Indeedsomefewoftheprimaryqualitieshaveanecessarydependenceandvisibleconnexiononewithanother，asfigurenecessarilysupposesextension；receivingorcommunicatingmotionbyimpulse，supposessolidity。Butthoughthese，andperhapssomeothersofourideashave:
yettherearesofewofthemthathaveavisibleconnexiononewithanother，thatwecanbyintuitionordemonstrationdiscovertheco-existenceofveryfewofthequalitiesthataretobefoundunitedinsubstances:andweareleftonlytotheassistanceofoursensestomakeknowntouswhatqualitiestheycontain。Forofallthequalitiesthatareco-existentinanysubject，withoutthisdependenceandevidentconnexionoftheirideasonewithanother，wecannotknowcertainlyanytwotoco-exist，anyfurtherthanexperience，byoursenses，informsus。Thus，thoughweseetheyellowcolour，and，upontrial，findtheweight，malleableness，fusibility，andfixednessthatareunitedinapieceofgold，yet；becausenooneoftheseideashasanyevidentdependenceornecessaryconnexionwiththeother，wecannotcertainlyknowthatwhereanyfouroftheseare，thefifthwillbetherealso，howhighlyprobablesoeveritmaybe；
becausethehighestprobabilityamountsnottocertainty，withoutwhichtherecanbenotrueknowledge。Forthisco-existencecanbenofurtherknownthanitisperceived；anditcannotbeperceivedbuteitherinparticularsubjects，bytheobservationofoursenses，or，ingeneral，bythenecessaryconnexionoftheideasthemselves。
15。Ofrepugnancytoco-exist，ourknowledgeislarger。Astotheincompatibilityorrepugnancytocoexistence，wemayknowthatanysubjectmayhaveofeachsortofprimaryqualitiesbutoneparticularatonce:v。g。eachparticularextension，figure，numberofparts，motion，excludesallotherofeachkind。Thelikealsoiscertainofallsensibleideaspeculiartoeachsense；forwhateverofeachkindispresentinanysubject，excludesallotherofthatsort:v。g。noonesubjectcanhavetwosmellsortwocoloursatthesametime。Tothis，perhapswillbesaid，Hasnotanopal，ortheinfusionoflignumnephriticum，twocoloursatthesametime？TowhichIanswer，thatthesebodies，toeyesdifferentlyplaced，mayatthesametimeafforddifferentcolours:butItakelibertyalsotosay，toeyesdifferentlyplaced，itisdifferentpartsoftheobjectthatreflecttheparticlesoflight:andthereforeitisnotthesamepartoftheobject，andsonottheverysamesubject，whichatthesametimeappearsbothyellowandazure。For，itisasimpossiblethattheverysameparticleofanybodyshouldatthesametimedifferentlymodifyorreflecttheraysoflight，asthatitshouldhavetwodifferentfiguresandtexturesatthesametime。
16。Ourknowledgeoftheco-existenceofpowersinbodiesextendsbutaverylittleway。Butastothepowersofsubstancestochangethesensiblequalitiesofotherbodies，whichmakeagreatpartofourinquiriesaboutthem，andisnoinconsiderablebranchofourknowledge；Idoubtastothese，whetherourknowledgereachesmuchfurtherthanourexperience；orwhetherwecancometothediscoveryofmostofthesepowers，andbecertainthattheyareinanysubject，bytheconnexionwithanyofthoseideaswhichtousmakeitsessence。Becausetheactiveandpassivepowersofbodies，andtheirwaysofoperating，consistinginatextureandmotionofpartswhichwecannotbyanymeanscometodiscover；itisbutinveryfewcaseswecanbeabletoperceivetheirdependenceon，orrepugnanceto，anyofthoseideaswhichmakeourcomplexoneofthatsortofthings。Ihavehereinstancedinthecorpuscularianhypothesis，asthatwhichisthoughttogofurthestinanintelligibleexplicationofthosequalitiesofbodies；andIfeartheweaknessofhumanunderstandingisscarceabletosubstituteanother，whichwillaffordusafullerandclearerdiscoveryofthenecessaryconnexionandcoexistenceofthepowerswhicharetobeobservedunitedinseveralsortsofthem。Thisatleastiscertain，that，whicheverhypothesisbeclearestandtruest，(forofthatitisnotmybusinesstodetermine，)ourknowledgeconcerningcorporealsubstanceswillbeverylittleadvancedbyanyofthem，tillwearemadetoseewhatqualitiesandpowersofbodieshaveanecessaryconnexionorrepugnancyonewithanother；whichinthepresentstateofphilosophyIthinkweknowbuttoaverysmalldegree:andI
doubtwhether，withthosefacultieswehave，weshalleverbeabletocarryourgeneralknowledge(Isaynotparticularexperience)inthispartmuchfurther。Experienceisthatwhichinthispartwemustdependon。Anditweretobewishedthatitweremoreimproved。
Wefindtheadvantagessomemen’sgenerouspainshavethiswaybroughttothestockofnaturalknowledge。Andifothers，especiallythephilosophersbyfire，whopretendtoit，hadbeensowaryintheirobservations，andsincereintheirreportsasthosewhocallthemselvesphilosophersoughttohavebeen，ouracquaintancewiththebodieshereaboutus，andourinsightintotheirpowersandoperationshadbeenyetmuchgreater。
17。Ofthepowersthatco-existinspiritsyetnarrower。Ifweareatalossinrespectofthepowersandoperationsofbodies，Ithinkitiseasytoconcludewearemuchmoreinthedarkinreferencetospirits；whereofwenaturallyhavenoideasbutwhatwedrawfromthatofourown，byreflectingontheoperationsofourownsoulswithinus，asfarastheycancomewithinourobservation。Buthowinconsiderablearankthespiritsthatinhabitourbodiesholdamongstthosevariousandpossiblyinnumerablekindsofnoblerbeings；andhowfarshorttheycomeoftheendowmentsandperfectionsofcherubimandseraphim，andinfinitesortsofspiritsaboveus，iswhatbyatransienthintinanotherplaceIhaveofferedtomyreader’sconsideration。
18。Ofrelationsbetweenabstractedideasitisnoteasytosayhowfarourknowledgeextends。Thirdly，Astothethirdsortofourknowledge，viz。theagreementordisagreementofanyofourideasinanyotherrelation:this，asitisthelargestfieldofourknowledge，soitishardtodeterminehowfaritmayextend:becausetheadvancesthataremadeinthispartofknowledge，dependingonoursagacityinfindingintermediateideas，thatmayshowtherelationsandhabitudesofideaswhoseco-existenceisnotconsidered，itisahardmattertotellwhenweareatanendofsuchdiscoveries；andwhenreasonhasallthehelpsitiscapableof，forthefindingofproofsorexaminingtheagreementordisagreementofremoteideas。
TheythatareignorantofAlgebracannotimaginethewondersinthiskindaretobedonebyit:andwhatfurtherimprovementsandhelpsadvantageoustootherpartsofknowledgethesagaciousmindofmanmayyetfindout，itisnoteasytodetermine。ThisatleastIbelieve，thattheideasofquantityarenotthosealonethatarecapableofdemonstrationandknowledge；andthatother，andperhapsmoreuseful，partsofcontemplation，wouldafforduscertainty，ifvices，passions，anddomineeringinterestdidnotopposeormenacesuchendeavours。
Moralitycapableofdemonstration。TheideaofasupremeBeing，infiniteinpower，goodness，andwisdom，whoseworkmanshipweare，andonwhomwedepend；andtheideaofourselves，asunderstanding，rationalcreatures，beingsuchasareclearinus，would，Isuppose，ifdulyconsideredandpursued，affordsuchfoundationsofourdutyandrulesofactionasmightplacemoralityamongstthesciencescapableofdemonstration:whereinIdoubtnotbutfromself-evidentpropositions，bynecessaryconsequences，asincontestibleasthoseinmathematics，themeasuresofrightandwrongmightbemadeout，toanyonethatwillapplyhimselfwiththesameindifferencyandattentiontotheoneashedoestotheotherofthesesciences。Therelationofothermodesmaycertainlybeperceived，aswellasthoseofnumberandextension:andIcannotseewhytheyshouldnotalsobecapableofdemonstration，ifduemethodswerethoughtontoexamineorpursuetheiragreementordisagreement。\"Wherethereisnopropertythereisnoinjustice，\"isapropositionascertainasanydemonstrationinEuclid:fortheideaofpropertybeingarighttoanything，andtheideatowhichthename\"injustice\"isgivenbeingtheinvasionorviolationofthatright，itisevidentthattheseideas，beingthusestablished，andthesenamesannexedtothem，I
canascertainlyknowthispropositiontobetrue，asthatatrianglehasthreeanglesequaltotworightones。Again:\"Nogovernmentallowsabsoluteliberty。\"Theideaofgovernmentbeingtheestablishmentofsocietyuponcertainrulesorlawswhichrequireconformitytothem；andtheideaofabsolutelibertybeingforanyonetodowhateverhepleases；Iamascapableofbeingcertainofthetruthofthispropositionasofanyinthemathematics。
19。Twothingshavemademoralideastobethoughtincapableofdemonstration:theirunfitnessforsensiblerepresentation，andtheircomplexedness。Thatwhichinthisrespecthasgiventheadvantagetotheideasofquantity，andmadethemthoughtmorecapableofcertaintyanddemonstration，is，First，Thattheycanbesetdownandrepresentedbysensiblemarks，whichhaveagreaterandnearercorrespondencewiththemthananywordsorsoundswhatsoever。Diagramsdrawnonpaperarecopiesoftheideasinthemind，andnotliabletotheuncertaintythatwordscarryintheirsignification。Anangle，circle，orsquare，drawninlines，liesopentotheview，andcannotbemistaken:itremainsunchangeable，andmayatleisurebeconsideredandexamined，andthedemonstrationberevised，andallthepartsofitmaybegoneovermorethanonce，withoutanydangeroftheleastchangeintheideas。
