ChapterVI
OfUniversalPropositions:theirTruthandCertainty1。Treatingofwordsnecessarytoknowledge。Thoughtheexaminingandjudgingofideasbythemselves，theirnamesbeingquitelaidaside，bethebestandsurestwaytoclearanddistinctknowledge:
yet，throughtheprevailingcustomofusingsoundsforideas，I
thinkitisveryseldompractised。Everyonemayobservehowcommonitisfornamestobemadeuseof，insteadoftheideasthemselves，evenwhenmenthinkandreasonwithintheirownbreasts；especiallyiftheideasbeverycomplex，andmadeupofagreatcollectionofsimpleones。ThismakestheconsiderationofwordsandpropositionssonecessaryapartoftheTreatiseofKnowledge，thatitisveryhardtospeakintelligiblyoftheone，withoutexplainingtheother。
2。Generaltruthshardlytobeunderstood，butinverbalpropositions。Alltheknowledgewehave，beingonlyofparticularorgeneraltruths，itisevidentthatwhatevermaybedoneintheformerofthese，thelatter，whichisthatwhichwithreasonismostsoughtafter，canneverbewellmadeknown，andisveryseldomapprehended，butasconceivedandexpressedinwords。Itisnot，therefore，outofourway，intheexaminationofourknowledge，toinquireintothetruthandcertaintyofuniversalpropositions。
3。Certaintytwofold-oftruthandofknowledge。Butthatwemaynotbemisledinthiscasebythatwhichisthedangereverywhere，I
meanbythedoubtfulnessofterms，itisfittoobservethatcertaintyistwofold:certaintyoftruthandcertaintyofknowledge。Certaintyoftruthis，whenwordsaresoputtogetherinpropositionsasexactlytoexpresstheagreementordisagreementoftheideastheystandfor，asreallyitis。Certaintyofknowledgeistoperceivetheagreementordisagreementofideas，asexpressedinanyproposition。
Thisweusuallycallknowing，orbeingcertainofthetruthofanyproposition。
4。Nopropositioncanbecertainlyknowntobetrue，wheretherealessenceofeachspeciesmentionedisnotknown。Now，becausewecannotbecertainofthetruthofanygeneralproposition，unlessweknowthepreciseboundsandextentofthespeciesitstermsstandfor，itisnecessaryweshouldknowtheessenceofeachspecies，whichisthatwhichconstitutesandboundsit。
This，inallsimpleideasandmodes，isnothardtodo。Forinthesetherealandnominalessencebeingthesame，or，whichisallone，theabstractideawhichthegeneraltermstandsforbeingthesoleessenceandboundarythatisorcanbesupposedofthespecies，therecanbenodoubthowfarthespeciesextends，orwhatthingsarecomprehendedundereachterm；which，itisevident，areallthathaveanexactconformitywiththeideaitstandsfor，andnoother。
Butinsubstances，whereinarealessence，distinctfromthenominal，issupposedtoconstitute，determine，andboundthespecies，theextentofthegeneralwordisveryuncertain；because，notknowingthisrealessence，wecannotknowwhatis，orwhatisnotofthatspecies；and，consequently，whatmayormaynotwithcertaintybeaffirmedofit。Andthus，speakingofaman，orgold，oranyotherspeciesofnaturalsubstances，assupposedconstitutedbyapreciseandrealessencewhichnatureregularlyimpartstoeveryindividualofthatkind，wherebyitismadetobeofthatspecies，wecannotbecertainofthetruthofanyaffirmationornegationmadeofit。Formanorgold，takeninthissense，andusedforspeciesofthingsconstitutedbyrealessences，differentfromthecomplexideainthemindofthespeaker，standforweknownotwhat；andtheextentofthesespecies，withsuchboundaries，aresounknownandundetermined，thatitisimpossiblewithanycertaintytoaffirm，thatallmenarerational，orthatallgoldisyellow。Butwherethenominalessenceiskeptto，astheboundaryofeachspecies，andmenextendtheapplicationofanygeneraltermnofurtherthantotheparticularthingsinwhichthecomplexideaitstandsforistobefound，theretheyareinnodangertomistaketheboundsofeachspecies，norcanbeindoubt，onthisaccount，whetheranypropositionbetrueornot。Ihavechosentoexplainthisuncertaintyofpropositionsinthisscholasticway，andhavemadeuseofthetermsofessences，andspecies，onpurposetoshowtheabsurdityandinconveniencethereistothinkofthemasofanyothersortofrealities，thanbarelyabstractideaswithnamestothem。Tosupposethatthespeciesofthingsareanythingbutthesortingofthemundergeneralnames，accordingastheyagreetoseveralabstractideasofwhichwemakethosenamesthesigns，istoconfoundtruth，andintroduceuncertaintyintoallgeneralpropositionsthatcanbemadeaboutthem。Thoughthereforethesethingsmight，topeoplenotpossessedwithscholasticlearning，betreatedofinabetterandclearerway；yetthosewrongnotionsofessencesorspecieshavinggotrootinmostpeople’smindswhohavereceivedanytincturefromthelearningwhichhasprevailedinthispartoftheworld，aretobediscoveredandremoved，tomakewayforthatuseofwordswhichshouldconveycertaintywithit。
5。Thismoreparticularlyconcernssubstances。Thenamesofsubstances，then，whenevermadetostandforspecieswhicharesupposedtobeconstitutedbyrealessenceswhichweknownot，arenotcapabletoconveycertaintytotheunderstanding。Ofthetruthofgeneralpropositionsmadeupofsuchtermswecannotbesure。Thereasonwhereofisplain:forhowcanwebesurethatthisorthatqualityisingold，whenweknownotwhatisorisnotgold？Sinceinthiswayofspeaking，nothingisgoldbutwhatpartakesofanessence，whichwe，notknowing，cannotknowwhereitisorisnot，andsocannotbesurethatanyparcelofmatterintheworldisorisnotinthissensegold；beingincurablyignorantwhetherithasorhasnotthatwhichmakesanythingtobecalledgold；i。e。thatrealessenceofgoldwhereofwehavenoideaatall。Thisbeingasimpossibleforustoknowasitisforablindmantotellinwhatflowerthecolourofapansyisorisnottobefound，whilsthehasnoideaofthecolourofapansyatan。Orifwecould(whichisimpossible)certainlyknowwherearealessence，whichweknownot，is，v。g。inwhatparcelsofmattertherealessenceofgoldis，yetcouldwenotbesurethatthisorthatqualitycouldwithtruthbeaffirmedofgold；sinceitisimpossibleforustoknowthatthisorthatqualityorideahasanecessaryconnexionwitharealessenceofwhichwehavenoideaatall，whateverspeciesthatsupposedrealessencemaybeimaginedtoconstitute。
6。Thetruthoffewuniversalpropositionsconcerningsubstancesistobeknown。Ontheotherside，thenamesofsubstances，whenmadeuseofastheyshouldbe，fortheideasmenhaveintheirminds，thoughtheycarryaclearanddeterminatesignificationwiththem，willnotyetserveustomakemanyuniversalpropositionsofwhosetruthwecanbecertain。Notbecauseinthisuseofthemweareuncertainwhatthingsaresignifiedbythem，butbecausethecomplexideastheystandforaresuchcombinationsofsimpleonesascarrynotwiththemanydiscoverableconnexionorrepugnancy，butwithaveryfewotherideas。
7。Becausenecessaryco-existenceofsimpleideasinsubstancescaninfewcasesbeknown。Thecomplexideasthatournamesofthespeciesofsubstancesproperlystandfor，arecollectionsofsuchqualitiesashavebeenobservedtoco-existinanunknownsubstratum，whichwecallsubstance；butwhatotherqualitiesnecessarilyco-existwithsuchcombinations，wecannotcertainlyknow，unlesswecandiscovertheirnaturaldependence；which，intheirprimaryqualities，wecangobutaverylittlewayin；andinalltheirsecondaryqualitieswecandiscovernoconnexionatall:forthereasonsmentioned，chap。iii。Viz。1。Becauseweknownottherealconstitutionsofsubstances，onwhicheachsecondaryqualityparticularlydepends。2。Didweknowthat，itwouldserveusonlyforexperimental(notuniversal)knowledge；andreachwithcertaintynofurtherthanthatbareinstance:becauseourunderstandingscandiscovernoconceivableconnexionbetweenanysecondaryqualityandanymodificationwhatsoeverofanyoftheprimaryones。Andthereforethereareveryfewgeneralpropositionstobemadeconcerningsubstances，whichcancarrywiththemundoubtedcertainty。
