atalltoobtainadisinterestedcourt。Indeed，thecommitteethatconsidered
anenclosurewaschosenontheverycontraryprinciple。Thisweknow，not
fromtheevidenceofunkindandprejudicedoutsiders，butfromtheReport
oftheCommitteeoftheHouseofCommons，whichinquiredin1825intothe
constitutionofCommitteesonPrivateBills。’Underthepresentsystemeach
BilliscommittedtotheMemberwhoischargedwithitsmanagementandsuch
otherMembersashemaychoosetonameintheHouse，andtheMembersserving
foraparticularCounty(usuallytheCountyimmediatelyconnectedwiththe
objectoftheBill)andtheadjoiningCounties，andconsequentlyithasbeen
practicallyfoundthattheMemberstowhomBillshavebeencommittedhave
beengenerallythosewhohavebeenmostinterestedintheresult。’
Duringtheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiestheredevelopedthepractice
ofopeningthecommittees。ThiswasthesystemofapplyingtoPrivateBills
theprocedurefollowedinthecaseofPublicBills，andproposingaresolution
intheHouseofCommonsthat’allwhoattendshallhavevoices，’i。e。，that
anymemberoftheHousewhocaredtoattendthecommitteeshouldbeable
tovote。Wecanseehowthisarrangementacted。Itmighthappenthatsome
ofthecountymemberswerehostiletoaparticularenclosurescheme；inthat
casethepromoterscouldcallforanopencommitteeandmasstheirfriends
uponit。Itmighthappen，ontheotherhand，thatthecommitteewassolid
insupportinganenclosure，andthatsomepowerfulpersonintheHouseconsidered
thathisinterests，ortheinterestsofhisfriend，hadnotbeendulyconsulted
inthedivisionofthespoil。Insuchacasehewouldcallforallto’have
voices’andsocompelthepromoterstosatisfyhisclaims。Thissystemthen
securedsomesortofroughjusticeasbetweenthepowerfulinterestsrepresented
inParliament，butitleftthesmallproprietorsandthecottagers，whowere
unrepresentedinthismê；lé；e，absolutelyatthemercyofthese
conflictingforces。
Itisdifficult，forexample，toimaginethatacommitteeinwhichthe
smallmenwererepresentedwouldhavesanctionedtheamazingclauseinthe
AshelworthAct(7*)whichprovided’thatallfieldsorinclosurescontaining
thePropertyofTwoormorePersonswithinonefence，andalsoallinclosures
containingthepropertyofonePersononly，ifthesamebeheldbyorunder
differentTenuresorInterests，shallbeconsideredascommonablelandand
bedividedandallottedaccordingly。’Thisclause，takenwiththeclause
thatfollows，simplymeantthatsomebiglandownerhadhiseyeonsomeparticular
pieceofenclosedproperty，whichintheordinarywaywouldnothavegone
intothemelting-potatall。ThearrangementsoftheWakefieldActwould
hardlyhavesavedthescrutinyofacommitteeonwhichtheDukeofLeeds’
classwasnotparamount。UnderthatAct(8*)thedukewastohavefullpower
toworkminesandgetminerals，andthoseproprietorswhosepremisessuffered
inconsequenceweretohavereasonablesatisfaction，notfromthedukewho
wasenrichedbythedisturbingcause，butfromalltheallottees，including
presumablythosewhosepropertywasdamaged。Further，tosavehimselfinconvenience，
thedukecouldforbidallotteesonWestgateMoortobuildahouseforsixty
years。AdifferentkindofHouseofCommonswouldhavelookedcloselyat
theActatMoretonCorbetwhichgavetheLordofthemanorallenclosures
andencroachmentsmorethantwentyyearsold，andalsoatthenotuncommon
provisionwhichexemptedthetithe-ownerfrompayingforhisownfencing。
TheReportofthe1825Committeedescribesthesystemas’invitingall
theinterestedpartiesintheSousetotakepartinthebusinessofthecommittee，
whichnecessarilyterminatesintheprevalenceofthestrongestpart，for
theywhohavenointerestoftheirowntoservewillnotbeprevailedupon
totakepartinastruggleinwhichtheirunbiassedjudgmentcanhaveno
effect。’Thechairmanofthecommitteewasgenerallythememberwhohadmoved
tointroducetheBill。TheunreformedParliamentoflandownersthatpassed
theexcellentActof1782，forbiddingMembersofParliamenttohaveaninterest
inGovernmentcontracts，neverthoughtuntiltheeveoftheReformBillthat
therewasanythingremarkableinthishabitofreferringEnclosureBills
tothejudgmentoftheverylandownerswhoweretoprofitbythem。Andin
1825itwasnottheEncLosureBills，inwhich。therichtookandthepoor
suffered，buttheRailwayBills，inwhichrichmenwerepittedagainstrich
