23。Theendsoflanguage:First，toconveyourideas。Toconcludethisconsiderationoftheimperfectionandabuseoflanguage。Theendsoflanguageinourdiscoursewithothersbeingchieflythesethree:
First，tomakeknownoneman’sthoughtsorideastoanother；Secondly，todoitwithasmucheaseandquicknessaspossible；and，Thirdly，therebytoconveytheknowledgeofthings:languageiseitherabusedofdeficient，whenitfailsofanyofthesethree。
First，Wordsfailinthefirstoftheseends，andlaynotopenoneman’sideastoanother’sview:1。Whenmenhavenamesintheirmouthswithoutanydeterminateideasintheirminds，whereoftheyarethesigns:or，2。Whentheyapplythecommonreceivednamesofanylanguagetoideas，towhichthecommonuseofthatlanguagedoesnotapplythem:or，3。Whentheyapplythemveryunsteadily，makingthemstand，nowforone，andbyandbyforanotheridea。
24。Todoitwithquickness。Secondly，Menfailofconveyingtheirthoughtswithallthequicknessandeasethatmaybe，whentheyhavecomplexideaswithouthavinganydistinctnamesforthem。Thisissometimesthefaultofthelanguageitself，whichhasnotinitasoundyetappliedtosuchasignification；andsometimesthefaultoftheman，whohasnotyetlearnedthenameforthatideahewouldshowanother。
25。Therewithtoconveytheknowledgeofthings。Thirdly，Thereisnoknowledgeofthingsconveyedbymen’swords，whentheirideasagreenottotherealityofthings。Thoughitbeadefectthathasitsoriginalinourideas，whicharenotsoconformabletothenatureofthingsasattention，study，andapplicationmightmakethem，yetitfailsnottoextenditselftoourwordstoo，whenweusethemassignsofrealbeings，whichyetneverhadanyrealityorexistence。
26。Howmen’swordsfailinallthese:First，whenusedwithoutanyideas。First，Hethathathwordsofanylanguage，withoutdistinctideasinhismindtowhichheappliesthem，does，sofarasheusesthemindiscourse，onlymakeanoisewithoutanysenseorsignification；andhowlearnedsoeverhemayseem，bytheuseofhardwordsorlearnedterms，isnotmuchmoreadvancedtherebyinknowledge，thanhewouldbeinlearning，whohadnothinginhisstudybutthebaretitlesofbooks，withoutpossessingthecontentsofthem。Forallsuchwords，howeverputintodiscourse，accordingtotherightconstructionofgrammaticalrules，ortheharmonyofwell-turnedperiods，doyetamounttonothingbutbaresounds，andnothingelse。
27。Whencomplexideasarewithoutnamesannexedtothem。
Secondly，Hethathascomplexideas，withoutparticularnamesforthem，wouldbeinnobettercasethanabookseller，whohadinhiswarehousevolumesthatlaythereunbound，andwithouttitles，whichhecouldthereforemakeknowntoothersonlybyshowingtheloosesheets，andcommunicatethemonlybytale。Thismanishinderedinhisdiscourse，forwantofwordstocommunicatehiscomplexideas，whichheisthereforeforcedtomakeknownbyanenumerationofthesimpleonesthatcomposethem；andsoisfainoftentousetwentywords，toexpresswhatanothermansignifiesinone。
28。Whenthesamesignisnotputforthesameidea。Thirdly，Hethatputsnotconstantlythesamesignforthesameidea，butusesthesamewordssometimesinoneandsometimesinanothersignification，oughttopassintheschoolsandconversationforasfairaman，ashedoesinthemarketandexchange，whosellsseveralthingsunderthesamename。
