ChapterXVII
OfReason1。Varioussignificationsoftheword\"reason\"。ThewordreasonintheEnglishlanguagehasdifferentsignifications:sometimesitistakenfortrueandclearprinciples:sometimesforclearandfairdeductionsfromthoseprinciples:andsometimesforthecause，andparticularlythefinalcause。ButtheconsiderationIshallhaveofithereisinasignificationdifferentfromallthese；andthatis，asitstandsforafacultyinman，thatfacultywherebymanissupposedtobedistinguishedfrombeasts，andwhereinitisevidenthemuchsurpassesthem。
2。Whereinreasoningconsists。Ifgeneralknowledge，ashasbeenshown，consistsinaperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourownideas，andtheknowledgeoftheexistenceofallthingswithoutus(exceptonlyofaGod，whoseexistenceeverymanmaycertainlyknowanddemonstratetohimselffromhisownexistence)，behadonlybyoursenses，whatroomistherefortheexerciseofanyotherfaculty，butoutwardsenseandinwardperception？Whatneeditthereofreason？Verymuch:bothfortheenlargementofourknowledge，andregulatingourassent。Forithathtodobothinknowledgeandopinion，andisnecessaryandassistingtoallourotherintellectualfaculties，andindeedcontainstwoofthem，viz。sagacityandillation。Bytheone，itfindsout；andbytheother，itsoorderstheintermediateideasastodiscoverwhatconnexionthereisineachlinkofthechain，wherebytheextremesareheldtogether；andthereby，asitwere，todrawintoviewthetruthsoughtfor，whichisthatwhichwecallillationorinference，andconsistsinnothingbuttheperceptionoftheconnexionthereisbetweentheideas，ineachstepofthededuction；wherebythemindcomestosee，eitherthecertainagreementordisagreementofanytwoideas，asindemonstration，inwhichitarrivesatknowledge；ortheirprobableconnexion，onwhichitgivesorwithholdsitsassent，asinopinion。
Senseandintuitionreachbutaverylittleway。Thegreatestpartofourknowledgedependsupondeductionsandintermediateideas:andinthosecaseswherewearefaintosubstituteassentinsteadofknowledge，andtakepropositionsfortrue，withoutbeingcertaintheyareso，wehaveneedtofindout，examine，andcomparethegroundsoftheirprobability。Inboththesecases，thefacultywhichfindsoutthemeans，andrightlyappliesthem，todiscovercertaintyintheone，andprobabilityintheother，isthatwhichwecallreason。For，asreasonperceivesthenecessaryandindubitableconnexionofalltheideasorproofsonetoanother，ineachstepofanydemonstrationthatproducesknowledge；soitlikewiseperceivestheprobableconnexionofalltheideasorproofsonetoanother，ineverystepofadiscourse，towhichitwillthinkassentdue。Thisisthelowestdegreeofthatwhichcanbetrulycalledreason。Forwheretheminddoesnotperceivethisprobableconnexion，whereitdoesnotdiscernwhethertherebeanysuchconnexionorno；theremen’sopinionsarenottheproductofjudgment，ortheconsequenceofreason，buttheeffectsofchanceandhazard，ofamindfloatingatalladventures，withoutchoiceandwithoutdirection。
3。Reasoninitsfourdegrees。Sothatwemayinreasonconsiderthesedegrees:fourthefirstandhighestisthediscoveringandfindingoutoftruths；thesecond，theregularandmethodicaldispositionofthem，andlayingtheminaclearandfitorder，tomaketheirconnexionandforcebeplainlyandeasilyperceived；thethirdistheperceivingtheirconnexion；andthefourth，amakingarightconclusion。Theseseveraldegreesmaybeobservedinanymathematicaldemonstration；itbeingonethingtoperceivetheconnexionofeachpart，asthedemonstrationismadebyanother；
anothertoperceivethedependenceoftheconclusiononalltheparts；
athird，tomakeoutademonstrationclearlyandneatlyone’sself；
andsomethingdifferentfromallthese，tohavefirstfoundouttheseintermediateideasorproofsbywhichitismade。
4。Whethersyllogismisthegreatinstrumentofreason:firstcausetodoubtthis。ThereisonethingmorewhichIshalldesiretobeconsideredconcerningreason；andthatis，whethersyllogism，asisgenerallythought，betheproperinstrumentofit，andtheusefullestwayofexercisingthisfaculty。ThecausesIhavetodoubtarethese:-
First，Becausesyllogismservesourreasonbutinoneonlyoftheforementionedpartsofit；andthatis，toshowtheconnexionoftheproofsinanyoneinstance，andnomore；butinthisitisofnogreatuse，sincethemindcanperceivesuchconnexion，whereitreallyis，aseasily，nay，perhapsbetter，withoutit。
Mencanreasonwellwhocannotmakeasyllogism。Ifwewillobservetheactingsofourownminds，weshallfindthatwereasonbestandclearest，whenweonlyobservetheconnexionoftheproof，withoutreducingourthoughtstoanyruleofsyllogism。Andthereforewemaytakenotice，thattherearemanymenthatreasonexceedingclearandrightly，whoknownothowtomakeasyllogism。
HethatwilllookintomanypartsofAsiaandAmerica，willfindmenreasonthereperhapsasacutelyashimself，whoyetneverheardofasyllogism，norcanreduceanyoneargumenttothoseforms:andI
believescarceanyonemakessyllogismsinreasoningwithinhimself。
Indeedsyllogismismadeuseof，onoccasion，todiscoverafallacyhidinarhetoricalflourish，orcunninglywraptupinasmoothperiod；and，strippinganabsurdityofthecoverofwitandgoodlanguage，showitinitsnakeddeformity。Buttheweaknessorfallacyofsuchaloosediscourseitshows，bytheartificialformitisputinto，onlytothosewhohavethoroughlystudiedmodeandfigure，andhavesoexaminedthemanywaysthatthreepropositionsmaybeputtogether，astoknowwhichofthemdoescertainlyconcluderight，andwhichnot，anduponwhatgroundsitisthattheydoso。Allwhohavesofarconsideredsyllogism，astoseethereasonwhyinthreepropositionslaidtogetherinoneform，theconclusionwillbecertainlyright，butinanothernotcertainlyso，Igrantarecertainoftheconclusiontheydrawfromthepremisesintheallowedmodesandfigures。Buttheywhohavenotsofarlookedintothoseforms，arenotsurebyvirtueofsyllogism，thattheconclusioncertainlyfollowsfromthepremises；theyonlytakeittobesobyanimplicitfaithintheirteachersandaconfidenceinthoseformsofargumentation；butthisisstillbutbelieving，notbeingcertain。
Now，if，ofallmankindthosewhocanmakesyllogismsareextremelyfewincomparisonofthosewhocannot；andif，ofthosefewwhohavebeentaughtlogic，thereisbutaverysmallnumberwhodoanymorethanbelievethatsyllogisms，intheallowedmodesandfiguresdoconcluderight，withoutknowingcertainlythattheydoso:ifsyllogismsmustbetakenfortheonlyproperinstrumentofreasonandmeansofknowledge，itwillfollow，that，beforeAristotle，therewasnotonemanthatdidorcouldknowanythingbyreason；andthat，sincetheinventionofsyllogisms，thereisnotoneoftenthousandthatdoth。
Aristotle。ButGodhasnotbeensosparingtomentomakethembarelytwo-leggedcreatures，andleftittoAristotletomakethemrational，i。e。thosefewofthemthathecouldgetsotoexaminethegroundsofsyllogisms，astoseethat，inabovethreescorewaysthatthreepropositionsmaybelaidtogether，therearebutaboutfourteenwhereinonemaybesurethattheconclusionisright；anduponwhatgroundsitis，that，inthesefew，theconclusioniscertain，andintheothernot。Godhasbeenmorebountifultomankindthanso。Hehasgiventhemamindthatcanreason，withoutbeinginstructedinmethodsofsyllogizing:theunderstandingisnottaughttoreasonbytheserules；ithasanativefacultytoperceivethecoherenceorincoherenceofitsideas，andcanrangethemright，withoutanysuchperplexingrepetitions。IsaynotthisanywaytolessenAristotle，whomIlookonasoneofthegreatestmenamongsttheancients；whoselargeviews，acuteness，andpenetrationofthoughtandstrengthofjudgment，fewhaveequalled；andwho，inthisveryinventionofformsofargumentation，whereintheconclusionmaybeshowntoberightlyinferred，didgreatserviceagainstthosewhowerenotashamedtodenyanything。AndIreadilyown，thatallrightreasoningmaybereducedtohisformsofsyllogism。ButyetIthink，withoutanydiminutiontohim，Imaytrulysay，thattheyarenottheonlynorthebestwayofreasoning，fortheleadingofthoseintotruthwhoarewillingtofindit，anddesiretomakethebestusetheymayoftheirreason，fortheattainmentofknowledge。Andhehimself，itisplain，foundoutsomeformstobeconclusive，andothersnot，notbytheformsthemselves，butbytheoriginalwayofknowledge，i。e。bythevisibleagreementofideas。Tellacountrygentlewomanthatthewindissouth-west，andtheweatherlowering，andliketorain，andshewilleasilyunderstanditisnotsafeforhertogoabroadthincladinsuchaday，afterafever:sheclearlyseestheprobableconnexionofallthese，viz。south-westwind，andclouds，rain，wetting，takingcold，relapse，anddangerofdeath，withouttyingthemtogetherinthoseartificialandcumbersomefettersofseveralsyllogisms，thatclogandhinderthemind，whichproceedsfromoneparttoanotherquickerandclearerwithoutthem:andtheprobabilitywhichsheeasilyperceivesinthingsthusintheirnativestatewouldbequitelost，ifthisargumentweremanagedlearnedly，andproposedinmodeandfigure。Foritveryoftenconfoundstheconnexion；and，Ithink，everyonewillperceiveinmathematicaldemonstrations，thattheknowledgegainedtherebycomesshortestandclearestwithoutsyllogism。
