IntheprecedingchapterIhaveleftundeterminedtheemotionalcharacteristicsoftheimpulsethatpromptsustoobeythedictatesofReason。Ihavedonesobecausetheseseemtobeverydifferentindifferentminds，andeventovarymuchandrapidlyinthesamemind，withoutanycorrespondingvariationinthevolitionaldirectionoftheimpulse。Forinstance，inthemindofarationalEgoisttherulingimpulseisgenerallywhatButlerandHutchesoncalla``calm’’
or``cool’’self-love:whereasinthemanwhotakesuniversalhappinessastheendandstandardofrightconduct，thedesiretodowhatisjudgedtobereasonableassuchiscommonlyblendedinvaryingdegreeswithsympathyandphilanthropicenthusiasm。Again，ifoneconceivesthedictatingReason——whateveritsdictatesmaybe——asexternaltooneself，thecognitionofrightnessisaccompaniedbyasentimentofReverenceforAuthority；whichmaybysomebeconceivedimpersonally，butismorecommonlyregardedastheauthorityofasupremePerson，sothatthesentimentblendswiththeaffectionsnormallyexcitedbypersonsindifferentrelations，andbecomesReligious。ThisconceptionofReasonasanexternalauthority，againstwhichtheself-willrebels，isoftenirresistiblyforcedonthereflectivemind:atothertimes，however，theidentityofReasonandSelfpresentsitselfasanimmediateconviction，andthenReverenceforAuthoritypassesoverintoSelf-respect；
andtheoppositeandevenmorepowerfulsentimentofFreedomiscalledin，ifweconsidertherationalSelfasliabletobeenslavedbytheusurpingforceofsensualimpulses。QuitedifferentagainaretheemotionsofAspirationorAdmirationarousedbytheconceptionofVirtueasanidealofMoralBeauty。Otherphasesofemotionmightbementioned，allhavingwiththesethecommoncharacteristicthattheyareinseparablefromanapparentcognition——implicitorexplicit，directorindirect——ofrightnessintheconducttowhichtheyprompt。Thereare，nodoubt，importantdifferencesinthemoralvalueandefficacyofthesedifferentemotions，towhichIshallhereaftercallattention；buttheirprimarypracticaleffectdoesnotappeartovarysolongasthecognitionofrightnessremainsunchanged。ItisthenwiththesecognitionsthatEthics，inmyview，isprimarilyconcerned:itsobjectistofreethemfromdoubtanderror，andsystematisethemasfaraspossible。
Thereis，however，oneviewofthefeelingswhichprompttovoluntaryaction，whichissometimesthoughttocutshortallcontroversyastotheprinciplesonwhichsuchactionoughttoberegulated。
Imeantheviewthatvolitionisalwaysdeterminedbypleasuresorpainsactualorprospective。Thisdoctrine——whichImaydistinguishasPsychologicalHedonism——isoftenconnectedandnotseldomconfoundedwiththemethodofEthicswhichIhavecalledEgoisticHedonism；andnodoubtitseemsatfirstsightanaturalinferencethatifoneendofaction——myownpleasureorabsenceofpain——isdefinitelydeterminedformebyunvaryingpsychologicallaws，adifferentendcannotbeprescribedformebyReason。
Reflection，however，showsthatthisinferenceinvolvestheunwarrantedassumptionthataman’spleasureandpainaredeterminedindependentlyofhismoraljudgments:whereasitismanifestlypossiblethatourprospectofpleasureresultingfromanycourseofconductmaylargelydependonourconceptionofitasrightorotherwise:andinfactthepsychologicaltheoryabovementionedwouldrequireustosupposethatthisisnormallythecasewithconscientiouspersons，whohabituallyactinaccordancewiththeirmoralconvictions。Theconnexionoftheexpectationofpleasurefromanactwiththejudgmentthatitisrightmaybedifferentindifferentcases:wecommonlyconceiveatrulymoralmanasonewhofindspleasureindoingwhathejudgestoberightbecausebesojudgesit:but，evenwheremoralsensibilityisweak，expectationofpleasurefromanactmaybeanecessaryconsequentofajudgmentthatitisright，throughabeliefinthemoralgovernmentoftheworldsomehowharmonisingVirtueandSelf-interest。
I
thereforeconcludethatthereisnonecessaryconnexionbetweenthepsychologicalpropositionthatpleasureorabsenceofpaintomyselfisalwaystheactualultimateendofmyaction，andtheethicalpropositionthatmyowngreatesthappinessorpleasureisformetherightultimateend。Itmay，however，berepliedthatiftheformerpropositionbeacceptedinthesamequantitativelypreciseformasthelatter——ifitisadmittedthatImustbyalawofmynaturealwaysaimatthegreatestpossiblepleasure(orleastpain)tomyself——thenatleastIcannotconceiveanyaimconflictingwiththistobeprescribedbyReason。Andthisseemstomeundeniable。
