第16章

Thingsaresaidto’be’(1)inanaccidentalsense，(2)bytheir ownnature。 (1)Inanaccidentalsense，e。g。wesay’therighteousdoeris musical’，and’themanismusical’，and’themusicianisaman’， justaswesay’themusicianbuilds’，becausethebuilderhappensto bemusicalorthemusiciantobeabuilder；forhere’onethingis another’means’oneisanaccidentofanother’。Sointhecaseswe havementioned；forwhenwesay’themanismusical’and’themusician isaman’，or’hewhoispaleismusical’or’themusicianispale’， thelasttwomeanthatbothattributesareaccidentsofthesame thing；thefirstthattheattributeisanaccidentofthatwhichis， while’themusicalisaman’meansthat’musical’isanaccidentof aman。(Inthissense，too，thenot-paleissaidtobe，becausethat ofwhichitisanaccidentis。)Thuswhenonethingissaidinan accidentalsensetobeanother，thisiseitherbecausebothbelong tothesamething，andthisis，orbecausethattowhichtheattribute belongsis，orbecausethesubjectwhichhasasanattributethatof whichitisitselfpredicated，itselfis。 (2)Thekindsofessentialbeingarepreciselythosethatare indicatedbythefiguresofpredication；forthesensesof’being’are justasmanyasthesefigures。Since，then，somepredicatesindicate whatthesubjectis，othersitsquality，othersquantity，others relation，othersactivityorpassivity，othersits’where’，othersits ’when’，’being’hasameaningansweringtoeachofthese。Forthereis nodifferencebetween’themanisrecovering’and’theman recovers’，norbetween’themaniswalkingorcutting’and’theman walks’or’cuts’；andsimilarlyinallothercases。 Again，’being’and’is’meanthatastatementistrue，’not being’thatitisnottruebutfalses-andthisalikeinthecaseof affirmationandofnegation；e。g。’Socratesismusical’meansthat thisistrue，or’Socratesisnot-pale’meansthatthisistrue；but ’thediagonalofthesquareisnotcommensuratewiththeside’means thatitisfalsetosayitis。 Again，’being’and’thatwhichis’meanthatsomeofthe thingswehavementioned’are’potentially，othersincomplete reality。Forwesaybothofthatwhichseespotentiallyandofthat whichseesactually，thatitis’seeing’，andbothofthatwhichcan actualizeitsknowledgeandofthatwhichisactualizingit，thatit knows，andbothofthattowhichrestisalreadypresentandofthat whichcanrest，thatitrests。Andsimilarlyinthecaseof substances；wesaytheHermesisinthestone，andthehalfofthe lineisintheline，andwesayofthatwhichisnotyetripethat itiscorn。Whenathingispotentialandwhenitisnotyetpotential mustbeexplainedelsewhere。 Wecall’substance’(1)thesimplebodies，i。e。earthandfireand waterandeverythingofthesort，andingeneralbodiesandthethings composedofthem，bothanimalsanddivinebeings，andthepartsof these。Allthesearecalledsubstancebecausetheyarenot predicatedofasubjectbuteverythingelseispredicatedofthem-(2) Thatwhich，beingpresentinsuchthingsasarenotpredicatedofa subject，isthecauseoftheirbeing，asthesoulisofthebeingof ananimal-(3)Thepartswhicharepresentinsuchthings，limiting themandmarkingthemasindividuals，andbywhosedestructionthe wholeisdestroyed，asthebodyisbythedestructionoftheplane，as somesay，andtheplanebythedestructionoftheline；andingeneral numberisthoughtbysometobeofthisnature；forifitis destroyed，theysay，nothingexists，anditlimitsallthings-(4)The essence，theformulaofwhichisadefinition，isalsocalledthe substanceofeachthing。 Itfollows，then，that’substance’hastwosenses，(A)ultimate substratum，whichisnolongerpredicatedofanythingelse，and(B) thatwhich，beinga’this’，isalsoseparableandofthisnatureis theshapeorformofeachthing。 ’Thesame’means(1)thatwhichisthesameinanaccidental sense，e。