Eudoxussupposedthatthemotionofthesunorofthemoon
involves，ineithercase，threespheres，ofwhichthefirstisthe
sphereofthefixedstars，andthesecondmovesinthecirclewhich
runsalongthemiddleofthezodiac，andthethirdinthecirclewhich
isinclinedacrossthebreadthofthezodiac；butthecirclein
whichthemoonmovesisinclinedatagreateranglethanthatinwhich
thesunmoves。Andthemotionoftheplanetsinvolves，ineachcase，
fourspheres，andofthesealsothefirstandsecondarethesameas
thefirsttwomentionedabove(forthesphereofthefixedstarsis
thatwhichmovesalltheotherspheres，andthatwhichisplaced
beneaththisandhasitsmovementinthecirclewhichbisectsthe
zodiaciscommontoall)，butthepolesofthethirdsphereofeach
planetareinthecirclewhichbisectsthezodiac，andthemotionof
thefourthsphereisinthecirclewhichisinclinedatanangleto
theequatorofthethirdsphere；andthepolesofthethirdsphereare
differentforeachoftheotherplanets，butthoseofVenusand
Mercuryarethesame。
CallippusmadethepositionofthespheresthesameasEudoxus
did，butwhileheassignedthesamenumberasEudoxusdidtoJupiter
andtoSaturn，hethoughttwomorespheresshouldbeaddedtothe
sunandtwotothemoon，ifoneistoexplaintheobservedfacts；
andonemoretoeachoftheotherplanets。
Butitisnecessary，ifallthespherescombinedaretoexplain
theobservedfacts，thatforeachoftheplanetsthereshouldbeother
spheres(onefewerthanthosehithertoassigned)whichcounteract
thosealreadymentionedandbringbacktothesamepositionthe
outermostsphereofthestarwhichineachcaseissituatedbelow
thestarinquestion；foronlythuscanalltheforcesatworkproduce
theobservedmotionoftheplanets。Since，then，thespheres
involvedinthemovementoftheplanetsthemselvesare——eightfor
SaturnandJupiterandtwenty-fivefortheothers，andoftheseonly
thoseinvolvedinthemovementofthelowest-situatedplanetneed
notbecounteractedthesphereswhichcounteractthoseofthe
outermosttwoplanetswillbesixinnumber，andthesphereswhich
counteractthoseofthenextfourplanetswillbesixteen；therefore
thenumberofallthespheres——boththosewhichmovetheplanetsand
thosewhichcounteractthese——willbefifty-five。Andifonewere
nottoaddtothemoonandtothesunthemovementswementioned，
thewholesetofsphereswillbeforty-seveninnumber。
Letthis，then，betakenasthenumberofthespheres，sothatthe
unmovablesubstancesandprinciplesalsomayprobablybetakenasjust
somany；theassertionofnecessitymustbelefttomorepowerful
thinkers。Butiftherecanbenospatialmovementwhichdoesnot
conducetothemovingofastar，andiffurthereverybeingand
everysubstancewhichisimmunefromchangeandinvirtueofitself
hasattainedtothebestmustbeconsideredanend，therecanbeno
otherbeingapartfromthesewehavenamed，butthismustbethe
numberofthesubstances。Forifthereareothers，theywillcause
changeasbeingafinalcauseofmovement；buttherecannotheother
movementsbesidesthosementioned。Anditisreasonabletoinfer
thisfromaconsiderationofthebodiesthataremoved；forif
everythingthatmovesisforthesakeofthatwhichismoved，and
everymovementbelongstosomethingthatismoved，nomovementcan
beforthesakeofitselforofanothermovement，butallthe
movementsmustbeforthesakeofthestars。Forifthereistobea
movementforthesakeofamovement，thislatteralsowillhaveto
beforthesakeofsomethingelse；sothatsincetherecannotbean
infiniteregress，theendofeverymovementwillbeoneofthe
divinebodieswhichmovethroughtheheaven。
(Evidentlythereisbutoneheaven。Foriftherearemany
heavensastherearemanymen，themovingprinciples，ofwhicheach
heavenwillhaveone，willbeoneinformbutinnumbermany。But
allthingsthataremanyinnumberhavematter；foroneandthesame
