Besidesthis，evenifthegeneraareinthehighestdegree
principles，shouldoneregardthefirstofthegeneraasprinciples，
orthosewhicharepredicateddirectlyoftheindividuals？Thisalso
admitsofdispute。Foriftheuniversalsarealwaysmoreofthenature
ofprinciples，evidentlytheuppermostofthegeneraarethe
principles；forthesearepredicatedofallthings。Therewill，
then，beasmanyprinciplesofthingsasthereareprimarygenera，
sothatbothbeingandunitywillbeprinciplesandsubstances；for
thesearemostofallpredicatedofallexistingthings。Butitisnot
possiblethateitherunityorbeingshouldbeasinglegenusof
things；forthedifferentiaeofanygenusmusteachofthemboth
havebeingandbeone，butitisnotpossibleforthegenustaken
apartfromitsspecies(anymorethanforthespeciesofthegenus)to
bepredicatedofitsproperdifferentiae；sothatifunityorbeingis
agenus，nodifferentiawilleitherhavebeingorbeone。Butifunity
andbeingarenotgenera，neitherwilltheybeprinciples，ifthe
generaaretheprinciples。Again，theintermediatekinds，inwhose
naturethedifferentiaeareincluded，willonthistheorybegenera，
downtotheindivisiblespecies；butasitis，somearethoughtto
begeneraandothersarenotthoughttobeso。Besidesthis，the
differentiaeareprinciplesevenmorethanthegenera；andifthese
alsoareprinciples，therecomestobepracticallyaninfinite
numberofprinciples，especiallyifwesupposethehighestgenustobe
aprinciple-Butagain，ifunityismoreofthenatureofaprinciple，
andtheindivisibleisone，andeverythingindivisibleissoeitherin
quantityorinspecies，andthatwhichissoinspeciesisthe
prior，andgeneraaredivisibleintospeciesformanisnotthe
genusofindividualmen)，thatwhichispredicateddirectlyofthe
individualswillhavemoreunity-Further，inthecaseofthingsin
whichthedistinctionofpriorandposteriorispresent，thatwhichis
predicableofthesethingscannotbesomethingapartfromthem(e。g。
iftwoisthefirstofnumbers，therewillnotbeaNumberapart
fromthekindsofnumbers；andsimilarlytherewillnotbeaFigure
apartfromthekindsoffigures；andifthegeneraofthesethings
donotexistapartfromthespecies，thegeneraofotherthingswill
scarcelydoso；forgeneraofthesethingsarethoughttoexistifany
do)。Butamongtheindividualsoneisnotpriorandanotherposterior。
Further，whereonethingisbetterandanotherworse，thebetteris
alwaysprior；sothatofthesealsonogenuscanexist。Fromthese
considerations，then，thespeciespredicatedofindividualsseemtobe
principlesratherthanthegenera。Butagain，itisnoteasytosayin
whatsensethesearetobetakenasprinciples。Fortheprincipleor
causemustexistalongsideofthethingsofwhichitistheprinciple，
andmustbecapableofexistinginseparationfromthem；butfor
whatreasonshouldwesupposeanysuchthingtoexistalongsideofthe
individual，exceptthatitispredicateduniversallyandofall？But
ifthisisthereason，thethingsthataremoreuniversalmustbe
supposedtobemoreofthenatureofprinciples；sothatthehighest
generawouldbetheprinciples。
(8)Thereisadifficultyconnectedwiththese，thehardestofall
andthemostnecessarytoexamine，andofthisthediscussionnow
awaitsus。If，ontheonehand，thereisnothingapartfromindividual
things，andtheindividualsareinfiniteinnumber，howthenisit
possibletogetknowledgeoftheinfiniteindividuals？Forall
thingsthatwecometoknow，wecometoknowinsofarastheyhave
someunityandidentity，andinsofarassomeattributebelongsto
themuniversally。
Butifthisisnecessary，andtheremustbesomethingapartfrom
theindividuals，itwillbenecessarythatthegeneraexistapartfrom
theindividuals，eitherthelowestorthehighestgenera；butwefound
bydiscussionjustnowthatthisisimpossible。
Further，ifweadmitinthefullestsensethatsomethingexists