men，thatdrewtheattentionoftheHouseofCommonstothedisadvantages
andrisksofthisprocedure。
ThecommitteesocomposedsetstoworkontheBill，andmeanwhile，perhaps，
someofthepersonsaffectedbytheenclosuresendpetitionsagainstitto
theSouseofCommons。Difficultiesoftimeandspacewouldasaruledeter
allbuttherichdissentients，unlesstheenclosurewasnearLondon。These
petitionsaredifferentlytreatedaccordingtotheirorigin。Iftheyemanate
fromalordofthemanor，orfromatithe-owner，whoforsomereasonorother
isdissatisfiedwiththecontemplatedarrangements，theyreceivesomeattention。
InsuchacasethepetitionerprobablyhassomefriendinParliament，and
hispointofviewisunderstood。Hecan，ifnecessary，getthisfriendto
attendthecommitteeandintroduceamendments。Heisthereforeaforceto
bereckonedwith；theBillisperhapsalteredtosuithim；thepetitionis
atanyratereferredtothecommittee。Ontheotherhand，ifthepetition
comesfromcottagersorsmallproprietors，itissafe，asarule，toneglect
it。
TheenclosurehistoriessetoutintheAppendixsupplysomegoodexamples
ofthisdifferentialtreatment。LordStraffordsendsapetitionagainstthe
BillforenclosingWakefieldwiththeresultthatheisallowedtoappoint
acommissioner，andalsothathisdisputewiththedukeofLeedsisexempted
fromthejurisdictionoftheEnclosureCommissioners。Ontheotherhand，
theunfortunatepersonswhopetitionagainstthemonstrousprovisionthat
forbadethemtoerectanybuildingfortwenty，fortyorsixtyyears，get
nokindofredress。InthecaseofCroydon，JamesTrecothick，Esq。，whois
dissatisfiedwiththeBill，isstrongenoughtodemandspecialconsideration。
Accordinglyaspecialprovisionismadethatthecommissionersareobliged
tosellMr。Trecothick，byprivatecontract，partofAddingtonHills，if
hesowishes。Butwhenthevariousfreeholders，copyholders，leaseholders
andinhabitanthouseholdersofCroydon，whocomplainthatthepromotersof
theBillhavenamedcommissionerswithoutconsultingthepersonsinterested，
askleavetonominateathirdcommissioner，onlyfourmembersoftheHouse
ofCommonssupportLordWilliamRussell’sproposaltoconsiderthispetition，
andfifty-onevotetheotherway。Anotherexampleofthespiritinwhich
Parliamentreceivedpetitionsfromunimportantpersonsisfurnishedbythe
caseoftheenclosureofHolyIsland。In1791(Feb。23)(9*)apetitionwas
presentedtoParliamentfortheenclosureofHolyIsland，askingforthe
divisionofastintedpasture，andtheextinctionoftherightsofcommon
or’eatage’overcertaininfieldlands。Leavewasgiven，andtheBillwas
preparedandreadafirsttimeon28thFebruary。ThesamedayParliament
receivedapetitionfromfreeholdersandstallingers，whoasktobeheard
bythemselvesorbycounselagainsttheBill。FromEden(10*)welearnthat
therewere26freeholdersand31stallingers，andthatthelatterwerein
thestrictsenseofthetermasmuchfreeholdersastheformer。Whilst，however，
afreeholderhadtherighttoput30sheep，4blackcattleand3horseson
thestintedcommon，astallingerhadarightofcommonforonehorseand
onecowonly。TheHouseorderedthatthispetitionshouldlieonthetable
tillthesecondreading，andthatthepetitionersshouldthenbeheard。The
secondreading，whichhadbeenfixedfor2ndApril，wasdeferredtill20th
April，achangewhichprobablyputthepetitionerstoconsiderableexpense。
On20thApriltheBillwasreadasecondtime，andtheHousewasinformed
thatCounselattended，andamotionwasmadethatCounselbenowcalledin。
Butthemotionwasopposed，andonadivisionwasdefeatedby47votesto
12。TheBillpassedtheHouseofCommonson10thMay，andreceivedtheRoyal
Assenton9thJune。(11*)InthiscasetheHouseofCommonsbrokefaithwith
thepetitioners，andrefusedthehearingithadpromised。Suchexperience
wasnotlikelytoencouragedissentientstowastetheirmoneyonanappeal
toParliamentagainstaBillthatwaspromotedbypowerfulpoliticians。It
willbeobservedthatinmanycasesthepetitionersdidnotthinkthatit
wasworththetroubleandexpensetobeheardonSecondReading。
TheReportoftheCommitteefollowedastereotypedformula：’Thatthe
StandingOrdershadbeencompliedwith：andthattheCommitteehadexamined
theAllegationsoftheBillandfoundthesametobetrue；andthattheParties
concernedhadgiventheirConsenttotheBill，totheSatisfactionofthe
