Thereis，however，asimpleinterpretationoftheterm——whichiswidelymaintainedtobethetrueone——accordingtowhicheverythingwhichwejudgetobegoodisimplicitlyconceivedasameanstotheendofpleasure，evenwhenwedonotmakeinourjudgmentanyexplicitreferencetothisoranyotherulteriorend。
Onthisview，anycomparisonofthingsinrespectoftheir`goodness’wouldseemtobereallyacomparisonofthemassourcesofpleasure；sothatanyattempttosystematiseourintuitionsofgoodness，whetherinconductandcharacterorinotherthings，mustreasonablyleadusstraighttoHedonism。
Andnodoubt，ifweconsidertheapplicationoftheterm，outsidethesphereofcharacterandconduct，tothingsthatarenotdefinitelyregardedasmeanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorobjectofdesire，wefindaclosecorrespondencebetweenourapprehensionofpleasurederivedfromanobject，andourrecognitionthattheobjectisinitself`good’。Thegoodthingsoflifearethingswhichgivepleasure，whethersensualoremotional:asgooddinners，wines，poems，pictures，music:andthisgivesaprimafaciesupporttotheinterpretationof`good’asequivalentto`pleasant’。
Ithink，however，thatifwereflectontheapplicationofthetermtothecasesmostanalogoustothatofconduct——i。e。towhatwemaycall`objectsoftaste’——weshallfindthatthisinterpretationofithasnotclearlythesupportofcommonsense。Inthefirstplace，allowingthatthejudgmentthatanyobjectisgoodofitskindiscloselyconnectedwiththeapprehensionofpleasurederivedfromit，wemustobservethatitisgenerallytoaspecifickindofpleasurethattheaffirmationofgoodnesscorresponds；andthatiftheobjecthappenstogiveuspleasureofadifferentkind，wedonotthereforecallitgood——atleastwithoutqualification。Forinstance，weshouldnotcallawinegoodsolelybecauseitwasverywholesome；norapoemonaccountofitsmorallessons。Andhencewhenwecometoconsiderthemeaningoftheterm`good’asappliedtoconduct，thereisnoreason，sofar，tosupposethatithasanyreferenceorcorrespondencetoallthepleasuresthatmayresultfromtheconduct。Rathertheperceptionofgoodnessorvirtueinactionswouldseemtobeanalogoustotheperceptionofbeautyinmaterialthings:whichisnormallyaccompaniedwithaspecificpleasurewhichwecall`aesthetic’，buthasoftennodiscoverablerelationtothegeneralusefulnessoragreeablenessofthethingdiscernedtobebeautiful:indeed，weoftenrecognisethiskindofexcellenceinthingshurtfulanddangerous。
Butfurther:asregardsaestheticpleasures，andthesourcesofsuchpleasuresthatwecommonlyjudgetobegood，itisthereceivedopinionthatsomepersonshavemoreandothersless`goodtaste’:anditisonlythejudgmentofpersonsofgoodtastethatwerecogniseasvalidinrespectoftherealgoodnessofthethingsenjoyed。Wethinkthatofhisownpleasureeachindividualisthefinaljudge，andthereisnoappealfromhisdecision，——atleastsofarasheiscomparingpleasureswithinhisactualexperience；buttheaffirmationofgoodnessinanyobjectinvolvestheassumptionofauniversallyvalidstandard，which，aswebelieve，thejudgmentofpersonstowhomweattributegoodtasteapproximatelyrepresents。
Anditseemsclearthattheterm`good’asappliedto`taste’doesnotmean`pleasant’；itmerelyimportstheconformityoftheaestheticjudgmentsocharacterisedtothesupposedideal，deviationfromwhichimplieserroranddefect。Nordoesitappeartobealwaysthepersonofbesttastewhoderivesthegreatestenjoymentfromanykindofgoodandpleasantthings。
Wearefamiliarwiththefactthatconnoisseursofwines，pictures，etc。，oftenretaintheirintellectualfacultyofappraisingthemeritsoftheobjectswhichtheycriticise，anddecidingontheirrespectiveplacesinthescaleofexcellence，evenwhentheirsusceptibilitiestopleasurefromtheseobjectsarecomparativelybluntedandexhausted。Andmoregenerallyweseethatfreshnessandfulnessoffeelingbynomeansgoalongwithtasteandjudgment:andthatapersonwhopossessestheformermayderivemorepleasurefrominferiorobjectsthananothermayfromthebest。