apartfromtheconcretething，wheneversomethingispredicatedofthe
matter，mustthere，ifthereissomethingapart，besomethingapart
fromeachsetofindividuals，orfromsomeandnotfromothers，or
fromnone？(A)Ifthereisnothingapartfromindividuals，there
willbenoobjectofthought，butallthingswillbeobjectsofsense，
andtherewillnotbeknowledgeofanything，unlesswesaythat
sensationisknowledge。Further，nothingwillbeeternalorunmovable；
forallperceptiblethingsperishandareinmovement。Butifthereis
nothingeternal，neithercantherebeaprocessofcomingtobe；for
theremustbesomethingthatcomestobe，i。e。fromwhichsomething
comestobe，andtheultimateterminthisseriescannothavecome
tobe，sincetheserieshasalimitandsincenothingcancometobe
outofthatwhichisnot。Further，ifgenerationandmovementexist
theremustalsobealimit；fornomovementisinfinite，butevery
movementhasanend，andthatwhichisincapableofcompletingits
comingtobecannotbeinprocessofcomingtobe；andthatwhich
hascompleteditscomingtobemustheassoonasithascometobe。
Further，sincethematterexists，becauseitisungenerated，itisa
fortiorireasonablethatthesubstanceoressence，thatwhichthe
matterisatanytimecomingtobe，shouldexist；forifneither
essencenormatteristobe，nothingwillbeatall，andsincethisis
impossibletheremustbesomethingbesidestheconcretething，viz。
theshapeorform。
Butagain(B)ifwearetosupposethis，itishardtosayin
whichcaseswearetosupposeitandinwhichnot。Forevidentlyitis
notpossibletosupposeitinallcases；wecouldnotsupposethat
thereisahousebesidestheparticularhouses-Besidesthis，willthe
substanceofalltheindividuals，e。g。ofallmen，beone？Thisis
paradoxical，forallthethingswhosesubstanceisoneareone。But
arethesubstancesmanyanddifferent？Thisalsoisunreasonable-At
thesametime，howdoesthematterbecomeeachoftheindividuals，and
howistheconcretethingthesetwoelements？
(9)Again，onemightaskthefollowingquestionalsoaboutthe
firstprinciples。Iftheyareoneinkindonly，nothingwillbe
numericallyone，notevenunity-itselfandbeing-itself；andhow
willknowingexist，ifthereisnottobesomethingcommontoa
wholesetofindividuals？
Butifthereisacommonelementwhichisnumericallyone，and
eachoftheprinciplesisone，andtheprinciplesarenotasinthe
caseofperceptiblethingsdifferentfordifferentthings(e。g。
sincethisparticularsyllableisthesameinkindwheneveritoccurs，
theelementsitarealsothesameinkind；onlyinkind，forthese
also，likethesyllable，arenumericallydifferentindifferent
contexts)，-ifitisnotlikethisbuttheprinciplesofthingsare
numericallyone，therewillbenothingelsebesidestheelements
(forthereisnodifferenceofmeaningbetween’numericallyone’and
’individual’；forthisisjustwhatwemeanbytheindividual-the
numericallyone，andbytheuniversalwemeanthatwhichispredicable
oftheindividuals)。Thereforeitwillbejustasiftheelementsof
articulatesoundwerelimitedinnumber；allthelanguageintheworld
wouldbeconfinedtotheABC，sincetherecouldnotbetwoormore
lettersofthesamekind。
(10)Onedifficultywhichisasgreatasanyhasbeenneglected
bothbymodernphilosophersandbytheirpredecessors-whetherthe
principlesofperishableandthoseofimperishablethingsarethesame
ordifferent。Iftheyarethesame，howaresomethingsperishableand
othersimperishable，andforwhatreason？TheschoolofHesiodandall
thetheologiansthoughtonlyofwhatwasplausibletothemselves，
andhadnoregardtous。For，assertingthefirstprinciplestobe
godsandbornofgods，theysaythatthebeingswhichdidnottasteof
nectarandambrosiabecamemortal；andclearlytheyareusingwords
whicharefamiliartothemselves，yetwhattheyhavesaidaboutthe
veryapplicationofthesecausesisaboveourcomprehension。Forif