Thiscannotbethusdoneinmoralideas:wehavenosensiblemarksthatresemblethem，wherebywecansetthemdown；wehavenothingbutwordstoexpressthemby；which，thoughwhenwrittentheyremainthesame，yettheideastheystandformaychangeinthesameman；anditisveryseldomthattheyarenotdifferentindifferentpersons。
Secondly，Anotherthingthatmakesthegreaterdifficultyinethicsis，Thatmoralideasarecommonlymorecomplexthanthoseofthefiguresordinarilyconsideredinmathematics。Fromwhencethesetwoinconveniencesfollow:-First，thattheirnamesareofmoreuncertainsignification，theprecisecollectionofsimpleideastheystandfornotbeingsoeasilyagreedon；andsothesignthatisusedforthemincommunicationalways，andinthinkingoften，doesnotsteadilycarrywithitthesameidea。Uponwhichthesamedisorder，confusion，anderrorfollow，aswouldifaman，goingtodemonstratesomethingofanheptagon，should，inthediagramhetooktodoit，leaveoutoneoftheangles，orbyoversightmakethefigurewithoneanglemorethanthenameordinarilyimported，orheintendeditshouldwhenatfirsthethoughtofhisdemonstration。Thisoftenhappens，andishardlyavoidableinverycomplexmoralideas，wherethesamenamebeingretained，oneangle，i。e。onesimpleidea，isleftout，orputinthecomplexone(stillcalledbythesamename)moreatonetimethananother。Secondly，Fromthecomplexednessofthesemoralideastherefollowsanotherinconvenience，viz。thatthemindcannoteasilyretainthoseprecisecombinationssoexactlyandperfectlyasisnecessaryintheexaminationofthehabitudesandcorrespondences，agreementsordisagreements，ofseveralofthemonewithanother；especiallywhereitistobejudgedofbylongdeductions，andtheinterventionofseveralothercomplexideastoshowtheagreementordisagreementoftworemoteones。
Thegreathelpagainstthiswhichmathematiciansfindindiagramsandfigures，whichremainunalterableintheirdraughts，isveryapparent，andthememorywouldoftenhavegreatdifficultyotherwisetoretainthemsoexactly，whilstthemindwentoverthepartsofthemstepbysteptoexaminetheirseveralcorrespondences。Andthoughincastingupalongsumeitherinaddition，multiplication，ordivision，everypartbeonlyaprogressionofthemindtakingaviewofitsownideas，andconsideringtheiragreementordisagreement，andtheresolutionofthequestionbenothingbuttheresultofthewhole，madeupofsuchparticulars，whereofthemindhasaclearperception:yet，withoutsettingdowntheseveralpartsbymarks，whoseprecisesignificationsareknown，andbymarksthatlast，andremaininviewwhenthememoryhadletthemgo，itwouldbealmostimpossibletocarrysomanydifferentideasinthemind，withoutconfoundingorlettingslipsomepartsofthereckoning，andtherebymakingallourreasoningsaboutituseless。Inwhichcasethecyphersormarkshelpnotthemindatalltoperceivetheagreementofanytwoormorenumbers，theirequalitiesorproportions；thatthemindhasonlybyintuitionofitsownideasofthenumbersthemselves。
Butthenumericalcharactersarehelpstothememory，torecordandretaintheseveralideasaboutwhichthedemonstrationismade，wherebyamanmayknowhowfarhisintuitiveknowledgeinsurveyingseveraloftheparticularshasproceeded；thatsohemaywithoutconfusiongoontowhatisyetunknown；andatlasthaveinoneviewbeforehimtheresultofallhisperceptionsandreasonings。
20。Remediesofourdifficultiesindealingdemonstrativelywithmoralideas。Onepartofthesedisadvantagesinmoralideaswhichhasmadethembethoughtnotcapableofdemonstration，mayinagoodmeasureberemediedbydefinitions，settingdownthatcollectionofsimpleideas，whicheverytermshallstandfor:andthenusingthetermssteadilyandconstantlyforthatprecisecollection。Andwhatmethodsalgebra，orsomethingofthatkind，mayhereaftersuggest，toremovetheotherdifficulties，itisnoteasytoforetell。
ConfidentIam，that，ifmenwouldinthesamemethod，andwiththesameindifferency，searchaftermoralastheydomathematicaltruths，theywouldfindthemhaveastrongerconnexiononewithanother，andamorenecessaryconsequencefromourclearanddistinctideas，andtocomenearerperfectdemonstrationthaniscommonlyimagined。Butmuchofthisisnottobeexpected，whilstthedesireofesteem，riches，orpowermakesmenespousethewell-endowedopinionsinfashion，andthenseekargumentseithertomakegoodtheirbeauty，orvarnishoverandcovertheirdeformity。
Nothingbeingsobeautifultotheeyeastruthistothemind；nothingsodeformedandirreconcilabletotheunderstandingasalie。Forthoughmanyamancanwithsatisfactionenoughownanoveryhandsomewifetoinhisbosom；yetwhoisboldenoughopenlytoavowthathehasespousedafalsehood，andreceivedintohisbreastsouglyathingasalie？Whilstthepartiesofmencramtheirtenetsdownallmen’sthroatswhomtheycangetintotheirpower，withoutpermittingthemtoexaminetheirtruthorfalsehood；andwillnotlettruthhavefairplayintheworld，normenthelibertytosearchafterit:
whatimprovementscanbeexpectedofthiskind？Whatgreaterlightcanbehopedforinthemoralsciences？Thesubjectpartofmankindinmostplacesmight，insteadthereof，withEgyptianbondage，expectEgyptiandarkness，werenotthecandleoftheLordsetupbyhimselfinmen’sminds，whichitisimpossibleforthebreathorpowerofmanwhollytoextinguish。
21。Ofthethreerealexistencesofwhichwehavecertainknowledge。
Fourthly，Astothefourthsortofourknowledge，viz。oftherealactualexistenceofthings，wehaveanintuitiveknowledgeofourownexistence，andademonstrativeknowledgeoftheexistenceofaGod:oftheexistenceofanythingelse，wehavenootherbutasensitiveknowledge；whichextendsnotbeyondtheobjectspresenttooursenses。
22。Ourignorancegreat。Ourknowledgebeingsonarrow，asIhaveshown，itwillperhapsgiveussomelightintothepresentstateofourmindsifwelookalittleintothedarkside，andtakeaviewofourignorance；which，beinginfinitelylargerthanourknowledge，mayservemuchtothequietingofdisputes，andimprovementofusefulknowledge；if，discoveringhowfarwehaveclearanddistinctideas，weconfineourthoughtswithinthecontemplationofthosethingsthatarewithinthereachofourunderstandings，andlaunchnotoutintothatabyssofdarkness，(wherewehavenoteyestosee，norfacultiestoperceiveanything)，outofapresumptionthatnothingisbeyondourcomprehension。Buttobesatisfiedofthefollyofsuchaconceit，weneednotgofar。Hethatknowsanything，knowsthis，inthefirstplace，thatheneednotseeklongforinstancesofhisignorance。Themeanestandmostobviousthingsthatcomeinourwayhavedarksides，thatthequickestsightcannotpenetrateinto。
Theclearestandmostenlargedunderstandingsofthinkingmenfindthemselvespuzzledandatalossineveryparticleofmatter。Weshallthelesswondertofinditso，whenweconsiderthecausesofourignorance；which，fromwhathasbeensaid，Isupposewillbefoundtobethesethree:-
Itscauses。First，Wantofideas。
Secondly，Wantofadiscoverableconnexionbetweentheideaswehave。
Thirdly，Wantoftracingandexaminingourideas。
23。Onecauseofourignorancewantofideas。First，Therearesomethings，andthosenotafew，thatweareignorantof，forwantofideas。
I。Wantofsimpleideasthatothercreaturesinotherpartsoftheuniversemayhave。First，allthesimpleideaswehaveareconfined(asIhaveshown)tothosewereceivefromcorporealobjectsbysensation，andfromtheoperationsofourownmindsastheobjectsofreflection。Buthowmuchthesefewandnarrowinletsaredisproportionatetothevastwholeextentofallbeings，willnotbehardtopersuadethosewhoarenotsofoolishastothinktheirspanthemeasureofallthings。Whatothersimpleideasitispossiblethecreaturesinotherpartsoftheuniversemayhave，bytheassistanceofsensesandfacultiesmoreorperfecterthanwehave，ordifferentfromours，itisnotforustodetermine。Buttosayorthinktherearenosuch，becauseweconceivenothingofthem，isnobetteranargumentthanifablindmanshouldbepositiveinit，thattherewasnosuchthingassightandcolours，becausehehadnomannerofideaofanysuchthing，norcouldbyanymeansframetohimselfanynotionsaboutseeing。Theignoranceanddarknessthatisinusnomorehindersnorconfinestheknowledgethatisinothers，thantheblindnessofamoleisanargumentagainstthequicksightednessofaneagle。Hethatwillconsidertheinfinitepower，wisdom，andgoodnessoftheCreatorofallthingswillfindreasontothinkitwasnotalllaidoutuponsoinconsiderable，mean，andimpotentacreatureashewillfindmantobe；whoinallprobabilityisoneofthelowestofallintellectualbeings。Whatfaculties，therefore，otherspeciesofcreatureshavetopenetrateintothenatureandinmostconstitutionsofthings；whatideastheymayreceiveofthemfardifferentfromours，weknownot。Thisweknowandcertainlyfind，thatwewantseveralotherviewsofthembesidesthosewehave，tomakediscoveriesofthemmoreperfect。Andwemaybeconvincedthattheideaswecanattaintobyourfacultiesareverydisproportionatetothingsthemselves，whenapositive，clear，distinctoneofsubstanceitself，whichisthefoundationofalltherest，isconcealedfromus。Butwantofideasofthiskind，beingapartaswellascauseofourignorance，cannotbedescribed。OnlythisIthinkImayconfidentlysayofit，Thattheintellectualandsensibleworldareinthisperfectlyalike:thatthatpartwhichweseeofeitherofthemholdsnoproportionwithwhatweseenot；andwhatsoeverwecanreachwithoureyesorourthoughtsofeitherofthemisbutapoint，almostnothingincomparisonoftherest。
