ALLmenbynaturedesiretoknow。Anindicationofthisisthe
delightwetakeinoursenses；forevenapartfromtheirusefulness
theyarelovedforthemselves；andaboveallothersthesenseof
sight。Fornotonlywithaviewtoaction，butevenwhenwearenot
goingtodoanything，wepreferseeing(onemightsay)toeverything
else。Thereasonisthatthis，mostofallthesenses，makesusknow
andbringstolightmanydifferencesbetweenthings。
Bynatureanimalsarebornwiththefacultyofsensation，andfrom
sensationmemoryisproducedinsomeofthem，thoughnotinothers。
Andthereforetheformeraremoreintelligentandaptatlearningthan
thosewhichcannotremember；thosewhichareincapableofhearing
soundsareintelligentthoughtheycannotbetaught，e。g。thebee，and
anyotherraceofanimalsthatmaybelikeit；andthosewhichbesides
memoryhavethissenseofhearingcanbetaught。
Theanimalsotherthanmanlivebyappearancesandmemories，and
havebutlittleofconnectedexperience；butthehumanracelivesalso
byartandreasonings。Nowfrommemoryexperienceisproducedin
men；fortheseveralmemoriesofthesamethingproducefinallythe
capacityforasingleexperience。Andexperienceseemsprettymuch
likescienceandart，butreallyscienceandartcometomenthrough
experience；for’experiencemadeart’，asPolussays，’but
inexperienceluck。’Nowartariseswhenfrommanynotionsgainedby
experienceoneuniversaljudgementaboutaclassofobjectsis
produced。FortohaveajudgementthatwhenCalliaswasillofthis
diseasethisdidhimgood，andsimilarlyinthecaseofSocratesand
inmanyindividualcases，isamatterofexperience；buttojudgethat
ithasdonegoodtoallpersonsofacertainconstitution，marked
offinoneclass，whentheywereillofthisdisease，e。g。to
phlegmaticorbiliouspeoplewhenburningwithfevers-thisisamatter
ofart。
Withaviewtoactionexperienceseemsinnorespectinferiorto
art，andmenofexperiencesucceedevenbetterthanthosewhohave
theorywithoutexperience。(Thereasonisthatexperienceisknowledge
ofindividuals，artofuniversals，andactionsandproductionsareall
concernedwiththeindividual；forthephysiciandoesnotcureman，
exceptinanincidentalway，butCalliasorSocratesorsomeother
calledbysomesuchindividualname，whohappenstobeaman。If，
then，amanhasthetheorywithouttheexperience，andrecognizes
theuniversalbutdoesnotknowtheindividualincludedinthis，he
willoftenfailtocure；foritistheindividualthatistobe
cured。)Butyetwethinkthatknowledgeandunderstandingbelongto
artratherthantoexperience，andwesupposeartiststobewiserthan
menofexperience(whichimpliesthatWisdomdependsinallcases
ratheronknowledge)；andthisbecausetheformerknowthecause，
butthelatterdonot。Formenofexperienceknowthatthethingis
so，butdonotknowwhy，whiletheothersknowthe’why’andthe
cause。Hencewethinkalsothatthemasterworkersineachcraftare
morehonourableandknowinatruersenseandarewiserthanthe
manualworkers，becausetheyknowthecausesofthethingsthatare
done(wethinkthemanualworkersarelikecertainlifelessthings
whichactindeed，butactwithoutknowingwhattheydo，asfire
burns，-butwhilethelifelessthingsperformeachoftheirfunctions
byanaturaltendency，thelabourersperformthemthroughhabit)；thus
weviewthemasbeingwisernotinvirtueofbeingabletoact，butof
havingthetheoryforthemselvesandknowingthecauses。Andin
generalitisasignofthemanwhoknowsandofthemanwhodoes
notknow，thattheformercanteach，andthereforewethinkartmore
trulyknowledgethanexperienceis；forartistscanteach，andmen
ofmereexperiencecannot。
Again，wedonotregardanyofthesensesasWisdom；yetsurely
thesegivethemostauthoritativeknowledgeofparticulars。Butthey
donottellusthe’why’ofanything-e。g。whyfireishot；theyonly
saythatitishot。
Atfirsthewhoinventedanyartwhateverthatwentbeyondthe
commonperceptionsofmanwasnaturallyadmiredbymen，notonly
becausetherewassomethingusefulintheinventions，butbecausehe
wasthoughtwiseandsuperiortotherest。Butasmoreartswere
invented，andsomeweredirectedtothenecessitiesoflife，othersto
recreation，theinventorsofthelatterwerenaturallyalwaysregarded
aswiserthantheinventorsoftheformer，becausetheirbranchesof
knowledgedidnotaimatutility。Hencewhenallsuchinventions
werealreadyestablished，thescienceswhichdonotaimatgiving
