Onemightraisethequestion，whywomandoesnotdifferfromman
inspecies，whenfemaleandmalearecontraryandtheirdifference
isacontrariety；andwhyafemaleandamaleanimalarenotdifferent
inspecies，thoughthisdifferencebelongstoanimalinvirtueof
itsownnature，andnotaspalenessordarknessdoes；both’female’
and’male’belongtoitquaanimal。Thisquestionisalmostthesame
astheother，whyonecontrarietymakesthingsdifferentinspecies
andanotherdoesnot，e。g。’withfeet’and’withwings’do，but
palenessanddarknessdonot。Perhapsitisbecausetheformerare
modificationspeculiartothegenus，andthelatterarelessso。And
sinceoneelementisdefinitionandoneismatter，contrarietieswhich
areinthedefinitionmakeadifferenceinspecies，butthosewhich
areinthethingtakenasincludingitsmatterdonotmakeone。Andso
palenessinaman，ordarkness，doesnotmakeone，noristherea
differenceinspeciesbetweenthepalemanandthedarkman，not
evenifeachofthembedenotedbyoneword。Formanisherebeing
consideredonhismaterialside，andmatterdoesnotcreatea
difference；foritdoesnotmakeindividualmenspeciesofman，though
thefleshandthebonesofwhichthismanandthatmanconsistare
other。Theconcretethingisother，butnototherinspecies，
becauseinthedefinitionthereisnocontrariety。Thisisthe
ultimateindivisiblekind。Calliasisdefinition+matter，thepale
man，then，issoalso，becauseitistheindividualCalliasthatis
pale；man，then，ispaleonlyincidentally。Neitherdoabrazenand
awoodencircle，then，differinspecies；andifabrazentriangleand
awoodencircledifferinspecies，itisnotbecauseofthematter，
butbecausethereisacontrarietyinthedefinition。Butdoesthe
matternotmakethingsotherinspecies，whenitisotherinacertain
way，oristhereasenseinwhichitdoes？Forwhyisthishorseother
thanthismaninspecies，althoughtheirmatterisincludedwiththeir
definitions？Doubtlessbecausethereisacontrarietyinthe
definition。Forwhilethereisacontrarietyalsobetweenpalemanand
darkhorse，anditisacontrarietyinspecies，itdoesnotdepend
onthepalenessoftheoneandthedarknessoftheother，sinceeven
ifbothhadbeenpale，yettheywouldhavebeenotherinspecies。
Butmaleandfemale，whiletheyaremodificationspeculiarto
’animal’，aresonotinvirtueofitsessencebutinthematter，ie。
thebody。Thisiswhythesameseedbecomesfemaleormalebybeing
actedoninacertainway。Wehavestated，then，whatitistobe
otherinspecies，andwhysomethingsdifferinspeciesandothers
donot。
Sincecontrariesareotherinform，andtheperishableandthe
imperishablearecontraries(forprivationisadeterminate
incapacity)，theperishableandtheimperishablemustbedifferent
inkind。
Nowsofarwehavespokenofthegeneraltermsthemselves，sothat
itmightbethoughtnottobenecessarythateveryimperishable
thingshouldbedifferentfromeveryperishablethinginform，justas
noteverypalethingisdifferentinformfromeverydarkthing。For
thesamethingcanbeboth，andevenatthesametimeifitisa
universal(e。g。mancanbebothpaleanddark)，andifitisan
individualitcanstillbeboth；forthesamemancanbe，thoughnot
atthesametime，paleanddark。Yetpaleiscontrarytodark。
Butwhilesomecontrariesbelongtocertainthingsbyaccident
(e。g。boththosenowmentionedandmanyothers)，otherscannot，and
amongtheseare’perishable’and’imperishable’。Fornothingisby
accidentperishable。Forwhatisaccidentaliscapableofnotbeing
present，butperishablenessisoneoftheattributesthatbelongof
necessitytothethingstowhichtheybelong；orelseoneandthesame
thingmaybeperishableandimperishable，ifperishablenessiscapable
ofnotbelongingtoit。Perishablenessthenmusteitherbetheessence
orbepresentintheessenceofeachperishablething。Thesame
accountholdsgoodforimperishablenessalso；forbothare
attributeswhicharepresentofnecessity。Thecharacteristics，
then，inrespectofwhichandindirectconsequenceofwhichonething
isperishableandanotherimperishable，areopposite，sothatthe
thingsmustbedifferentinkind。
Evidently，then，therecannotbeFormssuchassomemaintain，
forthenonemanwouldbeperishableandanotherimperishable。Yetthe
Formsaresaidtobethesameinformwiththeindividualsandnot