24。Wantofsimpleideasthatmenarecapableofhaving，buthavenot，becauseoftheirremoteness。Secondly，Anothergreatcauseofignoranceisthewantofideaswearecapableof。Asthewantofideaswhichourfacultiesarenotabletogiveusshutsuswhollyfromthoseviewsofthingswhichitisreasonabletothinkotherbeings，perfecterthanwe，have，ofwhichweknownothing；sothewantofideasInowspeakofkeepsusinignoranceofthingsweconceivecapableofbeingknowntous。Bulk，figure，andmotionwehaveideasof。Butthoughwearenotwithoutideasoftheseprimaryqualitiesofbodiesingeneral，yetnotknowingwhatistheparticularbulk，figure，andmotion，ofthegreatestpartofthebodiesoftheuniverse，weareignorantoftheseveralpowers，efficacies，andwaysofoperation，wherebytheeffectswhichwedailyseeareproduced。Thesearehidfromus，insomethingsbybeingtooremote，andinothersbybeingtoominute。Whenweconsiderthevastdistanceoftheknownandvisiblepartsoftheworld，andthereasonswehavetothinkthatwhatlieswithinourkenisbutasmallpartoftheuniverse，weshallthendiscoverahugeabyssofignorance。Whataretheparticularfabricsofthegreatmassesofmatterwhichmakeupthewholestupendousframeofcorporealbeings；
howfartheyareextended；whatistheirmotion，andhowcontinuedorcommunicated；andwhatinfluencetheyhaveoneuponanother，arecontemplationsthatatfirstglimpseourthoughtslosethemselvesin。Ifwenarrowourcontemplations，andconfineourthoughtstothislittlecanton-Imeanthissystemofoursun，andthegrossermassesofmatterthatvisiblymoveaboutit，Whatseveralsortsofvegetables，animals，andintellectualcorporealbeings，infinitelydifferentfromthoseofourlittlespotofearth，maythereprobablybeintheotherplanets，totheknowledgeofwhich，evenoftheiroutwardfiguresandparts，wecannowayattainwhilstweareconfinedtothisearth；therebeingnonaturalmeans，eitherbysensationorreflection，toconveytheircertainideasintoourminds？Theyareoutofthereachofthoseinletsofallourknowledge:andwhatsortsoffurnitureandinhabitantsthosemansionscontaininthemwecannotsomuchasguess，muchlesshaveclearanddistinctideasofthem。
25。Becauseoftheirminuteness。Ifagreat，nay，farthegreatestpartoftheseveralranksofbodiesintheuniverseescapeournoticebytheirremoteness，thereareothersthatarenolessconcealedfromusbytheirminuteness。Theseinsensiblecorpuscles，beingtheactivepartsofmatter，andthegreatinstrumentsofnature，onwhichdependnotonlyalltheirsecondaryqualities，butalsomostoftheirnaturaloperations，ourwantofprecisedistinctideasoftheirprimaryqualitieskeepsusinanincurableignoranceofwhatwedesiretoknowaboutthem。Idoubtnotbutifwecoulddiscoverthefigure，size，texture，andmotionoftheminuteconstituentpartsofanytwobodies，weshouldknowwithouttrialseveraloftheiroperationsoneuponanother；aswedonowthepropertiesofasquareoratriangle。Didweknowthemechanicalaffectionsoftheparticlesofrhubarb，hemlock，opium，andaman，asawatchmakerdoesthoseofawatch，wherebyitperformsitsoperations；andofafile，whichbyrubbingonthemwillalterthefigureofanyofthewheels；weshouldbeabletotellbeforehandthatrhubarbwillpurge，hemlockkill，andopiummakeamansleep:aswellasawatchmakercan，thatalittlepieceofpaperlaidonthebalancewillkeepthewatchfromgoingtillitberemoved；orthat，somesmallpartofitbeingrubbedbyafile，themachinewouldquiteloseitsmotion，andthewatchgonomore。Thedissolvingofsilverinaquafortis，andgoldinaquaregia，andnotviceversa，wouldbethenperhapsnomoredifficulttoknowthanitistoasmithtounderstandwhytheturningofonekeywillopenalock，andnottheturningofanother。Butwhilstwearedestituteofsensesacuteenoughtodiscovertheminuteparticlesofbodies，andtogiveusideasoftheirmechanicalaffections，wemustbecontenttobeignorantoftheirpropertiesandwaysofoperation；norcanwebeassuredaboutthemanyfurtherthansomefewtrialswemakeareabletoreach。Butwhethertheywillsucceedagainanothertime，wecannotbecertain。Thishindersourcertainknowledgeofuniversaltruthsconcerningnaturalbodies:andourreasoncarriesushereinverylittlebeyondparticularmatteroffact。
26。Hencenoscienceofbodieswithinourreach。AndthereforeI
amapttodoubtthat，howfarsoeverhumanindustrymayadvanceusefulandexperimentalphilosophyinphysicalthings，scientificalwillstillbeoutofourreach:becausewewantperfectandadequateideasofthoseverybodieswhicharenearesttous，andmostunderourcommand。Thosewhichwehaverankedintoclassesundernames，andwethinkourselvesbestacquaintedwith，wehavebutveryimperfectandincompleteideasof。Distinctideasoftheseveralsortsofbodiesthatfallundertheexaminationofoursensesperhapswemayhave:butadequateideas，Isuspect，wehavenotofanyoneamongstthem。Andthoughtheformerofthesewillserveusforcommonuseanddiscourse，yetwhilstwewantthelatter，wearenotcapableofscientificalknowledge；norshalleverbeabletodiscovergeneral，instructive，unquestionabletruthsconcerningthem。Certaintyanddemonstrationarethingswemustnot，inthesematters，pretendto。Bythecolour，figure，taste，andsmell，andothersensiblequalities，wehaveasclearanddistinctideasofsageandhemlock，aswehaveofacircleandatriangle:buthavingnoideasoftheparticularprimaryqualitiesoftheminutepartsofeitheroftheseplants，norofotherbodieswhichwewouldapplythemto，wecannottellwhateffectstheywillproduce；norwhenweseethoseeffectscanwesomuchasguess，muchlessknow，theirmannerofproduction。Thus，havingnoideasoftheparticularmechanicalaffectionsoftheminutepartsofbodiesthatarewithinourviewandreach，weareignorantoftheirconstitutions，powers，andoperations:andofbodiesmoreremoteweareyetmoreignorant，notknowingsomuchastheirveryoutwardshapes，orthesensibleandgrosserpartsoftheirconstitutions。
27。Muchlessascienceofunembodiedspirits。Thisatfirstwillshowushowdisproportionateourknowledgeistothewholeextentevenofmaterialbeings；towhichifweaddtheconsiderationofthatinfinitenumberofspiritsthatmaybe，andprobablyare，whichareyetmoreremotefromourknowledge，whereofwehavenocognizance，norcanframetoourselvesanydistinctideasoftheirseveralranksandsorts，weshallfindthiscauseofignoranceconcealfromus，inanimpenetrableobscurity，almostthewholeintellectualworld；agreatercertainty，andmorebeautifulworldthanthematerial。For，batingsomeveryfew，andthose，ifImaysocallthem，superficialideasofspirit，whichbyreflectionwegetofourown，andfromthencethebestwecancollectoftheFatherofallspirits，theeternalindependentAuthorofthem，andus，andallthings，wehavenocertaininformation，somuchasoftheexistenceofotherspirits，butbyrevelation。Angelsofallsortsarenaturallybeyondourdiscovery；
andallthoseintelligences，whereofitislikelytherearemoreordersthanofcorporealsubstances，arethingswhereofournaturalfacultiesgiveusnocertainaccountatall。Thattherearemindsandthinkingbeingsinothermenaswellashimself，everymanhasareason，fromtheirwordsandactions，tobesatisfied:andtheknowledgeofhisownmindcannotsufferamanthatconsiders，tobeignorantthatthereisaGod。ButthattherearedegreesofspiritualbeingsbetweenusandthegreatGod，whoisthere，that，byhisownsearchandability，cancometoknow？Muchlesshavewedistinctideasoftheirdifferentnatures，conditions，states，powers，andseveralconstitutionswhereintheyagreeordifferfromoneanotherandfromus。And，therefore，inwhatconcernstheirdifferentspeciesandpropertiesweareinabsoluteignorance。