29。Whenwordsaredivertedfromtheircommonuse。Fourthly，Hethatappliesthewordsofanylanguagetoideasdifferentfromthosetowhichthecommonuseofthatcountryappliesthem，howeverhisownunderstandingmaybefilledwithtruthandlight，willnotbysuchwordsbeabletoconveymuchofittoothers，withoutdefininghisterms。Forhoweverthesoundsaresuchasarefamiliarlyknown，andeasilyentertheearsofthosewhoareaccustomedtothem；yetstandingforotherideasthanthosetheyusuallyareannexedto，andarewonttoexciteinthemindofthehearers，theycannotmakeknownthethoughtsofhimwhothususesthem。
30。Whentheyarenamesoffantasticalimaginations。Fifthly，Hethatimaginedtohimselfsubstancessuchasneverhavebeen，andfilledhisheadwithideaswhichhavenotanycorrespondencewiththerealnatureofthings，towhichyethegivessettledanddefinednames，mayfillhisdiscourse，andperhapsanotherman’sheadwiththefantasticalimaginationsofhisownbrain，butwillbeveryfarfromadvancingtherebyonejotinrealandtrueknowledge。
31。Summary。Hethathathnameswithoutideas，wantsmeaninginhiswords，andspeaksonlyemptysounds。Hethathathcomplexideaswithoutnamesforthem，wantslibertyanddispatchinhisexpressions，andisnecessitatedtouseperiphrases。Hethatuseshiswordslooselyandunsteadilywilleitherbenotmindedornotunderstood。Hethatapplieshisnamestoideasdifferentfromtheircommonuse，wantsproprietyinhislanguage，andspeaksgibberish。Andhethathaththeideasofsubstancesdisagreeingwiththerealexistenceofthings，sofarwantsthematerialsoftrueknowledgeinhisunderstanding，andhathinsteadthereofchimeras。
32。Howmen’swordsfailwhentheystandforsubstances。InournotionsconcerningSubstances，weareliabletoalltheformerinconveniences:v。g。hethatusesthewordtarantula，withouthavinganyimaginationorideaofwhatitstandsfor，pronouncesagoodword；
butsolongmeansnothingatallbyit。2。Hethat，inanewly-discoveredcountry，shallseeseveralsortsofanimalsandvegetables，unknowntohimbefore，mayhaveastrueideasofthem，asofahorseorastag；butcanspeakofthemonlybyadescription，tillheshalleithertakethenamesthenativescallthemby，orgivethemnameshimself。3。Hethatusesthewordbodysometimesforpureextension，andsometimesforextensionandsoliditytogether，willtalkveryfallaciously。4。Hethatgivesthenamehorsetothatideawhichcommonusagecallsmule，talksimproperly，andwillnotbeunderstood。5。Hethatthinksthenamecentaurstandsforsomerealbeing，imposesonhimself，andmistakeswordsforthings。
33。Howwhentheystandformodesandrelations。InModesandRelationsgenerally，weareliableonlytothefourfirstoftheseinconveniences；viz。1。Imayhaveinmymemorythenamesofmodes，asgratitudeorcharity，andyetnothaveanypreciseideasannexedinmythoughtstothosenames。2。Imayhaveideas，andnotknowthenamesthatbelongtothem:v。g。Imayhavetheideaofaman’sdrinkingtillhiscolourandhumourbealtered，tillhistonguetrips，andhiseyeslookred，andhisfeetfailhim；andyetnotknowthatitistobecalleddrunkenness。3。Imayhavetheideasofvirtuesorvices，andnamesalso，butapplythemamiss:v。g。whenIapplythenamefrugalitytothatideawhichotherscallandsignifybythissound，covetousness。4。Imayuseanyofthosenameswithinconstancy。5。
But，inmodesandrelations，Icannothaveideasdisagreeingtotheexistenceofthings:formodesbeingcomplexideas，madebythemindatpleasure，andrelationbeingbutbywayofconsideringorcomparingtwothingstogether，andsoalsoanideaofmyownmaking，theseideascanscarcebefoundtodisagreewithanythingexisting；sincetheyarenotinthemindasthecopiesofthingsregularlymadebynature，noraspropertiesinseparablyflowingfromtheinternalconstitutionoressenceofanysubstance；but，asitwere，patternslodgedinmymemory，withnamesannexedtothem，todenominateactionsandrelationsby，astheycometoexist。Butthemistakeiscommonlyinmygivingawrongnametomyconceptions；andsousingwordsinadifferentsensefromotherpeople:Iamnotunderstood，butamthoughttohavewrongideasofthem，whenIgivewrongnamestothem。OnlyifIputinmyideasofmixedmodesorrelationsanyinconsistentideastogether，Ifillmyheadalsowithchimeras；sincesuchideas，ifwellexamined，cannotsomuchasexistinthemind，muchlessanyrealbeingeverbedenominatedfromthem。