merelytohavethesamename；butthingswhichdifferinkindare
fartherapartthanthosewhichdifferinform。
THATWisdomisascienceoffirstprinciplesisevidentfromthe
introductorychapters，inwhichwehaveraisedobjectionstothe
statementsofothersaboutthefirstprinciples；butonemightaskthe
questionwhetherWisdomistobeconceivedasonescienceoras
several。Ifasone，itmaybeobjectedthatonesciencealwaysdeals
withcontraries，butthefirstprinciplesarenotcontrary。Ifitis
notone，whatsortofsciencesarethosewithwhichitistobe
identified？
Further，isitthebusinessofonescience，orofmorethanone，
toexaminethefirstprinciplesofdemonstration？Ifofone，whyof
thisratherthanofanyother？Ifofmore，whatsortofsciences
mustthesebesaidtobe？
Further，doesWisdominvestigateallsubstancesornot？Ifnot
all，itishardtosaywhich；butif，beingone，itinvestigates
themall，itisdoubtfulhowthesamesciencecanembraceseveral
subject-matters。
Further，doesitdealwithsubstancesonlyoralsowiththeir
attributes？Ifinthecaseofattributesdemonstrationispossible，in
thatofsubstancesitisnot。Butifthetwosciencesaredifferent，
whatiseachofthemandwhichisWisdom？Ifwethinkofitas
demonstrative，thescienceoftheattributesisWisdom，butifas
dealingwithwhatisprimary，thescienceofsubstancesclaimsthe
tide。
Butagainthesciencewearelookingformustnotbesupposedto
dealwiththecauseswhichhavebeenmentionedinthePhysics。For(A)
itdoesnotdealwiththefinalcause(forthatisthenatureofthe
good，andthisisfoundinthefieldofactionandmovement；anditis
thefirstmover-forthatisthenatureoftheend-butinthecaseof
thingsunmovablethereisnothingthatmovedthemfirst)，and(B)in
generalitishardtosaywhetherperchancethesciencewearenow
lookingfordealswithperceptiblesubstancesornotwiththem，but
withcertainothers。Ifwithothers，itmustdealeitherwiththe
Formsorwiththeobjectsofmathematics。Now(a)evidentlythe
Formsdonotexist。(Butitishardtosay，evenifonesupposethem
toexist，whyintheworldthesameisnottrueoftheotherthingsof
whichthereareForms，asoftheobjectsofmathematics。Imeanthat
thesethinkersplacetheobjectsofmathematicsbetweentheForms
andperceptiblethings，asakindofthirdsetofthingsapartboth
fromtheFormsandfromthethingsinthisworld；butthereisnota
thirdmanorhorsebesidestheidealandtheindividuals。Ifonthe
otherhanditisnotastheysay，withwhatsortofthingsmustthe
mathematicianbesupposedtodeal？Certainlynotwiththethingsin
thisworld；fornoneoftheseisthesortofthingwhichthe
mathematicalsciencesdemand。)Nor(b)doesthesciencewhichweare
nowseekingtreatoftheobjectsofmathematics；fornoneofthem
canexistseparately。Butagainitdoesnotdealwithperceptible
substances；fortheyareperishable。
Ingeneralonemightraisethequestion，towhatkindofscience
itbelongstodiscussthedifficultiesaboutthematteroftheobjects
ofmathematics。Neithertophysics(becausethewholeinquiryofthe
physicistisaboutthethingsthathaveinthemselvesaprinciple。
ofmovementandrest)，noryettothesciencewhichinquiresinto
demonstrationandscience；forthisisjustthesubjectwhichit
investigates。Itremainsthenthatitisthephilosophywhichwe
havesetbeforeourselvesthattreatsofthosesubjects。
Onemightdiscussthequestionwhetherthescienceweare
seekingshouldbesaidtodealwiththeprincipleswhicharebysome
calledelements；allmensupposethesetobepresentincomposite
things。Butitmightbethoughtthatthescienceweseekshould
treatratherofuniversals；foreverydefinitionandeveryscience
isofuniversalsandnotofinfimaespecies，sothatasfarasthis
goesitwoulddealwiththehighestgenera。Thesewouldturnouttobe
beingandunity；forthesemightmostofallbesupposedtocontain
allthingsthatare，andtobemostlikeprinciplesbecausetheyare
bynature；foriftheyperishallotherthingsaredestroyedwith
them；foreverythingisandisone。Butinasmuchas，ifoneisto
supposethemtobegenera，theymustbepredicableoftheir
differentiae，andnogenusispredicableofanyofitsdifferentiae，
inthiswayitwouldseemthatweshouldnotmakethemgeneranor
principles。Further，ifthesimplerismoreofaprinciplethanthe
