AndduringthefirstperiodofethicalcontroversyinmodernEngland，aftertheaudaciousenunciationofEgoismbyHobbesbadrousedinrealearnestthesearchforaphilosophicalbasisofmorality，UtilitarianismappearsinfriendlyalliancewithIntuitionism。ItwasnottosupersedebuttosupportthemoralityofCommonSense，againstthedangerousinnovationsofHobbes，thatCumberlanddeclared``thecommongoodofallRationals’’tobetheendtowhichmoralruleswerethemeans。WefindhimquotedwithapprovalbyClarke，whoiscommonlytakentorepresentIntuitionisminanextremeform。NordoesShaftesbury，inintroducingthetheoryofa``moralsense’’，seemtohavedreamtthatitcouldeverimpelustoactionsnotclearlyconducivetotheGoodoftheWhole:antihisdiscipleHutchesonexpresslyidentifieditspromptingswiththoseofBenevolence。Butler，Ithink，wasourfirstinfluentialwriterwhodweltonthediscrepanciesbetweenVirtueascommonlyunderstoodand``conductlikeliesttoproduceanoverbalanceofhappiness’’。[5]WhenHumepresentedUtilitarianismasamodeofexplainingcurrentmorality，itwasseenorsuspectedtohaveapartiallydestructivetendency。ButitwasnottillthetimeofPaleyandBenthamthatitwasofferedasamethodfordeterminingconduct，whichwastooverrulealltraditionalpreceptsandsupersedeallexistingmoralsentiments。Andeventhisfinalantagonismrelatesrathertotheoryandmethodthantopracticalresults:practicalconflict，inordinaryhumanminds，ismainlybetweenSelf-interestandSocialDutyhoweverdetermined。Indeed，fromapracticalpointofviewtheprincipleofaimingatthe``greatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’’
isprimafaciemoredefinitelyopposedtoEgoismthantheCommon-Sensemoralityis。Forthislatterseemstoleaveamanfreetopursuehisownhappinessundercertaindefinitelimitsandconditions:whereasUtilitarianismseemstorequireamorecomprehensiveandunceasingsubordinationofself-interesttothecommongood。Andthus，asMillremarks，Utilitarianismissometimesattackedfromtwopreciselyoppositesides:fromaconfusionwithEgoisticHedonismitiscalledbaseandgrovelling；whileatthesametimeitismoreplausiblychargedwithsettinguptoohighastandardofunselfishnessandmakingexaggerateddemandsonhumannature。
Agooddealremainstobesaid，inordertomaketheprincipleandmethodofUtilitarianismperfectlyclearandexplicit:
butitseemsbesttodeferthistillwecometotheinvestigationofitsdetails。Itwillbeconvenienttotakethisasthefinalstageofourexaminationofmethods。ForontheonehanditissimplerthatthediscussionofEgoisticshouldprecedethatofUniversalisticHedonism；andontheother，itseemsdesirablethatweshouldobtaininasexactaformaspossibletheenunciationsofIntuitiveMorality，beforewecomparethesewiththeresultsofthemoredoubtfulanddifficultcalculationsofutilitarianconsequences。
IntheremainingchaptersofthisBookIshallendeavourtoremovecertainambiguitiesastothegeneralnatureandrelationsoftheothertwomethods，asdesignatedrespectivelybythetermsEgoismandIntuitionism，beforeproceedingtothefullerexaminationoftheminBooksii。andiii。{Note}
MEBook1Chapter6Section3Note6
NOTE——IhavecalledtheethicaldoctrinethattakesuniversalbappinessastheultimateendandstandardofrightconductbythenameofBentham，becausethethinkerswhohavechieflytaughtthisdoctrineillEnglandduringthepresentcenturyhavereferredittoBenthamastheirmaster。Anditcertainlyseemstomeclear——thoughMr。
Bain(cf。Mind，January1883，p。48)appearstodoubtit——thatBenthamadoptedthisdoctrineexplicitly，initsmostcomprehensivescope，attheearlieststageintheformationofhisopinions；nordoIthinkthatlieeverconsciouslyabandonedorqualifiedit。Wefindhimwritinginhiscommon-placebook，in1773——4(cf。Works，Bowring’sedition，vol。x。p。70)，thatHelvetiushad``establishedastandardofrectitudeforactions’’；thestandardbeingthat``asortofactionisarightone，whenthetendencyofitistoaugmentthemassofhappinessinthecommunity’’。
Andwefindhimwritingfiftyyearslater(cf。Works，vol。x。p。
79)thefollowingaccountofhisearliestview，inapassagewhichcontainsnohintoflaterdissentfromit:——``ByanearlypamphletofPriestley’s？lightwasaddedtothewarmth。Inthephrase`thegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber’，Ithensawdelineated，forthefirsttime，aplainaswellasatruestandardforwhateverisrightorwrong？inhumanconduct，whetherinthefieldofmoralsorofpolitics’’。
AtthesametimeImustadmitthatinotherpassagesBenthamseemsnolessexplicitlytoadoptEgoisticHedonismasthemethodof`privateEthics’，asdistinctfromlegislation:andinhisposthumous`Deontology’thetwoprinciplesappeartobereconciledbythedoctrine，thatitisalwaystheindividual’strueinterest，evenfromapurelymundanepointofview，toactinthemannermostconducivetothegeneralhappiness。Thislatterproposition-whichIregardaserroneous-isnot，indeed，definitelyputforwardinanyofthetreatisespublishedbyBenthaminhislifetime，orcompletelypreparedbyhimforpublication:butitmaybeinferredfromhiscommon-placebookthatheheldit(seehisWorks，vol。x。pp……IntheprecedingchaptersIhaveusedtheterm``Egoism’’，asitismostcommonlyused，todenoteasystemwhichprescribesactionsasmeanstotheendoftheindividual’shappinessorpleasure。Therulingmotiveinsuchasystemiscommonlysaidtobe``self-love’’。
Butbothtermsadmitofotherinterpretations，whichitwillbewelltodistinguishandsetasidebeforeproceedingfurther。
Forexample，theterm``egoistic’’
isordinarilyandnotimproperlyappliedtothebasisonwhichHobbesattemptedtoconstructmorality；andonwhichalone，asheheld，thesocialordercouldfirmlyrest，andescapethestormsandconvulsionswithwhichitseemedtobemenacedfromthevagariesoftheunenlightenedconscience。
ButitisnotstrictlytheendofEgoismasIhavedefinedit——greatestattainablepleasurefortheindividual——butrather``self-preservation’’，whichdeterminesthefirstofthosepreceptsofrationalegoismwhichHobbescalls``LawsofNature’’，viz。，``Seekpeaceandensueit’’。AndinthedevelopmentofhissystemweoftenfindthatitisPreservationratherthanPleasure，orperhapsacompromisebetweenthetwo，thatistakenastheultimateendandstandardofrightconduct。
Again，inSpinoza’sviewtheprincipleofrationalactionisnecessarilyegoistic，andis(aswithHobbes)theimpulseofself-preservation。Theindividualmind，saysSpinoza，likeeverythingelse，strivessofarasitisabletocontinueinitsstateofbeing:indeedthiseffortisitsveryessence。Itistruethattheobjectofthisimpulsecannotbeseparatedfrompleasureorjoy；becausepleasureorjoyis``apassioninwhichthesoulpassestohigherperfection’’。StillitisnotatPleasurethattheimpulseprimarilyaims，butatthemind’sPerfectionorReality:asweshouldnowsay，atSelf-realisationorSelf-development。
Ofthis，accordingtoSpinoza，thehighestformconsistsinaclearcomprehensionofallthingsintheirnecessaryorderasmodificationsoftheoneDivineBeing，andthatwillingacceptanceofallwhichspringsfromthiscomprehension。
Inthisstatethemindispurelyactive，withoutanyadmixtureofpassionorpassivity:andthusitsessentialnatureisrealisedoractualisedtothegreatestpossibledegree。
WeperceivethatthisisthenotionofSelf-realisationasdefinednotonlybybutforaphilosopher:andthatitwouldmeansomethingquitedifferentinthecaseofamanofaction——such，forexample，asthereflectivedramatistofGermanyintroducesexclaiming
Ichkannmichnicht
WiesoeinWortheld，soeinTugend-Schwä；tzer
AnmeinemWillenwarmen，undGedanken？Wennichnichtwirkemehr，binichvernichtet。[2]Theartist，again，oftencontemplateshisproductionofthebeautifulasarealisationofself:andmoralistsofacertainturnofmind，inallages，havesimilarlyregardedthesacrificeofinclinationtodutyasthehighestformofSelf-developmentandheldthattrueself-lovepromptsusalwaystoobeythecommandsissuedbythegoverningprinciple——ReasonorConscience——withinus，asinsuchobedience，howeverpainful，weshallberealisingourtruestself。
Wesee，inshort，thatthetermEgoism，sofarasitmerelyimpliesthatreferenceismadetoselfinlayingdownfirstprinciplesofconduct，doesnotreallyindicateinanywaythesubstanceofsuchprinciples。Forallourimpulses，highandlow，sensualandmoralalike，aresofarsimilarlyrelatedtoself，that——exceptwhentwoormoreimpulsescomeintoconsciousconflict——wetendtoidentifyourselveswitheachasitarises。Thusself-consciousnessmaybeprominentinyieldingtoanyimpulse:andegoism，insofarasitmerelyimpliessuchprominence，isacommonformapplicabletoallprinciplesofaction。
Itmaybesaid，however，thatwedonot，properlyspeaking，`develop’or`realise’selfbyyieldingtotheimpulsewhichhappenstobepredominantinus；butbyexercising，eachinitsdueplaceandproperdegree，allthedifferentfaculties，capacities，andpropensities，ofwhichournatureismadeup。Butherethereisanimportantambiguity。
Whatdowemeanby`dueproportionandproperdegree’？Thesetermsmayimplyanideal，intoconformitywithwhichtheindividualmindhastobetrained，byrestrainingsomeofitsnaturalimpulsesandstrengtheningothers，anddevelopingitshigherfacultiesratherthanitslower:ortheymaymerelyrefertotheoriginalcombinationandproportionoftendenciesinthecharacterwithwhicheachisborn；tothis，itmaybemeant，weoughttoadaptasfaraspossiblethecircumstancesinwhichweplaceourselvesandthefunctionswhichwechoosetoexercise，inorderthatwemay``beourselves’’，``liveourownlife’’，etc。AccordingtotheformerinterpretationrationalSelf-developmentismerelyanothertermforthepursuitofPerfectionforoneself:whileinthelattersenseithardlyappearsthatSelf-development(whenclearlydistinguished)isreallyputforwardasanabsoluteend，butratherasameanstohappiness；forsupposingamantohaveinheritedpropensitiesclearlytendingtohisownunhappiness，noonewouldrecommendhimtodeveloptheseasfullyaspossible，insteadofmodifyingorsubduingtheminsomeway。Whetheractuallythebestwayofseekinghappinessistogivefreeplaytoone’snature，wewillhereafterconsiderinthecourseofourexaminationofHedonism。
Onthewhole，then，IconcludethatthenotionofSelfrealisationistobeavoidedinatreatiseonethicalmethod，onaccountofitsindefiniteness:
andforasimilarreasonwemustdiscardacommonaccountofEgoismwhichdescribesitsultimateendasthe`good’oftheindividual；fortheterm`good’maycoverallpossibleviewsoftheultimateendofrationalconduct。
IndeeditmaybesaidthatEgoisminthissensewasassumedininthewholeethicalcontroversyofancientGreece；thatis，itwasassumedonallsidesthatarationalindividualwouldmakethepursuitofhisowngoodhissupremeaim:thecontrovertedquestionwaswhetherthisGoodwasrightlyconceivedasPleasureorVirtue，oranytertiumquid。NoristheambiguityremovedifwefollowAristotleinconfiningourattentiontotheGoodattainableinhumanlife，andcallthisWell-being(Eudaimonia)。ForwemaystillarguewiththeStoics，thatvirtuousorexcellentactivitiesandnotpleasuresaretheelementsofwhichtruehumanWell-beingiscomposed。
IndeedAristotlehimselfadoptsthisview，sofarastodeterminethedetailsofWell-beingaccordingly:thoughhedoesnot，withtheStoics，regardthepursuitofVirtueandthatofPleasureascompetingalternatives，holdingratherthatthe``bestpleasure’’isaninseparableconcomitantofthemostexcellentaction。EventheEnglishtermHappinessisnotfreefromasimilarambiguity。Itseems，indeed，tobecommonlyusedinBentham’swayasconvertiblewithPleasure，——orratherasdenotingthatofwhichtheconstituentsarepleasures——anditisinthissensethatIthinkitmostconvenienttouseit。Sometimes，however，inordinarydiscourse，thetermisratheremployedtodenoteaparticularkindofagreeableconsciousness，whichisdistinguishedfromandevencontrastedwithdefinitespecificpleasures——suchasthegratificationsofsensualappetiteorotherkeenandvehementdesires——asbeingatoncecalmerandmoreindefinite:wemaycharacteriseitasthefeelingwhichaccompaniesthenormalactivityofa``healthymindinahealthybody’’，andofwhichspecificpleasuresseemtoberatherstimulantsthanelements。Sometimes，again——though，Ithink，withamoremanifestdivergencefromcommonusage——``happiness’’
or``truehappiness’’isunderstoodinadefinitelynon-hedonisticsense，asdenotingresultsotherthanagreeablefeelingsofanykind。
