Itremainstoconsiderbywhatstandardthevalueofconductorcharacter，thusintuitivelyjudgedtobegoodinitself，istobeco-ordinatedandcomparedwiththatofothergoodthings。Ishallnotnowattempttoestablishsuchastandard；butalittlereflectionmayenableustolimitconsiderablytherangeofcomparisonforwhichitisrequired。ForIthinkthatifweconsidercarefullysuchpermanentresultsasarecommonlyjudgedtobegood，otherthanqualitiesofhumanbeings，wecanfindnothingthat，onreflection，appearstopossessthisqualityofgoodnessoutofrelationtohumanexistence，oratleasttosomeconsciousnessorfeelingForexample，wecommonlyjudgesomeinanimateobjects，scenes，etc。tobegoodaspossessingbeauty，andothersbadfromugliness:
stillnoonewouldconsideritrationaltoaimattheproductionofbeautyinexternalnature，apartfromanypossiblecontemplationofitbyhumanbeings。Infactwhenbeautyismaintainedtobeobjective，itisnotcommonlymeantthatitexistsasbeautyoutofrelationtoanymindwhatsoever:
butonlythatthereissomestandardofbeautyvalidforallminds。
Itmay，however，besaidthatbeautyandotherresultscommonlyjudgedtobegood，thoughwedonotconceivethemtoexistoutofrelationtohumanbeings(oratleastmindsofsomekind)，areyetsofarseparableasendsfromthehumanbeingsonwhomtheirexistencedepends，thattheirrealisationmayconceivablycomeintocompetitionwiththeperfectionorhappinessofthesebeings。Thus，thoughbeautifulthingscannotbethoughtworthproducingexceptaspossibleobjectsofcontemplation，stillamanmaydevotehimselftotheirproductionwithoutanyconsiderationofthepersonswhoaretocontemplatethem。Similarlyknowledgeisagoodwhichcannotexistexceptinminds；andyetonemaybemoreinterestedinthedevelopmentofknowledgethaninitspossessionbyanyparticularminds；andmaytaketheformerasanultimateendwithoutregardingthelatter。
Still，assoonasthealternativesareclearlyapprehended，itwill，Ithink，begenerallyheldthatbeauty，knowledge，andotheridealgoods，aswellasallexternalmaterialthings，areonlyreasonablytobesoughtbymeninsofarastheyconduceeither(1)toHappinessor(2)tothePerfectionorExcellenceofhumanexistence。I
say``human’’，forthoughmostutilitariansconsiderthepleasure(andfreedomfrompain)oftheinferioranimalstobeincludedintheHappinesswhichtheytakeastherightandproperendofconduct，nooneseemstocontendthatweoughttoaimatperfectingbrutes，exceptasameanstoourends，oratleastasobjectsofscientificoraestheticcontemplationforus。Nor，again，canweinclude，asapracticalend，theexistenceofbeingsabovethehuman。WecertainlyapplytheideaofGoodtotheDivineExistence，justaswedotoHiswork，andindeedinapre-eminentmanner:
andwhenitissaidthat``weshoulddoallthingstothegloryofGod’’，itmayseemtobeimpliedthattheexistenceofGodismadebetterbyourglorifyingHim。Stillthisinferencewhenexplicitlydrawnappearssomewhatimpiousandtheologiansgenerallyrecoilfromit，andrefrainfromusingthenotionofapossibleadditiontotheGoodnessoftheDivineExistenceasagroundofhumanduty。Norcantheinfluenceofouractionsonotherextra-humanintelligencesbesidestheDivinebeatpresentmadematterofscientificdiscussion。
Ishallthereforeconfidentlylaydown，thatiftherebeanyGoodotherthanHappinesstobesoughtbyman，asanultimatepracticalend，itcanOnlybetheGoodness，Perfection，orExcellenceofHumanExistence。HowfarthisnotionincludesmorethanVirtue，whatitspreciserelationtoPleasureis，andtowhatmethodweshallbelogicallyledifweacceptitasfundamental，arequestionswhichweshallmoreconvenientlydiscussafterthedetailedexaminationofthesetwoothernotions，PleasureandVirtue，inwhichweshallbeengagedinthetwofollowingBooks。