lesssimple，andtheultimatemembersofthegenusaresimplerthan
thegenera(fortheyareindivisible，butthegeneraaredivided
intomanyanddifferingspecies)，thespeciesmightseemtobethe
principles，ratherthanthegenera。Butinasmuchasthespeciesare
involvedinthedestructionofthegenera，thegeneraaremorelike
principles；forthatwhichinvolvesanotherinitsdestructionisa
principleofit。Theseandothersofthekindarethesubjectsthat
involvedifficulties。
Further，mustwesupposesomethingapartfromindividualthings，
orisitthesethatthescienceweareseekingtreatsof？Butthese
areinfiniteinnumber。Yetthethingsthatareapartfromthe
individualsaregeneraorspecies；butthesciencewenowseek
treatsofneitherofthese。Thereasonwhythisisimpossiblehasbeen
stated。Indeed，itisingeneralhardtosaywhetheronemustassume
thatthereisaseparablesubstancebesidesthesensiblesubstances
(i。e。thesubstancesinthisworld)，orthatthesearetherealthings
andWisdomisconcernedwiththem。Forweseemtoseekanotherkindof
substance，andthisisourproblem，i。e。toseeifthereis
somethingwhichcanexistapartbyitselfandbelongstonosensible
thing-Further，ifthereisanothersubstanceapartfromand
correspondingtosensiblesubstances，whichkindsofsensible
substancemustbesupposedtohavethiscorrespondingtothem？Why
shouldonesupposemenorhorsestohaveit，morethaneitherthe
otheranimalsorevenalllifelessthings？Ontheotherhandtosetup
otherandeternalsubstancesequalinnumbertothesensibleand
perishablesubstanceswouldseemtofallbeyondtheboundsof
probability-Butiftheprinciplewenowseekisnotseparablefrom
corporealthings，whathasabetterclaimtothenamematter？This，
however，doesnotexistinactuality，butexistsinpotency。Andit
wouldseemratherthattheformorshapeisamoreimportantprinciple
thanthis；buttheformisperishable，sothatthereisnoeternal
substanceatallwhichcanexistapartandindependent。Butthisis
paradoxical；forsuchaprincipleandsubstanceseemstoexistand
issoughtbynearlyallthemostrefinedthinkersassomethingthat
exists；forhowistheretobeorderunlessthereissomethingeternal
andindependentandpermanent？
Further，ifthereisasubstanceorprincipleofsuchanature
asthatwhichwearenowseeking，andifthisisoneforallthings，
andthesameforeternalandforperishablethings，itishardto
saywhyintheworld，ifthereisthesameprinciple，someofthe
thingsthatfallundertheprincipleareeternal，andothersarenot
eternal；thisisparadoxical。Butifthereisoneprincipleof
perishableandanotherofeternalthings，weshallbeinalike
difficultyiftheprincipleofperishablethings，aswellasthatof
eternal，iseternal；forwhy，iftheprincipleiseternal，arenotthe
thingsthatfallundertheprinciplealsoeternal？Butifitis
perishableanotherprincipleisinvolvedtoaccountforit，and
anothertoaccountforthat，andthiswillgoontoinfinity。
Ifontheotherhandwearetosetupwhatarethoughttobethe
mostunchangeableprinciples，beingandunity，firstly，ifeachof
thesedoesnotindicatea’this’orsubstance，howwilltheybe
separableandindependent？Yetweexpecttheeternalandprimary
principlestobeso。Butifeachofthemdoessignifya’this’or
substance，allthingsthatarearesubstances；forbeingispredicated
ofallthings(andunityalsoofsome)；butthatallthingsthatare
aresubstanceisfalse。Further，howcantheyberightwhosaythat
thefirstprincipleisunityandthisissubstance，andgenerate
numberasthefirstproductfromunityandfrommatter，assertthat
numberissubstance？Howarewetothinkof’two’，andeachofthe
othernumberscomposedofunits，asone？Onthispointneitherdothey
sayanythingnorisiteasytosayanything。Butifweareto
supposelinesorwhatcomesafterthese(Imeantheprimary
surfaces)tobeprinciples，theseatleastarenotseparable
substances，butsectionsanddivisions-theformerofsurfaces，the
latterofbodies(whilepointsaresectionsanddivisionsoflines)；
andfurthertheyarelimitsofthesesamethings；andallthesearein
otherthingsandnoneisseparable。Further，howarewetosuppose
thatthereisasubstanceofunityandthepoint？Everysubstance
comesintobeingbyagradualprocess，butapointdoesnot；forthe
pointisadivision。