Inferenceislookedonasthegreatactoftherationalfaculty，andsoitiswhenitisrightlymade:butthemind，eitherverydesiroustoenlargeitsknowledge，orveryapttofavourthesentimentsithasonceimbibed，isveryforwardtomakeinferences；andthereforeoftenmakestoomuchhaste，beforeitperceivestheconnexionoftheideasthatmustholdtheextremestogether。
Syllogismdoesnotdiscoverideas，ortheirconnexions。Toinfer，isnothingbutbyvirtueofonepropositionlaiddownastrue，todrawinanotherastrue，i。e。toseeorsupposesuchaconnexionofthetwoideasoftheinferredproposition。V。g。Letthisbethepropositionlaiddown，\"Menshallbepunishedinanotherworld，\"andfromthencebeinferredthisother，\"Thenmencandeterminethemselves。\"Thequestionnowis，toknowwhetherthemindhasmadethisinferencerightorno:ifithasmadeitbyfindingouttheintermediateideas，andtakingaviewoftheconnexionofthem，placedinadueorder，ithasproceededrationally，andmadearightinference:ifithasdoneitwithoutsuchaview，ithasnotsomuchmadeaninferencethatwillhold，oraninferenceofrightreason，asshownawillingnesstohaveitbe，orbetakenforsuch。Butinneithercaseisitsyllogismthatdiscoveredthoseideas，orshowedtheconnexionofthem；fortheymustbebothfoundout，andtheconnexioneverywhereperceived，beforetheycanrationallybemadeuseofinsyllogism:
unlessitcanbesaid，thatanyidea，withoutconsideringwhatconnexionithathwiththetwoother，whoseagreementshouldbeshownbyit，willdowellenoughinasyllogism，andmaybetakenataventureforthemediusterminus，toproveanyconclusion。Butthisnobodywillsay；becauseitisbyvirtueoftheperceivedagreementoftheintermediateideawiththeextremes，thattheextremesareconcludedtoagree；andthereforeeachintermediateideamustbesuchasinthewholechainhathavisibleconnexionwiththosetwoithasbeenplacedbetween，orelsetherebytheconclusioncannotbeinferredordrawnin:forwhereveranylinkofthechainislooseandwithoutconnexion，therethewholestrengthofitislost，andithathnoforcetoinferordrawinanything。Intheinstanceabovementioned，whatisitshowstheforceoftheinference，andconsequentlythereasonablenessofit，butaviewoftheconnexionofalltheintermediateideasthatdrawintheconclusion，orpropositioninferred？V。g。\"Menshallbepunished\"；\"Godthepunisher\"；\"Justpunishment\"；\"Thepunishedguilty\"；\"Couldhavedoneotherwise\"；\"Freedom\"；\"Self-determination\"；bywhichchainofideasthusvisiblylinkedtogetherintrain，i。e。eachintermediateideaagreeingoneachsidewiththosetwoitisimmediatelyplacedbetween，theideasofmenandself-determinationappeartobeconnected，i。e。thisproposition\"mencandeterminethemselves\"isdrawninorinferredfromthis，\"thattheyshallbepunishedintheotherworld。\"Forherethemind，seeingtheconnexionthereisbetweentheideaofmen’spunishmentintheotherworldandtheideaofGodpunishing；betweenGodpunishingandthejusticeofthepunishment；
betweenjusticeofpunishmentandguilt；betweenguiltandapowertodootherwise；betweenapowertodootherwiseandfreedom；andbetweenfreedomandself-determination，seestheconnexionbetweenmenandself-determination。
Theconnexionmustbediscoveredbeforeitcanbeputintosyllogisms。NowIask，whethertheconnexionoftheextremesbenotmoreclearlyseeninthissimpleandnaturaldisposition，thanintheperplexedrepetitions，andjumbleoffiveorsixsyllogisms。I
mustbegpardonforcallingitjumble，tillsomebodyshallputtheseideasintosomanysyllogisms，andthensaythattheyarelessjumbled，andtheirconnexionmorevisible，whentheyaretransposedandrepeated，andspunouttoagreaterlengthinartificialforms，thaninthatshortandnaturalplainordertheyarelaiddowninhere，whereineveryonemayseeit，andwhereintheymustbeseenbeforetheycanbeputintoatrainofsyllogisms。Forthenaturalorderoftheconnectingideasmustdirecttheorderofthesyllogisms，andamanmustseetheconnexionofeachintermediateideawiththosethatitconnects，beforehecanwithreasonmakeuseofitinasyllogism。Andwhenallthosesyllogismsaremade，neitherthosethatarenorthosethatarenotlogicianswillseetheforceoftheargumentation，i。e。，theconnexionoftheextremes，onejotthebetter。[Forthosethatarenotmenofart，notknowingthetrueformsofsyllogism，northereasonsofthem，cannotknowwhethertheyaremadeinrightandconclusivemodesandfiguresorno，andsoarenotatallhelpedbytheformstheyareputinto；thoughbythemthenaturalorder，whereinthemindcouldjudgeoftheirrespectiveconnexion，beingdisturbed，renderstheillationmuchmoreuncertainthanwithoutthem。]Andasforthelogiciansthemselves，theyseetheconnexionofeachintermediateideawiththoseitstandsbetween，(onwhichtheforceoftheinferencedepends，)aswellbeforeasafterthesyllogismismade，orelsetheydonotseeitatall。Forasyllogismneithershowsnorstrengthenstheconnexionofanytwoideasimmediatelyputtogether，butonlybytheconnexionseeninthemshowswhatconnexiontheextremeshaveonewithanother。Butwhatconnexiontheintermediatehaswitheitheroftheextremesinthesyllogism，thatnosyllogismdoesorcanshow。Thatthemindonlydothorcanperceiveastheystandthereinthatjuxta-positionbyitsownview，towhichthesyllogisticalformithappenstobeingivesnohelporlightatall:itonlyshowsthatiftheintermediateideaagreeswiththoseitisonbothsidesimmediatelyappliedto；thenthosetworemoteones，or，astheyarecalled，extremes，docertainlyagree；andthereforetheimmediateconnexionofeachideatothatwhichitisappliedtooneachside，onwhichtheforceofthereasoningdepends，isaswellseenbeforeasafterthesyllogismismade，orelsehethatmakesthesyllogismcouldneverseeitatall。
This，ashasbeenalreadyobserved，isseenonlybytheeye，ortheperceptivefaculty，ofthemind，takingaviewofthemlaidtogether，inajuxta-position；whichviewofanytwoithasequally，whenevertheyarelaidtogetherinanyproposition，whetherthatpropositionbeplacedasamajororaminor，inasyllogismorno。
Useofsyllogism。Ofwhatuse，thenaresyllogisms？Ianswer，theirchiefandmainuseisintheSchools，wheremenareallowedwithoutshametodenytheagreementofideasthatdomanifestlyagree；
oroutoftheSchools，tothosewhofromthencehavelearnedwithoutshametodenytheconnexionofideas，whicheventothemselvesisvisible。Buttoaningenuoussearcheraftertruth，whohasnootheraimbuttofindit，thereisnoneedofanysuchformtoforcetheallowingoftheinference:thetruthandreasonablenessofitisbetterseeninrangingoftheideasinasimpleandplainorder:andhenceitisthatmen，intheirowninquiriesaftertruth，neverusesyllogismstoconvincethemselvesorinteachingotherstoinstructwillinglearners。Because，beforetheycanputthemintoasyllogism，theymustseetheconnexionthatisbetweentheintermediateideaandthetwootherideasitissetbetweenandappliedto，toshowtheiragreement；andwhentheyseethat，theyseewhethertheinferencebegoodorno；andsosyllogismcomestoolatetosettleit。Fortomakeuseagainoftheformerinstance，Iaskwhetherthemind，consideringtheideaofjustice，placedasanintermediateideabetweenthepunishmentofmenandtheguiltofthepunished，(andtillitdoessoconsiderit，themindcannotmakeuseofitasamediusterminus，)doesnotasplainlyseetheforceandstrengthoftheinferenceaswhenitisformedintoasyllogism。Toshowitinaveryplainandeasyexample；letanimalbetheintermediateideaormediusterminusthatthemindmakesuseoftoshowtheconnexionofhomoandvivens；Iaskwhethertheminddoesnotmorereadilyandplainlyseethatconnexioninthesimpleandproperpositionoftheconnectingideainthemiddlethus:
Homo-Animal-Vivens，thaninthisperplexedone，Animal-Vivens-Homo-Animal:
whichisthepositiontheseideashaveinasyllogism，toshowtheconnexionbetweenhomoandvivensbytheinterventionofanimal。
Nottheonlywaytodetectfallacies。Indeedsyllogismisthoughttobeofnecessaryuse，eventotheloversoftruth，toshowthemthefallaciesthatareoftenconcealedinflorid，witty，orinvolveddiscourses。Butthatthisisamistakewillappear，ifweconsider，thatthereasonwhysometimesmenwhosincerelyaimattruthareimposeduponbysuchloose，and，astheyarecalled，rhetoricaldiscourses，is，thattheirfanciesbeingstruckwithsomelivelymetaphoricalrepresentations，theyneglecttoobserve，ordonoteasilyperceive，whatarethetrueideasuponwhichtheinferencedepends。Now，toshowsuchmentheweaknessofsuchanargumentation，thereneedsnomorebuttostripifofthesuperfluousideas，which，blendedandconfoundedwiththoseonwhichtheinferencedepends，seemtoshowaconnexionwherethereisnone；