pleasureoratthenecessitiesoflifewerediscovered，andfirstin
theplaceswheremenfirstbegantohaveleisure。Thisiswhythe
mathematicalartswerefoundedinEgypt；fortherethepriestly
castewasallowedtobeatleisure。
WehavesaidintheEthicswhatthedifferenceisbetweenart
andscienceandtheotherkindredfaculties；butthepointofour
presentdiscussionisthis，thatallmensupposewhatiscalledWisdom
todealwiththefirstcausesandtheprinciplesofthings；sothat，
ashasbeensaidbefore，themanofexperienceisthoughttobe
wiserthanthepossessorsofanysense-perceptionwhatever，theartist
wiserthanthemenofexperience，themasterworkerthanthe
mechanic，andthetheoreticalkindsofknowledgetobemoreofthe
natureofWisdomthantheproductive。ClearlythenWisdomisknowledge
aboutcertainprinciplesandcauses。
2
Sinceweareseekingthisknowledge，wemustinquireofwhat
kindarethecausesandtheprinciples，theknowledgeofwhichis
Wisdom。Ifoneweretotakethenotionswehaveaboutthewiseman，
thismightperhapsmaketheanswermoreevident。Wesupposefirst，
then，thatthewisemanknowsallthings，asfaraspossible，although
hehasnotknowledgeofeachofthemindetail；secondly，thathe
whocanlearnthingsthataredifficult，andnoteasyformantoknow，
iswise(sense-perceptioniscommontoall，andthereforeeasyand
nomarkofWisdom)；again，thathewhoismoreexactandmore
capableofteachingthecausesiswiser，ineverybranchofknowledge；
andthatofthesciences，also，thatwhichisdesirableonitsown
accountandforthesakeofknowingitismoreofthenatureofWisdom
thanthatwhichisdesirableonaccountofitsresults，andthe
superiorscienceismoreofthenatureofWisdomthantheancillary；
forthewisemanmustnotbeorderedbutmustorder，andhemustnot
obeyanother，butthelesswisemustobeyhim。
Suchandsomanyarethenotions，then，whichwehaveaboutWisdom
andthewise。Nowofthesecharacteristicsthatofknowingall
thingsmustbelongtohimwhohasinthehighestdegreeuniversal
knowledge；forheknowsinasensealltheinstancesthatfallunder
theuniversal。Andthesethings，themostuniversal，areonthe
wholethehardestformentoknow；fortheyarefarthestfromthe
senses。Andthemostexactofthesciencesarethosewhichdealmost
withfirstprinciples；forthosewhichinvolvefewerprinciplesare
moreexactthanthosewhichinvolveadditionalprinciples，e。g。
arithmeticthangeometry。Butthesciencewhichinvestigatescausesis
alsoinstructive，inahigherdegree，forthepeoplewhoinstructus
arethosewhotellthecausesofeachthing。Andunderstandingand
knowledgepursuedfortheirownsakearefoundmostintheknowledge
ofthatwhichismostknowable(forhewhochoosestoknowforthe
sakeofknowingwillchoosemostreadilythatwhichismosttruly
knowledge，andsuchistheknowledgeofthatwhichismost
knowable)；andthefirstprinciplesandthecausesaremost
knowable；forbyreasonofthese，andfromthese，allotherthings
cometobeknown，andnotthesebymeansofthethingssubordinate
tothem。Andthesciencewhichknowstowhatendeachthingmustbe
doneisthemostauthoritativeofthesciences，andmoreauthoritative
thananyancillaryscience；andthisendisthegoodofthatthing，
andingeneralthesupremegoodinthewholeofnature。Judgedby
allthetestswehavementioned，then，thenameinquestionfallsto
thesamescience；thismustbeasciencethatinvestigatesthefirst
principlesandcauses；forthegood，i。e。theend，isoneofthe
causes。
Thatitisnotascienceofproductionisclearevenfromthe
historyoftheearliestphilosophers。Foritisowingtotheir
wonderthatmenbothnowbeginandatfirstbegantophilosophize；
theywonderedoriginallyattheobviousdifficulties，thenadvanced
littlebylittleandstateddifficultiesaboutthegreatermatters，
e。g。aboutthephenomenaofthemoonandthoseofthesunandofthe
stars，andaboutthegenesisoftheuniverse。Andamanwhoispuzzled
andwondersthinkshimselfignorant(whenceeventheloverofmyth
isinasensealoverofWisdom，forthemythiscomposedofwonders)；
thereforesincetheyphilosophizedordertoescapefromignorance，
evidentlytheywerepursuingscienceinordertoknow，andnotforany
utilitarianend。Andthisisconfirmedbythefacts；foritwaswhen
almostallthenecessitiesoflifeandthethingsthatmakefor
comfortandrecreationhadbeensecured，thatsuchknowledgebegan
tobesought。Evidentlythenwedonotseekitforthesakeofany