8。Instanceingold。\"Allgoldisfixed，\"isapropositionwhosetruthwecannotbecertainof，howuniversallysoeveritbebelieved。Forif，accordingtotheuselessimaginationoftheSchools，anyonesupposesthetermgoldtostandforaspeciesofthingssetoutbynature，byarealessencebelongingtoit，itisevidentheknowsnotwhatparticularsubstancesareofthatspecies；andsocannotwithcertaintyaffirmanythinguniversallyofgold。Butifhemakesgoldstandforaspeciesdeterminedbyitsnominalessence，letthenominalessence，forexample，bethecomplexideaofabodyofacertainyellowcolour，malleable，fusible，andheavierthananyotherknown；-inthisproperuseofthewordgold，thereisnodifficultytoknowwhatisorisnotgold。Butyetnootherqualitycanwithcertaintybeuniversallyaffirmedordeniedofgold，butwhathathadiscoverableconnexionorinconsistencywiththatnominalessence。Fixedness，forexample，havingnonecessaryconnexionthatwecandiscover，withthecolour，weight，oranyothersimpleideaofourcomplexone，orwiththewholecombinationtogether；itisimpossiblethatweshouldcertainlyknowthetruthofthisproposition，thatallgoldisfixed。
9。Nodiscoverablenecessaryconnexionbetweennominalessenceofgoldandothersimpleideas。Asthereisnodiscoverableconnexionbetweenfixednessandthecolour，weight，andothersimpleideasofthatnominalessenceofgold；so，ifwemakeourcomplexideaofgold，abodyyellow，fusible，ductile，weighty，andfixed，weshallbeatthesameuncertaintyconcerningsolubilityinaquaregia，andforthesamereason。Sincewecannever，fromconsiderationoftheideasthemselves，withcertaintyaffirmordenyofabodywhosecomplexideaismadeupofyellow，veryweighty，ductile，fusible，andfixed，thatitissolubleinaquaregia:andsoonoftherestofitsqualities。Iwouldgladlymeetwithonegeneralaffirmationconcerninganyqualityofgold，thatanyonecancertainlyknowistrue。Itwill，nodoubt，bepresentlyobjected，Isnotthisanuniversalproposition，Allgoldismalleable？TowhichIanswer，Itisaverycertainproposition，ifmalleablenessbeapartofthecomplexideathewordgoldstandsfor。Butthenhereisnothingaffirmedofgold，butthatthatsoundstandsforanideainwhichmalleablenessiscontained:andsuchasortoftruthandcertaintyasthisitis，tosayacentaurisfour-footed。Butifmalleablenessmakenotapartofthespecificessencethenameofgoldstandsfor，itisplain，allgoldismalleable，isnotacertainproposition。Because，letthecomplexideaofgoldbemadeupofwhichsoeverofitsotherqualitiesyouplease，malleablenesswillnotappeartodependonthatcomplexidea，norfollowfromanysimpleonecontainedinit:theconnexionthatmalleablenesshas(ifithasany)withthoseotherqualitiesbeingonlybytheinterventionoftherealconstitutionofitsinsensibleparts；which，sinceweknownot，itisimpossibleweshouldperceivethatconnexion，unlesswecoulddiscoverthatwhichtiesthemtogether。
10。Asfarasanysuchco-existencecanbeknown，sofaruniversalpropositionsmaybecertain。Butthiswillgobutalittleway。Themore，indeed，ofthesecoexistingqualitiesweuniteintoonecomplexidea，underonename，themorepreciseanddeterminatewemakethesignificationofthatword；butneveryetmakeittherebymorecapableofuniversalcertainty，inrespectofotherqualitiesnotcontainedinourcomplexidea:sinceweperceivenottheirconnexionordependenceononeanother；beingignorantbothofthatrealconstitutioninwhichtheyareallfounded，andalsohowtheyflowfromit。Forthechiefpartofourknowledgeconcerningsubstancesisnot，asinotherthings，barelyoftherelationoftwoideasthatmayexistseparately；butisofthenecessaryconnexionandco-existenceofseveraldistinctideasinthesamesubject，oroftheirrepugnancysotoco-exist。Couldwebeginattheotherend，anddiscoverwhatitwaswhereinthatcolourconsisted，whatmadeabodylighterorheavier，whattextureofpartsmadeitmalleable，fusible，andfixed，andfittobedissolvedinthissortofliquor，andnotinanother；-if，Isay，wehadsuchanideaasthisofbodies，andcouldperceivewhereinallsensiblequalitiesoriginallyconsist，andhowtheyareproduced；wemightframesuchabstractideasofthemaswouldfurnishuswithmatterofmoregeneralknowledge，andenableustomakeuniversalpropositions，thatshouldcarrygeneraltruthandcertaintywiththem。Butwhilstourcomplexideasofthesortsofsubstancesaresoremotefromthatinternalrealconstitutiononwhichtheirsensiblequalitiesdepend，andaremadeupofnothingbutanimperfectcollectionofthoseapparentqualitiesoursensescandiscover，therecanbefewgeneralpropositionsconcerningsubstancesofwhoserealtruthwecanbecertainlyassured；sincetherearebutfewsimpleideasofwhoseconnexionandnecessarycoexistencewecanhavecertainandundoubtedknowledge。Iimagine，amongstallthesecondaryqualitiesofsubstances，andthepowersrelatingtothem，therecannotanytwobenamed，whosenecessaryco-existence，orrepugnancetocoexist，cancertainlybeknown；unlessinthoseofthesamesense，whichnecessarilyexcludeoneanother，asIhaveelsewhereshown。Noone，Ithink，bythecolourthatisinanybody，cancertainlyknowwhatsmell，taste，sound，ortangiblequalitiesithas，norwhatalterationsitiscapabletomakeorreceiveonorfromotherbodies。Thesamemaybesaidofthesoundortaste，&c。Ourspecificnamesofsubstancesstandingforanycollectionsofsuchideas，itisnottobewonderedthatwecanwiththemmakeveryfewgeneralpropositionsofundoubtedrealcertainty。
Butyetsofarasanycomplexideaofanysortofsubstancescontainsinitanysimpleidea，whosenecessaryexistencewithanyothermaybediscovered，sofaruniversalpropositionsmaywithcertaintybemadeconcerningit:v。g。couldanyonediscoveranecessaryconnexionbetweenmalleablenessandthecolourorweightofgold，oranyotherpartofthecomplexideasignifiedbythatname，hemightmakeacertainuniversalpropositionconcerninggoldinthisrespect；andtherealtruthofthisproposition，thatallgoldismalleable，wouldbeascertainasofthis，thethreeanglesofallright-linedtrianglesareallequaltotworightones。
11。Thequalitieswhichmakeourcomplexideasofsubstancesdependmostlyonexternal，remote，andunperceivedcauses。Hadwesuchideasofsubstancesastoknowwhatrealconstitutionsproducethosesensiblequalitieswefindinthem，andhowthosequalitiesflowedfromthence，wecould，bythespecificideasoftheirrealessencesinourownminds，morecertainlyfindouttheirproperties，anddiscoverwhatqualitiestheyhadorhadnot，thanwecannowbyoursenses:andtoknowthepropertiesofgold，itwouldbenomorenecessarythatgoldshouldexist，andthatweshouldmakeexperimentsuponit，thanitisnecessaryfortheknowingthepropertiesofatriangle，thatatriangleshouldexistinanymatter，theideainourmindswouldservefortheoneaswellastheother。Butwearesofarfrombeingadmittedintothesecretsofnature，thatwescarcesomuchaseverapproachthefirstentrancetowardsthem。Forwearewonttoconsiderthesubstanceswemeetwith，eachofthem，asanentirethingbyitself，havingallitsqualitiesinitself，andindependentofotherthings；overlooking，forthemostpart，theoperationsofthoseinvisiblefluidstheyareencompassedwith，anduponwhosemotionsandoperationsdependthegreatestpartofthosequalitieswhicharetakennoticeofinthem，andaremadebyustheinherentmarksofdistinctionwherebyweknowanddenominatethem。Putapieceofgoldanywherebyitself，separatefromthereachandinfluenceofallotherbodies，itwillimmediatelyloseallitscolourandweight，andperhapsmalleablenesstoo；which，foraughtIknow，wouldbechangedintoaperfectfriability。Water，inwhichtousfluidityisanessentialquality，lefttoitself，wouldceasetobefluid。Butifinanimatebodiesowesomuchoftheirpresentstatetootherbodieswithoutthem，thattheywouldnotbewhattheyappeartouswerethosebodiesthatenvironthemremoved；itisyetmoresoinvegetables，whicharenourished，grow，andproduceleaves，flowers，andseeds，inaconstantsuccession。Andifwelookalittlenearerintothestateofanimals，weshallfindthattheirdependence，astolife，motion，andthemostconsiderablequalitiestobeobservedinthem，issowhollyonextrinsicalcausesandqualitiesofotherbodiesthatmakenopartofthem，thattheycannotsubsistamomentwithoutthem:thoughyetthosebodiesonwhichtheydependarelittletakennoticeof，andmakenopartofthecomplexideasweframeofthoseanimals。Taketheairbutforaminutefromthegreatestpartoflivingcreatures，andtheypresentlylosesense，life，andmotion。
