Itisclearalsofromtheseveryfactswhatconsequence
confrontsthosewhosaytheIdeasaresubstancescapableofseparate
existence，andatthesametimemaketheFormconsistofthegenusand
thedifferentiae。ForiftheFormsexistand’animal’ispresentin
’man’and’horse’，itiseitheroneandthesameinnumber，or
different。(Informulaitisclearlyone；forhewhostatesthe
formulawillgothroughtheformulaineithercase。)Ifthenthere
isa’man-in-himself’whoisa’this’andexistsapart，thepartsalso
ofwhichheconsists，e。g。’animal’and’two-footed’，mustindicate
’thises’，andbecapableofseparateexistence，andsubstances；
therefore’animal’，aswellas’man’，mustbeofthissort。
Now(1)ifthe’animal’in’thehorse’andin’man’isoneandthe
same，asyouarewithyourself，(a)howwilltheoneinthingsthat
existapartbeone，andhowwillthis’animal’escapebeingdivided
evenfromitself？
Further，(b)ifitistosharein’two-footed’and
’many-footed’，animpossibleconclusionfollows；forcontrary
attributeswillbelongatthesametimetoitalthoughitisoneanda
’this’。Ifitisnottoshareinthem，whatistherelationimplied
whenonesaystheanimalistwo-footedorpossessedoffeet？But
perhapsthetwothingsare’puttogether’andare’incontact’，orare
’mixed’。Yetalltheseexpressionsareabsurd。
But(2)supposetheFormtobedifferentineachspecies。Then
therewillbepracticallyaninfinitenumberofthingswhosesubstance
isanimal’；foritisnotbyaccidentthat’man’has’animal’for
oneofitselements。Further，manythingswillbe’animal-itself’。For
(i)the’animal’ineachspecieswillbethesubstanceofthespecies；
foritisafternothingelsethatthespeciesiscalled；ifitwere，
thatotherwouldbeanelementin’man’，i。e。wouldbethegenusof
man。Andfurther，(ii)alltheelementsofwhich’man’iscomposed
willbeIdeas。Noneofthem，then，willbetheIdeaofonethingand
thesubstanceofanother；thisisimpossible。The’animal’，then，
presentineachspeciesofanimalswillbeanimal-itself。Further，
fromwhatisthis’animal’ineachspeciesderived，andhowwillitbe
derivedfromanimal-itself？Orhowcanthis’animal’，whoseessenceis
simplyanimality，existapartfromanimal-itself？
Further，(3)inthecaseofsensiblethingsboththese
consequencesandothersstillmoreabsurdfollow。If，then，these
consequencesareimpossible，clearlytherearenotFormsofsensible
thingsinthesenseinwhichsomemaintaintheirexistence。
Sincesubstanceisoftwokinds，theconcretethingandthe
formula(Imeanthatonekindofsubstanceistheformulatakenwith
thematter，whileanotherkindistheformulainitsgenerality)，
substancesintheformersensearecapableofdestruction(forthey
arecapablealsoofgeneration)，butthereisnodestructionofthe
formulainthesensethatitiseverincourseofbeingdestroyed(for
thereisnogenerationofiteither；thebeingofhouseisnot
generated，butonlythebeingofthishouse)，butwithoutgeneration
anddestructionformulaeareandarenot；forithasbeenshownthat
noonebegetsnormakesthese。Forthisreason，also，thereisneither
definitionofnordemonstrationaboutsensibleindividual
substances，becausetheyhavematterwhosenatureissuchthatthey
arecapablebothofbeingandofnotbeing；forwhichreasonallthe
individualinstancesofthemaredestructible。Ifthendemonstration
isofnecessarytruthsanddefinitionisascientificprocess，andif，
justasknowledgecannotbesometimesknowledgeandsometimes
ignorance，butthestatewhichvariesthusisopinion，sotoo
demonstrationanddefinitioncannotvarythus，butitisopinion
thatdealswiththatwhichcanbeotherwisethanasitis，clearly
therecanneitherbedefinitionofnordemonstrationaboutsensible
individuals。Forperishingthingsareobscuretothosewhohavethe
relevantknowledge，whentheyhavepassedfromourperception；and
thoughtheformulaeremaininthesoulunchanged，therewillnolonger
beeitherdefinitionordemonstration。Andsowhenoneofthe
definition-mongersdefinesanyindividual，hemustrecognizethat