definition，e。g。thatofman，appliestomanythings，whileSocrates
isone。Buttheprimaryessencehasnotmatter；foritiscomplete
reality。Sotheunmovablefirstmoverisonebothindefinitionandin
number；sotoo，therefore，isthatwhichismovedalwaysand
continuously；thereforethereisoneheavenalone。)Ourforefathersin
themostremoteageshavehandeddowntotheirposteritya
tradition，intheformofamyth，thatthesebodiesaregods，andthat
thedivineenclosesthewholeofnature。Therestofthetraditionhas
beenaddedlaterinmythicalformwithaviewtothepersuasionofthe
multitudeandtoitslegalandutilitarianexpediency；theysay
thesegodsareintheformofmenorlikesomeoftheotheranimals，
andtheysayotherthingsconsequentonandsimilartothesewhich
wehavementioned。Butifoneweretoseparatethefirstpointfrom
theseadditionsandtakeitalone-thattheythoughtthefirst
substancestobegods，onemustregardthisasaninspired
utterance，andreflectthat，whileprobablyeachartandeach
sciencehasoftenbeendevelopedasfaraspossibleandhasagain
perished，theseopinions，withothers，havebeenpreserveduntilthe
presentlikerelicsoftheancienttreasure。Onlythusfar，then，is
theopinionofourancestorsandofourearliestpredecessorsclearto
Thenatureofthedivinethoughtinvolvescertainproblems；for
whilethoughtisheldtobethemostdivineofthingsobservedby
us，thequestionhowitmustbesituatedinordertohavethat
characterinvolvesdifficulties。Forifitthinksofnothing，what
istherehereofdignity？Itisjustlikeonewhosleeps。Andifit
thinks，butthisdependsonsomethingelse，then(sincethatwhich
isitssubstanceisnottheactofthinking，butapotency)it
cannotbethebestsubstance；foritisthroughthinkingthatits
valuebelongstoit。Further，whetheritssubstanceisthefaculty
ofthoughtortheactofthinking，whatdoesitthinkof？Eitherof
itselforofsomethingelse；andifofsomethingelse，eitherofthe
samethingalwaysorofsomethingdifferent。Doesitmatter，then，
ornot，whetheritthinksofthegoodorofanychancething？Are
therenotsomethingsaboutwhichitisincrediblethatitshould
think？Evidently，then，itthinksofthatwhichismostdivineand
precious，anditdoesnotchange；forchangewouldbechangeforthe
worse，andthiswouldbealreadyamovement。First，then，if’thought’
isnottheactofthinkingbutapotency，itwouldbereasonableto
supposethatthecontinuityofitsthinkingiswearisometoit。
Secondly，therewouldevidentlybesomethingelsemorepreciousthan
thought，viz。thatwhichisthoughtof。Forboththinkingandthe
actofthoughtwillbelongeventoonewhothinksoftheworstthing
intheworld，sothatifthisoughttobeavoided(anditought，for
thereareevensomethingswhichitisbetternottoseethantosee)，
theactofthinkingcannotbethebestofthings。Thereforeitmustbe
ofitselfthatthedivinethoughtthinks(sinceitisthemost
excellentofthings)，anditsthinkingisathinkingonthinking。
Butevidentlyknowledgeandperceptionandopinionand
understandinghavealwayssomethingelseastheirobject，and
themselvesonlybytheway。Further，ifthinkingandbeingthought
ofaredifferent，inrespectofwhichdoesgoodnessbelongtothought？
Fortoheanactofthinkingandtoheanobjectofthoughtarenot
thesamething。Weanswerthatinsomecasestheknowledgeisthe
object。Intheproductivesciencesitisthesubstanceoressenceof
theobject，matteromitted，andinthetheoreticalsciencesthe
definitionortheactofthinkingistheobject。Since，then，
thoughtandtheobjectofthoughtarenotdifferentinthecaseof
thingsthathavenotmatter，thedivinethoughtanditsobjectwillbe
thesame，i。e。thethinkingwillbeonewiththeobjectofits
thought。
Afurtherquestionisleft-whethertheobjectofthedivine