TheobjectofthepresentBookistoexaminethemethodofdeterminingreasonableconductwhichhasbeenalreadydefinedinoutlineunderthenameofEgoism:takingthistermasequivalenttoEgoisticHedonism，andasimplyingtheadoptionofhisowngreatesthappinessastheultimateendofeachindividual’sactions。Itmaybedoubtedwhetherthisoughttobeincludedamongreceived``methodsofEthics’’；sincetherearestronggroundsforholdingthatasystemofmorality，satisfactorytothemoralconsciousnessofmankindingeneral，cannotbeconstructedonthebasisofsimpleEgoism。InsubsequentchaptersIshallcarefullydiscussthesereasons:atpresentitseemssufficienttopointtothewideacceptanceoftheprinciplethatitisreasonableforamantoactinthemannermostconducivetohisownhappiness。WefinditexpresslyadmittedbyleadingrepresentativesbothofIntuitionismandofthatUniversalisticHedonismtowhichIproposetorestrictthenameofUtilitarianism。IhavealreadynoticedthatBentham，althoughheputsforwardthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberasthe``truestandardofrightandwrong’’，yetregardsitas``rightandproper’’thateachindividualshouldaimathisowngreatesthappiness。AndButlerisequallypreparedtogrant``thatourideasofhappinessandmiseryareofallourideasthenearestandmostimportanttous？that，thoughvirtueormoralrectitudedoesindeedconsistinaffectiontoandpursuitofwhatisrightandgoodassuch；
yet，whenwesitdowninacoolhour，wecanneitherjustifytoourselvesthisoranyotherpursuittillweareconvincedthatitwillbeforourhappiness，oratleastnotcontrarytoit。’’[2]
AndevenClarke——notwithstandingtheemphatictermsinwhichhehasmaintainedthat``VirtuetrulydeservestobechosenforitsownsakeandVicetobeavoided’’——yetadmitsthatitis``nottrulyreasonablethatmenbyadheringtoVirtueshouldpartwiththeirlives，iftherebytheyeternallydeprivedthemselvesofallpossibilityofreceivinganyadvantagefromthatadherence。’’
And，generally，intheagesofChristianfaith，ithasbeenobviousandnaturaltoholdthattherealisationofvirtueisessentiallyanenlightenedandfar-seeingpursuitofHappinessfortheagent。Norhasthisdoctrinebeenheldonlybypersonsofacoldandcalculatingturnofmind:wefinditurgedwithemphasisbysochivalrousandhigh-mindedapreacherasBishopBerkeley。NodoubtthisisonlyonesideorelementoftheChristianview:theoppositedoctrine，thatanactiondonefrommotivesofself-interestisnotproperlyvirtuous，hascontinuallyasserteditselfaseitheropenlyconflictingorinsomemannerreconciledwiththeformer。Stilltheformer，thoughlessrefinedandelevated，seemstohavebeenthecommonerview。Indeed，itishardlygoingtoofartosaythatcommonsenseassumesthat`interested’actions，tendingtopromotetheagent’shappiness，areprimafaciereasonable:andthattheonusprobandilieswiththosewhomaintainthatdisinterestedconduct，assuch，isreasonable。
But，ashasbeenbeforesaid，inthecommonnotionsof`interest’，`happiness’，etc。，thereisacertainamountofvaguenessandambiguity:sothatinordertofitthesetermsforthepurposesofscientificdiscussion，wemust，whileretainingthemainpartoftheirsignification，endeavourtomakeitmoreprecise。Inmyjudgmentthisresultisattainedifby`greatestpossibleHappiness’weunderstandthegreatestattainablesurplusofpleasureoverpain；thetwotermsbeingused，withequallycomprehensivemeanings，toincluderespectivelyallkindsofagreeableanddisagreeablefeelings。Further，ifthisquantitativedefinitionoftheendbeaccepted，consistencyrequiresthatpleasuresshouldbesoughtinproportiontotheirpleasantness；andthereforethelesspleasantconsciousnessmustnotbepreferredtothemorepleasant，onthegroundofanyotherqualitiesthatitmaypossess。ThedistinctionsofqualitythatMillandothersurgemaystillbeadmittedasgroundsofpreference，butonlyinsofarastheycanberesolvedintodistinctionsofquantity。Thisisthetypetowhichthepracticalreasoningthatiscommonlycalled`Egoistic’
tendstoconform，whenwerigorouslyexcludeallambiguitiesandinconsistencies:
and，itisonlyinthismorepreciseformthatitseemsworthwhiletosubjectsuchreasoningtoadetailedexamination。WemustthereforeunderstandbyanEgoistamanwhowhentwoormorecoursesofactionareopentohim，ascertainsasaccuratelyashecantheamountsofpleasureandpainthatarelikelytoresultfromeach，andchoosestheonewhichhethinkswillyieldhimthegreatestsurplusofpleasureoverpain。
Itmust，however，bepointedoutthattheadoptionofthefundamentalprincipleofEgoism，asjustexplained，bynomeansnecessarilyimpliestheordinaryempiricalmethodofseekingone’sownpleasureorhappiness。Amanmayaimatthegreatesthappinesswithinhisreach，andyetnotattempttoascertainempiricallywhatamountofpleasureandpainislikelytoattendanygivencourseofaction；believingthathehassomesurer，deductivemethodfordeterminingtheconductwhichwillmakehimmosthappyinthelong-run。HewaybelievethisongroundsofPositiveReligion，becauseGodhaspromisedhappinessasarewardforobediencetocertaindefinitecommands:orongroundsofNaturalReligion，becauseGodbeingjustandbenevolentmusthavesoorderedtheworldthatHappinesswillinthelong-runbedistributedinproportiontoVirtue。