Tosumup:thegeneraladmissionthatthingswhicharecalled`good’areproductiveofpleasure，andthattheformerqualityisinseparableinthoughtfromthelatter，doesnotinvolvetheinferencethatthecommonestimatesofthegoodnessofconductmaybefairlytakenasestimatesoftheamountofpleasureresultingfromit。For(1)analogywouldleadustoconcludethattheattributionofgoodness，inthecaseofconductasofobjectsoftastegenerally，maycorrespondnottoallthepleasurethatiscausedbytheconduct，buttoaspecificpleasure，inthiscasethecontemplativesatisfactionwhichtheconductcausestoadisinterestedspectator:and(2)itmaynotexciteeventhisspecificpleasuregenerallyinproportiontoitsgoodness，butonly(atmost)inpersonsofgoodmoraltaste:andevenintheircasewecandistinguishtheintellectualapprehensionofgoodness——whichinvolvestheconceptionofanidealobjectivestandard——fromthepleasurableemotionwhichcommonlyaccompaniesit；andmaysupposethelatterelementofconsciousnessdiminishedalmostindefinitely。
Finally，whenwepassfromtheadjectivetothesubstantivegood，itisatonceevidentthatthislattercannotbeunderstoodasequivalentto`pleasure’or`happiness’byanypersonswhoaffirm——asasignificantpropositionandnotasameretautology——thatthePleasureorHappinessofhumanbeingsistheirGoodorUltimateGood。
Suchaffirmation，whichwould，Ithink，beordinarilymadebyHedonists，obviouslyimpliesthatthemeaningofthetwotermsisdifferent，howevercloselytheirdenotationmaycoincide。Anditdoesnotseemthatanyfundamentaldifferenceofmeaningisimpliedbythegrammaticalvariationfromadjectivetosubstantive。
Whatthencanwestateasthegeneralmeaningoftheterm’good’？Shallwesay——withHobbes，andmanysinceHobbes——that`whatsoeveristheobjectofanyman’sDesire，thatitiswhichheforhispartcallethGood，andtheobjectofhisaversion，Evil’？Tosimplifythediscussion，wewillconsideronlywhatamandesiresforitself——notasameanstoanulteriorresult，——andforhimself——notbenevolentlyforothers:hisownGoodandultimateGood。Wehavefirsttomeettheobviousobjectionthatamanoftendesireswhatheknowsisonthewholebadforhim:thepleasureofdrinkingchampagnewhichissuretodisagreewithhim，thegratificationofrevengewhenheknowsthathistrueinterestliesinreconciliation。Theansweristhatinsuchcasesthedesiredresultisaccompaniedorfollowedbyothereffectswhichwhentheycomeexciteaversionstrongerthanthedesireforthedesiredeffect:
butthatthesebadeffects，thoughfore-seenarenotfore-felt:
therepresentationofthemdoesnotadequatelymodifythepredominantdirectionofdesireasapresentfact。But，grantingthis，andfixingattentionsolelyontheresultdesired，apartfromitsconcomitantsandconsequences——itwouldstillseemthatwhatisdesiredatanytimeis，assuch，merelyapparentGood，whichmaynotbefoundgoodwhenfruitioncomes，oratanyratenotsogoodasitappeared。Itmayturnouta’DeadSeaapple’，meredustandashesintheeating:moreoften，fruitionwillpartlycorrespondtoexpectation，butmaystillfallshortofitinamarkeddegree。Andsometimes——evenwhileyieldingtothedesire——weareawareoftheillusorinessofthisexpectationof`good’whichthedesirecarrieswithit。Iconclude，therefore，thatifwearetoconceiveoftheelementsofultimateGoodascapableofquantitativecomparison——aswedowhenwespeakofpreferringa’greater’
goodtoa’lesser’，——wecannotidentifytheobjectofdesirewith’good’
simply，or`truegood’，butonlywith’apparentgood’。
Butfurther:aprudentmanisaccustomedtosuppress，withmoreorlesssuccess，desiresforwhatheregardsasoutofhispowertoattainbyvoluntaryaction——asfineweather，perfecthealth，greatwealthorfame，etc。；butanysuccesshemayhaveindiminishingtheactualintensityofsuchdesireshasnoeffectinleadinghimtojudgetheobjectsdesiredless`good’。
Itwouldseemthen，thatifweinterpretthenotion`good’inrelationto`desire’，wemustidentifyitnotwiththeactuallydesired，butratherwiththedesirable:——meaningby`desirable’
notnecessarily`whatoughttobedesired’butwhatwouldbedesired，withstrengthproportionedtothedegreeofdesirability，ifitwerejudgedattainablebyvoluntaryaction，supposingthedesirertopossessaperfectforecast，emotionalaswellasintellectual，ofthestateofattainmentorfruition。