28。Anothercause，wantofadiscoverableconnexionbetweenideaswehave。Secondly，Whatasmallpartofthesubstantialbeingsthatareintheuniversethewantofideasleavesopentoourknowledge，wehaveseen。Inthenextplace，anothercauseofignorance，ofnolessmoment，isawantofadiscoverableconnexionbetweenthoseideaswehave。Forwhereverwewantthat，weareutterlyincapableofuniversalandcertainknowledge；andare，intheformercase，leftonlytoobservationandexperiment:which，hownarrowandconfineditis，howfarfromgeneralknowledgeweneednotbetold。Ishallgivesomefewinstancesofthiscauseofourignorance，andsoleaveit。Itisevidentthatthebulk，figure，andmotionofseveralbodiesaboutusproduceinusseveralsensations，asofcolours，sounds，tastes，smells，pleasure，andpain，&c。Thesemechanicalaffectionsofbodieshavingnoaffinityatallwiththoseideastheyproduceinus，(therebeingnoconceivableconnexionbetweenanyimpulseofanysortofbodyandanyperceptionofacolourorsmellwhichwefindinourminds，)wecanhavenodistinctknowledgeofsuchoperationsbeyondourexperience；andcanreasonnootherwiseaboutthem，thanaseffectsproducedbytheappointmentofaninfinitelyWiseAgent，whichperfectlysurpassourcomprehensions。Astheideasofsensiblesecondaryqualitieswhichwehaveinourminds，canbyusbenowaydeducedfrombodilycauses，noranycorrespondenceorconnexionbefoundbetweenthemandthoseprimaryqualitieswhich(experienceshowsus)producetheminus；so，ontheotherside，theoperationofourmindsuponourbodiesisasinconceivable。Howanythoughtshouldproduceamotioninbodyisasremotefromthenatureofourideas，ashowanybodyshouldproduceanythoughtinthemind。Thatitisso，ifexperiencedidnotconvinceus，theconsiderationofthethingsthemselveswouldneverbeableintheleasttodiscovertous。
These，andthelike，thoughtheyhaveaconstantandregularconnexionintheordinarycourseofthings；yetthatconnexionbeingnotdiscoverableintheideasthemselves，whichappearingtohavenonecessarydependenceoneonanother，wecanattributetheirconnexiontonothingelsebutthearbitrarydeterminationofthatAll-wiseAgentwhohasmadethemtobe，andtooperateastheydo，inawaywhollyaboveourweakunderstandingstoconceive。
29。Instances。Insomeofourideastherearecertainrelations，habitudes，andconnexions，sovisiblyincludedinthenatureoftheideasthemselves，thatwecannotconceivethemseparablefromthembyanypowerwhatsoever。Andintheseonlywearecapableofcertainanduniversalknowledge。Thustheideaofaright-linedtrianglenecessarilycarrieswithitanequalityofitsanglestotworightones。Norcanweconceivethisrelation，thisconnexionofthesetwoideas，tobepossiblymutable，ortodependonanyarbitrarypower，whichofchoicemadeitthus，orcouldmakeitotherwise。Butthecoherenceandcontinuityofthepartsofmatter；theproductionofsensationinusofcoloursandsounds，&c。，byimpulseandmotion；
nay，theoriginalrulesandcommunicationofmotionbeingsuch，whereinwecandiscovernonaturalconnexionwithanyideaswehave，wecannotbutascribethemtothearbitrarywillandgoodpleasureoftheWiseArchitect。Ineednot，Ithink，herementiontheresurrectionofthedead，thefuturestateofthisglobeofearth，andsuchotherthings，whicharebyeveryoneacknowledgedtodependwhollyonthedeterminationofafreeagent。Thethingsthat，asfarasourobservationreaches，weconstantlyfindtoproceedregularly，wemayconcludedoactbyalawsetthem；butyetbyalawthatweknownot:whereby，thoughcausesworksteadily，andeffectsconstantlyflowfromthem，yettheirconnexionsanddependenciesbeingnotdiscoverableinourideas，wecanhavebutanexperimentalknowledgeofthem。Fromallwhichitiseasytoperceivewhatadarknessweareinvolvedin，howlittleitisofBeing，andthethingsthatare，thatwearecapabletoknow。Andthereforeweshalldonoinjurytoourknowledge，whenwemodestlythinkwithourselves，thatwearesofarfrombeingabletocomprehendthewholenatureoftheuniverseandallthethingscontainedinit，thatwearenotcapableofaphilosophicalknowledgeofthebodiesthatareaboutus，andmakeapartofus:concerningtheirsecondaryqualities，powers，andoperations，wecanhavenouniversalcertainty。Severaleffectscomeeverydaywithinthenoticeofoursenses，ofwhichwehavesofarsensitiveknowledge:butthecauses，manner，andcertaintyoftheirproduction，forthetwoforegoingreasons，wemustbecontenttobeveryignorantof。Inthesewecangonofurtherthanparticularexperienceinformsusmatteroffact，andbyanalogytoguesswhateffectsthelikebodiesare，uponothertrials，liketoproduce。Butastoaperfectscienceofnaturalbodies，(nottomentionspiritualbeings，)weare，Ithink，sofarfrombeingcapableofanysuchthing，thatIconcludeitlostlabourtoseekafterit。
30。Athirdcause，wantoftracingourideas。Thirdly，Wherewehaveadequateideas，andwherethereisacertainanddiscoverableconnexionbetweenthem，yetweareoftenignorant，forwantoftracingthoseideaswhichwehaveormayhave；andforwantoffindingoutthoseintermediateideas，whichmayshowuswhathabitudeofagreementordisagreementtheyhaveonewithanother。Andthusmanyareignorantofmathematicaltruths，notoutofanyimperfectionoftheirfaculties，oruncertaintyinthethingsthemselves，butforwantofapplicationinacquiring，examining，andbyduewayscomparingthoseideas。Thatwhichhasmostcontributedtohindertheduetracingofourideas，andfindingouttheirrelations，andagreementsordisagreements，onewithanother，hasbeen，Isuppose，theilluseofwords。Itisimpossiblethatmenshouldevertrulyseekorcertainlydiscovertheagreementordisagreementofideasthemselves，whilsttheirthoughtsflutterabout，orstickonlyinsoundsofdoubtfulanduncertainsignifications。Mathematiciansabstractingtheirthoughtsfromnames，andaccustomingthemselvestosetbeforetheirmindstheideasthemselvesthattheywouldconsider，andnotsoundsinsteadofthem，haveavoidedtherebyagreatpartofthatperplexity，puddering，andconfusion，whichhassomuchhinderedmen’sprogressinotherpartsofknowledge。Forwhilsttheystickinwordsofundeterminedanduncertainsignification，theyareunabletodistinguishtruefromfalse，certainfromprobable，consistentfrominconsistent，intheirownopinions。Thishavingbeenthefateormisfortuneofagreatpartofmenofletters，theincreasebroughtintothestockofrealknowledgehasbeenverylittle，inproportiontotheschools，disputes，andwritings，theworldhasbeenfilledwith；whilststudents，beinglostinthegreatwoodofwords，knewnotwhereaboutstheywere，howfartheirdiscoverieswereadvanced，orwhatwaswantingintheirown，orthegeneralstockofknowledge。
Hadmen，inthediscoveriesofthematerial，doneastheyhaveinthoseoftheintellectualworld，involvedallintheobscurityofuncertainanddoubtfulwaysoftalking，volumeswritofnavigationandvoyages，theoriesandstoriesofzonesandtides，multipliedanddisputed；nay，shipsbuilt，andfleetssentout，wouldneverhavetaughtusthewaybeyondtheline；andtheAntipodeswouldbestillasmuchunknown，aswhenitwasdeclaredheresytoholdtherewereany。
Buthavingspokensufficientlyofwords，andtheillorcarelessusethatiscommonlymadeofthem，Ishallnotsayanythingmoreofithere。
31。Extentofhumanknowledgeinrespecttoitsuniversality。
Hithertowehaveexaminedtheextentofourknowledge，inrespectoftheseveralsortsofbeingsthatare。Thereisanotherextentofit，inrespectofuniversality，whichwillalsodeservetobeconsidered；andinthisregard，ourknowledgefollowsthenatureofourideas。Iftheideasareabstract，whoseagreementordisagreementweperceive，ourknowledgeisuniversal。Forwhatisknownofsuchgeneralideas，willbetrueofeveryparticularthinginwhomthatessence，i。e。thatabstractidea，istobefound:andwhatisonceknownofsuchideas，willbeperpetuallyandforevertrue。Sothatastoallgeneralknowledgewemustsearchandfinditonlyinourminds；anditisonlytheexaminingofourownideasthatfurnishethuswiththat。Truthsbelongingtoessencesofthings(thatis，toabstractideas)areeternal；andaretobefoundoutbythecontemplationonlyofthoseessences:astheexistenceofthingsistobeknownonlyfromexperience。ButhavingmoretosayofthisinthechapterswhereIshallspeakofgeneralandrealknowledge，thismayheresufficeastotheuniversalityofourknowledgeingeneral。
ChapterIV
OftheRealityofKnowledge1。Objection。\"Knowledgeplacedinourideasmaybeallunrealorchimerical。\"Idoubtnotbutmyreader，bythistime，maybeapttothinkthatIhavebeenallthiswhileonlybuildingacastleintheair；andbereadytosaytome:
\"Towhatpurposeallthisstir？Knowledge，sayyou，isonlytheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourownideas:butwhoknowswhatthoseideasmaybe？Isthereanythingsoextravagantastheimaginationsofmen’sbrains？Whereistheheadthathasnochimerasinit？Oriftherebeasoberandawiseman，whatdifferencewilltherebe，byyourrules，betweenhisknowledgeandthatofthemostextravagantfancyintheworld？Theybothhavetheirideas，andperceivetheiragreementanddisagreementonewithanother。Iftherebeanydifferencebetweenthem，theadvantagewillbeonthewarm-headedman’sside，ashavingthemoreideas，andthemorelively。