oratleasttohinderthediscoveryofthewantofit；andthentolaythenakedideasonwhichtheforceoftheargumentationdependsintheirdueorder；inwhichpositionthemind，takingaviewofthem，seeswhatconnexiontheyhave，andsoisabletojudgeoftheinferencewithoutanyneedofasyllogismatall。
Igrantthatmodeandfigureiscommonlymadeuseofinsuchcases，asifthedetectionoftheincoherenceofsuchloosediscourseswerewhollyowingtothesyllogisticalform；andsoImyselfformerlythought，till，uponastricterexamination，Inowfind，thatlayingtheintermediateideasnakedintheirdueorder，showstheincoherenceoftheargumentationbetterthansyllogism；notonlyassubjectingeachlinkofthechaintotheimmediateviewofthemindinitsproperplace，wherebyitsconnexionisbestobserved；butalsobecausesyllogismshowstheincoherenceonlytothose(whoarenotoneoftenthousand)whoperfectlyunderstandmodeandfigure，andthereasonuponwhichthoseformsareestablished；whereasadueandorderlyplacingoftheideasuponwhichtheinferenceismade，makeseveryone，whetherlogicianornotlogician，whounderstandstheterms，andhaththefacultytoperceivetheagreementordisagreementofsuchideas，(withoutwhich，inoroutofsyllogism，hecannotperceivethestrengthorweakness，coherenceorincoherenceofthediscourse)seethewantofconnexionintheargumentation，andtheabsurdityoftheinference。
AndthusIhaveknownamanunskilfulinsyllogism，whoatfirsthearingcouldperceivetheweaknessandinconclusivenessofalongartificialandplausiblediscourse，wherewithothersbetterskilledinsyllogismhavebeenmisled:andIbelievetherearefewofmyreaderswhodonotknowsuch。Andindeed，ifitwerenotso，thedebatesofmostprinces’councils，andthebusinessofassemblies，wouldbeindangertobemismanaged，sincethosewhoarereliedupon，andhaveusuallyagreatstrokeinthem，arenotalwayssuchwhohavethegoodlucktobeperfectlyknowingintheformsofsyllogism，orexpertinmodeandfigure。Andifsyllogismweretheonly，orsomuchasthesurestwaytodetectthefallaciesofartificialdiscourses；Idonotthinkthatallmankind，evenprincesinmattersthatconcerntheircrownsanddignities，aresomuchinlovewithfalsehoodandmistake，thattheywouldeverywherehaveneglectedtobringsyllogismintothedebatesofmoment；orthoughtitridiculoussomuchastooffertheminaffairsofconsequence；aplainevidencetome，thatmenofpartsandpenetration，whowerenotidlytodisputeattheirease，butweretoactaccordingtotheresultoftheirdebates，andoftenpayfortheirmistakeswiththeirheadsorfortunes，foundthosescholasticformswereoflittleusetodiscovertruthorfallacy，whilstboththeoneandtheothermightbeshown，andbettershownwithoutthem，tothosewhowouldnotrefusetoseewhatwasvisiblyshownthem。
Anothercausetodoubtwhethersyllogismbetheonlyproperinstrumentofreason，inthediscoveryoftruth。Secondly，Anotherreasonthatmakesmedoubtwhethersyllogismbetheonlyproperinstrumentofreason，inthediscoveryoftruth，is，thatofwhateverusemodeandfigureispretendedtobeinthelayingopenoffallacy，(whichhasbeenaboveconsidered，)thosescholasticformsofdiscoursearenotlessliabletofallaciesthantheplainerwaysofargumentation；andforthisIappealtocommonobservation，whichhasalwaysfoundtheseartificialmethodsofreasoningmoreadaptedtocatchandentanglethemind，thantoinstructandinformtheunderstanding。Andhenceitisthatmen，evenwhentheyarebaffledandsilencedinthisscholasticway，areseldomorneverconvinced，andsobroughtovertotheconqueringside:theyperhapsacknowledgetheiradversarytobethemoreskilfuldisputant，butrestneverthelesspersuadedofthetruthontheirside，andgoaway，worstedastheyare，withthesameopiniontheybroughtwiththem:
whichtheycouldnotdoifthiswayofargumentationcarriedlightandconvictionwithit，andmademenseewherethetruthlay；andthereforesyllogismhasbeenthoughtmoreproperfortheattainingvictoryindispute，thanforthediscoveryorconfirmationoftruthinfairinquiries。Andifitbecertain，thatfallaciescanbecouchedinsyllogism，asitcannotbedenied；itmustbesomethingelse，andnotsyllogism，thatmustdiscoverthem。
Ihavehadexperiencehowreadysomemenare，whenalltheusewhichtheyhavebeenwonttoascribetoanythingisnotallowed，tocryout，thatIamforlayingitwhollyaside。Buttopreventsuchunjustandgroundlessimputations，Itellthem，thatIamnotfortakingawayanyhelpstotheunderstandingintheattainmentofknowledge。Andifmenskilledinandusedtosyllogisms，findthemassistingtotheirreasoninthediscoveryoftruth，Ithinktheyoughttomakeuseofthem。AllthatIaimat，is，thattheyshouldnotascribemoretotheseformsthanbelongstothem，andthinkthatmenhavenouse，ornotsofullanuse，oftheirreasoningfacultieswithoutthem。Someeyeswantspectaclestoseethingsclearlyanddistinctly；butletnotthosethatusethemthereforesaynobodycanseeclearlywithoutthem:
thosewhodosowillbethought，infavourofart(which，perhaps，theyarebeholdento，)alittletoomuchtodepressanddiscreditnature。Reason，byitsownpenetration，whereitisstrongandexercised，usuallyseesquickerandclearerwithoutsyllogism。Ifuseofthosespectacleshassodimmeditssight，thatitcannotwithoutthemseeconsequencesorinconsequencesinargumentation，Iamnotsounreasonableastobeagainsttheusingthem。Everyoneknowswhatbestfitshisownsight；butlethimnotthenceconcludeallinthedark，whousenotjustthesamehelpsthathefindsaneedof。
5。Syllogismhelpslittleindemonstration，lessinprobability。Buthoweveritbeinknowledge，IthinkImaytrulysay，itisoffarless，ornouseatallinprobabilities。Fortheassenttherebeingtobedeterminedbythepreponderancy，afterdueweighingofalltheproofs，withallcircumstancesonbothsides，nothingissounfittoassistthemindinthatassyllogism；whichrunningawaywithoneassumedprobability，oronetopicalargument，pursuesthattillithasledthemindquiteoutofsightofthethingunderconsideration；and，forcingituponsomeremotedifficulty，holdsitfastthere；entangledperhaps，and，asitwere，manacled，inthechainofsyllogisms，withoutallowingittheliberty，muchlessaffordingitthehelps，requisitetoshowonwhichside，allthingsconsidered，isthegreaterprobability。
6。Servesnottoincreaseourknowledge，buttofencewiththeknowledgewesupposewehave。Butletithelpus(asperhapsmaybesaid)inconvincingmenoftheirerrorsandmistakes:(andyetIwouldfainseethemanthatwasforcedoutofhisopinionbydintofsyllogism，)yetstillitfailsourreasoninthatpart，which，ifnotitshighestperfection，isyetcertainlyitshardesttask，andthatwhichwemostneeditshelpin；andthatisthefindingoutofproofs，andmakingnewdiscoveries。Therulesofsyllogismservenottofurnishthemindwiththoseintermediateideasthatmayshowtheconnexionofremoteones。Thiswayofreasoningdiscoversnonewproofs，butistheartofmarshallingandrangingtheoldoneswehavealready。Theforty-seventhpropositionofthefirstbookofEuclidisverytrue；butthediscoveryofit，Ithink，notowingtoanyrulesofcommonlogic。Amanknowsfirst，andthenheisabletoprovesyllogistically。Sothatsyllogismcomesafterknowledge，andthenamanhaslittleornoneedofit。Butitischieflybythefindingoutthoseideasthatshowtheconnexionofdistantones，thatourstockofknowledgeisincreased，andthatusefulartsandsciencesareadvanced。Syllogism，atbest，isbuttheartoffencingwiththelittleknowledgewehave，withoutmakinganyadditiontoit。Andifamanshouldemployhisreasonallthisway，hewillnotdomuchotherwisethanhewho，havinggotsomeironoutofthebowelsoftheearth，shouldhaveitbeatenupallintoswords，andputitintohisservants’handstofencewithandbangoneanother。HadtheKingofSpainemployedthehandsofhispeople，andhisSpanishironso，hehadbroughttolightbutlittleofthattreasurethatlaysolonghidinthedarkentrailsofAmerica。AndIamapttothink，thathewhoshallemployalltheforceofhisreasononlyinbrandishingofsyllogisms，willdiscoververylittleofthatmassofknowledgewhichliesyetconcealedinthesecretrecessesofnature；andwhich，Iamapttothink，nativerusticreason(asitformerlyhasdone)islikeliertoopenawayto，andaddtothecommonstockofmankind，ratherthananyscholasticproceedingbythestrictrulesofmod，andfigure。
7。Otherhelpstoreasonthansyllogismshouldbesought。Idoubtnot，nevertheless，buttherearewaystobefoundtoassistourreasoninthismostusefulpart；andthisthejudiciousHookerencouragesmetosay，whoinhisEccl。Pol。1。i。SS6，speaksthus:\"Iftheremightbeaddedtherighthelpsoftrueartandlearning，(whichhelps，Imustplainlyconfess，thisageoftheworld，carryingthenameofalearnedage，dothneithermuchknownorgenerallyregard，)therewouldundoubtedlybealmostasmuchdifferenceinmaturityofjudgmentbetweenmentherewithinured，andthatwhichmennoware，asbetweenmenthatarenow，andinnocents。\"Idonotpretendtohavefoundordiscoveredhereanyofthose\"righthelpsofart，\"thisgreatmanofdeepthoughtmentions:butthatisplain，thatsyllogism，andthelogicnowinuse，whichwereaswellknowninhisdays，canbenoneofthosehemeans。Itissufficientforme，ifbyaDiscourse，perhapssomethingoutoftheway，Iamsure，astome，whollynewandunborrowed，Ishallhavegivenoccasiontootherstocastaboutfornewdiscoveries，andtoseekintheirownthoughtsforthoserighthelpsofart，whichwillscarcebefound，Ifear，bythosewhoservilelyconfinethemselvestotherulesanddictatesofothers。