Itstillremainspossiblethatthechoiceofanyparticulargood，thusdefinedasanobjectofpursuit，maybeonthewholenbad，onaccountofitsconcomitantsandconsequences；eventhoughtheparticularresultwhenattainedisnotfoundotherthanitwasimaginedintheconditionofpreviousdesire。If，therefore，inseekingadefinitionof`ultimateGood’wemean`goodonthewhole’，wehave——followingthelineofthoughtoftheprecedingparagraph——toexpressitsrelationtoDesiredifferently。Inthefirstplacewehavetolimitourviewtodesirewhichbecomespracticalinvolition；asImaystillregardasdesirableresultswhichIjudgeitonthewholeimprudenttoaimat。But，evenwiththislimitation，therelationofmy`goodonthewhole’tomydesireisverycomplicated。ForitisnotevensufficienttosaythatmyGoodonthewholeiswhatIshouldactuallydesireandseekifalltheconsequencesofseekingitcouldbeforeknownandadequatelyrealisedbymeinimaginationatthetimeofmakingmychoice。Nodoubtanequalregardforallthemomentsofourconsciousexperience——sofar，atleast，asthemeredifferenceoftheirpositionintimeisconcerned——isanessentialcharacteristicofrationalconduct。Butthemerefact，thatamandoesnotafterwardsfeelfortheconsequencesofanactionaversionstrongenoughtocausehimtoregretit，cannotbeacceptedasacompleteproofthatbehasactedforhis`goodonthewhole’。Indeed，wecommonlyreckonitamongtheworstconsequencesofsomekindsofconductthattheyaltermen’stendenciestodesire，andmakethemdesiretheirlessergoodmorethantheirgreater:
andwethinkitalltheworseforaman——eveninthisworld——ifheisneverrousedoutofsuchaconditionandlivestilldeaththelifeofacontentedpig，whenhemighthavebeensomethingbetter。Toavoidthisobjection，itwouldhavetobesaidthataman’sfuturegoodonthewholeiswhathewouldnowdesireandseekonthewholeifalltheconsequencesofallthedifferentlinesofconductopentohimwereaccuratelyforeseenandadequatelyrealisedinimaginationatthepresentpointoftime。
Thishypotheticalcompositionofimpulsiveforcesinvolvessoelaborateandcomplexaconception，thatitissomewhatparadoxicaltosaythatthisiswhatwecommonlymeanwhenwetalkofaman’s`goodonthewhole’。Still，Icannotdenythatthishypotheticalobjectofaresultantdesiresuppliesanintelligibleandadmissibleinterpretationoftheterms`good’(substantive)and`desirable’，asgivingphilosophicalprecisiontothevaguermeaningwithwhichtheyareusedinordinarydiscourse:anditwouldseemthatacalmcomprehensivedesirefor`good’conceivedsomewhatinthisway，thoughmorevaguely，isnormallyproducedbyintellectualcomparisonandexperienceinareflectivemind。Thenotionof`Good’thusattainedhasanidealelement:itissomethingthatisnotalwaysactuallydesiredandaimedatbyhumanbeings:buttheidealelementisentirelyinterpretableintermsoffact，actualorhypothetical，anddoesnotintroduceanyjudgmentofvalue，fundamentallydistinctfromjudgmentsrelatingtoexistence；——stilllessany`dictateofReason’。[2]
Itseemstome，however，moreinaccordancewithcommonsensetorecognise——asButlerdoes——thatthecalmdesireformy`goodonthewhole’isauthoritative；andthereforecarrieswithitimplicitlyarationaldictatetoaimatthisend，ifinanycaseaconflictingdesireurgesthewillinanoppositedirection。Stillwemaykeepthenotionof`dictate’or`imperative’merelyimplicitandlatent，——asitseemstobeinordinaryjudgmentsasto`mygood’anditsopposite——byinterpreting`ultimategoodonthewholeforme’tomeanwhatIshouldpracticallydesireifmydesireswereinharmonywithreason，assumingmyownexistencealonetobeconsidered。Onthisview，``ultimategoodonthewhole’’，unqualifiedbyreferencetoaparticularsubject，mustbetakentomeanwhatasarationalbeingIshoulddesireandseektorealise，assumingmyselftohaveanequalconcernforallexistence。Whenconductisjudgedtobe`good’or`desirable’initself，independentlyofitsconsequences，itis，Iconceive，thislatterpointofviewthatistaken。Suchajudgmentdiffers，asI
havesaid，fromthejudgmentthatconductis`right’，insofarasitdoesnotinvolveadefiniteprecepttoperformit；sinceitstillleavesitanopenquestionwhetherthisparticularkindofgoodisthegreatestgoodthatwecanunderthecircumstancesobtain。Itdiffersfurther，aswemaynowobserve，insofarasgoodorexcellentactionsarenotimpliedtobeinourpowerinthesamestrictsenseas`right’actions——anymorethananyothergoodthings:andinfacttherearemanyexcellencesofbehaviourwhichwecannotattainbyanyeffortofwill，atleastdirectlyandatthemoment:henceweoftenfeelthattherecognitionofgoodnessintheconductofothersdoesnotcarrywithitaclearprecepttodolikewise，butrather
thevaguedesire
Thatstirsanimitativewill。InsofarasthisisthecaseGoodnessofConductbecomesanulteriorend，theattainmentofwhichliesoutsideandbeyondtherangeofimmediatevolition。