Andso，byyourrules，hewillbethemoreknowing。Ifitbetrue，thatallknowledgeliesonlyintheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourownideas，thevisionsofanenthusiastandthereasoningsofasobermanwillbeequallycertain。Itisnomatterhowthingsare:soamanobservebuttheagreementofhisownimaginations，andtalkconformably，itisalltruth，allcertainty。
Suchcastlesintheairwillbeasstrongholdsoftruth，asthedemonstrationsofEuclid。Thatanharpyisnotacentaurisbythiswayascertainknowledge，andasmuchatruth，asthatasquareisnotacircle。\"
\"Butofwhatuseisallthisfineknowledgeofmen’sownimaginations，toamanthatinquiresaftertherealityofthings？Itmattersnotwhatmen’sfanciesare，itistheknowledgeofthingsthatisonlytobeprized:itisthisalonegivesavaluetoourreasonings，andpreferencetooneman’sknowledgeoveranother’s，thatitisofthingsastheyreallyare，andnotofdreamsandfancies。\"
2。Answer:\"Notso，whereideasagreewiththings。\"TowhichI
answer，Thatifourknowledgeofourideasterminateinthem，andreachnofurther，wherethereissomethingfurtherintended，ourmostseriousthoughtswillbeoflittlemoreusethanthereveriesofacrazybrain；andthetruthsbuiltthereonofnomoreweightthanthediscoursesofamanwhoseesthingsclearlyinadream，andwithgreatassuranceuttersthem。ButIhope，beforeIhavedone，tomakeitevident，thatthiswayofcertainty，bytheknowledgeofourownideas，goesalittlefurtherthanbareimagination:andI
believeitwillappearthatallthecertaintyofgeneraltruthsamanhasliesinnothingelse。
3。Butwhatshallbethecriterionofthisagreement？Itisevidentthemindknowsnotthingsimmediately，butonlybytheinterventionoftheideasithasofthem。Ourknowledge，thereforeisrealonlysofarasthereisaconformitybetweenourideasandtherealityofthings。Butwhatshallbeherethecriterion？Howshallthemind，whenitperceivesnothingbutitsownideas，knowthattheyagreewiththingsthemselves？This，thoughitseemsnottowantdifficulty，yet，Ithink，therebetwosortsofideasthatwemaybeassuredagreewiththings。
4。Asallsimpleideasarereallyconformedtothings。First，Thefirstaresimpleideas，whichsincethemind，ashasbeenshown，canbynomeansmaketoitself，mustnecessarilybetheproductofthingsoperatingonthemind，inanaturalway，andproducingthereinthoseperceptionswhichbytheWisdomandWillofourMakertheyareordainedandadaptedto。Fromwhenceitfollows，thatsimpleideasarenotfictionsofourfancies，butthenaturalandregularproductionsofthingswithoutus，reallyoperatinguponus；
andsocarrywiththemalltheconformitywhichisintended；orwhichourstaterequires:fortheyrepresenttousthingsunderthoseappearanceswhichtheyarefittedtoproduceinus:wherebyweareenabledtodistinguishthesortsofparticularsubstances，todiscernthestatestheyarein，andsototakethemforournecessities，andapplythemtoouruses。Thustheideaofwhiteness，orbitterness，asitisinthemind，exactlyansweringthatpowerwhichisinanybodytoproduceitthere，hasalltherealconformityitcanoroughttohave，withthingswithoutus。Andthisconformitybetweenoursimpleideasandtheexistenceofthings，issufficientforrealknowledge。
5。Allcomplexideas，exceptideasofsubstances，aretheirownarchetypes。Secondly，Allourcomplexideas，exceptthoseofsubstances，beingarchetypesofthemind’sownmaking，notintendedtobethecopiesofanything，norreferredtotheexistenceofanything，astotheiroriginals，cannotwantanyconformitynecessarytorealknowledge。Forthatwhichisnotdesignedtorepresentanythingbutitself，canneverbecapableofawrongrepresentation，normisleadusfromthetrueapprehensionofanything，byitsdislikenesstoit:andsuch，exceptingthoseofsubstances，areallourcomplexideas。Which，asIhaveshowninanotherplace，arecombinationsofideas，whichthemind，byitsfreechoice，putstogether，withoutconsideringanyconnexiontheyhaveinnature。Andhenceitis，thatinallthesesortstheideasthemselvesareconsideredasthearchetypes，andthingsnootherwiseregarded，butastheyareconformabletothem。Sothatwecannotbutbeinfalliblycertain，thatalltheknowledgeweattainconcerningtheseideasisreal，andreachesthingsthemselves。Becauseinallourthoughts，reasonings，anddiscoursesofthiskind，weintendthingsnofurtherthanastheyareconformabletoourideas。Sothatinthesewecannotmissofacertainandundoubtedreality。
6。Hencetherealityofmathematicalknowledge。Idoubtnotbutitwillbeeasilygranted，thattheknowledgewehaveofmathematicaltruthsisnotonlycertain，butrealknowledge；andnotthebareemptyvisionofvain，insignificantchimerasofthebrain:andyet，ifwewillconsider，weshallfindthatitisonlyofourownideas。Themathematicianconsidersthetruthandpropertiesbelongingtoarectangleorcircleonlyastheyareinideainhisownmind。Foritispossibleheneverfoundeitherofthemexistingmathematically，i。e。preciselytrue，inhislife。Butyettheknowledgehehasofanytruthsorpropertiesbelongingtoacircle，oranyothermathematicalfigure，areneverthelesstrueandcertain，evenofrealthingsexisting:becauserealthingsarenofurtherconcerned，norintendedtobemeantbyanysuchpropositions，thanasthingsreallyagreetothosearchetypesinhismind。Isittrueoftheideaofatriangle，thatitsthreeanglesareequaltotworightones？Itistruealsoofatriangle，whereveritreallyexists。Whateverotherfigureexists，thatitisnotexactlyanswerabletothatideaofatriangleinhismind，isnotatallconcernedinthatproposition。Andthereforeheiscertainallhisknowledgeconcerningsuchideasisrealknowledge:because，intendingthingsnofurtherthantheyagreewiththosehisideas，heissurewhatheknowsconcerningthosefigures，whentheyhavebarelyanidealexistenceinhismind，willholdtrueofthemalsowhentheyhavearealexistenceinmatter:
hisconsiderationbeingbarelyofthosefigures，whicharethesamewhereverorhowevertheyexist。
7。Andofmoral。Andhenceitfollowsthatmoralknowledgeisascapableofrealcertaintyasmathematics。Forcertaintybeingbuttheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofourideas，anddemonstrationnothingbuttheperceptionofsuchagreement，bytheinterventionofotherideasormediums；ourmoralideas，aswellasmathematical，beingarchetypesthemselves，andsoadequateandcompleteideas；alltheagreementordisagreementwhichweshallfindinthemwillproducerealknowledge，aswellasinmathematicalfigures。
8。Existencenotrequiredtomakeabstractknowledgereal。Fortheattainingofknowledgeandcertainty，itisrequisitethatwehavedeterminedideas:and，tomakeourknowledgereal，itisrequisitethattheideasanswertheirarchetypes。Norletitbewondered，thatI
placethecertaintyofourknowledgeintheconsiderationofourideas，withsolittlecareandregard(asitmayseem)totherealexistenceofthings:sincemostofthosediscourseswhichtakeupthethoughtsandengagethedisputesofthosewhopretendtomakeittheirbusinesstoinquireaftertruthandcertainty，will，I
presume，uponexamination，befoundtobegeneralpropositions，andnotionsinwhichexistenceisnotatallconcerned。Allthediscoursesofthemathematiciansaboutthesquaringofacircle，conicsections，oranyotherpartofmathematics，concernnottheexistenceofanyofthosefigures:buttheirdemonstrations，whichdependontheirideas，arethesame，whethertherebeanysquareorcircleexistingintheworldorno。Inthesamemanner，thetruthandcertaintyofmoraldiscoursesabstractsfromthelivesofmen，andtheexistenceofthosevirtuesintheworldwhereoftheytreat:norareTully’sOfficeslesstrue，becausethereisnobodyintheworldthatexactlypractiseshisrules，andlivesuptothatpatternofavirtuousmanwhichhehasgivenus，andwhichexistednowherewhenhewritbutinidea。Ifitbetrueinspeculation，i。e。inidea，thatmurderdeservesdeath，itwillalsobetrueinrealityofanyactionthatexistsconformabletothatideaofmurder。Asforotheractions，thetruthofthatpropositionconcernsthemnot。Andthusitisofallotherspeciesofthings，whichhavenootheressencesbutthoseideaswhichareinthemindsofmen。
9。Norwillitbelesstrueorcertain，becausemoralideasareofourownmakingandnaming。Butitwillherebesaid，thatifmoralknowledgebeplacedinthecontemplationofourownmoralideas，andthose，asothermodes，beofourownmaking，Whatstrangenotionswilltherebeofjusticeandtemperance？Whatconfusionofvirtuesandvice，ifeveryonemaymakewhatideasofthemhepleases？Noconfusionordisorderinthethingsthemselves，northereasoningsaboutthem；nomorethan(inmathematics)therewouldbeadisturbanceinthedemonstration，orachangeinthepropertiesoffigures，andtheirrelationsonetoanother，ifamanshouldmakeatrianglewithfourcorners，oratrapeziumwithfourrightangles:thatis，inplainEnglish，changethenamesofthefigures，andcallthatbyonename，whichmathematicianscallordinarilybyanother。For，letamanmaketohimselftheideaofafigurewiththreeangles，whereofoneisarightone，andcallit，ifheplease，equilaterumortrapezium，oranythingelse；thepropertiesof，anddemonstrationsaboutthatideawillbethesameasifhecalleditarectangulartriangle。I