g。’thepale’and’themusical’arethesamebecausetheyare accidentsofthesamething，and’aman’and’musical’becausetheone isanaccidentoftheother；and’themusical’is’aman’becauseit isanaccidentoftheman。(Thecomplexentityisthesameaseither ofthesimpleonesandeachoftheseisthesameasit；forboth ’theman’and’themusical’aresaidtobethesameas’themusical man’，andthisthesameasthey。)Thisiswhyallofthese statementsaremadenotuniversally；foritisnottruetosaythat everymanisthesameas’themusical’(foruniversalattributes belongtothingsinvirtueoftheirownnature，butaccidentsdonot belongtotheminvirtueoftheirownnature)；butofthe individualsthestatementsaremadewithoutqualification。For ’Socrates’and’musicalSocrates’arethoughttobethesame；but ’Socrates’isnotpredicableofmorethanonesubject，andtherefore wedonotsay’everySocrates’aswesay’everyman’。 Somethingsaresaidtobethesameinthissense，others(2) arethesamebytheirownnature，inasmanysensesasthatwhichis onebyitsownnatureisso；forboththethingswhosematterisone eitherinkindorinnumber，andthosewhoseessenceisone，are saidtobethesame。Clearly，therefore，samenessisaunityofthe beingeitherofmorethanonethingorofonethingwhenitistreated asmorethanone，ie。whenwesayathingisthesameasitself；for wetreatitastwo。 Thingsarecalled’other’ifeithertheirkindsortheirmatters orthedefinitionsoftheiressencearemorethanone；andin general’other’hasmeaningsoppositetothoseof’thesame’。 ’Different’isapplied(1)tothosethingswhichthoughother arethesameinsomerespect，onlynotinnumberbuteitherinspecies oringenusorbyanalogy；(2)tothosewhosegenusisother，andto contraries，andtoanthingsthathavetheirothernessintheir essence。 Thosethingsarecalled’like’whichhavethesameattributesin everyrespect，andthosewhichhavemoreattributesthesamethan different，andthosewhosequalityisone；andthatwhichshares withanotherthingthegreaternumberorthemoreimportantofthe attributes(eachofthemoneoftwocontraries)inrespectofwhich thingsarecapableofaltering，islikethatotherthing。Thesenses of’unlike’areoppositetothoseof’like’。 Theterm’opposite’isappliedtocontradictories，andto contraries，andtorelativeterms，andtoprivationandpossession， andtotheextremesfromwhichandintowhichgenerationand dissolutiontakeplace；andtheattributesthatcannotbepresentat thesametimeinthatwhichisreceptiveofboth，aresaidtobe opposed，-eitherthemselvesoftheirconstituents。Greyandwhite colourdonotbelongatthesametimetothesamething；hencetheir constituentsareopposed。 Theterm’contrary’isapplied(1)tothoseattributesdiffering ingenuswhichcannotbelongatthesametimetothesamesubject，(2) tothemostdifferentofthethingsinthesamegenus，(3)tothemost differentoftheattributesinthesamerecipientsubject，(4)to themostdifferentofthethingsthatfallunderthesamefaculty，(5) tothethingswhosedifferenceisgreatesteitherabsolutelyorin genusorinspecies。Theotherthingsthatarecalledcontraryare socalled，somebecausetheypossesscontrariesoftheabovekind， somebecausetheyarereceptiveofsuch，somebecausetheyare productiveoforsusceptibletosuch，orareproducingorsuffering them，orarelossesoracquisitions，orpossessionsorprivations， ofsuch。Since’one’and’being’havemanysenses，theotherterms whicharederivedfromthese，andtherefore’same’，’other’，and ’contrary’，mustcorrespond，sothattheymustbedifferentforeach category。 