thegodstasteofnectarandambrosiafortheirpleasure，thesearein
nowisethecausesoftheirexistence；andiftheytastethemto
maintaintheirexistence，howcangodswhoneedfoodbeeternal？-But
intothesubtletiesofthemythologistsitisnotworthourwhileto
inquireseriously；those，however，whousethelanguageofproofwe
mustcross-examineandaskwhy，afterall，thingswhichconsistofthe
sameelementsare，someofthem，eternalinnature，whileothers
perish。Sincethesephilosophersmentionnocause，anditis
unreasonablethatthingsshouldbeastheysay，evidentlythe
principlesorcausesofthingscannotbethesame。Eventhemanwhom
onemightsupposetospeakmostconsistently-Empedocles，evenhehas
madethesamemistake；forhemaintainsthatstrifeisaprinciple
thatcausesdestruction，butevenstrifewouldseemnolesstoproduce
everything，excepttheOne；forallthingsexceptingGodproceed
fromstrife。Atleasthesays:-
Fromwhichallthatwasandisandwillbehereafter-
Trees，andmenandwomen，tooktheirgrowth，
Andbeastsandbirdsandwater-nourishedfish，
Andlong-agedgods。
Theimplicationisevidentevenapartfromthesewords；forif
strifehadnotbeenpresentinthings，allthingswouldhavebeenone，
accordingtohim；forwhentheyhavecometogether，’thenstrifestood
outermost。’HenceitalsofollowsonhistheorythatGodmost
blessedislesswisethanallothers；forhedoesnotknowallthe
elements；forhehasinhimnostrife，andknowledgeisofthelikeby
thelike。’Forbyearth，’hesays，
weseeearth，bywaterwater，
Byethergodlikeether，byfirewastingfire，
Lovebylove，andstrifebygloomystrife。
But-andthisisthepointwestartedfromthisatleastis
evident，thatonhistheoryitfollowsthatstrifeisasmuchthe
causeofexistenceasofdestruction。Andsimilarlyloveisnot
speciallythecauseofexistence；forincollectingthingsintothe
Oneitdestroysallotherthings。AndatthesametimeEmpedocles
mentionsnocauseofthechangeitself，exceptthatthingsaresoby
nature。
Butwhenstrifeatlastwaxedgreatinthelimbsofthe
Sphere，
Andsprangtoassertitsrightsasthetimewasfulfilled
Whichisfixedfortheminturnbyamightyoath。
Thisimpliesthatchangewasnecessary；butheshowsnocauseof
thenecessity。Butyetsofaratleasthealonespeaksconsistently；
forhedoesnotmakesomethingsperishableandothersimperishable，
butmakesallperishableexcepttheelements。Thedifficultyweare
speakingofnowis，whysomethingsareperishableandothersarenot，
iftheyconsistofthesameprinciples。
Letthissufficeasproofofthefactthattheprinciplescannot
bethesame。Butiftherearedifferentprinciples，onedifficulty
iswhetherthesealsowillbeimperishableorperishable。Forif
theyareperishable，evidentlythesealsomustconsistofcertain
elements(forallthingsthatperish，perishbybeingresolvedinto
theelementsofwhichtheyconsist)；sothatitfollowsthatprior
totheprinciplesthereareotherprinciples。Butthisis
impossible，whethertheprocesshasalimitorproceedstoinfinity。
Further，howwillperishablethingsexist，iftheirprinciplesare
tobeannulled？Butiftheprinciplesareimperishable，whywill
thingscomposedofsomeimperishableprinciplesbeperishable，while
thosecomposedoftheothersareimperishable？Thisisnotprobable，
butiseitherimpossibleorneedsmuchproof。Further，noonehaseven
triedtomaintaindifferentprinciples；theymaintainthesame
principlesforallthings。Buttheyswallowthedifficultywestated
firstasiftheytookittobesomethingtrifling。
(11)Theinquirythatisboththehardestofallandthemost
necessaryforknowledgeofthetruthiswhetherbeingandunityare
thesubstancesofthings，andwhethereachofthem，withoutbeing
anythingelse，isbeingorunityrespectively，orwemustinquirewhat
beingandunityare，withtheimplicationthattheyhavesomeother
underlyingnature。Forsomepeoplethinktheyareoftheformer，