Forbeatentracksleadthissortofcattle，(asanobservingRomancallsthem，)whosethoughtsreachonlytoimitation，Nonquoeundumest，sedquoitur。ButIcanbeboldtosay，thatthisageisadornedwithsomemenofthatstrengthofjudgmentandlargenessofcomprehension，that，iftheywouldemploytheirthoughtsonthissubject，couldopennewandundiscoveredwaystotheadvancementofknowledge。
8。Wecanreasonaboutparticulars；andtheimmediateobjectofallourreasoningsisnothingbutparticularideas。Havingherehadoccasiontospeakofsyllogismingeneral，andtheuseofitinreasoning，andtheimprovementofourknowledge，itisfit，beforeI
leavethissubject，totakenoticeofonemanifestmistakeintherulesofsyllogism:viz。thatnosyllogisticalreasoningcanberightandconclusive，butwhathasatleastonegeneralpropositioninit。Asifwecouldnotreason，andhaveknowledgeaboutparticulars:
whereas，intruth，thematterrightlyconsidered，theimmediateobjectofallourreasoningandknowledge，isnothingbutparticulars。
Everyman’sreasoningandknowledgeisonlyabouttheideasexistinginhisownmind；whicharetruly，everyoneofthem，particularexistences:andourknowledgeandreasonaboutotherthingsisonlyastheycorrespondwiththoseparticularideas。Sothattheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourparticularideasisthewholeandutmostofallourknowledge。Universalityisbutaccidentaltoit，andconsistsonlyinthis，thattheparticularideasaboutwhichitisaresuchasmorethanoneparticularthingcancorrespondwithandberepresentedby。Buttheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanytwoideas，andconsequentlyourknowledge，isequallyclearandcertain，whethereither，orboth，orneitherofthoseideas，becapableofrepresentingmorerealbeingsthanone，orno。OnethingmoreIcraveleavetoofferaboutsyllogism，beforeIleaveit，viz。
Mayonenotuponjustgroundinquirewhethertheformsyllogismnowhas，isthatwhichinreasonitoughttohave？Forthemediusterminusbeingtojointheextremes，i。e。theintermediateideas，byitsintervention，toshowtheagreementordisagreementofthetwoinquestion，wouldnotthepositionofthemediusterminusbemorenatural，andshowtheagreementordisagreementoftheextremesclearerandbetter，ifitwereplacedinthemiddlebetweenthem？
Whichmightbeeasilydonebytransposingthepropositions，andmakingthemediusterminusthepredicateofthefirst，andthesubjectofthesecond。Asthus:
Omnishomoestanimal。
Omneanimalestvivens。
Ergo，omnishomoestvivens。
Omnecorpusestextensumetsolidum。
Nullumextensumetsolidumestpuraextensio。
Ergo，corpusnonestpuraextensio。
Ineednottroublemyreaderwithinstancesinsyllogismswhoseconclusionsareparticular。Thesamereasonholdforthesameforminthem，aswellasinthegeneral。
9。Ourreasonoftenfailsus。Reason，thoughitpenetratesintothedepthsoftheseaandearth，elevatesourthoughtsashighasthestars，andleadsusthroughthevastspacesandlargeroomsofthismightyfabric，yetitcomesfarshortoftherealextentofevencorporealbeing。Andtherearemanyinstanceswhereinitfailsus:as，I。Incaseswhenwehavenoideas。Itperfectlyfailsuswhereourideasfail。Itneitherdoesnorcanextenditselffurtherthantheydo。Andtherefore，whereverwehavenoideas，ourreasoningstops，andweareatanendofourreckoning:andifatanytimewereasonaboutwordswhichdonotstandforanyideas，itisonlyaboutthosesounds，andnothingelse。
10。II。Becauseourideasareoftenobscureorimperfect。Ourreasonisoftenpuzzledandatalossbecauseoftheobscurity，confusion，orimperfectionoftheideasitisemployedabout；andthereweareinvolvedindifficultiesandcontradictions。Thus，nothavinganyperfectideaoftheleastextensionofmatter，norofinfinity，weareatalossaboutthedivisibilityofmatter；buthavingperfect，clear，anddistinctideasofnumber，ourreasonmeetswithnoneofthoseinextricabledifficultiesinnumbers，norfindsitselfinvolvedinanycontradictionsaboutthem。Thus，wehavingbutimperfectideasoftheoperationsofoutminds，andofthebeginningofmotion，orthoughthowthemindproduceseitheroftheminus，andmuchimperfecteryetoftheoperationofGod，runintogreatdifficultiesaboutfreecreatedagents，whichreasoncannotwellextricateitselfoutof。
11。III。Becauseweperceivenotintermediateideastoshowconclusions。Ourreasonisoftenatastandbecauseitperceivesnotthoseideas，whichcouldservetoshowthecertainorprobableagreementordisagreementofanyothertwoideas:andinthissomemen’sfacultiesfaroutgoothers。Tillalgebra，thatgreatinstrumentandinstanceofhumansagacity，wasdiscovered，menwithamazementlookedonseveralofthedemonstrationsofancientmathematicians，andcouldscarceforbeartothinkthefindingseveralofthoseproofstobesomethingmorethanhuman。
12。IV。Becauseweoftenproceeduponwrongprinciples。Themind，byproceedinguponfalseprinciples，isoftenengagedinabsurditiesanddifficulties，broughtintostraitsandcontradictions，withoutknowinghowtofreeitself:andinthatcaseitisinvaintoimplorethehelpofreason，unlessitbetodiscoverthefalsehoodandrejecttheinfluenceofthosewrongprinciples。Reasonissofarfromclearingthedifficultieswhichthebuildinguponfalsefoundationsbringsamaninto，thatifhewillpursueit，itentangleshimthemore，andengageshimdeeperinperplexities。
13。V。Becauseweoftenemploydoubtfulterms。Asobscureandimperfectideasofteninvolveourreason，so，uponthesameground，dodubiouswordsanduncertainsigns，often，indiscoursesandarguings，whennotwarilyattendedto，puzzlemen’sreason，andbringthemtoanonplus。Butthesetwolatterareourfault，andnotthefaultofreason。Butyettheconsequencesofthemareneverthelessobvious；andtheperplexitiesorerrorstheyfillmen’smindswithareeverywhereobservable。
14。Ourhighestdegreeofknowledgeisintuitive，withoutreasoning。
Someoftheideasthatareinthemind，aresothere，thattheycanbebythemselvesimmediatelycomparedonewithanother:andinthesethemindisabletoperceivethattheyagreeordisagreeasclearlyasthatithasthem。Thusthemindperceives，thatanarchofacircleislessthanthewholecircle，asclearlyasitdoestheideaofacircle:andthis，therefore，ashasbeensaid，Icallintuitiveknowledge；whichiscertain，beyondalldoubt，andneedsnoprobation，norcanhaveany；thisbeingthehighestofallhumancertainty。Inthisconsiststheevidenceofallthosemaximswhichnobodyhasanydoubtabout，buteveryman(doesnot，asissaid，onlyassentto，but)
knowstobetrue，assoonasevertheyareproposedtohisunderstanding。Inthediscoveryofandassenttothesetruths，thereisnouseofthediscursivefaculty，noneedofreasoning，buttheyareknownbyasuperiorandhigherdegreeofevidence。Andsuch，ifImayguessatthingsunknown，Iamapttothinkthatangelshavenow，andthespiritsofjustmenmadeperfectshallhave，inafuturestate，ofthousandsofthingswhichnoweitherwhollyescapeourapprehensions，orwhichourshort-sightedreasonhavinggotsomefaintglimpseof，we，inthedark，gropeafter。
15。Thenextisgotbyreasoning。Butthoughwehave，hereandthere，alittleofthisclearlight，somesparksofbrightknowledge，yetthegreatestpartofourideasaresuch，thatwecannotdiscerntheiragreementordisagreementbyanimmediatecomparingthem。Andinallthesewehaveneedofreasoning，andmust，bydiscourseandinference，makeourdiscoveries。Nowofthesetherearetwosorts，whichIshalltakethelibertytomentionhereagain:-
Throughreasoningsthataredemonstrative。First，Thosewhoseagreementordisagreement，thoughitcannotbeseenbyanimmediateputtingthemtogether，yetmaybeexaminedbytheinterventionofotherideaswhichcanbecomparedwiththem。Inthiscase，whentheagreementordisagreementoftheintermediateidea，onbothsides，withthosewhichwewouldcompare，isplainlydiscerned:thereitamountstodemonstrationwherebyknowledgeisproduced，which，thoughitbecertain，yetitisnotsoeasy，noraltogethersoclearasintuitiveknowledge。Becauseinthatthereisbarelyonesimpleintuition，whereinthereisnoroomforanytheleastmistakeordoubt:thetruthisseenallperfectlyatonce。Indemonstration，itistrue，thereisintuitiontoo，butnotaltogetheratonce；fortheremustbearemembranceoftheintuitionoftheagreementofthemedium，orintermediateidea，withthatwecompareditwithbefore，whenwecompareitwiththeother:andwheretherebemanymediums，therethedangerofthemistakeisthegreater。Foreachagreementordisagreementoftheideasmustbeobservedandseenineachstepofthewholetrain，andretainedinthememory，justasitis；andthemindmustbesurethatnopartofwhatisnecessarytomakeupthedemonstrationisomittedoroverlooked。Thismakessomedemonstrationslongandperplexed，andtoohardforthosewhohavenotstrengthofpartsdistinctlytoperceive，andexactlycarrysomanyparticularsorderlyintheirheads。Andeventhosewhoareabletomastersuchintricatespeculations，arefainsometimestogooverthemagain，andthereisneedofmorethanonereviewbeforetheycanarriveatcertainty。Butyetwherethemindclearlyretainstheintuitionithadoftheagreementofanyideawithanother，andthatwithathird，andthatwithafourth，&c。，theretheagreementofthefirstandthefourthisademonstration，andproducescertainknowledge；whichmaybecalledrationalknowledge，astheotherisintuitive。
