Butthoughprobablyallmoralagentshaveexperienceofsuchparticularintuitions，andthoughtheyconstituteagreatpartofthemoralphenomenaofmostminds，comparativelyfewaresothoroughlysatisfiedwiththem，asnottofeelaneedofsomefurthermoralknowledgeevenfromastrictlypracticalpointofview。Fortheseparticularintuitionsdonot，toreflectivepersons，presentthemselvesasquiteindubitableandirrefragable:nordotheyalwaysfindwhentheyhaveputanethicalquestiontothemselveswithallsincerity，thattheyareconsciousofclearimmediateinsightinrespectofit。Again，whenamancomparestheutterancesofhisconscienceatdifferenttimes，heoftenfindsitdifficulttomakethemaltogetherconsistent:thesameconductwillwearadifferentmoralaspectatonetimefromthatwhichitworeatanother，althoughourknowledgeofitscircumstancesandconditionsisnotmateriallychanged。Further，webecomeawarethatthemoralperceptionsofdifferentminds，toallappearanceequallycompetenttojudge，frequentlyconflict:onecondemnswhatanotherapproves。Inthiswayseriousdoubtsarearousedastothevalidityofeachman’sparticularmoraljudgments:
andweareledtoendeavourtosetthesedoubtsatrestbyappealingtogeneralrules，morefirmlyestablishedonabasisofcommonconsent。
Andinfact，thoughtheviewofconscienceabovediscussedisonewhichmuchpopularlanguageseemstosuggest，itisnotthatwhichChristianandothermoralistshaveusuallygiven。Theyhaveratherrepresentedtheprocessofconscienceasanalogoustooneofjuralreasoning，suchasisconductedinaCourtofLaw。Herewehavealwaysasystemofuniversalrulesgiven，andanyparticularactionhastobebroughtunderoneoftheserulesbeforeitcanbepronouncedlawfulorunlawful。Nowtherulesofpositivelawareusuallynotdiscoverablebytheindividual’sreason:thismayteachhimthatlawoughttobeobeyed，butwhatlawismust，inthemain，becommunicatedtohimfromsomeexternalauthority。Andthisisnotunfrequentlythecasewiththeconscientiousreasoningofordinarypersonswhenanydisputeordifficultyforcesthemtoreason:theyhaveagenuineimpulsetoconformtotherightrulesofconduct，buttheyarenotconscious，indifficultordoubtfulcases，ofseeingforthemselveswhattheseare:theyhavetoinquireoftheirpriest，ortheirsacredbooks，orperhapsthecommonopinionofthesocietytowhichtheybelong。InsofarasthisisthecasewecannotstrictlycalltheirmethodIntuitional。Theyfollowrulesgenerallyreceived，notintuitivelyapprehended。Otherpersons，however(orperhapsalltosomeextent)，doseemtoseeforthemselvesthetruthandbindingnessofallormostofthesecurrentrules。Theymaystillputforward`commonconsent’asanargumentforthevalidityoftheserules:butonlyassupportingtheindividual’sintuition，notasasubstituteforitorassupersedingit。
HerethenwehaveasecondIntuitionalMethod:
ofwhichthefundamentalassumptionisthatwecandiscerncertaingeneralruleswithreallyclearandfinallyvalidintuition。Itisheldthatsuchgeneralrulesareimplicitinthemoralreasoningofordinarymen，whoapprehendthemadequatelyformostpracticalpurposes，andareabletoenunciatethemroughly；butthattostatethemwithproperprecisionrequiresaspecialhabitofcontemplatingclearlyandsteadilyabstractmoralnotions。
Itisheldthatthemoralist’sfunctionthenistoperformthisprocessofabstractcontemplation，toarrangetheresultsassystematicallyaspossible，andbyproperdefinitionsandexplanationstoremovevaguenessandpreventconflict。ItissuchasystemasthiswhichseemstobegenerallyintendedwhenIntuitiveorapriorimoralityismentioned，andwhichwillchieflyoccupyusinBookiii。
Byphilosophicminds，however，the`MoralityofCommonSense’(asIhaveventuredtocallit)，evenwhenmadeaspreciseandorderlyaspossible，isoftenfoundunsatisfactoryasasystem，althoughtheyhavenodispositiontoquestionitsgeneralauthority。Itisfounddifficulttoacceptasscientificfirstprinciplesthemoralgeneralitiesthatweobtainbyreflectionontheordinarythoughtofmankind，eventhoughwesharethisthought。Evengrantingthattheserulescanbesodefinedasperfectlytofittogetherandcoverthewholefieldofhumanconduct，withoutcomingintoconflictandwithoutleavinganypracticalquestionsunanswered，——stilltheresultingcodeseemsanaccidentalaggregateofprecepts，whichstandsinneedofsomerationalsynthesis。Inshort，withoutbeingdisposedtodenythatconductcommonlyjudgedtoberightisso，wemayyetrequiresomedeeperexplanationwhyitisso。FromthisdemandspringsathirdspeciesorphaseofIntuitionism，which，whileacceptingthemoralityofcommonsenseasinthemainsound，stillattemptstofindforitaphilosophicbasiswhichitdoesnotitselfoffer:togetoneormoreprinciplesmoreabsolutelyandundeniablytrueandevident，fromwhichthecurrentrulesmightbededuced，eitherjustastheyarecommonlyreceivedorwithslightmodificationsandrectifications。[1]