Thisthenecessityofbreathinghasforcedintoourknowledge。Buthowmanyotherextrinsicalandpossiblyveryremotebodiesdothespringsoftheseadmirablemachinesdependon，whicharenotvulgarlyobserved，orsomuchasthoughton；andhowmanyaretherewhichtheseverestinquirycanneverdiscover？Theinhabitantsofthisspotoftheuniverse，thoughremovedsomanymillionsofmilesfromthesun，yetdependsomuchonthedulytemperedmotionofparticlescomingfromoragitatedbyit，thatwerethisearthremovedbutasmallpartofthedistanceoutofitspresentsituation，andplacedalittlefurtherornearerthatsourceofheat，itismorethanprobablethatthegreatestpartoftheanimalsinitwouldimmediatelyperish:sincewefindthemsooftendestroyedbyanexcessordefectofthesun’swarmth，whichanaccidentalpositioninsomepartsofthisourlittleglobeexposesthemto。Thequalitiesobservedinaloadstonemustneedshavetheirsourcefarbeyondtheconfinesofthatbody；andtheravagemadeoftenonseveralsortsofanimalsbyinvisiblecauses，thecertaindeath(aswearetold)ofsomeofthem，bybarelypassingtheline，or，asitiscertainofother，bybeingremovedintoaneighbouringcountry；evidentlyshowthattheconcurrenceandoperationsofseveralbodies，withwhichtheyareseldomthoughttohaveanythingtodo，isabsolutelynecessarytomakethembewhattheyappeartous，andtopreservethosequalitiesbywhichweknowanddistinguishthem。Wearethenquiteoutoftheway，whenwethinkthatthingscontainwithinthemselvesthequalitiesthatappeartousinthem；andweinvainsearchforthatconstitutionwithinthebodyofaflyoranelephant，uponwhichdependthosequalitiesandpowersweobserveinthem。Forwhich，perhaps，tounderstandthemaright，weoughttolooknotonlybeyondthisourearthandatmosphere，butevenbeyondthesunorremoteststaroureyeshaveyetdiscovered。Forhowmuchthebeingandoperationofparticularsubstancesinthisourglobedependsoncausesutterlybeyondourview，isimpossibleforustodetermine。Weseeandperceivesomeofthemotionsandgrosseroperationsofthingshereaboutus；butwhencethestreamscomethatkeepallthesecuriousmachinesinmotionandrepair，howconveyedandmodified，isbeyondournoticeandapprehension:andthegreatpartsandwheels，asI
maysayso，ofthisstupendousstructureoftheuniverse，may，foraughtweknow，havesuchaconnexionanddependenceintheirinfluencesandoperationsoneuponanother，thatperhapsthingsinthisourmansionwouldputonquiteanotherface，andceasetobewhattheyare，ifsomeoneofthestarsorgreatbodiesincomprehensiblyremotefromus，shouldceasetobeormoveasitdoes。Thisiscertain:things，howeverabsoluteandentiretheyseeminthemselves，arebutretainerstootherpartsofnature，forthatwhichtheyaremosttakennoticeofbyus。Theirobservablequalities，actions，andpowersareowingtosomethingwithoutthem；andthereisnotsocompleteandperfectapartthatweknowofnature，whichdoesnotowethebeingithas，andtheexcellencesofit，toitsneighbours；andwemustnotconfineourthoughtswithinthesurfaceofanybody，butlookagreatdealfurther，tocomprehendperfectlythosequalitiesthatareinit。
12。Ournominalessencesofsubstancesfurnishfewuniversalpropositionsaboutthemthatarecertain。Ifthisbeso，itisnottobewonderedthatwehaveveryimperfectideasofsubstances，andthattherealessences，onwhichdependtheirpropertiesandoperations，areunknowntous。Wecannotdiscoversomuchasthatsize，figure，andtextureoftheirminuteandactiveparts，whichisreallyinthem；muchlessthedifferentmotionsandimpulsesmadeinanduponthembybodiesfromwithout，uponwhichdepends，andbywhichisformedthegreatestandmostremarkablepartofthosequalitiesweobserveinthem，andofwhichourcomplexideasofthemaremadeup。Thisconsiderationaloneisenoughtoputanendtoallourhopesofeverhavingtheideasoftheirrealessences；whichwhilstwewant，thenominalessenceswemakeuseofinsteadofthemwillbeabletofurnishusbutverysparinglywithanygeneralknowledge，oruniversalpropositionscapableofrealcertainty。
13。Judgmentofprobabilityconcerningsubstancesmayreachfurther:
butthatisnotknowledge。Wearenotthereforetowonder，ifcertaintybetobefoundinveryfewgeneralpropositionsmadeconcerningsubstances:ourknowledgeoftheirqualitiesandpropertiesgoesveryseldomfurtherthanoursensesreachandinformus。Possiblyinquisitiveandobservingmenmay，bystrengthofjudgment，penetratefurther，and，onprobabilitiestakenfromwaryobservation，andhintswelllaidtogether，oftenguessrightatwhatexperiencehasnotyetdiscoveredtothem。Butthisisbutguessingstill；itamountsonlytoopinion，andhasnotthatcertaintywhichisrequisitetoknowledge。Forallgeneralknowledgeliesonlyinourownthoughts，andconsistsbarelyinthecontemplationofourownabstractideas。Whereverweperceiveanyagreementordisagreementamongstthem，therewehavegeneralknowledge；andbyputtingthenamesofthoseideastogetheraccordinglyinpropositions，canwithcertaintypronouncegeneraltruths。Butbecausetheabstractideasofsubstances，forwhichtheirspecificnamesstand，whenevertheyhaveanydistinctanddeterminatesignification，haveadiscoverableconnexionorinconsistencywithbutaveryfewotherideas，thecertaintyofuniversalpropositionsconcerningsubstancesisverynarrowandscanty，inthatpartwhichisourprincipalinquiryconcerningthem；andtherearescarceanyofthenamesofsubstances，lettheideaitisappliedtobewhatitwill，ofwhichwecangenerally，andwithcertainty，pronounce，thatithasorhasnotthisorthatotherqualitybelongingtoit，andconstantlyco-existingorinconsistentwiththatidea，whereveritistobefound。
14。Whatisrequisiteforourknowledgeofsubstances。Beforewecanhaveanytolerableknowledgeofthiskind，wemustFirstknowwhatchangestheprimaryqualitiesofonebodydoregularlyproduceintheprimaryqualitiesofanother，andhow。Secondly，Wemustknowwhatprimaryqualitiesofanybodyproducecertainsensationsorideasinus。Thisisintruthnolessthantoknowalltheeffectsofmatter，underitsdiversmodificationsofbulk，figure，cohesionofparts，motionandrest。Which，Ithinkeverybodywillallow，isutterlyimpossibletobeknownbyuswithoutrevelation。Norifitwererevealedtouswhatsortoffigure，bulk，andmotionofcorpuscleswouldproduceinusthesensationofayellowcolour，andwhatsortoffigure，bulk，andtextureofpartsinthesuperficiesofanybodywerefittogivesuchcorpusclestheirduemotiontoproducethatcolour；
wouldthatbeenoughtomakeuniversalpropositionswithcertainty，concerningtheseveralsortsofthem；unlesswehadfacultiesacuteenoughtoperceivetheprecisebulk，figure，texture，andmotionofbodies，inthoseminuteparts，bywhichtheyoperateonoursenses，sothatwemightbythoseframeourabstractideasofthem。Ihavementionedhereonlycorporealsubstances，whoseoperationsseemtoliemoreleveltoourunderstandings。Forastotheoperationsofspirits，boththeirthinkingandmovingofbodies，weatfirstsightfindourselvesataloss；thoughperhaps，whenwehaveappliedourthoughtsalittlenearertotheconsiderationofbodiesandtheiroperations，andexaminedhowfarournotions，eveninthese，reachwithanyclearnessbeyondsensiblematteroffact，weshallbeboundtoconfessthat，eveninthesetoo，ourdiscoveriesamounttoverylittlebeyondperfectignoranceandincapacity。
15。Whilstourcomplexideasofsubstancescontainnotideasoftheirrealconstitutions，wecanmakebutfewgeneralcertainpropositionsconcerningthem。Thisisevident，theabstractcomplexideasofsubstances。forwhichtheirgeneralnamesstand，notcomprehendingtheirrealconstitutions，canaffordusverylittleuniversalcertainty。Becauseourideasofthemarenotmadeupofthatonwhichthosequalitiesweobserveinthem，andwouldinformourselvesabout，dodepend，orwithwhichtheyhaveanycertainconnexion:v。g。lettheideastowhichwegivethenamemanbe，asitcommonlyis，abodyoftheordinaryshape，withsense，voluntarymotion，andreasonjoinedtoit。Thisbeingtheabstractidea，andconsequentlytheessenceofourspecies，man，wecanmakebutveryfewgeneralcertainpropositionsconcerningman，standingforsuchanidea。Because，notknowingtherealconstitutiononwhichsensation，powerofmotion，andreasoning，withthatpeculiarshape，depend，andwherebytheyareunitedtogetherinthesamesubject，thereareveryfewotherqualitieswithwhichwecanperceivethemtohaveanecessaryconnexion:andthereforewecannotwithcertaintyaffirm:
Thatallmensleepbyintervals；Thatnomancanbenourishedbywoodorstones；Thatallmenwillbepoisonedbyhemlock:becausetheseideashavenoconnexionnorrepugnancywiththisournominalessenceofman，withthisabstractideathatnamestandsfor。Wemust，intheseandthelike，appealtotrialinparticularsubjects，whichcanreachbutalittleway。Wemustcontentourselveswithprobabilityintherest:butcanhavenogeneralcertainty，whilstourspecificideaofmancontainsnotthatrealconstitutionwhichistherootwhereinallhisinseparablequalitiesareunited，andfromwhencetheyflow。Whilstourideathewordmanstandsforisonlyanimperfectcollectionofsomesensiblequalitiesandpowersinhim，thereisnodiscernibleconnexionorrepugnancebetweenourspecificidea，andtheoperationofeitherthepartsofhemlockorstonesuponhisconstitution。Thereareanimalsthatsafelyeathemlock，andothersthatarenourishedbywoodandstones:butaslongaswewantideasofthoserealconstitutionsofdifferentsortsofanimalswhereontheseandthelikequalitiesandpowersdepend，wemustnothopetoreachcertaintyinuniversalpropositionsconcerningthem。Thosefewideasonlywhichhaveadiscernibleconnexionwithournominalessence，oranypartofit，canaffordussuchpropositions。Butthesearesofew，andofsolittlemoment，thatwemayjustlylookonourcertaingeneralknowledgeofsubstancesasalmostnoneatall。
16。Whereinliesthegeneralcertaintyofpropositions。Toconclude:
generalpropositions，ofwhatkindsoever，arethenonlycapableofcertainty，whenthetermsusedinthemstandforsuchideas，whoseagreementordisagreement，asthereexpressed，iscapabletobediscoveredbyus。Andwearethencertainoftheirtruthorfalsehood，whenweperceivetheideasthetermsstandfortoagreeornotagree，accordingastheyareaffirmedordeniedoneofanother。Whencewemaytakenotice，thatgeneralcertaintyisnevertobefoundbutinourideas。Wheneverwegotoseekitelsewhere，inexperimentorobservationswithoutus，ourknowledgegoesnotbeyondparticulars。Itisthecontemplationofourownabstractideasthataloneisabletoaffordusgeneralknowledge。
ChapterVII
OfMaxims1。Maximsoraxiomsareself-evidentpropositions。Thereareasortofpropositions，which，underthenameofmaximsandaxioms，havepassedforprinciplesofscience:andbecausetheyareself-evident，havebeensupposedinnate，withoutthatanybody(thatIknow)everwentabouttoshowthereasonandfoundationoftheirclearnessorcogency。Itmay，however，beworthwhiletoinquireintothereasonoftheirevidence，andseewhetheritbepeculiartothemalone；andalsotoexaminehowfartheyinfluenceandgovernourotherknowledge。
2。Whereinthatself-evidenceconsists。Knowledge，ashasbeenshown，consistsintheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofideas。Now，wherethatagreementordisagreementisperceivedimmediatelybyitself，withouttheinterventionorhelpofanyother，thereourknowledgeisself-evident。Thiswillappeartobesotoanywhowillbutconsideranyofthosepropositionswhich，withoutanyproof，heassentstoatfirstsight:forinallofthemhewillfindthatthereasonofhisassentisfromthatagreementordisagreementwhichthemind，byanimmediatecomparingthem，findsinthoseideasansweringtheaffirmationornegationintheproposition。
3。Self-evidencenotpeculiartoreceivedaxioms。Thisbeingso，inthenextplace，letusconsiderwhetherthisself-evidencebepeculiaronlytothosepropositionswhichcommonlypassunderthenameofmaxims，andhavethedignityofaxiomsallowedthem。Andhereitisplain，thatseveralothertruths，notallowedtobeaxioms，partakeequallywiththeminthisself-evidence。Thisweshallsee，ifwegoovertheseseveralsortsofagreementordisagreementofideaswhichI
haveabovementioned，viz。identity，relation，coexistence，andrealexistence；whichwilldiscovertous，thatnotonlythosefewpropositionswhichhavehadthecreditofmaximsareself-evident，butagreatmany，evenalmostaninfinitenumberofotherpropositionsaresuch。
4。I。Astoidentityanddiversity，allpropositionsareequallyself-evident。For，First，Theimmediateperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofidentitybeingfoundedinthemind’shavingdistinctideas，thisaffordsusasmanyself-evidentpropositionsaswehavedistinctideas。Everyonethathasanyknowledgeatall，has，asthefoundationofit，variousanddistinctideas:anditisthefirstactofthemind(withoutwhichitcanneverbecapableofanyknowledge)toknoweveryoneofitsideasbyitself，anddistinguishitfromothers。Everyonefindsinhimself，thatheknowstheideashehas；thatheknowsalso，whenanyoneisinhisunderstanding，andwhatitis；andthatwhenmorethanonearethere，heknowsthemdistinctlyandunconfusedlyonefromanother；whichalwaysbeingso，(itbeingimpossiblebutthatheshouldperceivewhatheperceives，)
hecanneverbeindoubtwhenanyideaisinhismind，thatitisthere，andisthatideaitis；andthattwodistinctideas，whentheyareinhismind，arethere，andarenotoneandthesameidea。Sothatallsuchaffirmationsandnegationsaremadewithoutanypossibilityofdoubt，uncertainty，orhesitation，andmustnecessarilybeassentedtoassoonasunderstood；thatis，assoonaswehaveinourmindsdeterminedideas，whichthetermsinthepropositionstandfor。And，therefore，wheneverthemindwithattentionconsidersanyproposition，soastoperceivethetwoideassignifiedbytheterms，andaffirmedordeniedoneoftheothertobethesameordifferent；
itispresentlyandinfalliblycertainofthetruthofsuchaproposition；andthisequallywhetherthesepropositionsbeintermsstandingformoregeneralideas，orsuchasarelessso:v。g。
whetherthegeneralideaofBeingbeaffirmedofitself，asinthisproposition，\"whatsoeveris，is\"；oramoreparticularideabeaffirmedofitself，as\"amanisaman\"；or，\"whatsoeveriswhiteiswhite\"；orwhethertheideaofbeingingeneralbedeniedofnot-Being，whichistheonly(ifImaysocallit)ideadifferentfromit，asinthisotherproposition，\"itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe\":oranyideaofanyparticularbeingbedeniedofanotherdifferentfromit，as\"amanisnotahorse\"；\"redisnotblue。\"Thedifferenceoftheideas，assoonasthetermsareunderstood，makesthetruthofthepropositionpresentlyvisible，andthatwithanequalcertaintyandeasinessinthelessaswellasthemoregeneralpropositions；andallforthesamereason，viz。
becausethemindperceives，inanyideasthatithas，thesameideatobethesamewithitself；andtwodifferentideastobedifferent，andnotthesame；andthisitisequallycertainof，whethertheseideasbemoreorlessgeneral，abstract，andcomprehensive。Itisnot，therefore，alonetothesetwogeneralpropositions-\"whatsoeveris，is\"；and\"itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe\"-
thatthissortofself-evidencebelongsbyanypeculiarright。Theperceptionofbeing，ornotbeing，belongsnomoretothesevagueideas，signifiedbythetermswhatsoever，andthing，thanitdoestoanyotherideas。Thesetwogeneralmaxims，amountingtonomore，inshort，butthis，thatthesameisthesame，andthesameisnotdifferent，aretruthsknowninmoreparticularinstances，aswellasinthosegeneralmaxims；andknownalsoinparticularinstances，beforethesegeneralmaximsareeverthoughton；anddrawalltheirforcefromthediscernmentofthemindemployedaboutparticularideas。Thereisnothingmorevisiblethanthatthemind，withoutthehelpofanyproof，orreflectiononeitherofthesegeneralpropositions，perceivessoclearly，andknowssocertainly，thattheideaofwhiteistheideaofwhite，andnottheideaofblue；andthattheideaofwhite，whenitisinthemind，isthere，andisnotabsent；thattheconsiderationoftheseaxiomscanaddnothingtotheevidenceorcertaintyofitsknowledge。Justsoitis(aseveryonemayexperimentinhimself)inalltheideasamanhasinhismind:
heknowseachtobeitself，andnottobeanother；andtobeinhismind，andnotawaywhenitisthere，withacertaintythatcannotbegreater；and，therefore，thetruthofnogeneralpropositioncanbeknownwithagreatercertainty，noraddanythingtothis。Sothat，inrespectofidentity，ourintuitiveknowledgereachesasfarasourideas。Andwearecapableofmakingasmanyself-evidentpropositions，aswehavenamesfordistinctideas。AndIappealtoeveryone’sownmind，whetherthisproposition，\"acircleisacircle，\"benotasself-evidentapropositionasthatconsistingofmoregeneralterms，\"whatsoeveris，is\"；andagain，whetherthisproposition，\"blueisnotred，\"benotapropositionthatthemindcannomoredoubtof，assoonasitunderstandsthewords，thanitdoesofthataxiom，\"itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe？\"
Andsoofallthelike。
5。II。Inco-existencewehavefewself-evidentpropositions。
Secondly，astoco-existence，orsuchanecessaryconnexionbetweentwoideasthat，inthesubjectwhereoneofthemissupposed，theretheothermustnecessarilybealso:ofsuchagreementordisagreementasthis，themindhasanimmediateperceptionbutinveryfewofthem。Andthereforeinthissortwehavebutverylittleintuitiveknowledge:noraretheretobefoundverymanypropositionsthatareself-evident，thoughsomethereare:v。g。theideaoffillingaplaceequaltothecontentsofitssuperficies，beingannexedtoourideaofbody，Ithinkitisaself-evidentproposition，thattwobodiescannotbeinthesameplace。
6。III。Inotherrelationswemayhavemany。Thirdly，Astotherelationsofmodes，mathematicianshaveframedmanyaxiomsconcerningthatonerelationofequality。As，\"equalstakenfromequals，theremainderwillbeequal\"；which，withtherestofthatkind，howevertheyarereceivedformaximsbythemathematicians，andareunquestionabletruths，yet，Ithink，thatanyonewhoconsidersthemwillnotfindthattheyhaveaclearerself-evidencethanthese，-that\"oneandoneareequaltotwo\"；that\"ifyoutakefromthefivefingersofonehandtwo，andfromthefivefingersoftheotherhandtwo，theremainingnumberswillbeequal。\"Theseandathousandothersuchpropositionsmaybefoundinnumbers，which，attheveryfirsthearing，forcetheassent，andcarrywiththemanequal，ifnotgreaterclearness，thanthosemathematicalaxioms。
7。IV。Concerningrealexistence，wehavenone。Fourthly，astorealexistence，sincethathasnoconnexionwithanyotherofourideas，butthatofourselves，andofaFirstBeing，wehaveinthat，concerningtherealexistenceofallotherbeings，notsomuchasdemonstrative，muchlessaself-evidentknowledge:and，therefore，concerningthosetherearenomaxims。
8。Theseaxiomsdonotmuchinfluenceourotherknowledge。Inthenextplaceletusconsider，whatinfluencethesereceivedmaximshaveupontheotherpartsofourknowledge。Therulesestablishedintheschools，thatallreasoningsareExpraeognitisetpraeconcessis，seemtolaythefoundationofallotherknowledgeinthesemaxims，andtosupposethemtobepraecognita。Whereby，Ithink，aremeantthesetwothings:first，thattheseaxiomsarethosetruthsthatarefirstknowntothemind；and，secondly，thatuponthemtheotherpartsofourknowledgedepend。
9。Becausemaximsoraxiomsarenotthetruthswefirstknew。First，Thattheyarenotthetruthsfirstknowntothemindisevidenttoexperience，aswehaveshowninanotherplace。(Bk。I。chap。i。)Whoperceivesnotthatachildcertainlyknowsthatastrangerisnotitsmother；thatitssucking-bottleisnottherod，longbeforeheknowsthat\"itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe？\"Andhowmanytruthsarethereaboutnumbers，whichitisobvioustoobservethatthemindisperfectlyacquaintedwith，andfullyconvincedof，beforeiteverthoughtonthesegeneralmaxims，towhichmathematicians，intheirarguings，dosometimesreferthem？
Whereofthereasonisveryplain:forthatwhichmakesthemindassenttosuchpropositions，beingnothingelsebuttheperceptionithasoftheagreementordisagreementofitsideas，accordingasitfindsthemaffirmedordeniedoneofanotherinwordsitunderstands；andeveryideabeingknowntobewhatitis，andeverytwodistinctideasbeingknownnottobethesame；itmustnecessarilyfollow，thatsuchself-evidenttruthsmustbefirstknownwhichconsistofideasthatarefirstinthemind。Andtheideasfirstinthemind，itisevident，arethoseofparticularthings，fromwhence，byslowdegrees，theunderstandingproceedstosomefewgeneralones；whichbeingtakenfromtheordinaryandfamiliarobjectsofsense，aresettledinthemind，withgeneralnamestothem。Thusparticularideasarefirstreceivedanddistinguished，andsoknowledgegotaboutthem；andnexttothem，thelessgeneralorspecific，whicharenexttoparticular。Forabstractideasarenotsoobviousoreasytochildren，ortheyetunexercisedmind，asparticularones。Iftheyseemsotogrownmen，itisonlybecausebyconstantandfamiliarusetheyaremadeso。For，whenwenicelyreflectuponthem，weshallfindthatgeneralideasarefictionsandcontrivancesofthemind，thatcarrydifficultywiththem，anddonotsoeasilyofferthemselvesasweareapttoimagine。Forexample，doesitnotrequiresomepainsandskilltoformthegeneralideaofatriangle，(whichisyetnoneofthemostabstract，comprehensive，anddifficult，)foritmustbeneitherobliquenorrectangle，neitherequilateral，equicrural，norscalenon；butallandnoneoftheseatonce。Ineffect，itissomethingimperfect，thatcannotexist；anideawhereinsomepartsofseveraldifferentandinconsistentideasareputtogether。Itistrue，themind，inthisimperfectstate，hasneedofsuchideas，andmakesallthehastetothemitcan，fortheconveniencyofcommunicationandenlargementofknowledge；tobothwhichitisnaturallyverymuchinclined。Butyetonehasreasontosuspectsuchideasaremarksofourimperfection；atleast，thisisenoughtoshowthatthemostabstractandgeneralideasarenotthosethatthemindisfirstandmosteasilyacquaintedwith，norsuchasitsearliestknowledgeisconversantabout。
10。Becauseonperceptionofthemtheotherpartsofourknowledgedonotdepend。Secondly，fromwhathasbeensaiditplainlyfollows，thatthesemagnifiedmaximsarenottheprinciplesandfoundationsofallourotherknowledge。Foriftherebeagreatmanyothertruths，whichhaveasmuchself-evidenceasthey，andagreatmanythatweknowbeforethem，itisimpossibletheyshouldbetheprinciplesfromwhichwededuceallothertruths。Isitimpossibletoknowthatoneandtwoareequaltothree，butbyvirtueofthis，orsomesuchaxiom，viz。\"thewholeisequaltoallitspartstakentogether？\"Manyaoneknowsthatoneandtwoareequaltothree，withouthavingheard，orthoughton，thatoranyotheraxiombywhichitmightbeproved；
andknowsitascertainlyasanyothermanknows，that\"thewholeisequaltoallitsparts，\"oranyothermaxim；andallfromthesamereasonofself-evidence:theequalityofthoseideasbeingasvisibleandcertaintohimwithoutthatoranyotheraxiomaswithit，itneedingnoprooftomakeitperceived。Noraftertheknowledge，thatthewholeisequaltoallitsparts，doesheknowthatoneandtwoareequaltothree，betterormorecertainlythanhedidbefore。
Foriftherebeanyoddsinthoseideas，thewholeandpartsaremoreobscure，oratleastmoredifficulttobesettledinthemindthanthoseofone，two，andthree。Andindeed，Ithink，Imayaskthesemen，whowillneedshaveallknowledge，besidesthosegeneralprinciplesthemselves，todependongeneral，innate，andself-evidentprinciples。Whatprincipleisrequisitetoprovethatoneandonearetwo，thattwoandtwoarefour，thatthreetimestwoaresix？Whichbeingknownwithoutanyproof，doevince，Thateitherallknowledgedoesnotdependoncertainpraecognitaorgeneralmaxims，calledprinciples；orelsethattheseareprinciples:andifthesearetobecountedprinciples，agreatpartofnumerationwillbeso。Towhich，ifweaddalltheself-evidentpropositionswhichmaybemadeaboutallourdistinctideas，principleswillbealmostinfinite，atleastinnumerable，whichmenarrivetotheknowledgeof，atdifferentages；andagreatmanyoftheseinnateprinciplestheynevercometoknowalltheirlives。Butwhethertheycomeinviewofthemindearlierorlater，thisistrueofthem，thattheyareallknownbytheirnativeevidence；arewhollyindependent；receivenolight，norarecapableofanyproofonefromanother；muchlessthemoreparticularfromthemoregeneral，orthemoresimplefromthemorecompounded；themoresimpleandlessabstractbeingthemostfamiliar，andtheeasierandearlierapprehended。Butwhicheverbetheclearestideas，theevidenceandcertaintyofallsuchpropositionsisinthis，Thatamanseesthesameideatobethesameidea，andinfalliblyperceivestwodifferentideastobedifferentideas。Forwhenamanhasinhisunderstandingtheideasofoneandoftwo，theideaofyellow，andtheideaofblue，hecannotbutcertainlyknowthattheideaofoneistheideaofone，andnottheideaoftwo；