16。Tosupplythenarrownessofdemonstrativeandintuitiveknowledgewehavenothingbutjudgmentuponprobablereasoning。
Secondly，Thereareotherideas，whoseagreementordisagreementcannootherwisebejudgedofbutbytheinterventionofotherswhichhavenotacertainagreementwiththeextremes，butanusualorlikelyone:
andintheseitisthatthejudgmentisproperlyexercised；whichistheacquiescingofthemind，thatanyideasdoagree，bycomparingthemwithsuchprobablemediums。This，thoughitneveramountstoknowledge，no，nottothatwhichisthelowestdegreeofit；yetsometimestheintermediateideastietheextremessofirmlytogether，andtheprobabilityissoclearandstrong，thatassentasnecessarilyfollowsit，asknowledgedoesdemonstration。Thegreatexcellencyanduseofthejudgmentistoobserveright，andtakeatrueestimateoftheforceandweightofeachprobability；andthencastingthemupallrighttogether，choosethatsidewhichhastheoverbalance。
17。Intuitiveknowledgeistheperceptionofthecertainagreementordisagreementoftwoideasimmediatelycomparedtogether。
Rationalknowledgeistheperceptionofthecertainagreementordisagreementofanytwoideas，bytheinterventionofoneormoreotherideas。
Judgmentisthethinkingortakingtwoideastoagreeordisagree，bytheinterventionofoneormoreideas，whosecertainagreementordisagreementwiththemitdoesnotperceive，buthathobservedtobefrequentandusual。
18。Consequencesofwords，andconsequencesofideas。Thoughthededucingonepropositionfromanother，ormakinginferencesinwords，beagreatpartofreason，andthatwhichitisusuallyemployedabout；yettheprincipalactofratiocinationisthefindingtheagreementordisagreementoftwoideasonewithanother，bytheinterventionofathird。Asaman，byayard，findstwohousestobeofthesamelength，tomeasuretheirequalitybyjuxta-position。Wordshavetheirconsequences，asthesignsofsuchideas:andthingsagreeordisagree，asreallytheyare；butweobserveitonlybyourideas。
19。Foursortsofarguments。Beforewequitthissubject，itmaybeworthourwhilealittletoreflectonfoursortsofarguments，thatmen，intheirreasoningswithothers，doordinarilymakeuseoftoprevailontheirassent；oratleasttoawethemastosilencetheiropposition。
I。Argumentumadverecundiam。Thefirstis，toallegetheopinionsofmen，whoseparts，learning，eminency，power，orsomeothercausehasgainedaname，andsettledtheirreputationinthecommonesteemwithsomekindofauthority。Whenmenareestablishedinanykindofdignity，itisthoughtabreachofmodestyforotherstoderogateanywayfromit，andquestiontheauthorityofmenwhoareinpossessionofit。Thisisapttobecensured，ascarryingwithittoomuchpride，whenamandoesnotreadilyyieldtothedeterminationofapprovedauthors，whichiswonttobereceivedwithrespectandsubmissionbyothers:anditislookeduponasinsolence，foramantosetupandadheretohisownopinionagainstthecurrentstreamofantiquity；ortoputitinthebalanceagainstthatofsomelearneddoctor，orotherwiseapprovedwriter。Whoeverbackshistenetswithsuchauthorities，thinksheoughttherebytocarrythecause，andisreadytostyleitimpudenceinanyonewhoshallstandoutagainstthem。ThisIthinkmaybecalledargumentumadverecundiam。
20。II。Argumentumadignorantiam。Secondly，Anotherwaythatmenordinarilyusetodriveothersandforcethemtosubmittotheirjudgments，andreceivetheiropinionindebate，istorequiretheadversarytoadmitwhattheyallegeasaproof，ortoassignabetter。
AndthisIcallargumentumadignorantiam。
21。III。Argumentumadhominem。Thirdly，athirdwayistopressamanwithconsequencesdrawnfromhisownprinciplesorconcessions。
Thisisalreadyknownunderthenameofargumentumadhominem。
22。IV。Argumentumadjudicium。Thefourthaloneadvancesusinknowledgeandjudgment。Thefourthistheusingofproofsdrawnfromanyofthefoundationsofknowledgeorprobability。ThisIcallargumentumadjudicium。Thisalone，ofallthefour，bringstrueinstructionwithit，andadvancesusinourwaytoknowledge。For，1。Itarguesnotanotherman’sopiniontoberight，becauseI，outofrespect，oranyotherconsiderationbutthatofconviction，willnotcontradicthim。2。Itprovesnotanothermantobeintherightway，northatIoughttotakethesamewithhim，becauseIknownotabetter。3。NordoesitfollowthatanothermanisintherightwaybecausehehasshownmethatIaminthewrong。Imaybemodest，andthereforenotopposeanotherman’spersuasion:Imaybeignorant，andnotbeabletoproduceabetter:Imaybeinanerror，andanothermayshowmethatIamso。Thismaydisposeme，perhaps，forthereceptionoftruth，buthelpsmenottoit:thatmustcomefromproofsandarguments，andlightarisingfromthenatureofthingsthemselves，andnotfrommyshamefacedness，ignorance，orerror。
23。Above，contrary，andaccordingtoreason。Bywhathasbeenbeforesaidofreason，wemaybeabletomakesomeguessatthedistinctionofthingsintothosethatareaccordingto，above，andcontrarytoreason。1。Accordingtoreasonaresuchpropositionswhosetruthwecandiscoverbyexaminingandtracingthoseideaswehavefromsensationandreflection；andbynaturaldeductionfindtobetrueorprobable。2。Abovereasonaresuchpropositionswhosetruthorprobabilitywecannotbyreasonderivefromthoseprinciples。3。
Contrarytoreasonaresuchpropositionsasareinconsistentwithorirreconcilabletoourclearanddistinctideas。ThustheexistenceofoneGodisaccordingtoreason；theexistenceofmorethanoneGod，contrarytoreason；theresurrectionofthedead，abovereason。
Abovereasonalsomaybetakeninadoublesense，viz。eitherassignifyingaboveprobability，orabovecertainty:andinthatlargesensealso，contrarytoreason，is，Isuppose，sometimestaken。
24。Reasonandfaithnotopposite，forfaithmustberegulatedbyreason。Thereisanotheruseofthewordreason，whereinitisopposedtofaith:which，thoughitbeinitselfaveryimproperwayofspeaking，yetcommonusehassoauthorizedit，thatitwouldbefollyeithertoopposeorhopetoremedyit。OnlyIthinkitmaynotbeamisstotakenoticethat，howeverfaithbeopposedtoreason，faithisnothingbutafirmassentofthemind:which，ifitberegulated，asisourduty，cannotbeaffordedtoanythingbutupongoodreason；andsocannotbeoppositetoit。Hethatbelieveswithouthavinganyreasonforbelieving，maybeinlovewithhisownfancies；butneitherseekstruthasheought，norpaystheobedienceduetohisMaker，whowouldhavehimusethosediscerningfacultieshehasgivenhim，tokeephimoutofmistakeanderror。Hethatdoesnotthistothebestofhispower，howeverhesometimeslightsontruth，isintherightbutbychance；andIknownotwhethertheluckinessoftheaccidentwillexcusetheirregularityofhisproceeding。Thisatleastiscertain，thathemustbeaccountableforwhatevermistakesherunsinto:whereashethatmakesuseofthelightandfacultiesGodhasgivenhim，andseekssincerelytodiscovertruthbythosehelpsandabilitieshehas，mayhavethissatisfactionindoinghisdutyasarationalcreature，that，thoughheshouldmisstruth，hewillnotmisstherewardofit。Forhegovernshisassentright，andplacesitasheshould，who，inanycaseormatterwhatsoever，believesordisbelievesaccordingasreasondirectshim。Hethatdothotherwise，transgressesagainsthisownlight，andmisusesthosefacultieswhichweregivenhimtonootherend，buttosearchandfollowtheclearerevidenceandgreaterprobability。Butsincereasonandfaitharebysomemenopposed，wewillsoconsidertheminthefollowingchapter。
ChapterXVIII
OfFaithandReason，andtheirDistinctProvinces1。Necessarytoknowtheirboundaries。Ithasbeenaboveshown，1。
Thatweareofnecessityignorant，andwantknowledgeofallsorts，wherewewantideas。2。Thatweareignorant，andwantrationalknowledge，wherewewantproofs。3。Thatwewantcertainknowledgeandcertainty，asfaraswewantclearanddeterminedspecificideas。4。
Thatwewantprobabilitytodirectourassentinmatterswherewehaveneitherknowledgeofourownnortestimonyofothermentobottomourreasonupon。
Fromthesethingsthuspremised，Ithinkwemaycometolaydownthemeasuresandboundariesbetweenfaithandreason:thewantwhereofmaypossiblyhavebeenthecause，ifnotofgreatdisorders，yetatleastofgreatdisputes，andperhapsmistakesintheworld。Fortillitberesolvedhowfarwearetobeguidedbyreason，andhowfarbyfaith，weshallinvaindispute，andendeavourtoconvinceoneanotherinmattersofreligion。