hisdefinitionmayalwaysbeoverthrown；foritisnotpossibleto
definesuchthings。
NorisitpossibletodefineanyIdea。FortheIdeais，asits
supporterssay，anindividual，andcanexistapart；andtheformula
mustconsistofwords；andhewhodefinesmustnotinventaword
(foritwouldbeunknown)，buttheestablishedwordsarecommontoall
themembersofaclass；thesethenmustapplytosomethingbesidesthe
thingdefined；e。g。ifoneweredefiningyou，hewouldsay’an
animalwhichislean’or’pale’，orsomethingelsewhichwillapply
alsotosomeoneotherthanyou。Ifanyoneweretosaythatperhaps
alltheattributestakenapartmaybelongtomanysubjects，but
togethertheybelongonlytothisone，wemustreplyfirstthatthey
belongalsotoboththeelements；e。g。’two-footedanimal’belongs
toanimalandtothetwo-footed。(Andinthecaseofeternal
entitiesthisisevennecessary，sincetheelementsarepriortoand
partsofthecompound；naymore，theycanalsoexistapart，if’man’
canexistapart。Foreitherneitherorbothcan。If，then，neither
can，thegenuswillnotexistapartfromthevariousspecies；butif
itdoes，thedifferentiawillalso。)Secondly，wemustreplythat
’animal’and’two-footed’arepriorinbeingto’two-footedanimal’；
andthingswhicharepriortoothersarenotdestroyedwhentheothers
are。
Again，iftheIdeasconsistofIdeas(astheymust，sinceelements
aresimplerthanthecompound)，itwillbefurthernecessarythat
theelementsalsoofwhichtheIdeaconsists，e。g。’animal’and
’two-footed’，shouldbepredicatedofmanysubjects。Ifnot，how
willtheycometobeknown？FortherewillthenbeanIdeawhich
cannotbepredicatedofmoresubjectsthanone。Butthisisnot
thoughtpossible-everyIdeaisthoughttobecapableofbeingshared。
Ashasbeensaid，then，theimpossibilityofdefining
individualsescapesnoticeinthecaseofeternalthings，especially
thosewhichareunique，likethesunorthemoon。Forpeopleerrnot
onlybyaddingattributeswhoseremovalthesunwouldsurvive，e。g。
’goingroundtheearth’or’night-hidden’(forfromtheirviewit
followsthatifitstandsstillorisvisible，itwillnolongerbe
thesun；butitisstrangeifthisisso；for’thesun’meansa
certainsubstance)；butalsobythementionofattributeswhichcan
belongtoanothersubject；e。g。ifanotherthingwiththestated
attributescomesintoexistence，clearlyitwillbeasun；theformula
thereforeisgeneral。Butthesunwassupposedtobeanindividual，
likeCleonorSocrates。Afterall，whydoesnotoneofthe
supportersoftheIdeasproduceadefinitionofanIdea？Itwould
becomeclear，iftheytried，thatwhathasnowbeensaidistrue。
Evidentlyevenofthethingsthatarethoughttobesubstances，
mostareonlypotencies，-boththepartsofanimals(fornoneofthem
existsseparately；andwhentheyareseparated，thentootheyexist，
allofthem，merelyasmatter)andearthandfireandair；fornoneof
themisaunity，butasitwereamereheap，tilltheyareworkedup
andsomeunityismadeoutofthem。Onemightmostreadilysupposethe
partsoflivingthingsandthepartsofthesoulnearlyrelatedto
themtoturnouttobeboth，i。e。existentincompleterealityaswell
asinpotency，becausetheyhavesourcesofmovementinsomethingin
theirjoints；forwhichreasonsomeanimalslivewhendivided。Yetall
thepartsmustexistonlypotentially，whentheyareoneand
continuousbynature，-notbyforceorbygrowingintoone，forsuch
aphenomenonisanabnormality。
Sincetheterm’unity’isusedliketheterm’being’，andthe
substanceofthatwhichisoneisone，andthingswhosesubstanceis
numericallyonearenumericallyone，evidentlyneitherunitynorbeing
canbethesubstanceofthings，justasbeinganelementora
principlecannotbethesubstance，butweaskwhat，then，the
principleis，thatwemayreducethethingtosomethingmoreknowable。
Nowoftheseconcepts’being’and’unity’aremoresubstantialthan
’principle’or’element’or’cause’，butnoteventheformerare
substance，sinceingeneralnothingthatiscommonissubstance；for