andthattheideaofyellowistheideaofyellow，andnottheideaofblue。Foramancannotconfoundtheideasinhismind，whichhehasdistinct:thatwouldbetohavethemconfusedanddistinctatthesametime，whichisacontradiction:andtohavenonedistinct，istohavenouseofourfaculties，tohavenoknowledgeatall。And，therefore，whatideasoeverisaffirmedofitself，orwhatsoevertwoentiredistinctideasaredeniedoneofanother，themindcannotbutassenttosuchapropositionasinfalliblytrue，assoonasitunderstandstheterms，withouthesitationorneedofproof，orregardingthosemadeinmoregeneraltermsandcalledmaxims。
11。Whatusethesegeneralmaximsoraxiomshave。Whatshallwethensay？Arethesegeneralmaximsofnouse？Bynomeans；thoughperhapstheiruseisnotthatwhichitiscommonlytakentobe。But，sincedoubtingintheleastofwhathathbeenbysomemenascribedtothesemaximsmaybeapttobecriedoutagainst，asoverturningthefoundationsofallthesciences；itmaybeworthwhiletoconsiderthemwithrespecttootherpartsofourknowledge，andexaminemoreparticularlytowhatpurposestheyserve，andtowhatnot。
(1)Itisevidentfromwhathasbeenalreadysaid，thattheyareofnousetoproveorconfirmlessgeneralself-evidentpropositions。
(2)Itisasplainthattheyarenot，norhavebeenthefoundationswhereonanysciencehathbeenbuilt。Thereis，Iknow，agreatdealoftalk，propagatedfromscholasticmen，ofsciencesandthemaximsonwhichtheyarebuilt:butithasbeenmyill-lucknevertomeetwithanysuchsciences；muchlessanyonebuiltuponthesetwomaxims，whatis，is；anditisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe。AndIwouldbegladtobeshownwhereanysuchscience，erectedupontheseoranyothergeneralaxiomsistobefound:andshouldbeobligedtoanyonewhowouldlaybeforemetheframeandsystemofanysciencesobuiltontheseoranysuchlikemaxims，thatcouldnotbeshowntostandasfirmwithoutanyconsiderationofthem。Iask，Whetherthesegeneralmaximshavenotthesameuseinthestudyofdivinity，andintheologicalquestions，thattheyhaveinothersciences？Theyservehere，too，tosilencewranglers，andputanendtodispute。ButIthinkthatnobodywillthereforesay，thattheChristianreligionisbuiltuponthesemaxims，orthattheknowledgewehaveofitisderivedfromtheseprincipals。Itisfromrevelationwehavereceivedit，andwithoutrevelationthesemaximshadneverbeenabletohelpustoit。Whenwefindoutanideabywhoseinterventionwediscovertheconnexionoftwoothers，thisisarevelationfromGodtousbythevoiceofreason:forwethencometoknowatruththatwedidnotknowbefore。WhenGoddeclaresanytruthtous，thisisarevelationtousbythevoiceofhisSpirit，andweareadvancedinourknowledge。
Butinneitherofthesedowereceiveourlightorknowledgefrommaxims。Butintheone，thethingsthemselvesaffordit:andweseethetruthinthembyperceivingtheiragreementordisagreement。Intheother，Godhimselfaffordsitimmediatelytous:andweseethetruthofwhathesaysinhisunerringveracity。
(3)Theyarenotofusetohelpmenforwardintheadvancementofsciences，ornewdiscoveriesofyetunknowntruths。Mr。Newton，inhisneverenoughtobeadmiredbook，hasdemonstratedseveralpropositions，whicharesomanynewtruths，beforeunknowntotheworld，andarefurtheradvancesinmathematicalknowledge:but，forthediscoveryofthese，itwasnotthegeneralmaxims，\"whatis，is；\"or，\"thewholeisbiggerthanapart，\"orthelike，thathelpedhim。Thesewerenotthecluesthatledhimintothediscoveryofthetruthandcertaintyofthosepropositions。Norwasitbythemthathegottheknowledgeofthosedemonstrations，butbyfindingoutintermediateideasthatshowedtheagreementordisagreementoftheideas，asexpressedinthepropositionshedemonstrated。Thisisthegreatestexerciseandimprovementofhumanunderstandingintheenlargingofknowledge，andadvancingthesciences；whereintheyarefarenoughfromreceivinganyhelpfromthecontemplationoftheseorthelikemagnifiedmaxims。Wouldthosewhohavethistraditionaladmirationofthesepropositions，thattheythinknostepcanbemadeinknowledgewithoutthesupportofanaxiom，nostonelaidinthebuildingofthescienceswithoutageneralmaxim，butdistinguishbetweenthemethodofacquiringknowledge，andofcommunicatingit；betweenthemethodofraisinganyscience，andthatofteachingittoothers，asfarasitisadvanced-theywouldseethatthosegeneralmaximswerenotthefoundationsonwhichthefirstdiscoverersraisedtheiradmirablestructures，notthekeysthatunlockedandopenedthosesecretsofknowledge。Thoughafterwards，whenschoolswereerected，andscienceshadtheirprofessorstoteachwhatothershadfoundout，theyoftenmadeuseofmaxims，i。e。
laiddowncertainpropositionswhichwereself-evident，ortobereceivedfortrue；whichbeingsettledinthemindsoftheirscholarsasunquestionableveritiestheyonoccasionmadeuseof，toconvincethemoftruthsinparticularinstances，thatwerenotsofamiliartotheirmindsasthosegeneralaxiomswhichhadbeforebeeninculcatedtothem，andcarefullysettledintheirminds。
Thoughtheseparticularinstances，whenwellreflectedon，arenolessself-evidenttotheunderstandingthanthegeneralmaximsbroughttoconfirmthem:anditwasinthoseparticularinstancesthatthefirstdiscovererfoundthetruth，withoutthehelpofthegeneralmaxims:andsomayanyoneelsedo，whowithattentionconsidersthem。
Maximsofuseintheexpositionofwhathasbeendiscovered，andinsilencingobstinatewranglers。Tocome，therefore，totheusethatismadeofmaxims。
(1)Theyareofuse，ashasbeenobserved，intheordinarymethodsofteachingsciencesasfarastheyareadvanced:butoflittleornoneinadvancingthemfurther。
(2)Theyareofuseindisputes，forthesilencingofobstinatewranglers，andbringingthoseconteststosomeconclusion。Whetheraneedofthemtothatendcamenotinthemannerfollowing，Icraveleavetoinquire。TheSchoolshavingmadedisputationthetouchstoneofmen’sabilities，andthecriterionofknowledge，adjudgedvictorytohimthatkeptthefield:andhethathadthelastwordwasconcludedtohavethebetteroftheargument，ifnotofthecause。Butbecausebythismeanstherewasliketobenodecisionbetweenskilfulcombatants，whilstoneneverfailedofamediusterminustoproveanyproposition；andtheothercouldasconstantly，withoutorwithadistinction，denythemajororminor；toprevent，asmuchascouldbe，runningoutofdisputesintoanendlesstrainofsyllogisms，certaingeneralpropositions-mostofthem，indeed，self-evident-wereintroducedintotheSchools:whichbeingsuchasallmenallowedandagreedin，werelookedonasgeneralmeasuresoftruth，andservedinsteadofprinciples(wherethedisputantshadnotlaindownanyotherbetweenthem)beyondwhichtherewasnogoing，andwhichmustnotberecededfrombyeitherside。Andthusthesemaxims，gettingthenameofprinciples，beyondwhichmenindisputecouldnotretreat，werebymistaketakentobetheoriginalsandsourcesfromwhenceallknowledgebegan，andthefoundationswhereonthescienceswerebuilt。Becausewhenintheirdisputestheycametoanyofthese，theystoppedthere，andwentnofurther；thematterwasdetermined。
Buthowmuchthisisamistake，hathbeenalreadyshown。
Howmaximscametobesomuchinvogue。ThismethodoftheSchools，whichhavebeenthoughtthefountainsofknowledge，introduced，asIsuppose，thelikeuseofthesemaximsintoagreatpartofconversationoutoftheSchools，tostopthemouthsofcavillers，whomanyoneisexcusedfromarguinganylongerwith，whentheydenythesegeneralself-evidentprinciplesreceivedbyallreasonablemenwhohaveoncethoughtofthem:butyettheirusehereinisbuttoputanendtowrangling。Theyintruth，whenurgedinsuchcases，teachnothing:thatisalreadydonebytheintermediateideasmadeuseofinthedebate，whoseconnexionmaybeseenwithoutthehelpofthosemaxims，andsothetruthknownbeforethemaximisproduced，andtheargumentbroughttoafirstprinciple。Menwouldgiveoffawrongargumentbeforeitcametothat，ifintheirdisputestheyproposedtothemselvesthefindingandembracingoftruth，andnotacontestforvictory。Andthusmaximshavetheirusetoputastoptotheirperverseness，whoseingenuityshouldhaveyieldedsooner。ButthemethodoftheSchoolshavingallowedandencouragedmentoopposeandresistevidenttruthtilltheyarebaffled，i。e。