2。Faithandreason，what，ascontradistinguished。Ifindeverysect，asfarasreasonwillhelpthem，makeuseofitgladly:andwhereitfailsthem，theycryout，Itismatteroffaith，andabovereason。AndIdonotseehowtheycanarguewithanyone，oreverconvinceagainsayerwhomakesuseofthesameplea，withoutsettingdownstrictboundariesbetweenfaithandreason；whichoughttobethefirstpointestablishedinallquestionswherefaithhasanythingtodo。
Reason，therefore，here，ascontradistinguishedtofaith，Itaketobethediscoveryofthecertaintyorprobabilityofsuchpropositionsortruthswhichthemindarrivesatbydeductionmadefromsuchideas，whichithasgotbytheuseofitsnaturalfaculties；
viz。bysensationorreflection。
Faith，ontheotherside，istheassenttoanyproposition，notthusmadeoutbythedeductionsofreason，butuponthecreditoftheproposer，ascomingfromGod，insomeextraordinarywayofcommunication。Thiswayofdiscoveringtruthstomen，wecallrevelation。
3。Nonewsimpleideacanbeconveyedbytraditionalrevelation。
First，ThenIsay，thatnomaninspiredbyGodcanbyanyrevelationcommunicatetoothersanynewsimpleideaswhichtheyhadnotbeforefromsensationorreflection。For，whatsoeverimpressionshehimselfmayhavefromtheimmediatehandofGod，thisrevelation，ifitbeofnewsimpleideas，cannotbeconveyedtoanother，eitherbywordsoranyothersigns。Becausewords，bytheirimmediateoperationonus，causenootherideasbutoftheirnaturalsounds:anditisbythecustomofusingthemforsigns，thattheyexciteandreviveinourmindslatentideas；butyetonlysuchideasasweretherebefore。
Forwords，seenorheard，recalltoourthoughtsthoseideasonlywhichtoustheyhavebeenwonttobesignsof，butcannotintroduceanyperfectlynewandformerlyunknownsimpleideas。Thesameholdsinallothersigns；whichcannotsignifytousthingsofwhichwehavebeforeneverhadanyideaatall。
ThuswhateverthingswerediscoveredtoSt。Paul，whenhewasraptupintothethirdheaven；whatevernewideashismindtherereceived，allthedescriptionhecanmaketoothersofthatplace，isonlythis，Thattherearesuchthings，\"aseyehathnotseen，norearheard，norhathitenteredintotheheartofmantoconceive。\"AndsupposingGodshoulddiscovertoanyone，supernaturally，aspeciesofcreaturesinhabiting，forexample，JupiterorSaturn，(forthatitispossibletheremaybesuch，nobodycandeny，)whichhadsixsenses；
andimprintonhismindtheideasconveyedtotheirsbythatsixthsense:hecouldnomore，bywords，produceinthemindsofothermenthoseideasimprintedbythatsixthsense，thanoneofuscouldconveytheideaofanycolour，bythesoundofwords，intoamanwho，havingtheotherfoursensesperfect，hadalwaystotallywantedthefifth，ofseeing。Foroursimpleideas，then，whicharethefoundation，andsolematterofallournotionsandknowledge，wemustdependwhollyonourreason；Imeanournaturalfaculties；andcanbynomeansreceivethem，oranyofthem，fromtraditionalrevelation。Isay，traditionalrevelation，indistinctiontooriginalrevelation。Bytheone，ImeanthatfirstimpressionwhichismadeimmediatelybyGodonthemindofanyman，towhichwecannotsetanybounds；andbytheother，thoseimpressionsdeliveredovertoothersinwords，andtheordinarywaysofconveyingourconceptionsonetoanother。
4。Traditionalrevelationmaymakeusknowpropositionsknowablealsobyreason，butnotwiththesamecertaintythatreasondoth。
Secondly，Isaythatthesametruthsmaybediscovered，andconveyeddownfromrevelation，whicharediscoverabletousbyreason，andbythoseideaswenaturallymayhave。SoGodmight，byrevelation，discoverthetruthofanypropositioninEuclid；aswellasmen，bythenaturaluseoftheirfaculties，cometomakethediscoverythemselves。Inallthingsofthiskindthereislittleneedoruseofrevelation，Godhavingfurnisheduswithnaturalandsurermeanstoarriveattheknowledgeofthem。Forwhatsoevertruthwecometothecleardiscoveryof，fromtheknowledgeandcontemplationofourownideas，willalwaysbecertainertousthanthosewhichareconveyedtousbytraditionalrevelation。FortheknowledgewehavethatthisrevelationcameatfirstfromGodcanneverbesosureastheknowledgewehavefromtheclearanddistinctperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourownideas:v。g。ifitwererevealedsomeagessince，thatthethreeanglesofatrianglewereequaltotworightones，Imightassenttothetruthofthatproposition，uponthecreditofthattradition，thatitwasrevealed:butthatwouldneveramounttosogreatacertaintyastheknowledgeofit，uponthecomparingandmeasuringmyownideasoftworightangles，andthethreeanglesofatriangle。Thelikeholdsinmatteroffactknowablebyoursenses；v。g。thehistoryofthedelugeisconveyedtousbywritingswhichhadtheiroriginalfromrevelation:andyetnobody，Ithink，willsayhehasascertainandclearaknowledgeofthefloodasNoah，thatsawit；orthathehimselfwouldhavehad，hadhethenbeenaliveandseenit。Forhehasnogreateranassurancethanthatofhissenses，thatitiswritinthebooksupposedwritbyMosesinspired:buthehasnotsogreatanassurancethatMoseswrotethatbookasifhehadseenMoseswriteit。Sothattheassuranceofitsbeingarevelationislessstillthantheassuranceofhissenses。
5。Evenoriginalrevelationcannotbeadmittedagainsttheclearevidenceofreason。Inpropositions，then，whosecertaintyisbuiltupontheclearperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourideas，attainedeitherbyimmediateintuition，asinself-evidentpropositions，orbyevidentdeductionsofreasonindemonstrationsweneednottheassistanceofrevelation，asnecessarytogainourassent，andintroducethemintoourminds。Becausethenaturalwaysofknowledgecouldsettlethemthere，orhaddoneitalready；whichisthegreatestassurancewecanpossiblyhaveofanything，unlesswhereGodimmediatelyrevealsittous:andtheretooourassurancecanbenogreaterthanourknowledgeis，thatitisarevelationfromGod。Butyetnothing，Ithink，can，underthattitle，shakeoroverruleplainknowledge；orrationallyprevailwithanymantoadmititfortrue，inadirectcontradictiontotheclearevidenceofhisownunderstanding。For，sincenoevidenceofourfaculties，bywhichwereceivesuchrevelations，canexceed，ifequal，thecertaintyofourintuitiveknowledge，wecanneverreceiveforatruthanythingthatisdirectlycontrarytoourclearanddistinctknowledge；v。g。theideasofonebodyandoneplacedosoclearlyagree，andthemindhassoevidentaperceptionoftheiragreement，thatwecanneverassenttoapropositionthataffirmsthesamebodytobeintwodistantplacesatonce，howeveritshouldpretendtotheauthorityofadivinerevelation:sincetheevidence，first，thatwedeceivenotourselves，inascribingittoGod；secondly，thatweunderstanditright；canneverbesogreatastheevidenceofourownintuitiveknowledge，wherebywediscernitimpossibleforthesamebodytobeintwoplacesatonce。Andthereforenopropositioncanbereceivedfordivinerevelation，orobtaintheassentduetoallsuch，ifitbecontradictorytoourclearintuitiveknowledge。Becausethiswouldbetosubverttheprinciplesandfoundationsofallknowledge，evidence，andassentwhatsoever:andtherewouldbeleftnodifferencebetweentruthandfalsehood，nomeasuresofcredibleandincredibleintheworld，ifdoubtfulpropositionsshalltakeplacebeforeself-evident；andwhatwecertainlyknowgivewaytowhatwemaypossiblybemistakenin。Inpropositionsthereforecontrarytotheclearperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanyofourideas，itwillbeinvaintourgethemasmattersoffaith。Theycannotmoveourassentunderthatoranyothertitlewhatsoever。Forfaithcanneverconvinceusofanythingthatcontradictsourknowledge。Because，thoughfaithbefoundedonthetestimonyofGod(whocannotlie)revealinganypropositiontous:yetwecannothaveanassuranceofthetruthofitsbeingadivinerevelationgreaterthanourownknowledge。SincethewholestrengthofthecertaintydependsuponourknowledgethatGodrevealedit；which，inthiscase，wherethepropositionsupposedrevealedcontradictsourknowledgeorreason，willalwayshavethisobjectionhangingtoit，viz。thatwecannottellhowtoconceivethattocomefromGod，thebountifulAuthorofourbeing，which，ifreceivedfortrue，mustoverturnalltheprinciplesandfoundationsofknowledgehehasgivenus；renderallourfacultiesuseless；whollydestroythemostexcellentpartofhisworkmanship，ourunderstandings；andputamaninaconditionwhereinhewillhavelesslight，lessconductthanthebeastthatperisheth。Forifthemindofmancanneverhaveaclearer(andperhapsnotsoclear)evidenceofanythingtobeadivinerevelation，asithasoftheprinciplesofitsownreason，itcanneverhaveagroundtoquittheclearevidenceofitsreason，togiveaplacetoaproposition，whoserevelationhasnotagreaterevidencethanthoseprincipleshave。