Itis(e。g。)byacombinationofboththeseargumentsthatPaleyconnectstheUniversalisticHedonismthatbeadoptsasamethodfordeterminingduties，withtheEgoismwhichseemstohimself-evidentasafundamentalprincipleofrationalconduct。Oragain，amanmayconnectvirtuewithhappinessbyaprocessofapriorireasoning，purelyethical；asAristotleseemstodobytheassumptionthatthe`best’activitywillbealwaysattendedbythegreatestpleasureasitsinseparableconcomitant；
`best’beingdeterminedbyareferencetomoralintuition，ortothecommonmoralopinionsofmengenerally，orofwell-bredandwell-educatedmen。
OrthedeductionbywhichMaximumPleasureisinferredtobetheresultofaparticularkindofactionmaybepsychologicalorphysiological:wemayhavesomegeneraltheoryastotheconnexionofpleasurewithsomeotherphysicalorpsychicalfact，accordingtowhichwecandeducetheamountofpleasurethatwillattendanyparticularkindofbehaviour:as(e。g。)itiswidelyheldthataperfectlyhealthyandharmoniousexerciseofourdifferentbodilyandmentalfunctionsisthecourseoflifemostconducivetopleasureinthelong-run。Inthislattercase，thoughacceptingunreservedlytheHedonisticprinciple，weshallnotbecalledupontoestimateandcompareparticularpleasures，butrathertodefinethenotionsof`perfecthealth’and`harmonyoffunctions’andconsiderhowtheseendsmaybeattained。Stillthosewhoadvocatesuchdeductivemethodscommonlyappealtoordinaryexperience，atleastassupplyingconfirmationorverification；andadmitthatthepleasantnessandpainfulnessofpleasuresandpainsareonlydirectlyknowntotheindividualwhoexperiencesthem。
Itwouldseem，therefore，that——atanyrate——theobviousmethodofEgoisticHedonismisthatwhichwemaycallEmpirical-reflective:anditisthisIconceivethatiscommonlyusedinegoisticdeliberation。Itwillbewell，therefore，toexaminethismethodinthefirstinstance；toascertainclearlytheassumptionswhichitinvolves，andestimatetheexactnessofitsresults。
Thefirstandmostfundamentalassumption，involvednotonlyintheempiricalmethodofEgoisticHedonism，butintheveryconceptionof`GreatestHappiness’
asanendofaction，isthecommensurabilityofPleasuresandPains。BythisImeanthatwemustassumethepleasuressoughtandthepainsshunnedtohavedeterminatequantitativerelationstoeachother；forotherwisetheycannotbeconceivedaspossibleelementsofatotalwhichwearetoseektomakeasgreataspossible。Itisnotabsolutelynecessarytoexcludethesuppositionthattherearesomekindsofpleasuresomuchmorepleasantthanothers，thatthesmallestconceivableamountoftheformerwouldoutweighthegreatestconceivableamountofthelatter；since，ifthiswereascertainedtobethecase，theonlyresultwouldbethatanyhedonisticcalculationinvolvingpleasuresoftheformerclassmightbesimplifiedbytreatingthoseofthelatterclassaspracticallynon-existent。[1]Ithink，however，thatinallordinaryprudentialreasoning，atanyrate，theassumptionisimplicitlymadethatallthepleasuresandpainsthatmancanexperiencebearafiniteratiotoeachotherinrespectofpleasantnessanditsopposite。
SofarasthisratiocanbemadedefinitetheIntensityofapleasure(orpain)canbebalancedagainstitsDuration:forifweconceiveonepleasure(orpain)，finiteinduration，tobeintensivelygreaterthananotherinsomedefiniteratio，itseemstobeimpliedinthisconceptionthatthelatterifcontinuouslyincreasedinextent——withoutchangeinitsintensity——wouldatacertainpointjustbalancetheformerinamount。
Ifpleasures，then，canbearrangedinascale，asgreaterorlessinsomefinitedegree；weareledtotheassumptionofahedonisticzero，orperfectlyneutralfeeling，asapointfromwhichthepositivequantityofpleasuresmaybemeasured。Andthislatterassumptionemergesstillmoreclearlywhenweconsiderthecomparisonandbalancingofpleasureswithpains，whichHedonismnecessarilyinvolves。Forpainmustbereckonedasthenegativequantityofpleasure，tobebalancedagainstandsubtractedfromthepositiveinestimatinghappinessonthewhole；