If，asBenthamaffirms，``ontheoccasionofeveryactheexercises，everyhumanbeingis’’inevitably``ledtopursuethatlineofconductwhich，accordingtohisviewofthecase，takenbyhimatthemoment，willbeinthehighestdegreecontributorytohisowngreatesthappiness’’[3]，then，toanyonewhoknowsthis，itmustbecomeinconceivablethatReasondictatestohimtopursueanyotherlineofconduct。Butatthesametime，asitseemstome，thepropositionthathe`ought’topursuethatlineofconductbecomesnolessclearlyincapableofbeingaffirmedwithanysignificance。Forapsychologicallawinvariablyrealisedinmyconductdoesnotadmitofbeingconceivedas`aprecept’or`dictate’ofreason:
thislattermustbearulefromwhichIamconsciousthatitispossibletodeviate。Idonot，however，thinkthatthepropositionquotedfromBenthamwouldbeaffirmedwithoutqualificationbyanyofthewriterswhonowmaintainpsychologicalHedonism。Theywouldadmit，withJ。S。Mill，thatmenoften，notfrommerelyintellectualdeficiencies，butfrom``infirmityofcharacter，maketheirelectionforthenearergood，thoughtheyknowittobelessvaluable:andthisnolesswhenthechoiceisbetweentwobodilypleasures？theypursuesensualindulgencestotheinjuryofhealth，thoughperfectlyawarethathealthisthegreatergood。’’[5]
Thisbeingso，EgoisticHedonismbecomesapossibleethicalidealtowhichpsychologicalHedonismseemstopoint。Ifitcanbeshownthattheultimateaimofeachofusinactingisalwayssolelysomepleasure(orabsenceofpain)tohimself，thedemonstrationcertainlysuggeststhateachoughttoseekhisowngreatestpleasure。Ashasbeensaid，nocogentinferenceispossiblefromthepsychologicalgeneralisationtotheethicalprinciple:
butthemindhasanaturaltendencytopassfromtheonepositiontotheother:iftheactualultimatespringsofourvolitionarealwaysourownpleasuresandpains，itseemsprimafaciereasonabletobemovedbytheminproportiontotheirpleasantnessandpainfulness，andthereforetochoosethegreatestpleasureorleastpainonthewhole。Further，thispsychologicaldoctrineseemstoconflictwithanethicalviewwidelyheldbypersonswhosemoralconsciousnessishighlydeveloped:viz。thatanact，tobeinthehighestsensevirtuous，mustnotbedonesolelyforthesakeoftheattendantpleasure，evenifthatbethepleasureofthemoralsense；sothatifIdoanactfromthesoledesireofobtainingtheglowofmoralself-approbationwhichIbelievewillattenditsperformance，theactwillnotbetrulyvirtuous。
ItseemsthereforeimportanttosubjectpsychologicalHedonism，eveninitsmoreindefiniteform，toacarefulexamination。
Itwillbewelltobeginbydefiningmorepreciselythequestionatissue。
First，Iwillconcedethatpleasureisakindoffeelingwhichstimulatesthewilltoactionstendingtosustainorproduceit，——tosustainit，ifactuallypresent，andtoproduceit，ifitbeonlyrepresentedinidea——；
andsimilarlypainisakindoffeelingwhichstimulatestoactionstendingtoremoveoravertit。[1]ItseemsconvenienttocallthefeltvolitionalstimulusinthetwocasesrespectivelyDesireandAversion；thoughitshouldbeobservedthattheformertermisordinarilyrestrictedtotheimpulsefeltwhenpleasureisnotactuallypresent，butonlyrepresentedinidea。
Thequestionatissue，then，isnotwhetherpleasure，presentorrepresented，isnormallyaccompaniedbyanimpulsetoprolongtheactualorrealisetherepresentedfeeling，andpaincorrespondinglybyaversion:butwhethertherearenodesiresandaversionswhichhavenotpleasuresandpainsfortheirobjects——noconsciousimpulsestoproduceoravertresultsotherthantheagent’sownfeelings。InthetreatisetowhichIhavereferred，Millexplainsthat``desiringathing，andfindingitpleasant，are，inthestrictnessoflanguage，twomodesofnamingthesamepsychologicalfact。’’Ifthisbethecase，itishardtoseehowthepropositionwearediscussingrequirestobedeterminedby``practisedself-consciousnessandself-observation’’；asthedenialofitwouldinvolveacontradictioninterms。ThetruthisthatanambiguityinthewordPleasurehastendedtoconfusethediscussionofthisquestion。Whenwespeakofamandoingsomething``athispleasure’’，or``ashepleases’’，weusuallysignifythemerefactofvoluntarychoice:notnecessarilythattheresultaimedatissomeprospectivefeelingofthechooser。Now，ifby``pleasant’’