6。Traditionalrevelationmuchless。Thusfaramanhasuseofreason，andoughttohearkentoit，eveninimmediateandoriginalrevelation，whereitissupposedtobemadetohimself。Buttoallthosewhopretendnottoimmediaterevelation，butarerequiredtopayobedience，andtoreceivethetruthsrevealedtoothers，which，bythetraditionofwritings，orwordofmouth，areconveyeddowntothem，reasonhasagreatdealmoretodo，andisthatonlywhichcaninduceustoreceivethem。Formatteroffaithbeingonlydivinerevelation，andnothingelse，faith，asweusetheword，(calledcommonlydivinefaith)，hastodowithnopropositions，butthosewhicharesupposedtobedivinelyrevealed。SothatIdonotseehowthosewhomakerevelationalonethesoleobjectoffaithcansaythatitisamatteroffaith，andnotofreason，tobelievethatsuchorsuchaproposition，tobefoundinsuchorsuchabook，isofdivineinspiration；unlessitberevealedthatthatproposition，orallinthatbook，wascommunicatedbydivineinspiration。Withoutsucharevelation，thebelieving，ornotbelieving，thatproposition，orbook，tobeofdivineauthority，canneverbematteroffaith，butmatterofreason；andsuchasImustcometoanassenttoonlybytheuseofmyreason，whichcanneverrequireorenablemetobelievethatwhichiscontrarytoitself:itbeingimpossibleforreasonevertoprocureanyassenttothatwhichtoitselfappearsunreasonable。
Inallthings，therefore，wherewehaveclearevidencefromourideas，andthoseprinciplesofknowledgeIhaveabovementioned，reasonistheproperjudge；andrevelation，thoughitmay，inconsentingwithit，confirmitsdictates，yetcannotinsuchcasesinvalidateitsdecrees:norcanwebeobliged，wherewehavetheclearandevidentsentienceofreason，toquititforthecontraryopinion，underapretencethatitismatteroffaith:whichcanhavenoauthorityagainsttheplainandcleardictatesofreason。
7。Thingsabovereasonare，whenrevealed，thepropermatteroffaith。But，Thirdly，Therebeingmanythingswhereinwehaveveryimperfectnotions，ornoneatall；andotherthings，ofwhosepast，present，orfutureexistence，bythenaturaluseofourfaculties，wecanhavenoknowledgeatall；these，asbeingbeyondthediscoveryofournaturalfaculties，andabovereason，are，whenrevealed，thepropermatteroffaith。Thus，thatpartoftheangelsrebelledagainstGod，andtherebylosttheirfirsthappystate:andthatthedeadshallrise，andliveagain:theseandthelike，beingbeyondthediscoveryofreason，arepurelymattersoffaith，withwhichreasonhasdirectlynothingtodo。
8。Ornotcontrarytoreason，ifrevealed，arematteroffaith；
andmustcarryitagainstprobableconjecturesofreason。ButsinceGod，ingivingusthelightofreason，hasnottherebytieduphisownhandsfromaffordingus，whenhethinksfit，thelightofrevelationinanyofthosematterswhereinournaturalfacultiesareabletogiveaprobabledetermination；revelation，whereGodhasbeenpleasedtogiveit，mustcarryitagainsttheprobableconjecturesofreason。
Becausethemindnotbeingcertainofthetruthofthatitdoesnotevidentlyknow，butonlyyieldingtotheprobabilitythatappearsinit，isboundtogiveupitsassenttosuchatestimonywhich，itissatisfied，comesfromonewhocannoterr，andwillnotdeceive。Butyet，itstillbelongstoreasontojudgeofthetruthofitsbeingarevelation，andofthesignificationofthewordswhereinitisdelivered。Indeed，ifanythingshallbethoughtrevelationwhichiscontrarytotheplainprinciplesofreason，andtheevidentknowledgethemindhasofitsownclearanddistinctideas；therereasonmustbehearkenedto，astoamatterwithinitsprovince。Sinceamancanneverhavesocertainaknowledgethatapropositionwhichcontradictstheclearprinciplesandevidenceofhisownknowledgewasdivinelyrevealed，orthatheunderstandsthewordsrightlywhereinitisdelivered，ashehasthatthecontraryistrue，andsoisboundtoconsiderandjudgeofitasamatterofreason，andnotswallowit，withoutexamination，asamatteroffaith。
9。Revelationinmatterswherereasoncannotjudge，orbutprobably，oughttobehearkenedto。First，Whateverpropositionisrevealed，ofwhosetruthourmind，byitsnaturalfacultiesandnotions，cannotjudge，thatispurelymatteroffaith，andabovereason。
Secondly，Allpropositionswhereofthemind，bytheuseofitsnaturalfaculties，cancometodetermineandjudge，fromnaturallyacquiredideas，arematterofreason；withthisdifferencestill，that，inthoseconcerningwhichithasbutanuncertainevidence，andsoispersuadedoftheirtruthonlyuponprobablegrounds，whichstilladmitapossibilityofthecontrarytobetrue，withoutdoingviolencetothecertainevidenceofitsownknowledge，andoverturningtheprinciplesofallreason；insuchprobablepropositions，Isay，anevidentrevelationoughttodetermineourassent，evenagainstprobability。Forwheretheprinciplesofreasonhavenotevidencedapropositiontobecertainlytrueorfalse，thereclearrevelation，asanotherprincipleoftruthandgroundofassent，maydetermine；andsoitmaybematteroffaith，andbealsoabovereason。Becausereason，inthatparticularmatter，beingabletoreachnohigherthanprobability，faithgavethedeterminationwherereasoncameshort；andrevelationdiscoveredonwhichsidethetruthlay。
10。Inmatterswherereasoncanaffordcertainknowledge，thatistobehearkenedto。Thusfarthedominionoffaithreaches，andthatwithoutanyviolenceorhindrancetoreason；whichisnotinjuredordisturbed，butassistedandimprovedbynewdiscoveriesoftruth，comingfromtheeternalfountainofallknowledge。WhateverGodhathrevealediscertainlytrue:nodoubtcanbemadeofit。Thisistheproperobjectoffaith:butwhetheritbeadivinerevelationorno，reasonmustjudge；whichcanneverpermitthemindtorejectagreaterevidencetoembracewhatislessevident，norallowittoentertainprobabilityinoppositiontoknowledgeandcertainty。Therecanbenoevidencethatanytraditionalrevelationisofdivineoriginal，inthewordswereceiveit，andinthesenseweunderstandit，soclearandsocertainasthatoftheprinciplesofreason:andthereforeNothingthatiscontraryto，andinconsistentwith，theclearandself-evidentdictatesofreason，hasarighttoheurgedorassentedtoasamatteroffaith，whereinreasonhathnothingtodo。Whatsoeverisdivinerevelation，oughttooverruleallouropinions，prejudices，andinterest，andhatharighttobereceivedwithfullassent。Suchasubmissionasthis，ofourreasontofaith，takesnotawaythelandmarksofknowledge:thisshakesnotthefoundationsofreason，butleavesusthatuseofourfacultiesforwhichtheyweregivenus。
11。Iftheboundariesbenotsetbetweenfaithandreason，noenthusiasmorextravagancyinreligioncanbecontradicted。Iftheprovincesoffaithandreasonarenotkeptdistinctbytheseboundaries，therewill，inmattersofreligion，benoroomforreasonatall；andthoseextravagantopinionsandceremoniesthataretobefoundintheseveralreligionsoftheworldwillnotdeservetobeblamed。For，tothiscryingupoffaithinoppositiontoreason，wemay，Ithink，ingoodmeasureascribethoseabsurditiesthatfillalmostallthereligionswhichpossessanddividemankind。Formenhavingbeenprincipledwithanopinionthattheymustnotconsultreasoninthethingsofreligion，howeverapparentlycontradictorytocommonsenseandtheveryprinciplesofalltheirknowledge，haveletloosetheirfanciesandnaturalsuperstition；andhavebeenbythemledintosostrangeopinions，andextravagantpracticesinreligion，thataconsideratemancannotbutstandamazedattheirfollies，andjudgethemsofarfrombeingacceptabletothegreatandwiseGod，thathecannotavoidthinkingthemridiculousandoffensivetoasobergoodman。Sothat，ineffect，religion，whichshouldmostdistinguishusfrombeasts，andoughtmostpeculiarlytoelevateus，asrationalcreatures，abovebrutes，isthatwhereinmenoftenappearmostirrational，andmoresenselessthanbeaststhemselves。Credo，quiaimpossibileest:Ibelieve，becauseitisimpossible，might，inagoodman，passforasallyofzeal；butwouldproveaveryillruleformentochoosetheiropinionsorreligionby。
ChapterXIX
OfEnthusiasm1。Loveoftruthnecessary。Hethatwouldseriouslysetuponthesearchoftruthoughtinthefirstplacetopreparehismindwithaloveofit。Forhethatlovesitnotwillnottakemuchpainstogetit；norbemuchconcernedwhenhemissesit。Thereisnobodyinthecommonwealthoflearningwhodoesnotprofesshimselfaloveroftruth:andthereisnotarationalcreaturethatwouldnottakeitamisstobethoughtotherwiseof。Andyet，forallthis，onemaytrulysay，thatthereareveryfewloversoftruth，fortruth’ssake，evenamongstthosewhopersuadethemselvesthattheyareso。Howamanmayknowwhetherhebesoinearnest，isworthinquiry:andIthinkthereisoneunerringmarkofit，viz。Thenotentertaininganypropositionwithgreaterassurancethantheproofsitisbuiltuponwillwarrant。Whoevergoesbeyondthismeasureofassent，itisplain，receivesnotthetruthintheloveofit；lovesnottruthfortruth’ssake，butforsomeotherbye-end。Fortheevidencethatanypropositionistrue(exceptsuchasareself-evident)lyingonlyintheproofsamanhasofit，whatsoeverdegreesofassentheaffordsitbeyondthedegreesofthatevidence，itisplainthatallthesurplusageofassuranceisowingtosomeotheraffection，andnottotheloveoftruth:itbeingasimpossiblethattheloveoftruthshouldcarrymyassentabovetheevidencethereistomethatitistrue，asthattheloveoftruthshouldmakemeassenttoanypropositionforthesakeofthatevidencewhichithasnot，thatitistrue:whichisineffecttoloveitasatruth，becauseitispossibleorprobablethatitmaynotbetrue。Inanytruththatgetsnotpossessionofourmindsbytheirresistiblelightofself-evidence，orbytheforceofdemonstration，theargumentsthatgainitassentarethevouchersandgageofitsprobabilitytous；andwecanreceiveitfornootherthansuchastheydeliverittoourunderstandings。