ThethreephasesofIntuitionismjustdescribedmaybetreatedasthreestagesintheformaldevelopmentofIntuitiveMorality:
wemaytermthemrespectivelyPerceptional，Dogmatic，andPhilosophical。
Thelast-mentionedIhaveonlydefinedinthevaguestway:infact，asyetIhavepresenteditonlyasaproblem，ofwhichitisimpossibletoforeseehowmanysolutionsmaybeattempted:butitdoesnotseemdesirabletoinvestigateitfurtheratpresent，asitwillbemoresatisfactorilystudiedafterexaminingindetailtheMoralityofCommonSense。
Itmustnotbethoughtthatthesethreephasesaresharplydistinguishedinthemoralreasoningofordinarymen:butthennomoreisIntuitionismofanysortsharplydistinguishedfromeitherspeciesofHedonism。Aloosecombinationorconfusionofmethodsisthemostcommontypeofactualmoralreasoning。Probablymostmoralmenbelievethattheirmoralsenseorinstinctinanycasewillguidethemfairlyright，butalsothattherearegeneralrulesfordeterminingrightactionindifferentdepartmentsofconduct:andthatfortheseagainitispossibletofindaphilosophicalexplanation，bywhichtheymaybededucedfromasmallernumberoffundamentalprinciples。Stillforsystematicdirectionofconduct，werequiretoknowonwhatjudgmentswearetorelyasultimatelyvalid。
SofarIhavebeenmainlyconcernedwithdifferencesinintuitionalmethodduetodifferenceofgeneralityintheintuitivebeliefsrecognisedasultimatelyvalid。Thereis，however，anotherclassofdifferencesarisingfromavariationofviewastotheprecisequalityimmediatelyapprehendedinthemoralintuition。Thesearepeculiarlysubtleanddifficulttofixinclearandpreciselanguage，andIthereforereservethemforaseparatechapter。{Note。}
MEBook1Chapter8Section4Note2
NOTE——Intuitionalmoralistshavenotalwaystakensufficientcareinexpoundingtheirsystemtomakeclearwhethertheyregardasultimatelyvalid，moraljudgmentsonsingleacts，orgeneralrulesprescribingparticularkindsofacts，ormoreuniversalandfundamentalprinciples。Forexample，DugaldStewartusestheterm``perception’’
todenotetheimmediateoperationofthemoralfaculty；atthesametime，indescribingwhatisthusperceived，healwaysseemstohaveinviewgeneralrules。
StillwecantolerablywelldistinguishamongEnglishethicalwritersthosewhohaveconfinedthemselvesmainlytothedefinitionandarrangementoftheMoralityofCommonSense，fromthosewhohaveaimedatamorephilosophicaltreatmentofthecontentofmoralintuition。Andwefindthatthedistinctioncorrespondsinthemaintoadifferenceofperiods:andthat——whatperhapsweshouldhardlyhaveexpected——themorephilosophicalschoolistheearlier。
Theexplanationofthismaybepartlyfoundbyreferringtothedoctrinesinantagonismtowhich，intherespectiveperiods，theIntuitionalmethodassertedanddevelopeditself。InthefirstperiodallorthodoxmoralistswereoccupiedinrefutingHobbism。Butthissystem，thoughbasedonMaterialismandEgoism，wasyetintendedasethicallyconstructive。Acceptinginthemainthecommonlyreceivedrulesofsocialmorality，itexplainedthemastheconditionsofpeacefulexistencewhichenlightenedselfinterestdirectedeachindividualtoobey；providedonlythesocialordertowhichtheybelongedwasnotmerelyideal，butmadeactualbyastronggovernment。
Nownodoubtthisviewrendersthetheoreticalbasisofdutyseriouslyunstable；still，assumingadecentlygoodgovernment，Hobbismmayclaimtoatonceexplainandestablish，insteadofundermining，themoralityofCommonSense。Andtherefore，thoughsomeofHobbes’antagonists(asCudworth)contentedthemselveswithsimplyreaffirmingtheabsolutenessofmorality，themorethoughtfulfeltthatsystemmustbemetbysystemandexplanationbyexplanation，andthattheymustpenetratebeyondthedogmasofcommonsensetosomemoreirrefragablecertainty。Aridso，whileCumberlandfoundthisdeeperbasisinthenotionof``thecommongoodofallRationals’’asanultimateend，Clarkesoughttoexhibitthemorefundamentalofthereceivedrulesasaxiomsofperfectself-evidence，necessarilyforceduponthemindincontemplatinghumanbeingsandtheirrelations。Clarke’sresults，however，werenotfoundsatisfactory:andbydegreestheattempttoexhibitmoralityasabodyofscientifictruthfellintodiscredit，andthedispositiontodwellontheemotionalsideofthemoralconsciousnessbecameprevalent。Butwhenethicaldiscussionthuspassedoverintopsychologicalanalysisandclassification，theconceptionoftheobjectivityofduty，onwhichtheauthorityofmoralsentimentdepends，fellgraduallyoutofview:forexample，wefindHutchesonaskingwhythemoralsenseshouldnotvaryindifferenthumanbeings，asthepalatedoes，withoutdreamingthatthereisanyperiltomoralityinadmittingsuchvariationsaslegitimate。