confessthechangeofthename，bytheimproprietyofspeech，willatfirstdisturbhimwhoknowsnotwhatideaitstandsfor:butassoonasthefigureisdrawn，theconsequencesanddemonstrationsareplainandclear。Justthesameisitinmoralknowledge:letamanhavetheideaoftakingfromothers，withouttheirconsent，whattheirhonestindustryhaspossessedthemof，andcallthisjusticeifheplease。Hethattakesthenameherewithouttheideaputtoitwillbemistaken，byjoininganotherideaofhisowntothatname:butstriptheideaofthatname，ortakeitsuchasitisinthespeaker’smind，andthesamethingswillagreetoit，asifyoucalleditinjustice。
Indeed，wrongnamesinmoraldiscoursesbreedusuallymoredisorder，becausetheyarenotsoeasilyrectifiedasinmathematics，wherethefigure，oncedrawnandseen，makesthenameuselessandofnoforce。Forwhatneedofasign，whenthethingsignifiedispresentandinview？Butinmoralnames，thatcannotbesoeasilyandshortlydone，becauseofthemanydecompositionsthatgotothemakingupthecomplexideasofthosemodes。Butyetforallthis，themiscallingofanyofthoseideas，contrarytotheusualsignificationofthewordsofthatlanguage，hindersnotbutthatwemayhavecertainanddemonstrativeknowledgeoftheirseveralagreementsanddisagreements，ifwewillcarefully，asinmathematics，keeptothesamepreciseideas，andtracethemintheirseveralrelationsonetoanother，withoutbeingledawaybytheirnames。Ifwebutseparatetheideaunderconsiderationfromthesignthatstandsforit，ourknowledgegoesequallyoninthediscoveryofrealtruthandcertainty，whateversoundswemakeuseof。
10。Misnamingdisturbsnotthecertaintyoftheknowledge。Onethingmorewearetotakenoticeof，ThatwhereGodoranyotherlaw-maker，hathdefinedanymoralnames，theretheyhavemadetheessenceofthatspeciestowhichthatnamebelongs；andthereitisnotsafetoapplyorusethemotherwise:butinothercasesitisbareimproprietyofspeechtoapplythemcontrarytothecommonusageofthecountry。Butyeteventhistoodisturbsnotthecertaintyofthatknowledge，whichisstilltobehadbyaduecontemplationandcomparingofthoseevennicknamedideas。
11。Ourcomplexideasofsubstanceshavetheirarchetypeswithoutus；andhereknowledgecomesshort。Thirdly，Thereisanothersortofcomplexideas，which，beingreferredtoarchetypeswithoutus，maydifferfromthem，andsoourknowledgeaboutthemmaycomeshortofbeingreal。Suchareourideasofsubstances，which，consistingofacollectionofsimpleideas，supposedtakenfromtheworksofnature，mayyetvaryfromthem；byhavingmoreordifferentideasunitedinthemthanaretobefoundunitedinthethingsthemselves。
Fromwhenceitcomestopass，thattheymay，andoftendo，failofbeingexactlyconformabletothingsthemselves。
12。Sofarasourcomplexideasagreewiththosearchetypeswithoutus，sofarourknowledgeconcerningsubstancesisreal。Isay，then，thattohaveideasofsubstanceswhich，bybeingconformabletothings，mayaffordusrealknowledge，itisnotenough，asinmodes，toputtogethersuchideasashavenoinconsistence，thoughtheydidneverbeforesoexist:v。g。theideasofsacrilegeorperjury，&c。，wereasrealandtrueideasbefore，asaftertheexistenceofanysuchfact。Butourideasofsubstances，beingsupposedcopies，andreferredtoarchetypeswithoutus，muststillbetakenfromsomethingthatdoesorhasexisted:theymustnotconsistofideasputtogetheratthepleasureofourthoughts，withoutanyrealpatterntheyweretakenfrom，thoughwecanperceivenoinconsistenceinsuchacombination。Thereasonwhereofis，becausewe，knowingnotwhatrealconstitutionitisofsubstanceswhereonoursimpleideasdepend，andwhichreallyisthecauseofthestrictunionofsomeofthemonewithanother，andtheexclusionofothersthereareveryfewofthemthatwecanbesureareorarenotinconsistentinnature，anyfurtherthanexperienceandsensibleobservationreach。
Herein，therefore，isfoundedtherealityofourknowledgeconcerningsubstances-Thatallourcomplexideasofthemmustbesuch，andsuchonly，asaremadeupofsuchsimpleonesashavebeendiscoveredtoco-existinnature。Andourideasbeingthustrue，thoughnotperhapsveryexactcopies，areyetthesubjectsofreal(asfaraswehaveany)knowledgeofthem。Which(ashasbeenalreadyshown)willnotbefoundtoreachveryfar:butsofarasitdoes，itwillstillberealknowledge。Whateverideaswehave，theagreementwefindtheyhavewithotherswillstillbeknowledge。Ifthoseideasbeabstract，itwillbegeneralknowledge。Buttomakeitrealconcerningsubstances，theideasmustbetakenfromtherealexistenceofthings。Whateversimpleideashavebeenfoundtoco-existinanysubstance，thesewemaywithconfidencejointogetheragain，andsomakeabstractideasofsubstances。Forwhateverhaveoncehadanunioninnature，maybeunitedagain。
13。Inourinquiriesaboutsubstances，wemustconsiderideas，andnotconfineourthoughtstonamesorspeciessupposedsetoutbynames。This，ifwerightlyconsider，andconfinenotourthoughtsandabstractideastonames，asiftherewere，orcouldbenoothersortsofthingsthanwhatknownnameshadalreadydetermined，and，asitwere，setout，weshouldthinkofthingswithgreaterfreedomandlessconfusionthanperhapswedo。Itwouldpossiblybethoughtaboldparadox，ifnotaverydangerousfalsehood，ifIshouldsaythatsomechangelings，whohavelivedfortyyearstogether，withoutanyappearanceofreason，aresomethingbetweenamanandabeast:
whichprejudiceisfoundeduponnothingelsebutafalsesupposition，thatthesetwonames，manandbeast，standfordistinctspeciessosetoutbyrealessences，thattherecancomenootherspeciesbetweenthem:whereasifwewillabstractfromthosenames，andthesuppositionofsuchspecificessencesmadebynature，whereinallthingsofthesamedenominationsdidexactlyandequallypartake；ifwewouldnotfancythattherewereacertainnumberoftheseessences，whereinallthings，asinmoulds，werecastandformed；weshouldfindthattheideaoftheshape，motion，andlifeofamanwithoutreason，isasmuchadistinctidea，andmakesasmuchadistinctsortofthingsfrommanandbeast，astheideaoftheshapeofanasswithreasonwouldbedifferentfromeitherthatofmanorbeast，andbeaspeciesofananimalbetween，ordistinctfromboth。
14。Objectionagainstachangelingbeingsomethingbetweenamanandbeast，answered。Hereeverybodywillbereadytoask，Ifchangelingsmaybesupposedsomethingbetweenmanandbeast，praywhatarethey？I
answer，changelings；whichisasgoodawordtosignifysomethingdifferentfromthesignificationofmanorbeast，asthenamesmanandbeastaretohavesignificationsdifferentonefromtheother。This，wellconsidered，wouldresolvethismatter，andshowmymeaningwithoutanymoreado。ButIamnotsounacquaintedwiththezealofsomemen，whichenablesthemtospinconsequences，andtoseereligionthreatened，wheneveranyoneventurestoquittheirformsofspeaking，asnottoforeseewhatnamessuchapropositionasthisisliketobechargedwith:andwithoutdoubtitwillbeasked，Ifchangelingsaresomethingbetweenmanandbeast，whatwillbecomeofthemintheotherworld？TowhichIanswer，I。Itconcernsmenottoknoworinquire。Totheirownmastertheystandorfall。Itwillmaketheirstateneitherbetternorworse，whetherwedetermineanythingofitorno。TheyareinthehandsofafaithfulCreatorandabountifulFather，whodisposesnotofhiscreaturesaccordingtoournarrowthoughtsoropinions，nordistinguishesthemaccordingtonamesandspeciesofourcontrivance。Andwethatknowsolittleofthispresentworldwearein，may，Ithink，contentourselveswithoutbeingperemptoryindefiningthedifferentstateswhichcreaturesshallcomeintowhentheygooffthisstage。Itmaysufficeus，thatHehathmadeknowntoallthosewhoarecapableofinstruction，discoursing，andreasoning，thattheyshallcometoanaccount，andreceiveaccordingtowhattheyhavedoneinthisbody。
15。Whatwillbecomeofchangelingsinafuturestate？But，Secondly，Ianswer，Theforceofthesemen’squestion(viz。Willyoudeprivechangelingsofafuturestate？)isfoundedononeofthesetwosuppositions，whicharebothfalse。Thefirstis，Thatallthingsthathavetheoutwardshapeandappearanceofamanmustnecessarilybedesignedtoanimmortalfuturebeingafterthislife:or，secondly，Thatwhateverisofhumanbirthmustbeso。Takeawaytheseimaginations，andsuchquestionswillbegroundlessandridiculous。