Theterm’otherinspecies’isappliedtothingswhichbeingof thesamegenusarenotsubordinatetheonetotheother，orwhich beinginthesamegenushaveadifference，orwhichhaveacontrariety intheirsubstance；andcontrariesareotherthanoneanotherin species(eitherallcontrariesorthosewhicharesocalledinthe primarysense)，andsoarethosethingswhosedefinitionsdifferin theinfimaspeciesofthegenus(e。g。manandhorseareindivisiblein genus，buttheirdefinitionsaredifferent)，andthosewhichbeing inthesamesubstancehaveadifference。’Thesameinspecies’hasthe variousmeaningsoppositetothese。 Thewords’prior’and’posterior’areapplied(1)tosomethings (ontheassumptionthatthereisafirst，i。e。abeginning，ineach class)becausetheyarenearersomebeginningdeterminedeither absolutelyandbynature，orbyreferencetosomethingorinsome placeorbycertainpeople；e。g。thingsarepriorinplacebecause theyarenearereithertosomeplacedeterminedbynature(e。g。the middleorthelastplace)，ortosomechanceobject；andthatwhichis fartherisposterior-Otherthingsarepriorintime；somebybeing fartherfromthepresent，i。e。inthecaseofpastevents(forthe TrojanwarispriortothePersian，becauseitisfartherfromthe present)，othersbybeingnearerthepresent，i。e。inthecaseof futureevents(fortheNemeangamesarepriortothePythian，ifwe treatthepresentasbeginningandfirstpoint，becausetheyare nearerthepresent)-Otherthingsarepriorinmovement；forthat whichisnearerthefirstmoverisprior(e。g。theboyispriortothe man)；andtheprimemoveralsoisabeginningabsolutely-Othersare priorinpower；forthatwhichexceedsinpower，i。e。themore powerful，isprior；andsuchisthataccordingtowhosewillthe other-i。e。theposterior-mustfollow，sothatifthepriordoesnot setitinmotiontheotherdoesnotmove，andifitsetsitin motionitdoesmove；andherewillisabeginning-Othersarepriorin arrangement；thesearethethingsthatareplacedatintervalsin referencetosomeonedefinitethingaccordingtosomerule，e。g。in thechorusthesecondmanispriortothethird，andinthelyrethe secondloweststringispriortothelowest；forintheonecasethe leaderandintheotherthemiddlestringisthebeginning。 These，then，arecalledpriorinthissense，but(2)inanother sensethatwhichispriorforknowledgeistreatedasalso absolutelyprior；ofthese，thethingsthatarepriorindefinitiondo notcoincidewiththosethatarepriorinrelationtoperception。 Forindefinitionuniversalsareprior，inrelationtoperception individuals。Andindefinitionalsotheaccidentispriortothe whole，e。g。’musical’to’musicalman’，forthedefinitioncannot existasawholewithoutthepart；yetmusicalnesscannotexistunless thereissomeonewhoismusical。 (3)Theattributesofpriorthingsarecalledprior，e。g。 straightnessispriortosmoothness；foroneisanattributeofaline assuch，andtheotherofasurface。 Somethingsthenarecalledpriorandposteriorinthissense， others(4)inrespectofnatureandsubstance，i。e。thosewhichcanbe withoutotherthings，whiletheotherscannotbewithoutthem，-a distinctionwhichPlatoused。(Ifweconsiderthevarioussensesof ’being’，firstlythesubjectisprior，sothatsubstanceisprior； secondly，accordingaspotencyorcompleterealityistakeninto account，differentthingsareprior，forsomethingsarepriorin respectofpotency，othersinrespectofcompletereality，e。g。in potencythehalflineispriortothewholeline，andthepartto thewhole，andthemattertotheconcretesubstance，butincomplete realitytheseareposterior；foritisonlywhenthewholehasbeen dissolvedthattheywillexistincompletereality。)Inasense， therefore，allthingsthatarecalledpriorandposteriorareso calledwithreferencetothisfourthsense；forsomethingscan existwithoutothersinrespectofgeneration，e。g。thewhole withouttheparts，andothersinrespectofdissolution，e。g。thepart withoutthewhole。Andthesameistrueinallothercases。