When，however，thenewdoctrinewasendorsedbythedreadednameofHume，itsdangerousnature，andtheneedofbringingagainintoprominencethecognitiveelementofmoralconsciousness，wereclearlyseen:andthisworkwasundertakenasapartofthegeneralphilosophicprotestoftheScottishSchoolagainsttheEmpiricismthathadculminatedinHume。ButthisschoolclaimedasitscharacteristicmeritthatitmetEmpiricismonitsownground，andshowedamongthefactsofpsychologicalexperiencewhichtheEmpiricistprofessedtoobserve，theassumptionswhichherepudiated。AndthusinEthicsitwasledrathertoexpoundandreaffirmthemoralityofCommonSense，thantoofferanyprofounderprincipleswhichcouldnotbesoeasilysupportedbyanappealtocommonexperience。
Wehavehithertospokenofthequalityofconductdiscernedbyourmoralfacultyas`rightness’，whichisthetermcommonlyusedbyEnglishmoralists。Wehaveregardedthisterm，anditsequivalentsinordinaryuse，asimplyingtheexistenceofadictateorimperativeofreason，whichprescribescertainactionseitherunconditionally，orwithreferencetosomeulteriorend。
Itis，however，possibletotakeaviewofvirtuousactioninwhich，thoughthevalidityofmoralintuitionsisnotdisputed，thisnotionofruleordictateisatanyrateonlylatentorimplicit，themoralidealbeingpresentedasattractiveratherthanimperative。Suchaviewseemstobetakenwhentheactiontowhichwearemorallyprompted，orthequalityofcharactermanifestedinit，isjudgedtobe`good’initself(andnotmerelyasameanstosomeulteriorGood)。This，aswasbeforenoticed，wasthefundamentalethicalconceptionintheGreekschoolsofMoralPhilosophygenerally；includingeventheStoics，thoughtheirsystem，fromtheprominencethatitgivestotheconceptionofNaturalLaw，formsatransitionallinkbetweenancientandmodernethics。Andthishistoricalillustrationmayservetoexhibitoneimportantresultofsubstitutingtheideaof`goodness’forthatof`rightness’ofconduct，whichatfirstsightmightbethoughtamerelyverbalchange。Forthechiefcharacteristicsofancientethicalcontroversyasdistinguishedfrommodernmaybetracedtotheemploymentofagenericnotioninsteadofaspecificoneinexpressingthecommonmoraljudgmentsonactions。VirtueorRightactioniscommonlyregardedasonlyaspeciesoftheGood:andso，onthisviewofthemoralintuition，thefirstquestionthatoffersitself，whenweendeavourtosystematiseconduct，ishowtodeterminetherelationofthisspeciesofgoodtotherestofthegenus。ItwasonthisquestionthattheGreekthinkersargued，fromfirsttolast。Theirspeculationscanscarcelybeunderstoodbyusunlesswithacertaineffortwethrowthequasi-juralnotionsofmodernethicsaside，andask(astheydid)not``WhatisDutyandwhatisitsground？’’but``WhichoftheobjectsthatmenthinkgoodistrulyGoodortheHighestGood？’’or，inthemorespecialisedformofthequestionwhichthemoralintuitionintroduces，``WhatistherelationofthekindofGoodwecallVirtue，thequalitiesofconductandcharacterwhichmencommendandadmire，toothergoodthings？’’
This，then，isthefirstdifferencetobenoticedbetweenthetwoformsoftheintuitivejudgment。Intherecognitionofconductas`right’isinvolvedanauthoritativeprescriptiontodoit:
butwhenwehavejudgedconducttobegood，itisnotyetclearthatweoughttopreferthiskindofgoodtoallothergoodthings:somestandardforestimatingtherelativevaluesofdifferent`goods’hasstilltobesought。
Ipropose，then，toexaminetheimportofthenotion’Good’inthewholerangeofitsapplication；——premisingthat，asitisfortheconstituentsofUltimateGoodthatwerequireastandardofcomparison，wearenotdirectlyconcernedwithanythingthatisclearlyonlygoodasameanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorend。If，indeed，wehadonlythislattercasetoconsider，itwouldbeplausibletointerpret`good’
withoutreferencetohumandesireorchoice，asmeaningmerely`fit’or`adapted’fortheproductionofcertaineffects——agoodhorseforriding，agoodgunforshooting，etc。Butasweapplythenotionalsotoultimateendswemustseekameaningforitwhichwillcoverbothapplications。