tilltheyarereducedtocontradictthemselves，orsomeestablishedprinciples:itisnowonderthattheyshouldnotincivilconversationbeashamedofthatwhichintheSchoolsiscountedavirtueandaglory，viz。obstinatelytomaintainthatsideofthequestiontheyhavechosen，whethertrueorfalse，tothelastextremity；evenafterconviction。Astrangewaytoattaintruthandknowledge:andthatwhichIthinktherationalpartofmankind，notcorruptedbyeducation，couldscarcebelieveshouldeverbeadmittedamongsttheloversoftruth，andstudentsofreligionornature，orintroducedintotheseminariesofthosewhoaretopropagatethetruthsofreligionorphilosophyamongsttheignorantandunconvinced。Howmuchsuchawayoflearningisliketoturnyoungmen’smindsfromthesinceresearchandloveoftruth；nay，andtomakethemdoubtwhetherthereisanysuchthing，or，atleast，worththeadheringto，Ishallnotnowinquire。ThisIthink，that，batingthoseplaces，whichbroughtthePeripatetickPhilosophyintotheirschools，whereitcontinuedmanyages，withoutteachingtheworldanythingbuttheartofwrangling，thesemaximswerenowherethoughtthefoundationsonwhichthescienceswerebuilt，northegreathelpstotheadvancementofknowledge。
Ofgreatusetostopwranglersindisputes，butoflittleusetothediscoveryoftruths。Astothesegeneralmaxims，therefore，theyare，asIhavesaid，ofgreatuseindisputes，tostopthemouthsofwranglers；butnotofmuchusetothediscoveryofunknowntruths，ortohelpthemindforwardsinitssearchafterknowledge。Forwhoeverbegantobuildhisknowledgeonthegeneralproposition，whatis，is；or，itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe:andfromeitherofthese，asfromaprincipleofscience，deducedasystemofusefulknowledge？Wrongopinionsofteninvolvingcontradictions，oneofthesemaxims，asatouchstone，mayservewelltoshowwhithertheylead。Butyet，howeverfittolayopentheabsurdityormistakeofaman’sreasoningoropinion，theyareofverylittleuseforenlighteningtheunderstanding:anditwillnotbefoundthatthemindreceivesmuchhelpfromtheminitsprogressinknowledge；whichwouldbeneitherless，norlesscertain，werethesetwogeneralpropositionsneverthoughton。Itistrue，asIhavesaid，theysometimesserveinargumentationtostopawrangler’smouth，byshowingtheabsurdityofwhathesaith，andbyexposinghimtotheshameofcontradictingwhatalltheworldknows，andhehimselfcannotbutowntobetrue。Butitisonethingtoshowamanthatheisinanerror，andanothertoputhiminpossessionoftruth；andIwouldfainknowwhattruthsthesetwopropositionsareabletoteach，andbytheirinfluencemakeusknow，whichwedidnotknowbefore，orcouldnotknowwithoutthem。Letusreasonfromthemaswellaswecan，theyareonlyaboutidenticalpredications，andinfluence，ifanyatall，nonebutsuch。Eachparticularpropositionconcerningidentityordiversityisasclearlyandcertainlyknowninitself，ifattendedto，aseitherofthesegeneralones:onlythesegeneralones，asservinginallcases，arethereforemoreinculcatedandinsistedon。Astootherlessgeneralmaxims，manyofthemarenomorethanbareverbalpropositions，andteachusnothingbuttherespectandimportofnamesonetoanother。\"Thewholeisequaltoallitsparts\":whatrealtruth，Ibeseechyou，doesitteachus？Whatmoreiscontainedinthatmaxim，thanwhatthesignificationofthewordtotum，orthewhole，doesofitselfimport？Andhethatknowsthatthewordwholestandsforwhatismadeupofallitsparts，knowsverylittlelessthanthatthewholeisequaltoallitsparts。And，uponthesameground，I
thinkthatthisproposition，\"Ahillishigherthanavalley，\"andseveralthelike，mayalsopassformaxims。Butyetmastersofmathematics，whentheywould，asteachersofwhattheyknow，initiateothersinthatscience，donotwithoutreasonplacethisandsomeothersuchmaximsattheentranceoftheirsystems；thattheirscholars，havinginthebeginningperfectlyacquaintedtheirthoughtswiththesepropositions，madeinsuchgeneralterms，maybeusedtomakesuchreflections，andhavethesemoregeneralpropositions，asformedrulesandsayings，readytoapplytoallparticularcases。Notthatiftheybeequallyweighed，theyaremoreclearandevidentthantheparticularinstancestheyarebroughttoconfirm；butthat，beingmorefamiliartothemind，theverynamingthemisenoughtosatisfytheunderstanding。Butthis，Isay，ismorefromourcustomofusingthem，andtheestablishmenttheyhavegotinourmindsbyouroftenthinkingofthem，thanfromthedifferentevidenceofthethings。Butbeforecustomhassettledmethodsofthinkingandreasoninginourminds，Iamapttoimagineitisquiteotherwise；andthatthechild，whenapartofhisappleistakenaway，knowsitbetterinthatparticularinstance，thanbythisgeneralproposition，\"Thewholeisequaltoallitsparts\"；andthat，ifoneofthesehaveneedtobeconfirmedtohimbytheother，thegeneralhasmoreneedtobeletintohismindbytheparticular，thantheparticularbythegeneral。Forinparticularsourknowledgebegins，andsospreadsitself，bydegrees，togenerals。Thoughafterwardsthemindtakesthequitecontrarycourse，andhavingdrawnitsknowledgeintoasgeneralpropositionsasitcan，makesthosefamiliartoitsthoughts，andaccustomsitselftohaverecoursetothem，astothestandardsoftruthandfalsehood。Bywhichfamiliaruseofthem，asrulestomeasurethetruthofotherpropositions，itcomesintimetobethought，thatmoreparticularpropositionshavetheirtruthandevidencefromtheirconformitytothesemoregeneralones，which，indiscourseandargumentation，aresofrequentlyurged，andconstantlyadmitted。AndthisIthinktobethereasonwhy，amongstsomanyself-evidentpropositions，themostgeneralonlyhavehadthetitleofmaxims。
12。Maxims，ifcarehenottakenintheuseofwords，mayprovecontradictions。Onethingfurther，Ithink，itmaynotbeamisstoobserveconcerningthesegeneralmaxims，Thattheyaresofarfromimprovingorestablishingourmindsintrueknowledge，thatifournotionsbewrong，loose，orunsteady，andweresignupourthoughtstothesoundofwords，ratherthanfixthemonsettled，determinedideasofthings；Isaythesegeneralmaximswillservetoconfirmusinmistakes；andinsuchawayofuseofwords，whichismostcommon，willservetoprovecontradictions:v。g。hethatwithDescartesshallframeinhismindanideaofwhathecallsbodytobenothingbutextension，mayeasilydemonstratethatthereisnovacuum，i。e。nospacevoidofbody，bythismaxim，Whatis，is。Fortheideatowhichheannexesthenamebody，beingbareextension，hisknowledgethatspacecannotbewithoutbody，iscertain。Forheknowshisownideaofextensionclearlyanddistinctly，andknowsthatitiswhatitis，andnotanotheridea，thoughitbecalledbythesethreenames，-extension，body，space。Whichthreewords，standingforoneandthesameidea，may，nodoubt，withthesameevidenceandcertaintybeaffirmedoneofanother，aseachofitself:anditisascertain，that，whilstIusethemalltostandforoneandthesameidea，thispredicationisastrueandidenticalinitssignification，that\"spaceisbody，\"asthispredicationistrueandidentical，that\"bodyisbody，\"bothinsignificationandsound。
13。Instanceinvacuum。Butifanothershouldcomeandmaketohimselfanotheridea，differentfromDescartes’s，ofthething，whichyetwithDescarteshecallsbythesamenamebody，andmakehisidea，whichheexpressesbythewordbody，tobeofathingthathathbothextensionandsoliditytogether；hewillaseasilydemonstrate，thattheremaybeavacuumorspacewithoutabody，asDescartesdemonstratedthecontrary。Becausetheideatowhichhegivesthenamespacebeingbarelythesimpleoneofextension，andtheideatowhichhegivesthenamebodybeingthecomplexideaofextensionandresistibilityorsolidity，togetherinthesamesubject，thesetwoideasarenotexactlyoneandthesame，butintheunderstandingasdistinctastheideasofoneandtwo，whiteandblack，orasofcorporeityandhumanity，ifImayusethosebarbarousterms:andthereforethepredicationoftheminourminds，orinwordsstandingforthem，isnotidentical，butthenegationofthemoneofanother；viz。thisproposition:\"Extensionorspaceisnotbody，\"isastrueandevidentlycertainasthismaxim，Itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe，canmakeanyproposition。
