，——impliedintheadoptionof``greatestsurplusofpleasureoverpain’’astheultimateend，——thatallpleasuresandpains，estimatedmerelyasfeelings，haveforthesentientindividualcognisabledegreesofdesirability，positiveornegative；observingfurther，thattheempiricalmethodofHedonismcanonlybeappliedsofarasweassumethatthesedegreesofdesirabilityaredefinitelygiveninexperience。
Thereisonemoreassumptionofafundamentalkind，whichisnotperhapsinvolvedintheacceptanceoftheHedonisticcalculusconsideredaspurelytheoretical，butiscertainlyimpliedifitbeputforwardasapracticalmethodfordeterminingrightconduct:theassumption，namely，thatwecanbyforesightandcalculationincreaseourpleasuresanddecreaseourpains。Itmayperhapsbethoughtpedantictostate，itformally:andinfactnoonewilldenythattheconditionsuponwhichourpleasuresandpainsdependaretosomeextentcognisablebyusandwithinourowncontrol。But，asweshallsee，ithasbeenmaintainedthatthepracticeofHedonisticobservationandcalculationhasaninevitabletendencytodecreaseourpleasuresgenerally，orthemostimportantofthem:sothatitbecomesaquestionwhetherwecangainourgreatesthappinessbyseekingit，oratanyratebytryingtoseekitwithscientificexactness。
ItissometimesthoughttobeanecessaryassumptionofHedoniststhatasurplusofpleasureoverpainisactuallyattainablebyhumanbeings:apropositionwhichallextremepessimistwoulddeny。Buttheconclusionthatlifeisalwaysonthewholepainfulwouldnotproveittobeunreasonableforamantoaimultimatelyatmininimisingpain，ifthisisstilladmittedtobepossible；thoughitwould，nodoubt，renderimmediatesuicide，bysomepainlessprocess，theonlyreasonablecourseforaperfectegoist——unlesshelookedforwardtoanotherlife。
Let，then，pleasurebedefinedasfeelingwhichthesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingitimplicitlyorexplicitlyapprehendstobedesirable；——desirable，thatis，whenconsideredmerelyasfeeling，andnotinrespectofitsobjectiveconditionsorconsequences，orofanyfactsthatcomedirectlywithinthecognisanceandjudgmentofothersbesidesthesentientindividual。Andletitbeprovisionallyassumedthatfeelingsgenerallycanbecomparedfromthispointofview，withsufficientdefinitenessforpracticalpurposes，andempiricallyknowntobemoreorlesspleasantinsomedefinitedegree。Thentheempirical-reflectivemethodofEgoisticHedonismwillbe，torepresentbeforehandthedifferentseriesoffeelingsthatourknowledgeofphysicalandpsychicalcausesleadsustoexpectfromthedifferentlinesofconductthatlieopentous；judge，whichseries，asthusrepresented，appearsonthewholepreferable，takingallprobabilitiesintoaccount；andadoptthecorrespondinglineofconduct。
Itmaybeobjectedthatthecalculationistoocomplexforpractice；sinceanycompleteforecastofthefuturewouldinvolveavastnumberofcontingenciesofvaryingdegreesofprobability，andtocalculatetheHedonisticvalueofeachofthesechancesoffeelingwouldbeinterminable。Stillwemayperhapsreducethecalculationwithinmanageablelimits，withoutseriouslossofaccuracy，bydiscardingallmanifestlyimprudentconduct，andneglectingthelessprobableandlessimportantcontingencies；aswedoinsomeoftheartsthathavemoredefiniteends，suchasstrategyandmedicine。Forifthegeneralinorderingamarch，orthephysicianinrecommendingachangeofabode，tookintoconsiderationallthecircumstancesthatwereatallrelevanttotheendsought，theircalculationswouldbecomeimpracticable；
accordinglytheyconfinethemselvestothemostimportant；andwemaydealsimilarlywiththeHedonisticartoflife。
Thereare，however，objectionsurgedagainsttheHedonisticmethodwhichgomuchdeeper；andbysomewritersarepressedtotheextremeofrejectingthemethodaltogether。Acarefulexaminationoftheseobjectionsseemstobethemostconvenientwayofobtainingaclearview，bothofthemethoditselfandoftheresultsthatmayreasonablybeexpectedfromit。
Ishould，however，pointoutthatwearenowonlyconcernedwithwhatmaybecalledintrinsicobjectionstoEgoisticHedonism；arguments，thatis，againstthepossibilityofobtainingbyittheresultsatwhichitaims。Wearenotnowtoconsiderwhetheritisreasonableforanindividualtotakehisownhappinessashisultimateend；orhowfartherulesofactiondeducedfromtheadoptionofthisend，andfromtheactualconditionsoftheindividual’sexistence，willcoincidewithcurrentopinionsastowhatisright。Thesequestions，accordingtotheplanofmywork，arepostponedforfutureconsideration:
