Itis，however，ofobviouspracticalimportancetoascertainhowfarthepowerofthewill(whethermetaphysicallyfreeornot)actuallyextends:forthisdefinestherangewithinwhichethicaljudgmentsareinthestrictestsenseapplicable。Thisinquiryisquiteindependentofthequestionofmetaphysicalfreedom；wemightstateitinDeterministtermsasaninquiryintotherangeofeffectswhichitwouldbepossibletocausebyhumanvolition，providedthatadequatemotivesarenotwanting。Theseeffectsseemtobemainlyofthreekinds:first，changesintheexternalworldconsequentuponmuscularcontractions；secondly，changesinthetrainofideasandfeelingsthatconstitutesourconsciouslife；andthirdly，changesinthetendenciestoacthereafterincertainwaysundercertaincircumstances。
I。Themostobviousandprominentpartofthesphereofvolitionalcausationisconstitutedbysucheventsascanbeproducedbymuscularcontractions。Asregardsthese，itissometimessaidthatitisproperlythemuscularcontractionthatwewill，andnotthemoreremoteeffects；fortheserequiretheconcurrenceofothercauses，andthereforewecanneverbeabsolutelycertainthattheywillfollow。Butnomoreisitcertain，strictlyspeaking，thatthemuscularcontractionwillfollow，sinceourlimbmaybeparalysed，etc。Theimmediateconsequentofthevolitionissomemolecularchangeinthemotornerves。Since，however，wearenotconsciousinwillingofourmotornervesandtheirchanges，norindeedcommonlyofthemuscularcontractionsthatfollowthem，——itseemsamisuseoftermstodescribeeitherasthenormal`object’ofthemindinwilling:
sinceitisalmostalwayssomemoreremoteeffectwhichweconsciouslywillandintend。Stillofalmostalleffectsofourwillontheexternalworldsomecontractionofourmusclesisanindispensableantecedent；andwhenthatisoverourpartinthecausationiscompleted。
II。Wecancontroltosomeextentourthoughtsandfeelings。Itwouldseem，indeed，thatanimportantpartofwhatwecommonlycall`controloffeeling’comesundertheheadjustdiscussed。
Ourcontroloverourmusclesenablesustokeepdowntheexpressionofthefeelingandtoresistitspromptingstoaction:andasthegivingfreeventtoafeelingtends，generallyspeaking，tosustainandprolongit，thismuscularcontrolamountstoacertainpowerovertheemotion。Butthereisnotthesameconnexionbetweenourmuscularsystemandourthoughts:
andyetexperienceshowsthatmostmen(thoughsome，nodoubt，muchmorethanothers)canvoluntarilydeterminethedirectionoftheirthoughts，andpursueatwillagivenlineofmeditation。Insuchcases，whatiseffectedbytheeffortofwillseemstobetheconcentrationofourconsciousnessonapartofitscontent，sothatthispartgrowsmorevividandclear，whiletheresttendstobecomeobscureandultimatelytovanish。Frequentlythisvoluntaryexertionisonlyneededtoinitiateatrainofideas，whichisafterwardscontinuedwithouteffort:asinrecallingaseriesofpasteventsorgoingthroughafamiliartrainofreasoning。Bysuchconcentrationwecanfreeourselvesofmanythoughtsandfeelingsuponwhichwedonotwishtodwell:butourpowertodothisisverylimited，andifthefeelingbestronganditscausepersistent，itrequiresaveryunusualeffortofwilltobanishitthus。
III。Theeffectofvolition，however，towhichIespeciallywishtodirectthereader’sattentionisthealterationinmen’stendenciestofutureactionwhichmustbeassumedtobeaconsequenceofgeneralresolutionsastofutureconduct，sofarastheyareeffective。Evenaresolutiontodoaparticularact——ifitisworthwhiletomakeit，asexperienceshowsittobe——mustbesupposedtoproduceachangeofthiskindinthepersonwhomakesit:itmustsomehowmodifyhispresenttendenciestoactinacertainwayonaforeseenfutureoccasion。Butitisinmakinggeneralresolutionsforfutureconductthatitisofmostpracticalimportanceforustoknowwhatiswithinthepowerofthewill。Letustakeanexample。Amanhasbeeninthehabitofdrinkingtoomuchbrandynightly:onemorningheresolvesthathewilldosonomore。Inmakingthisresolveheactsunderthebeliefthatbyapresentvolitionhecansofaralterhishabitualtendencytoindulgenceinbrandy，thatsomehourshencehewillresistthefullforceofhishabitualcravingforthestimulant。NowwhetherthisbeliefiswellorillfoundedisadifferentquestionfromthatusuallydiscussedbetweenDeterministsandLibertarians:atthesametimethetwoquestionsareliabletobeconfused。
ItissometimesvaguelythoughtthatabeliefinFreeWillrequiresustomaintainthatatanymomentwecanalterourhabitstoanyextentbyasufficientlystrongexertion。Andnodoubtmostcommonlywhenwemakesuchefforts，webelieveatthemomentthattheywillbecompletelyeffectual:
wewilltodosomethinghoursordayshencewiththesameconfidencewithwhichwewilltodosomethingimmediately。Butonreflection，noone，I
think，willmaintainthatinsuchcasesthefutureactappearstobeinhispowerinthesamesenseasachoiceofalternativesthattakeseffectimmediately。Notonlydoescontinualexperienceshowusthatsuchresolutionsastothefuturehavealimitedandtoofrequentlyaninadequateeffect:
butthecommonbeliefisreallyinconsistentwiththeverydoctrineofFreeWillthatisthoughttojustifyit:forifbyapresentvolitionI
canfullydetermineanactionthatistotakeplacesomehourshence，whenthetimecomestodothatactIshallfindmyselfnolongerfree。Wemustthereforeaccepttheconclusionthateachsuchresolvehasonlyalimitedeffect:andthatwecannotknowwhenmakingithowfarthiseffectwillexhibititselfintheperformanceoftheactresolvedupon。Atthesametimeitcanhardlybedeniedthatsuchresolvessometimessucceedinbreakingoldhabits:andevenwhentheyfailtodothis，theyoftensubstituteapainfulstruggleforsmoothandeasyindulgence。Henceitisreasonabletosupposethattheyalwaysproducesomeeffectinthisdirection；whethertheyoperatebycausingnewmotivestopresentthemselvesonthesideofreason，whenthetimeofinnerconflictarrives；orwhethertheydirectlyweakentheimpulsiveforceofhabitinthesamemannerasanactualbreachofcustomdoes，thoughinaninferiordegree。
Ifthisaccountoftherangeofvolitionbeaccepted，itwill，Itrust，dispelanylingeringdoubtswhichtheargumentoftheprecedingsection，astothepracticalunimportanceoftheFreeWillcontroversy，mayhaveleftinthereader’smind。ForitmayhavebeenvaguelythoughtthatwhileontheDeterministtheoryitwouldbewrong，incertaincases，toperformasingleactofvirtueifwehadnogroundforbelievingthatweshouldhereafterdulyfollowitup；ontheassumptionofFreedomweshouldboldlydoalwayswhatwouldbebestifconsistentlyfollowedup，beingconsciousthatsuchconsistencyisinourpower。Butthesupposeddifferencevanishes，ifitbeadmittedthatbyanyeffortofresolutionatthepresentmomentwecanonlyproduceacertainlimitedeffectuponourtendenciestoactionatsomefuturetime，andthatimmediateconsciousnesscannottellusthatthiseffectwillbeadequatetotheoccasion，norindeedhowgreatitwillreallyprovetobe。ForthemostextremeLibertarianmustthenallowthatbeforepledgingourselvestoanyfuturecourseofactionweoughttoestimatecarefully，fromourexperienceofourselvesandgeneralknowledgeofhumannature，whattheprobabilityisofourkeepingpresentresolutionsinthecircumstancesinwhichwearelikelytobeplaced。
Itisnodoubtmorallymostimportantthatweshouldnottranquillyacquiesceinanyweaknessorwantofself-control:butthefactremainsthatsuchweaknessisnotcurablebyasinglevolition:andwhateverwecandotowardscuringitbyanyeffortofwill-atanymoment，isasclearlyenjoinedbyreasonontheDeterministtheoryasitisontheLibertarian。Onneithertheoryisitreasonablethatweshoulddeceiveourselvesastotheextentofourweakness，orignoreitintheforecastofourconduct，orsupposeitmoreeasilyremediablethanitreallyis。
Theresultsofthethreeprecedingchaptersmaybebrieflystatedasfollows
TheaimofEthicsistosystematiseandfreefromerrortheapparentcognitionsthatmostmenhaveoftherightnessorreasonablenessofconduct，whethertheconductbeconsideredasrightinitself，orasthemeanstosomeendcommonlyconceivedasultimatelyreasonable。Thesecognitionsarenormallyaccompaniedbyemotionsofvariouskinds，knownas``moralsentiments’’:butanethicaljudgmentcannotbeexplainedasaffirmingmerelytheexistenceofsuchasentiment:indeeditisanessentialcharacteristicofamoralfeelingthatitisboundupwithanapparentcognitionofsomethingmorethanmerefeeling。Suchcognitions，again，Ihavecalled`dictates’，or`imperatives’；because，insofarastheyrelatetoconductonwhichanyoneisdeliberating，theyareaccompaniedbyacertainimpulsetodotheactsrecognisedasright，whichisliabletoconflictwithotherimpulses。Providedthisimpulseiseffectiveinproducingrightvolition，itisnotofprimaryimportanceforethicalpurposestodeterminetheexactcharacteristicsoftheemotionalstatesthatprecedesuchvolitions。Andthisremainstrueeveniftheforceactuallyoperatingonhiswillismeredesireforthepleasuresthatheforeseeswillattendrightconduct，oraversiontothepainsthatwillresultfromdoingwrong:
thoughweobservethatinthiscasehisactiondoesnotcorrespondtoourcommonnotionofstrictlyvirtuousconduct；andthoughthereseemstobenogroundforregardingsuchdesiresandaversionsasthesole，oreventhenormal，motivesofhumanvolitions。Nor，again，isitgenerallyimportanttodeterminewhetherwearealways，metaphysicallyspeaking，`free’todowhatweclearlyseetoberight。WhatI`ought’todo，inthestrictestuseoftheword`ought’，isalways`inmypower’，inthesensethatthereisnoobstacletomydoingitexceptabsenceofadequatemotive；anditisordinarilyimpossibleforme，indeliberation，toregardsuchabsenceofmotiveasareasonfornotdoingwhatIotherwisejudgetobereasonable。
Whatthendowecommonlyregardasvalidultimatereasonsforactingorabstaining？This，aswassaid，isthestarting-pointforthediscussionsofthepresenttreatise:whichisnotprimarilyconcernedwithprovingordisprovingthevalidityofanysuchreasons，butratherwiththecriticalexpositionofthedifferent`methods’——orrationalproceduresfordeterminingrightconductinanyparticularcase-whicharelogicallyconnectedwiththedifferentultimatereasonswidelyaccepted。InthefirstchapterwefoundthatsuchreasonsweresuppliedbythenotionsofHappinessandExcellenceorPerfection(includingVirtueorMoralPerfectionasaprominentelement)，regardedasultimateends，andDutyasprescribedbyunconditionalrules。Thisthreefolddifferenceintheconceptionoftheultimatereasonforconductcorrespondstowhatseemthemostfundamentaldistinctionsthatweapplytohumanexistence；thedistinctionbetweentheconsciousbeingandthestreamofconsciousexperience，andthedistinction(withinthislatter)ofActionandFeeling。ForPerfectionisputforwardastheidealgoalofthedevelopmentofahumanbeing，consideredasapermanententity；whilebyDuty，wemeanthekindofActionthatwethinkoughttobedone；andsimilarlybyHappinessorPleasurewemeananultimatelydesiredordesirablekindofFeeling。Itmayseem，however，thatthesenotionsbynomeansexhaustthelistofreasonswhicharewidelyacceptedasultimategroundsofaction。ManyreligiouspersonsthinkthatthehighestreasonfordoinganythingisthatitisGod’sWill:whiletoothers`Self-realisation’
or`Self-development’，andtoothers，again，`Lifeaccordingtonature’
appearthereallyultimateends。AnditisnothardtounderstandwhyconceptionssuchastheseareregardedassupplyingdeeperandmorecompletelysatisfyinganswerstothefundamentalquestionofEthics，thanthosebeforenamed:
sincetheydonotmerelyrepresentIwhatoughttobe，assuch；theyrepresentitinanapparentlysimplerelationtowhatactuallyis。God，Nature，Self，arethefundamentalfactsofexistence；theknowledgeofwhatwillaccomplishGod’sWill，whatis，`accordingtoNature’，whatwillrealisethetrueSelfineachofus，wouldseemtosolvethedeepestproblemsofMetaphysicsaswellasofEthics。Butjustbecausethesenotionscombinetheidealwiththeactual，theirproperspherebelongsnottoEthicsasIdefineit，buttoPhilosophy——thecentralandsupremestudywhichisconcernedwiththerelationsofallobjectsofknowledge。TheintroductionofthesenotionsintoEthicsisliabletobringwithitafundamentalconfusionbetween``whatis’’and``whatoughttobe’’，destructiveofallclearnessinethicalreasoning:andifthisconfusionisavoided，thestrictlyethicalimportofsuchnotions，whenmadeexplicit，appearsalwaystoleadustooneorotherofthemethodspreviouslydistinguished。
Thereisleastdangerofconfusioninthecaseofthetheologicalconceptionof`God’sWill’；sinceheretheconnexionbetween`whatis’and`whatoughttobe’isperfectlyclearandexplicit。
ThecontentofGod’sWillweconceiveaspresentlyexisting，inidea:itsactualisationistheendtobeaimedat。ThereisindeedadifficultyinunderstandingbowGod’sWillcanfailtoberealised，whetherwedorightorwrong:orhow，ifitcannotfailtoberealisedineithercase，itsrealisationcangivetheultimatemotivefordoingright。ButthisdifficultyitbelongstoTheologyratherthanEthicstosolve。Thepracticalquestionis，assumingthatGodwillsinaspecialsensewhatweoughttodo，howwearetoascertainthisinanyparticularcase。ThismustbeeitherbyRevelationorbyReason，orbybothcombined。IfanexternalRevelationisproposedasthestandard，weareobviouslycarriedbeyondtherangeofourstudy；