wemerelymeanthatwhichinfluenceschoice，exercisesacertainattractiveforceonthewillitisanassertionincontrovertiblebecausetautological，tosaythatwedesirewhatispleasant——oreventhatwedesireathinginproportionasitappearspleasant。Butifwetake``pleasure’’todenotethekindoffeelings，abovedefined，itbecomesareallydebateablequestionwhethertheendtowhichourdesiresarealwaysconsciouslydirectedistheattainmentbyourselvesofsuchfeelings。AndthisiswhatwemustunderstandMilltoconsider``soobvious，thatitwillhardlybedisputed’’。
Itisrathercurioustofindthatoneofthebest-knownofEnglishmoralistsregardstheexactoppositeofwhatMillthinkssoobvious，asbeingnotmerelyauniversalfactofourconsciousexperience，butevenanecessarytruth。Butler，asiswellknown，distinguishesself-love，ortheimpulsetowardsourownpleasure，from``particularmovementstowardsparticularexternalobjects-honour，power，theharm。orgoodofanother’’；
theactionsproceedingfromwhichare``nootherwiseinterestedthanaseveryactionofeverycreaturemustfromthenatureofthecasebe；fornoonecanactbutfromadesire，orchoice，orpreferenceofhisown’’。
Suchparticularpassionsorappetitesare，begoesontosay，``necessarilypresupposedbytheveryideaofaninterestedpursuit；sincetheveryideaofinterestorhappinessconsistsinthis，thatanappetiteoraffectionenjoysitsobject。’’Wecouldnotpursuepleasureatall，unlesswehaddesiresforsomethingelsethanpleasure；forpleasureconsistsinthesatisfactionofjustthese``disinterested’’impulses。
Butlerhascertainlyover-statedhiscase，sofarasmyownexperiencegoes；formanypleasures，——especiallythoseofsight，hearingandsmell，togetherwithmanyemotionalpleasures，——occurtomewithoutanyperceptiblerelationtopreviousdesires，anditseemsquiteconceivablethatourprimarydesiresmightbeentirelydirectedtowardssuchpleasuresasthese。Butasamatteroffact，itappearstomethatthroughoutthewholescaleofmyimpulses，sensual，emotional，andintellectualalike，Icandistinguishdesiresofwhichtheobjectissomethingotherthanmyownpleasure。
Iwillbeginbytakinganillustrationofthisfromtheimpulsescommonlyplacedlowestinthescale。Theappetiteofhunger，sofarasIcanobserve，isadirectimpulsetotheeatingoffood。
Sucheatingisnodoubtcommonlyattendedwithanagreeablefeelingofmoreorlessintensity；butitcannot，Ithink，bestrictlysaidthatthisagreeablefeelingistheobjectofhunger，andthatitistherepresentationofthispleasure。whichstimulatesthewillofthehungrymanassuch。
Ofcourse，hungerisfrequentlyandnaturallyaccompaniedwithanticipationofthepleasureofeating:butcarefulintrospectionseemstoshowthatthetwoarebynomeansinseparable。Andevenwhentheyoccurtogetherthepleasureseemsproperlytheobjectnotoftheprimaryappetite，butofasecondarydesirewhichcanbedistinguishedfromtheformer；sincethegourmand，inwhomthissecondarydesireisstrong，isoftenpromptedbyittoactionsdesignedtostimulatehunger，andoften，again，isledtocontroltheprimaryimpulse，inordertoprolongandvarytheprocessofsatisfyingit。
Indeeditissoobviousthathungerissomethingdifferentfromthedesireforanticipatedpleasure，thatsomewritershaveregardeditsvolitionalstimulus(andthatofdesiregenerally)asacaseofaversionfrompresentpain。This，however，seemstomeadistinctmistakeinpsychologicalclassification。Nodoubtdesireisastateofconsciousness。
Sofarsimilartopain，thatinbothwefeelastimuluspromptingustopassfromthepresentstateintoadifferentone。Butaversionfrompainisanimpulsetogetoutofthepresentstateandpassintosomeotherstatewhichisonlynegativelyrepresentedasdifferentfromthepresent:
whereasindesireassuch，theprimaryimpulseistowardstherealisationofsomepositivefutureresult。Itistruethatwhenastrongdesireis，foranyreason，baulkedofitseffectincausingaction，itisgenerallypainfulinsomedegree:andsoasecondaryaversiontothestateofdesireisgenerated，whichblendsitselfwiththedesireandmayeasilybeconfoundedwithit。Buthere，again，wemaydistinguishthetwoimpulsesbyobservingthedifferentkindsofconducttowhichtheyoccasionallyprompt:fortheaversiontothepainofungratifieddesire，thoughitmayactasanadditionalstimulustowardsthegratificationofthedesire，mayalso(andoftendoes)
promptustogetridofthepainbysuppressingthedesire。
Thequestionwhetheralldesirehasinsomedegreethequalityofpain，isoneofpsychologicalratherthanethicalinterest；solongasitisadmittedthatitisoftennotpainfulinanydegreecomparabletoitsintensityasdesire，sothatitsvolitionalimpulsecannotbeexplainedasacaseofaversiontoitsownpainfulness。