Whatsoevercreditorauthoritywegivetoanypropositionmorethanitreceivesfromtheprinciplesandproofsitsupportsitselfupon，isowingtoourinclinationsthatway，andissofaraderogationfromtheloveoftruthassuch:which，asitcanreceivenoevidencefromourpassionsorinterests，soitshouldreceivenotincturefromthem。
2。Aforwardnesstodictateanother’sbeliefs，fromwhence。Theassuminganauthorityofdictatingtoothers，andaforwardnesstoprescribetotheiropinions，isaconstantconcomitantofthisbiasandcorruptionofourjudgments。Forhowalmostcanitbeotherwise，butthatheshouldbereadytoimposeonanother’sbelief，whohasalreadyimposedonhisown？Whocanreasonablyexpectargumentsandconvictionfromhimindealingwithothers，whoseunderstandingisnotaccustomedtotheminhisdealingwithhimself？Whodoesviolencetohisownfaculties，tyrannizesoverhisownmind，andusurpstheprerogativethatbelongstotruthalone，whichistocommandassentbyonlyitsownauthority，i。e。byandinproportiontothatevidencewhichitcarrieswithit。
3。Forceofenthusiasm，inwhichreasonistakenaway。UponthisoccasionIshalltakethelibertytoconsiderathirdgroundofassent，whichwithsomemenhasthesameauthority，andisasconfidentlyreliedonaseitherfaithorreason；Imeanenthusiasm:
which，layingbyreason，wouldsetuprevelationwithoutit。Wherebyineffectittakesawaybothreasonandrevelation，andsubstitutesintheroomofthemtheungroundedfanciesofaman’sownbrain，andassumesthemforafoundationbothofopinionandconduct。
4。Reasonandrevelation。Reasonisnaturalrevelation，wherebytheeternalFatheroflightandfountainofallknowledge，communicatestomankindthatportionoftruthwhichhehaslaidwithinthereachoftheirnaturalfaculties:revelationisnaturalreasonenlargedbyanewsetofdiscoveriescommunicatedbyGodimmediately；whichreasonvouchesthetruthof，bythetestimonyandproofsitgivesthattheycomefromGod。Sothathethattakesawayreasontomakewayforrevelation，putsoutthelightofboth，anddoesmuchwhatthesameasifhewouldpersuadeamantoputouthiseyes，thebettertoreceivetheremotelightofaninvisiblestarbyatelescope。
5。Riseofenthusiasm。Immediaterevelationbeingamucheasierwayformentoestablishtheiropinionsandregulatetheirconductthanthetediousandnotalwayssuccessfullabourofstrictreasoning，itisnowonderthatsomehavebeenveryapttopretendtorevelation，andtopersuadethemselvesthattheyareunderthepeculiarguidanceofheavenintheiractionsandopinions，especiallyinthoseofthemwhichtheycannotaccountforbytheordinarymethodsofknowledgeandprinciplesofreason。Henceweseethat，inallages，meninwhommelancholyhasmixedwithdevotion，orwhoseconceitofthemselveshasraisedthemintoanopinionofagreaterfamiliaritywithGod，andaneareradmittancetohisfavourthanisaffordedtoothers，haveoftenflatteredthemselveswithapersuasionofanimmediateintercoursewiththeDeity，andfrequentcommunicationsfromtheDivineSpirit。
God，Iown，cannotbedeniedtobeabletoenlightentheunderstandingbyaraydartedintothemindimmediatelyfromthefountainoflight:thistheyunderstandhehaspromisedtodo，andwhothenhassogoodatitletoexpectitasthosewhoarehispeculiarpeople，chosenbyhim，anddependingonhim？
6。Enthusiasticimpulse。Theirmindsbeingthusprepared，whatevergroundlessopinioncomestosettleitselfstronglyupontheirfanciesisanilluminationfromtheSpiritofGod，andpresentlyofdivineauthority:andwhatsoeveroddactiontheyfindinthemselvesastronginclinationtodo，thatimpulseisconcludedtobeacallordirectionfromheaven，andmustbeobeyed:itisacommissionfromabove，andtheycannoterrinexecutingit。
7。Whatismeantbyenthusiasm。ThisItaketobeproperlyenthusiasm，which，thoughfoundedneitheronreasonnordivinerevelation，butrisingfromtheconceitsofawarmedoroverweeningbrain，worksyet，whereitoncegetsfooting，morepowerfullyonthepersuasionsandactionsofmenthaneitherofthosetwo，orbothtogether:menbeingmostforwardlyobedienttotheimpulsestheyreceivefromthemselves；andthewholemanissuretoactmorevigorouslywherethewholemaniscarriedbyanaturalmotion。Forstrongconceit，likeanewprinciple，carriesalleasilywithit，whengotabovecommonsense，andfreedfromallrestraintofreasonandcheckofreflection，itisheightenedintoadivineauthority，inconcurrencewithourowntemperandinclination。
8。Enthusiasmacceptsitssupposedilluminationwithoutsearchandproof。Thoughtheoddopinionsandextravagantactionsenthusiasmhasrunmenintowereenoughtowarnthemagainstthiswrongprinciple，soapttomisguidethembothintheirbeliefandconduct:
yettheloveofsomethingextraordinary，theeaseandgloryitistobeinspired，andbeabovethecommonandnaturalwaysofknowledge，soflattersmanymen’slaziness，ignorance，andvanity，that，whenoncetheyaregotintothiswayofimmediaterevelation，ofilluminationwithoutsearch，andofcertaintywithoutproofandwithoutexamination，itisahardmattertogetthemoutofit。Reasonislostuponthem，theyareaboveit:theyseethelightinfusedintotheirunderstandings，andcannotbemistaken；itisclearandvisiblethere，likethelightofbrightsunshine；showsitself，andneedsnootherproofbutitsownevidence:theyfeelthehandofGodmovingthemwithin，andtheimpulsesoftheSpirit，andcannotbemistakeninwhattheyfeel。Thustheysupportthemselves，andaresurereasoninghathnothingtodowithwhattheyseeandfeelinthemselves:whattheyhaveasensibleexperienceofadmitsnodoubt，needsnoprobation。
Wouldhenotberidiculous，whoshouldrequiretohaveitprovedtohimthatthelightshines，andthatheseesit？Itisitsownproof，andcanhavenoother。WhentheSpiritbringslightintoourminds，itdispelsdarkness。Weseeitaswedothatofthesunatnoon，andneednotthetwilightofreasontoshowitus。Thislightfromheavenisstrong，clear，andpure；carriesitsowndemonstrationwithit:andwemayasnaturallytakeaglow-wormtoassistustodiscoverthesun，astoexaminethecelestialraybyourdimcandle，reason。
9。Enthusiasmhowtobediscovered。Thisisthewayoftalkingofthesemen:theyaresure，becausetheyaresure:andtheirpersuasionsareright，becausetheyarestronginthem。For，whenwhattheysayisstrippedofthemetaphorofseeingandfeeling，thisisallitamountsto:andyetthesesimilessoimposeonthem，thattheyservethemforcertaintyinthemselves，anddemonstrationtoothers。
10。Thesupposedinternallightexamined。Buttoexaminealittlesoberlythisinternallight，andthisfeelingonwhichtheybuildsomuch。Thesemenhave，theysay，clearlight，andtheysee；theyhaveawakenedsense，andtheyfeel:thiscannot，theyaresure，bedisputedthem。Forwhenamansaysheseesorfeels，nobodycandenyhimthathedoesso。Buthereletmeask:Thisseeing，isittheperceptionofthetruthoftheproposition，orofthis，thatitisarevelationfromGod？Thisfeeling，isitaperceptionofaninclinationorfancytodosomething，oroftheSpiritofGodmovingthatinclination？Thesearetwoverydifferentperceptions，andmustbecarefullydistinguished，ifwewouldnotimposeuponourselves。I
mayperceivethetruthofaproposition，andyetnotperceivethatitisanimmediaterevelationfromGod。ImayperceivethetruthofapropositioninEuclid，withoutitsbeing，ormyperceivingittobe，arevelation:nay，ImayperceiveIcamenotbythisknowledgeinanaturalway，andsomayconcludeitrevealed，withoutperceivingthatitisarevelationofGod。Becausetherebespiritswhich，withoutbeingdivinelycommissioned，mayexcitethoseideasinme，andlaytheminsuchorderbeforemymind，thatImayperceivetheirconnexion。Sothattheknowledgeofanypropositioncomingintomymind，Iknownothow，isnotaperceptionthatitisfromGod。Muchlessisastrongpersuasionthatitistrue，aperceptionthatitisfromGod，orsomuchastrue。Buthoweveritbecalledlightandseeing，Isupposeitisatmostbutbeliefandassurance:andthepropositiontakenforarevelationisnotsuchastheyknowtobetrue，buttaketobetrue。Forwhereapropositionisknowntobetrue，revelationisneedless:anditishardtoconceivehowtherecanbearevelationtoanyoneofwhatheknowsalready。Ifthereforeitbeapropositionwhichtheyarepersuaded，butdonotknow，tobetrue，whatevertheymaycallit，itisnotseeing，butbelieving。