Idesirethenthosewhothinkthereisnomorebutanaccidentaldifferencebetweenthemselvesandchangelings，theessenceinbothbeingexactlythesame，toconsider，whethertheycanimagineimmortalityannexedtoanyoutwardshapeofthebody；theveryproposingitis，Isuppose，enoughtomakethemdisownit。Nooneyet，thateverIheardof，howmuchsoeverimmersedinmatter，allowedthatexcellencytoanyfigureofthegrosssensibleoutwardparts，astoaffirmeternallifeduetoit，oranecessaryconsequenceofit；orthatanymassofmattershould，afteritsdissolutionhere，beagainrestoredhereaftertoaneverlastingstateofsense，perception，andknowledge，onlybecauseitwasmouldedintothisorthatfigure，andhadsuchaparticularframeofitsvisibleparts。Suchanopinionasthis，placingimmortalityinacertainsuperficialfigure，turnsoutofdoorsallconsiderationofsoulorspirit；uponwhoseaccountalonesomecorporealbeingshavehithertobeenconcludedimmortal，andothersnot。Thisistoattributemoretotheoutsidethaninsideofthings；andtoplacetheexcellencyofamanmoreintheexternalshapeofhisbody，thaninternalperfectionsofhissoul:whichisbutlittlebetterthantoannexthegreatandinestimableadvantageofimmortalityandlifeeverlasting，whichhehasaboveothermaterialbeings，toannexit，Isay，tothecutofhisbeard，orthefashionofhiscoat。Forthisorthatoutwardmarkofourbodiesnomorecarrieswithitthehopeofaneternalduration，thanthefashionofaman’ssuitgiveshimreasonablegroundstoimagineitwillneverwearout，orthatitwillmakehimimmortal。Itwillperhapsbesaid，thatnobodythinksthattheshapemakesanythingimmortal，butitistheshapeisthesignofarationalsoulwithin，whichisimmortal。Iwonderwhomadeitthesignofanysuchthing:forbarelysayingit，willnotmakeitso。Itwouldrequiresomeproofstopersuadeoneofit。NofigurethatIknowspeaksanysuchlanguage。
Foritmayasrationallybeconcluded，thatthedeadbodyofaman，whereinthereistobefoundnomoreappearanceoractionoflifethanthereisinastatue，hasyetneverthelessalivingsoulinit，becauseofitsshape；asthatthereisarationalsoulinachangeling，becausehehastheoutsideofarationalcreature，whenhisactionscarryfarlessmarksofreasonwiththem，inthewholecourseofhislife，thanwhataretobefoundinmanyabeast。
16。Monsters。Butitistheissueofrationalparents，andmustthereforebeconcludedtohavearationalsoul。Iknownotbywhatlogicyoumustsoconclude。Iamsurethisisaconclusionthatmennowhereallowof。Foriftheydid，theywouldnotmakebold，aseverywheretheydo，todestroyill-formedandmis-shapedproductions。Ay，butthesearemonsters。Letthembeso:whatwillyourdrivelling，unintelligent，intractablechangelingbe？Shalladefectinthebodymakeamonster；adefectinthemind(thefarmorenoble，and，inthecommonphrase，thefarmoreessentialpart)
not？Shallthewantofanose，oraneck，makeamonster，andputsuchissueoutoftherankofmen；thewantofreasonandunderstanding，not？Thisistobringallbackagaintowhatwasexplodedjustnow:
thisistoplaceallintheshape，andtotakethemeasureofamanonlybyhisoutside。Toshowthataccordingtotheordinarywayofreasoninginthismatter，peopledolaythewholestressonthefigure，andresolvethewholeessenceofthespeciesofman(astheymakeit)intotheoutwardshape，howunreasonablesoeveritbe，andhowmuchsoevertheydisownit，weneedbuttracetheirthoughtsandpracticealittlefurther，andthenitwillplainlyappear。Thewell-shapedchangelingisaman，hasarationalsoul，thoughitappearnot:thisispastdoubt，sayyou:maketheearsalittlelonger，andmorepointed，andthenosealittleflatterthanordinary，andthenyoubegintoboggle:makethefaceyetnarrower，flatter，andlonger，andthenyouareatastand:addstillmoreandmoreofthelikenessofabrutetoit，andlettheheadbeperfectlythatofsomeotheranimal，thenpresentlyitisamonster；anditisdemonstrationwithyouthatithathnorationalsoul，andmustbedestroyed。Wherenow(Iask)shallbethejustmeasure；whichtheutmostboundsofthatshape，thatcarrieswithitarationalsoul？
For，sincetherehavebeenhumanfoetusesproduced，halfbeastandhalfman；andothersthreepartsone，andoneparttheother；andsoitispossibletheymaybeinallthevarietyofapproachestotheoneortheothershape，andmayhaveseveraldegreesofmixtureofthelikenessofaman，orabrute；-Iwouldgladlyknowwhatarethosepreciselineaments，which，accordingtothishypothesis，areorarenotcapableofarationalsoultobejoinedtothem。Whatsortofoutsideisthecertainsignthatthereisorisnotsuchaninhabitantwithin？Fortillthatbedone，wetalkatrandomofman:andshallalways，Ifear，doso，aslongaswegiveourselvesuptocertainsounds，andtheimaginationsofsettledandfixedspeciesinnature，weknownotwhat。But，afterall，Idesireitmaybeconsidered，thatthosewhothinktheyhaveansweredthedifficulty，bytellingus，thatamis-shapedfoetusisamonster，runintothesamefaulttheyarearguingagainst；byconstitutingaspeciesbetweenmanandbeast。Forwhatelse，Ipray，istheirmonsterinthecase，(ifthewordmonstersignifiesanythingatall，)butsomethingneithermannorbeast，butpartakingsomewhatofeither？Andjustsoisthechangelingbeforementioned。Sonecessaryisittoquitthecommonnotionofspeciesandessences，ifwewilltrulylookintothenatureofthings，andexaminethembywhatourfacultiescandiscoverinthemastheyexist，andnotbygroundlessfanciesthathavebeentakenupaboutthem。
17。Wordsandspecies。Ihavementionedthishere，becauseIthinkwecannotbetoocautiousthatwordsandspecies，intheordinarynotionswhichwehavebeenusedtoofthem，imposenotonus。ForIamapttothinkthereinliesonegreatobstacletoourclearanddistinctknowledge，especiallyinreferencetosubstances:andfromthencehasrisenagreatpartofthedifficultiesabouttruthandcertainty。Wouldweaccustomourselvestoseparateourcontemplationsandreasoningsfromwords，wemightinagreatmeasureremedythisinconveniencewithinourownthoughts:butyetitwouldstilldisturbusinourdiscoursewithothers，aslongasweretainedtheopinion，thatspeciesandtheiressenceswereanythingelsebutourabstractideas(suchastheyare)withnamesannexedtothem，tobethesignsofthem。
18。Recapitulation。Whereverweperceivetheagreementordisagreementofanyofourideas，thereiscertainknowledge:andwhereverwearesurethoseideasagreewiththerealityofthings，thereiscertainrealknowledge。Ofwhichagreementofourideaswiththerealityofthings，havingheregiventhemarks，Ithink，I
haveshownwhereinitisthatcertainty，realcertainty，consists。
Which，whateveritwastoothers，was，Iconfess，tomeheretofore，oneofthosedesideratawhichIfoundgreatwantof。
ChapterV
OfTruthinGeneral1。Whattruthis。Whatistruth？wasaninquirymanyagessince；anditbeingthatwhichallmankindeitherdo，orpretendtosearchafter，itcannotbutbeworthourwhilecarefullytoexaminewhereinitconsists，andsoacquaintourselveswiththenatureofit，astoobservehowtheminddistinguishesitfromfalsehood。
2。Arightjoiningorseparatingofsigns，i。e。eitherideasorwords。Truth，then，seemstome，intheproperimportoftheword，tosignifynothingbutthejoiningorseparatingofSigns，astheThingssignifiedbythemdoagreeordisagreeonewithanother。Thejoiningorseparatingofsignsheremeant，iswhatbyanothernamewecallproposition。Sothattruthproperlybelongsonlytopropositions:whereoftherearetwosorts，viz。mentalandverbal；
astherearetwosortsofsignscommonlymadeuseof，viz。ideasandwords。
3。Whichmakementalorverbalpropositions。Toformaclearnotionoftruth，itisverynecessarytoconsidertruthofthought，andtruthofwords，distinctlyonefromanother:butyetitisverydifficulttotreatofthemasunder。Becauseitisunavoidable，intreatingofmentalpropositions，tomakeuseofwords:andthentheinstancesgivenofmentalpropositionsceaseimmediatelytobebarelymental，andbecomeverbal。Foramentalpropositionbeingnothingbutabareconsiderationoftheideas，astheyareinourminds，strippedofnames，theylosethenatureofpurelymentalpropositionsassoonastheyareputintowords。