thoughtiscomposite；forifitwere，thoughtwouldchangein
passingfromparttopartofthewhole。Weanswerthateverything
whichhasnotmatterisindivisible-ashumanthought，orratherthe
thoughtofcompositebeings，isinacertainperiodoftime(forit
doesnotpossessthegoodatthismomentoratthat，butitsbest，
beingsomethingdifferentfromit，isattainedonlyinawhole
periodoftime)，sothroughouteternityisthethoughtwhichhas
itselfforitsobject。
Wemustconsideralsoinwhichoftwowaysthenatureofthe
universecontainsthegood，andthehighestgood，whetherassomething
separateandbyitself，orastheorderoftheparts。Probablyinboth
ways，asanarmydoes；foritsgoodisfoundbothinitsorderand
initsleader，andmoreinthelatter；forhedoesnotdependonthe
orderbutitdependsonhim。Andallthingsareorderedtogether
somehow，butnotallalike，-bothfishesandfowlsandplants；and
theworldisnotsuchthatonethinghasnothingtodowithanother，
buttheyareconnected。Forallareorderedtogethertooneend，but
itisasinahouse，wherethefreemenareleastatlibertytoact
atrandom，butallthingsormostthingsarealreadyordainedfor
them，whiletheslavesandtheanimalsdolittleforthecommon
good，andforthemostpartliveatrandom；forthisisthesortof
principlethatconstitutesthenatureofeach。Imean，forinstance，
thatallmustatleastcometobedissolvedintotheirelements，and
thereareotherfunctionssimilarlyinwhichallshareforthegoodof
thewhole。
Wemustnotfailtoobservehowmanyimpossibleorparadoxical
resultsconfrontthosewhoholddifferentviewsfromourown，andwhat
aretheviewsofthesubtlerthinkers，andwhichviewsareattendedby
fewestdifficulties。Allmakeallthingsoutofcontraries。But
neither’allthings’nor’outofcontraries’isright；nordothese
thinkerstellushowallthethingsinwhichthecontrariesare
presentcanbemadeoutofthecontraries；forcontrariesarenot
affectedbyoneanother。Nowforusthisdifficultyissolved
naturallybythefactthatthereisathirdelement。Thesethinkers
howevermakeoneofthetwocontrariesmatter；thisisdonefor
instancebythosewhomaketheunequalmatterfortheequal，orthe
manymatterfortheone。Butthisalsoisrefutedinthesameway；for
theonematterwhichunderliesanypairofcontrariesiscontraryto
nothing。Further，allthings，excepttheone，will，ontheviewweare
criticizing，partakeofevil；forthebaditselfisoneofthetwo
elements。Buttheotherschooldoesnottreatthegoodandthebad
evenasprinciples；yetinallthingsthegoodisinthehighest
degreeaprinciple。Theschoolwefirstmentionedisrightinsaying
thatitisaprinciple，buthowthegoodisaprincipletheydonot
say-whetherasendorasmoverorasform。
Empedoclesalsohasaparadoxicalview；forheidentifiesthegood
withlove，butthisisaprinciplebothasmover(foritbringsthings
together)andasmatter(foritispartofthemixture)。Nowevenif
ithappensthatthesamethingisaprinciplebothasmatterandas
mover，stillthebeing，atleast，ofthetwoisnotthesame。Inwhich
respectthenisloveaprinciple？Itisparadoxicalalsothatstrife
shouldbeimperishable；thenatureofhis’evil’isjuststrife。
Anaxagorasmakesthegoodamotiveprinciple；forhis’reason’
movesthings。Butitmovesthemforanend，whichmustbesomething
otherthanit，exceptaccordingtoourwayofstatingthecase；for，
onourview，themedicalartisinasensehealth。Itisparadoxical
alsonottosupposeacontrarytothegood，i。e。toreason。Butall
whospeakofthecontrariesmakenouseofthecontraries，unlesswe
bringtheirviewsintoshape。Andwhysomethingsareperishableand
othersimperishable，noonetellsus；fortheymakeallexisting
thingsoutofthesameprinciples。Further，somemakeexisting
thingsoutofthenonexistent；andotherstoavoidthenecessityof
thismakeallthingsone。