Committee，except……’
Nowwhatdidthismean？Whatconsentswerenecessarytosatisfythecommittee？
TheParliamentaryCommitteethatreportedonthecostofenclosuresin1800(12*)
saidthattherewasnofixedrule，thatinsomecasestheconsentofthree-fourths
wasrequired，inotherstheconsentoffour-fifths。Thisproportionhasa
lookoffairnessuntilwediscoverthatwearedealinginterms，notofpersons，
butofproperty，andthatthesuffrageswerenotcountedbutweighed。The
methodbywhichtheproportionswerereckonedvaried，asaglanceatthe
casesdescribedintheAppendixwillshow。Valueiscalculatedsometimes
inacres，sometimesinannualvalue，sometimesinassessmenttotheland
tax，sometimesinassessmenttothepoorrate。Itisimportanttoremember
thatitwasthepropertyinterestedthatcounted，andthatinacasewhere
therewascommonorwastetobedividedaswellasopenfields，onelarge
proprietor，whoownedaconsiderablepropertyinoldenclosures，couldswamp
theentirecommunityofsmallerproprietorsandcottagers。IfSquireWestern
ownedanenclosedestatewithparks，gardensandfarmsof800acres，and
therestoftheparishconsistedofacommonorwasteof1000acresandopen
fieldsof200acres，andthevillagepopulationconsistedof100cottagers
andsmallfarmers，eachwithastripoflandinthecommonfields，anda
rightofcommononthewaste，SquireWesternwouldhaveafour-fifthsmajority
indeterminingwhethertheopenfieldsandthewasteshouldbeenclosedor
not，andthewholematterwouldbeinhishands。Thisisanextremeexample
ofthewayinwhichthesystemworked。ThecaseofAshelworthshowsthat
acommonmightbecutup，onthevotesofpersonsholdingenclosedproperty，
againstthewishesofthegreatmajorityofthecommoners。AtLalehamthe
petitionersagainsttheBillclaimedthattheywere’agreatmajorityof
therealOwnersandProprietorsoforPersonsinterestedin，theLandsand
Groundsintendedtobeenclosed。’AtSimpson，wherecommonfieldswereto
beenclosed，theMajorPartoftheOwnersandProprietorspetitionedagainst
theBill，statingthattheywere’verywellsatisfiedwiththeSituation
andConvenienceoftheirrespectiveLandsandPropertiesintheirpresent
uninclosedState。’(13*)
Evenamajorityofthree-fourthsinvaluewasnotalwaysrequired；for
example，theReportoftheCommitteeontheenclosureofCartmelinLancashire
in1796gaveparticularsshowingthatthewholepropertybelongingtopersons
interestedintheenclosurewasassessedat£；150，andthattheproperty
ofthoseactuallyconsentingtotheenclosurewasjustunder£；110。(14*)
Yettheenclosurewasrecommendedandcarried。Anotherillustrationissupplied
bytheReportoftheCommitteeontheenclosureofHistonandImpingtonin
1801，wherethepartiesconcernedarereportedtohaveconsentedexceptthe
proprietorsof1020acres，outofatotalacreageof3680。(15*)Inthiscase
theBillwasrecommitted，andonitsnextappearancethecommitteegavethe
consentsintermsofassessmenttotheLandTaxinstead，puttingthetotal
figureat£；304，andtheassessmentoftheconsentingpartiesat£；188。
ThisseemstohavesatisfiedtheHouseofCommons。(16*)Further，theparticulars
giveninthecaseoftheenclosureofBishopstoneinWilts(enclosedin1809)
showthatthevotesofcopyholderswereheavilydiscounted。Inthiscase
thecopyholderswhodissentedheld1079acres，thecopyholderswhowereneuter
81acres，andthetotalareatobedividedwas2602acres。Butbysomeingenious
actuarialcalculationofthereversionaryinterestofthelordofthemanor
andtheinterestofthetithe-owner，the1079acresheldbycopyholdersare
writtendownto474acres。(17*)InthecasesofSimpsonandLouth，asreaders
whoconsulttheproceedingswillsee，thecommitteesweresatisfiedwith
majoritiesjustabovethree-fifthsinvalue。AtRaunds，where4963acres
were’interested，’theownersof570arestatedtobeagainst，andof721
neuter。(18*)Aninterestingillustrationofthelaxpracticeofthecommittees
isprovidedinthehistoryofanattemptedenclosureatQuainton
Inanycasethesignatureswereadoubtfulevidenceofconsent。’Itiseasy，’
wroteanacuteobserver，’forthelargeproprietorstoovercomeopposition。
Coaxing，bribing，threatening，togetherwithmanyotheractswhichsuperiors
willmakeuse，ofteninducetheinferiorstoconsenttothingswhichthey
thinkwillbetotheirfuturedisadvantage。(20*)Wehearechoesofsuchproceedings