4。Mentalpropositionsareveryhardtohetreatedof。Andthatwhichmakesityethardertotreatofmentalandverbalpropositionsseparatelyis，thatmostmen，ifnotall，intheirthinkingandreasoningswithinthemselves，makeuseofwordsinsteadofideas；atleastwhenthesubjectoftheirmeditationcontainsinitcomplexideas。Whichisagreatevidenceoftheimperfectionanduncertaintyofourideasofthatkind，andmay，ifattentivelymadeuseof，serveforamarktoshowuswhatarethosethingswehaveclearandperfectestablishedideasof，andwhatnot。Forifwewillcuriouslyobservethewayourmindtakesinthinkingandreasoning，weshallfind，Isuppose，thatwhenwemakeanypropositionswithinourownthoughtsaboutwhiteorblack，sweetorbitter，atriangleoracircle，wecanandoftendoframeinourmindstheideasthemselves，withoutreflectingonthenames。Butwhenwewouldconsider，ormakepropositionsaboutthemorecomplexideas，asofaman，vitriol，fortitude，glory，weusuallyputthenamefortheidea:becausetheideasthesenamesstandfor，beingforthemostpartimperfect，confused，andundetermined，wereflectonthenamesthemselves，becausetheyaremoreclear，certain，anddistinct，andreadieroccurtoourthoughtsthanthepureideas:andsowemakeuseofthesewordsinsteadoftheideasthemselves，evenwhenwewouldmeditateandreasonwithinourselves，andmaketacitmentalpropositions。Insubstances，ashasbeenalreadynoticed，thisisoccasionedbytheimperfectionsofourideas:wemakingthenamestandfortherealessence，ofwhichwehavenoideaatall。Inmodes，itisoccasionedbythegreatnumberofsimpleideasthatgotothemakingthemup。Formanyofthembeingcompounded，thenameoccursmucheasierthanthecomplexideaitself，whichrequirestimeandattentiontoberecollected，andexactlyrepresentedtothemind，eveninthosemenwhohaveformerlybeenatthepainstodoit；andisutterlyimpossibletobedonebythosewho，thoughtheyhavereadyintheirmemorythegreatestpartofthecommonwordsofthatlanguage，yetperhapsnevertroubledthemselvesinalltheirlivestoconsiderwhatpreciseideasthemostofthemstoodfor。Someconfusedorobscurenotionshaveservedtheirturns；andmanywhotalkverymuchofreligionandconscience，ofchurchandfaith，ofpowerandright，ofobstructionsandhumours，melancholyandcholer，wouldperhapshavelittleleftintheirthoughtsandmeditationsifoneshoulddesirethemtothinkonlyofthethingsthemselvesandlaybythosewordswithwhichtheysooftenconfoundothers，andnotseldomthemselvesalso。
5。Mentalandverbalpropositionscontrasted。Buttoreturntotheconsiderationoftruth:wemust，Isay，observetwosortsofpropositionsthatwearecapableofmaking:-
First，mental，whereintheideasinourunderstandingsarewithouttheuseofwordsputtogether，orseparated，bythemindperceivingorjudgingoftheiragreementordisagreement。
Secondly，Verbalpropositions，whicharewords，thesignsofourideas，puttogetherorseparatedinaffirmativeornegativesentences。
Bywhichwayofaffirmingordenying，thesesigns，madebysounds，are，asitwere，puttogetherorseparatedonefromanother。Sothatpropositionconsistsinjoiningorseparatingsigns；andtruthconsistsintheputtingtogetherorseparatingthosesigns，accordingasthethingswhichtheystandforagreeordisagree。
6。Whenmentalpropositionscontainrealtruth，andwhenverbal。
Everyone’sexperiencewillsatisfyhim，thatthemind，eitherbyperceiving，orsupposing，theagreementordisagreementofanyofitsideas，doestacitlywithinitselfputthemintoakindofpropositionaffirmativeornegative；whichIhaveendeavouredtoexpressbythetermsputtingtogetherandseparating。Butthisactionofthemind，whichissofamiliartoeverythinkingandreasoningman，iseasiertobeconceivedbyreflectingonwhatpassesinuswhenweaffirmordeny，thantobeexplainedbywords。
Whenamanhasinhisheadtheideaoftwolines，viz。thesideanddiagonalofasquare，whereofthediagonalisaninchlong，hemayhavetheideaalsoofthedivisionofthatlineintoacertainnumberofequalparts:v。g。intofive，ten，ahundred，athousand，oranyothernumber，andmayhavetheideaofthatinchlinebeingdivisible，ornotdivisible，intosuchequalparts，asacertainnumberofthemwillbeequaltothesideline。Now，wheneverheperceives，believes，orsupposessuchakindofdivisibilitytoagreeordisagreetohisideaofthatline，he，asitwere，joinsorseparatesthosetwoideas，viz。theideaofthatline，andtheideaofthatkindofdivisibility；andsomakesamentalproposition，whichistrueorfalse，accordingassuchakindofdivisibility；adivisibilityintosuchaliquotparts，doesreallyagreetothatlineorno。Whenideasaresoputtogether，orseparatedinthemind，astheyorthethingstheystandfordoagreeornot，thatis，asImaycallit，mentaltruth。Buttruthofwordsissomethingmore；andthatistheaffirmingordenyingofwordsoneofanother，astheideastheystandforagreeordisagree:andthisagainistwo-fold；eitherpurelyverbalandtrifling，whichIshallspeakof，(chap。viii。，)
orrealandinstructive；whichistheobjectofthatrealknowledgewhichwehavespokenofalready。
7。Objectionagainstverbaltruth，that\"thusitmayallbechimerical。\"Buthereagainwillbeapttooccurthesamedoubtabouttruth，thatdidaboutknowledge:anditwillbeobjected，thatiftruthbenothingbutthejoiningandseparatingofwordsinpropositions，astheideastheystandforagreeordisagreeinmen’sminds，theknowledgeoftruthisnotsovaluableathingasitistakentobe，norworththepainsandtimemenemployinthesearchofit:sincebythisaccountitamountstonomorethantheconformityofwordstothechimerasofmen’sbrains。Whoknowsnotwhatoddnotionsmanymen’sheadsarefilledwith，andwhatstrangeideasallmen’sbrainsarecapableof？Butifweresthere，weknowthetruthofnothingbythisrule，butofthevisionarywordsinourownimaginations；norhaveothertruth，butwhatasmuchconcernsharpiesandcentaurs，asmenandhorses。Forthose，andthelike，maybeideasinourheads，andhavetheiragreementordisagreementthere，aswellastheideasofrealbeings，andsohaveastruepropositionsmadeaboutthem。Anditwillbealtogetherastrueapropositiontosayallcentaursareanimals，asthatallmenareanimals；andthecertaintyofoneasgreatastheother。Forinboththepropositions，thewordsareputtogetheraccordingtotheagreementoftheideasinourminds:andtheagreementoftheideaofanimalwiththatofcentaurisasclearandvisibletothemind，astheagreementoftheideaofanimalwiththatofman；andsothesetwopropositionsareequallytrue，equallycertain。Butofwhatuseisallsuchtruthtous？
8。Answered，\"Realtruthisaboutideasagreeingtothings。\"
Thoughwhathasbeensaidintheforegoingchaptertodistinguishrealfromimaginaryknowledgemightsufficehere，inanswertothisdoubt，todistinguishrealtruthfromchimerical，or(ifyouplease)
barelynominal，theydependingbothonthesamefoundation；yetitmaynotbeamisshereagaintoconsider，thatthoughourwordssignifynothingbutourideas，yetbeingdesignedbythemtosignifythings，thetruththeycontainwhenputintopropositionswillbeonlyverbal，whentheystandforideasinthemindthathavenotanagreementwiththerealityofthings。Andthereforetruthaswellasknowledgemaywellcomeunderthedistinctionofverbalandreal；thatbeingonlyverbaltruth，whereintermsarejoinedaccordingtotheagreementordisagreementoftheideastheystandfor；withoutregardingwhetherourideasaresuchasreallyhave，orarecapableofhaving，anexistenceinnature。Butthenitistheycontainrealtruth，whenthesesignsarejoined，asourideasagree；andwhenourideasaresuchasweknowarecapableofhavinganexistenceinnature:whichinsubstanceswecannotknow，butbyknowingthatsuchhaveexisted。
9。Truthandfalsehoodingeneral。Truthisthemarkingdowninwordstheagreementordisagreementofideasasitis。Falsehoodisthemarkingdowninwordstheagreementordisagreementofideasotherwisethanitis。Andsofarastheseideas，thusmarkedbysounds，agreetotheirarchetypes，sofaronlyisthetruthreal。
Theknowledgeofthistruthconsistsinknowingwhatideasthewordsstandfor，andtheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofthoseideas，accordingasitismarkedbythosewords。
10。Generalpropositionstobetreatedofmoreatlarge。Butbecausewordsarelookedonasthegreatconduitsoftruthandknowledge，andthatinconveyingandreceivingoftruth，andcommonlyinreasoningaboutit，wemakeuseofwordsandpropositions，Ishallmoreatlargeinquirewhereinthecertaintyofrealtruthscontainedinpropositionsconsists，andwhereitistobehad；andendeavourtoshowinwhatsortofuniversalpropositionswearecapableofbeingcertainoftheirrealtruthorfalsehood。
Ishallbeginwithgeneralpropositions，asthosewhichmostemployourthoughts，andexerciseourcontemplation。Generaltruthsaremostlookedafterbythemindasthosethatmostenlargeourknowledge；andbytheircomprehensivenesssatisfyingusatonceofmanyparticulars，enlargeourview，andshortenourwaytoknowledge。
11。Moralandmetaphysicaltruth。Besidestruthtakeninthestrictsensebeforementioned，thereareothersortsoftruths:As，1。
Moraltruth，whichisspeakingofthingsaccordingtothepersuasionofourownminds，thoughthepropositionwespeakagreenottotherealityofthings；2。Metaphysicaltruth，whichisnothingbuttherealexistenceofthings，conformabletotheideastowhichwehaveannexedtheirnames。This，thoughitseemstoconsistintheverybeingsofthings，yet，whenconsideredalittlenearly，willappeartoincludeatacitproposition，wherebythemindjoinsthatparticularthingtotheideaithadbeforesettledwiththenametoit。Buttheseconsiderationsoftruth，eitherhavingbeenbeforetakennoticeof，ornotbeingmuchtoourpresentpurpose，itmaysufficehereonlytohavementionedthem。