14。Buttheyprovenottheexistenceofthingswithoutus。Butyet，thoughboththesepropositions(asyousee)maybeequallydemonstrated，viz。thattheremaybeavacuum，andthattherecannotbeavacuum，bythesetwocertainprinciples，viz。whatis，is，andthesamethingcannotbeandnotbe:yetneitheroftheseprincipleswillservetoprovetous，thatany，orwhatbodiesdoexist:forthatwearelefttooursensestodiscovertousasfarastheycan。
Thoseuniversalandself-evidentprinciplesbeingonlyourconstant，clear，anddistinctknowledgeofourownideas，moregeneralorcomprehensive，canassureusofnothingthatpasseswithoutthemind:theircertaintyisfoundedonlyupontheknowledgewehaveofeachideabyitself，andofitsdistinctionfromothers，aboutwhichwecannotbemistakenwhilsttheyareinourminds；thoughwemaybeandoftenaremistakenwhenweretainthenameswithouttheideas；
orusethemconfusedly，sometimesforoneandsometimesforanotheridea。Inwhichcasestheforceoftheseaxioms，reachingonlytothesound，andnotthesignificationofthewords，servesonlytoleadusintoconfusion，mistake，anderror。Itistoshowmenthatthesemaxims，howevercriedupforthegreatguardsoftruth，willnotsecurethemfromerrorinacarelesslooseuseoftheirwords，thatIhavemadethisremark。Inallthatisheresuggestedconcerningtheirlittleusefortheimprovementofknowledge，ordangeroususeinundeterminedideas，Ihavebeenfarenoughfromsayingorintendingtheyshouldbelaidaside；assomehavebeentooforwardtochargeme。
Iaffirmthemtobetruths，self-evidenttruths；andsocannotbelaidaside。Asfarastheirinfluencewillreach，itisinvaintoendeavour，norwillIattempt，toabridgeit。Butyet，withoutanyinjurytotruthorknowledge，Imayhavereasontothinktheiruseisnotanswerabletothegreatstresswhichseemstobelaidonthem；andImaywarnmennottomakeanilluseofthem，fortheconfirmingthemselvesinerrors。
15。Theycannotaddtoourknowledgeofsubstances，andtheirapplicationtocomplexideasisdangerous。Butletthembeofwhatusetheywillinverbalpropositions，theycannotdiscoverorprovetoustheleastknowledgeofthenatureofsubstances，astheyarefoundandexistwithoutus，anyfurtherthangroundedonexperience。
Andthoughtheconsequenceofthesetwopropositions，calledprinciples，beveryclear，andtheirusenotdangerousorhurtful，intheprobationofsuchthingswhereinthereisnoneedatallofthemforproof，butsuchasareclearbythemselveswithoutthem，viz。
whereourideasare[determined]andknownbythenamesthatstandforthem:yetwhentheseprinciples，viz。whatis，is，anditisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe，aremadeuseofintheprobationofpropositionswhereinarewordsstandingforcomplexideas，v。g。man，horse，gold，virtue；theretheyareofinfinitedanger，andmostcommonlymakemenreceiveandretainfalsehoodformanifesttruth，anduncertaintyfordemonstration:
uponwhichfollowerror，obstinacy，andallthemischiefsthatcanhappenfromwrongreasoning。Thereasonwhereofisnot，thattheseprinciplesarelesstrueoroflessforceinprovingpropositionsmadeoftermsstandingforcomplexideas，thanwherethepropositionsareaboutsimpleideas。Butbecausemenmistakegenerally，-thinkingthatwherethesametermsarepreserved，thepropositionsareaboutthesamethings，thoughtheideastheystandforareintruthdifferent，thereforethesemaximsaremadeuseoftosupportthosewhichinsoundandappearancearecontradictorypropositions；andisclearinthedemonstrationsabovementionedaboutavacuum。Sothatwhilstmentakewordsforthings，asusuallytheydo，thesemaximsmayanddocommonlyservetoprovecontradictorypropositions；asshallyetbefurthermademanifest。
16。Instanceindemonstrationsaboutman，whichcanonlybeverbal。Forinstance:letmanbethatconcerningwhichyouwouldbythesefirstprinciplesdemonstrateanything，andweshallsee，thatsofarasdemonstrationisbytheseprinciples，itisonlyverbal，andgivesusnocertain，universal，trueproposition，orknowledge，ofanybeingexistingwithoutus。First，achildhavingframedtheideaofaman，itisprobablethathisideaisjustlikethatpicturewhichthepaintermakesofthevisibleappearancesjoinedtogether；andsuchacomplicationofideastogetherinhisunderstandingmakesupthesinglecomplexideawhichhecallsman，whereofwhiteorflesh-colourinEnglandbeingone，thechildcandemonstratetoyouthatanegroisnotaman，becausewhitecolourwasoneoftheconstantsimpleideasofthecomplexideahecallsman；andthereforehecandemonstrate，bytheprinciple，Itisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe，thatanegroisnotaman；thefoundationofhiscertaintybeingnotthatuniversalproposition，whichperhapsheneverheardnorthoughtof，buttheclear，distinctperceptionhehathofhisownsimpleideasofblackandwhite，whichhecannotbepersuadedtotake，norcanevermistakeoneforanother，whetherheknowsthatmaximorno。Andtothischild，oranyonewhohathsuchanidea，whichhecallsman，canyouneverdemonstratethatamanhathasoul，becausehisideaofmanincludesnosuchnotionorideainit。Andtherefore，tohim，theprincipleofWhatis，is，provesnotthismatter；butitdependsuponcollectionandobservation，bywhichheistomakehiscomplexideacalledman。
17。Anotherinstance。Secondly，Anotherthathathgonefurtherinframingandcollectingtheideahecallsman，andtotheoutwardshapeaddslaughterandrationaldiscourse，maydemonstratethatinfantsandchangelingsarenomen，bythismaxim，itisimpossibleforthesamethingtoheandnottobe；andIhavediscoursedwithveryrationalmen，whohaveactuallydeniedthattheyaremen。
18。Athirdinstance。Thirdly，Perhapsanothermakesupthecomplexideawhichhecallsman，onlyoutoftheideasofbodyingeneral，andthepowersoflanguageandreason，andleavesouttheshapewholly:thismanisabletodemonstratethatamanmayhavenohands，butbequadrupes，neitherofthosebeingincludedinhisideaofman:andinwhateverbodyorshapehefoundspeechandreasonjoined，thatwasaman；because，havingaclearknowledgeofsuchacomplexidea，itiscertainthatWhatis，is。
19。Littleuseofthesemaximsinproofswherewehaveclearanddistinctideas。Sothat，ifrightlyconsidered，Ithinkwemaysay，Thatwhereourideasaredeterminedinourminds，andhaveannexedtothembyusknownandsteadynamesunderthosesettleddeterminations，thereislittleneed，ornouseatallofthesemaxims，toprovetheagreementordisagreementofanyofthem。Hethatcannotdiscernthetruthorfalsehoodofsuchpropositions，withoutthehelpoftheseandthelikemaxims，willnotbehelpedbythesemaximstodoit:sincehecannotbesupposedtoknowthetruthofthesemaximsthemselveswithoutproof，ifhecannotknowthetruthofotherswithoutproof，whichareasself-evidentasthese。Uponthisgrounditisthatintuitiveknowledgeneitherrequiresnoradmitsanyproof，onepartofitmorethananother。Hethatwillsupposeitdoes，takesawaythefoundationofallknowledgeandcertainty；andhethatneedsanyprooftomakehimcertain，andgivehisassenttothisproposition，thattwoareequaltotwo，willalsohaveneedofaprooftomakehimadmit，thatwhatis，is。Hethatneedsaprobationtoconvincehimthattwoarenotthree，thatwhiteisnotblack，thatatriangleisnotacircle，&c。，oranyothertwo[determined]
distinctideasarenotoneandthesame，willneedalsoademonstrationtoconvincehimthatItisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe。
20。Theirusedangerous，whereourideasarenotdetermined。Andasthesemaximsareoflittleusewherewehavedeterminedideas，sotheyare，asIhaveshown，ofdangeroususewhereourideasarenotdetermined；andwhereweusewordsthatarenotannexedtodeterminedideas，butsuchasareofalooseandwanderingsignification，sometimesstandingforone，andsometimesforanotheridea:fromwhichfollowmistakeanderror，whichthesemaxims(broughtasproofstoestablishpropositions，whereinthetermsstandforundeterminedideas)dobytheirauthorityconfirmandrivet。