otheradvantage；butasthemanisfree，wesay，whoexistsforhis
ownsakeandnotforanother’s，sowepursuethisastheonlyfree
science，foritaloneexistsforitsownsake。
Hencealsothepossessionofitmightbejustlyregardedasbeyond
humanpower；forinmanywayshumannatureisinbondage，sothat
accordingtoSimonides’Godalonecanhavethisprivilege’，andit
isunfittingthatmanshouldnotbecontenttoseektheknowledgethat
issuitedtohim。If，then，thereissomethinginwhatthepoets
say，andjealousyisnaturaltothedivinepower，itwouldprobably
occurinthiscaseaboveall，andallwhoexcelledinthisknowledge
wouldbeunfortunate。Butthedivinepowercannotbejealous(nay，
accordingtotheproverb，’bardstellalie’)，norshouldanyother
sciencebethoughtmorehonourablethanoneofthissort。Forthemost
divinescienceisalsomosthonourable；andthissciencealonemust
be，intwoways，mostdivine。Forthesciencewhichitwouldbemost
meetforGodtohaveisadivinescience，andsoisanysciencethat
dealswithdivineobjects；andthissciencealonehasboththese
qualities；for(1)Godisthoughttobeamongthecausesofallthings
andtobeafirstprinciple，and(2)suchascienceeitherGodalone
canhave，orGodaboveallothers。Allthesciences，indeed，are
morenecessarythanthis，butnoneisbetter。
Yettheacquisitionofitmustinasenseendinsomethingwhich
istheoppositeofouroriginalinquiries。Forallmenbegin，aswe
said，bywonderingthatthingsareastheyare，astheydoabout
self-movingmarionettes，oraboutthesolsticesorthe
incommensurabilityofthediagonalofasquarewiththeside；forit
seemswonderfultoallwhohavenotyetseenthereason，thatthereis
athingwhichcannotbemeasuredevenbythesmallestunit。Butwe
mustendinthecontraryand，accordingtotheproverb，thebetter
state，asisthecaseintheseinstancestoowhenmenlearnthecause；
forthereisnothingwhichwouldsurpriseageometersomuchasifthe
diagonalturnedouttobecommensurable。
Wehavestated，then，whatisthenatureofthescienceweare
searchingfor，andwhatisthemarkwhichoursearchandourwhole
investigationmustreach。
Evidentlywehavetoacquireknowledgeoftheoriginalcauses(for
wesayweknoweachthingonlywhenwethinkwerecognizeitsfirst
cause)，andcausesarespokenofinfoursenses。Inoneofthesewe
meanthesubstance，i。e。theessence(forthe’why’isreducible
finallytothedefinition，andtheultimate’why’isacauseand
principle)；inanotherthematterorsubstratum，inathirdthesource
ofthechange，andinafourththecauseopposedtothis，the
purposeandthegood(forthisistheendofallgenerationand
change)。Wehavestudiedthesecausessufficientlyinourworkon
nature，butyetletuscalltoouraidthosewhohaveattackedthe
investigationofbeingandphilosophizedaboutrealitybeforeus。
Forobviouslytheytoospeakofcertainprinciplesandcauses；togo
overtheirviews，then，willbeofprofittothepresentinquiry，
forweshalleitherfindanotherkindofcause，orbemoreconvinced
ofthecorrectnessofthosewhichwenowmaintain。
Ofthefirstphilosophers，then，mostthoughttheprincipleswhich
wereofthenatureofmatterweretheonlyprinciplesofallthings。
Thatofwhichallthingsthatareconsist，thefirstfromwhichthey
cometobe，thelastintowhichtheyareresolved(thesubstance
remaining，butchanginginitsmodifications)，thistheysayisthe
elementandthistheprincipleofthings，andthereforetheythink
nothingiseithergeneratedordestroyed，sincethissortofentityis
alwaysconserved，aswesaySocratesneithercomestobeabsolutely
whenhecomestobebeautifulormusical，norceasestobewhen
losesthesecharacteristics，becausethesubstratum，Socrates
himselfremains。justsotheysaynothingelsecomestobeorceases
tobe；fortheremustbesomeentity-eitheroneormorethan
one-fromwhichallotherthingscometobe，itbeingconserved。
Yettheydonotallagreeastothenumberandthenatureofthese
principles。Thales，thefounderofthistypeofphilosophy，saysthe
principleiswater(forwhichreasonhedeclaredthattheearth
restsonwater)，gettingthenotionperhapsfromseeingthatthe
nutrimentofallthingsismoist，andthatheatitselfisgenerated
fromthemoistandkeptalivebyit(andthatfromwhichtheycome
tobeisaprincipleofallthings)。Hegothisnotionfromthisfact，
andfromthefactthattheseedsofallthingshaveamoistnature，
andthatwateristheoriginofthenatureofmoistthings。