substancedoesnotbelongtoanythingbuttoitselfandtothat
whichhasit，ofwhichitisthesubstance。Further，thatwhichisone
cannotbeinmanyplacesatthesametime，butthatwhichiscommonis
presentinmanyplacesatthesametime；sothatclearlyno
universalexistsapartfromitsindividuals。
ButthosewhosaytheFormsexist，inonerespectareright，in
givingtheFormsseparateexistence，iftheyaresubstances；butin
anotherrespecttheyarenotright，becausetheysaytheoneovermany
isaForm。Thereasonfortheirdoingthisisthattheycannotdeclare
whatarethesubstancesofthissort，theimperishablesubstances
whichexistapartfromtheindividualandsensiblesubstances。They
makethem，then，thesameinkindastheperishablethings(forthis
kindofsubstanceweknow)——’man-himself’and’horse-itself’，adding
tothesensiblethingstheword’itself’。Yetevenifwehadnot
seenthestars，nonetheless，Isuppose，wouldtheyhavebeeneternal
substancesapartfromthosewhichweknew；sothatnowalsoifwedo
notknowwhatnon-sensiblesubstancesthereare，yetitisdoubtless
necessarythatthereshouldhesome-Clearly，then，nouniversal
termisthenameofasubstance，andnosubstanceiscomposedof
substances。
Letusstatewhat，i。e。whatkindofthing，substanceshouldbe
saidtobe，takingoncemoreanotherstarting-point；forperhaps
fromthisweshallgetaclearviewalsoofthatsubstancewhich
existsapartfromsensiblesubstances。Since，then，substanceisa
principleandacause，letuspursueitfromthisstarting-point。
The’why’isalwayssoughtinthisform——’whydoesonethingattachto
someother？’Fortoinquirewhythemusicalmanisamusicalman，is
eithertoinquire——aswehavesaidwhythemanismusical，oritis
somethingelse。Now’whyathingisitself’isameaninglessinquiry
(for(togivemeaningtothequestion’why’)thefactortheexistence
ofthethingmustalreadybeevident-e。g。thatthemoonis
eclipsed-butthefactthatathingisitselfisthesinglereason
andthesinglecausetobegiveninanswertoallsuchquestionsas
whythemanisman，orthemusicianmusical’，unlessonewereto
answer’becauseeachthingisinseparablefromitself，anditsbeing
onejustmeantthis’；this，however，iscommontoallthingsandis
ashortandeasywaywiththequestion)。Butwecaninquirewhymanis
ananimalofsuchandsuchanature。This，then，isplain，thatweare
notinquiringwhyhewhoisamanisaman。Weareinquiring，then，
whysomethingispredicableofsomething(thatitispredicablemust
beclear；forifnot，theinquiryisaninquiryintonothing)。E。g。
whydoesitthunder？Thisisthesameas’whyissoundproducedinthe
clouds？’Thustheinquiryisaboutthepredicationofonethingof
another。Andwhyarethesethings，i。e。bricksandstones，ahouse？
Plainlyweareseekingthecause。Andthisistheessence(tospeak
abstractly)，whichinsomecasesistheend，e。g。perhapsinthe
caseofahouseorabed，andinsomecasesisthefirstmover；for
thisalsoisacause。Butwhiletheefficientcauseissoughtinthe
caseofgenesisanddestruction，thefinalcauseissoughtinthecase
ofbeingalso。
Theobjectoftheinquiryismosteasilyoverlookedwhereoneterm
isnotexpresslypredicatedofanother(e。g。whenweinquire’whatman
is’)，becausewedonotdistinguishanddonotsaydefinitelythat
certainelementsmakeupacertainwhole。Butwemustarticulateour
meaningbeforewebegintoinquire；ifnot，theinquiryisonthe
border-linebetweenbeingasearchforsomethingandasearchfor
nothing。Sincewemusthavetheexistenceofthethingassomething
given，clearlythequestioniswhythematterissomedefinite
thing；e。g。whyarethesematerialsahouse？Becausethatwhichwas
theessenceofahouseispresent。Andwhyisthisindividualthing，
orthisbodyhavingthisform，aman？Thereforewhatweseekisthe
cause，i。e。theform，byreasonofwhichthematterissomedefinite
thing；andthisisthesubstanceofthething。Evidently，then，inthe
caseofsimpletermsnoinquirynorteachingispossible；ourattitude
towardssuchthingsisotherthanthatofinquiry。