34。Seventhly，languageisoftenabusedbyfigurativespeech。
Sincewitandfancyfindeasierentertainmentintheworldthandrytruthandrealknowledge，figurativespeechesandallusioninlanguagewillhardlybeadmittedasanimperfectionorabuseofit。I
confess，indiscourseswhereweseekratherpleasureanddelightthaninformationandimprovement，suchornamentsasareborrowedfromthemcanscarcepassforfaults。Butyetifwewouldspeakofthingsastheyare，wemustallowthatalltheartofrhetoric，besidesorderandclearness；alltheartificialandfigurativeapplicationofwordseloquencehathinvented，arefornothingelsebuttoinsinuatewrongideas，movethepassions，andtherebymisleadthejudgment；andsoindeedareperfectcheats:andtherefore，howeverlaudableorallowableoratorymayrendertheminharanguesandpopularaddresses，theyarecertainly，inalldiscoursesthatpretendtoinformorinstruct，whollytobeavoided；andwheretruthandknowledgeareconcerned，cannotbutbethoughtagreatfault，eitherofthelanguageorpersonthatmakesuseofthem。Whatandhowvarioustheyare，willbesuperfluousheretotakenotice；thebooksofrhetoricwhichaboundintheworld，willinstructthosewhowanttobeinformed:onlyIcannotbutobservehowlittlethepreservationandimprovementoftruthandknowledgeisthecareandconcernofmankind；
sincetheartsoffallacyareendowedandpreferred。Itisevidenthowmuchmenlovetodeceiveandbedeceived，sincerhetoric，thatpowerfulinstrumentoferroranddeceit，hasitsestablishedprofessors，ispubliclytaught，andhasalwaysbeenhadingreatreputation:andIdoubtnotbutitwillbethoughtgreatboldness，ifnotbrutality，inmetohavesaidthusmuchagainstit。
Eloquence，likethefairsex，hastooprevailingbeautiesinittosufferitselfevertobespokenagainst。Anditisinvaintofindfaultwiththoseartsofdeceiving，whereinmenfindpleasuretobedeceived。
ChapterXI
OftheRemediesoftheForegoingImperfectionsandAbusesofWords1。RemediesareworthseekingThenaturalandimprovedimperfectionsoflanguageswehaveseenaboveatlarge:andspeechbeingthegreatbondthatholdssocietytogether，andthecommonconduit，wherebytheimprovementsofknowledgeareconveyedfromonemanandonegenerationtoanother，itwouldwelldeserveourmostseriousthoughtstoconsider，whatremediesaretobefoundfortheinconveniencesabovementioned。
2。Arenoteasytofind。Iamnotsovainastothinkthatanyonecanpretendtoattempttheperfectreformingthelanguagesoftheworld，nonotsomuchasofhisowncountry，withoutrenderinghimselfridiculous。Torequirethatmenshouldusetheirwordsconstantlyinthesamesense，andfornonebutdeterminedanduniformideas，wouldbetothinkthatallmenshouldhavethesamenotions，andshouldtalkofnothingbutwhattheyhaveclearanddistinctideasof:whichisnottobeexpectedbyanyonewhohathnotvanityenoughtoimaginehecanprevailwithmentobeveryknowingorverysilentAndhemustbeverylittleskilledintheworld，whothinksthatavolubletongueshallaccompanyonlyagoodunderstanding；orthatmen’stalkingmuchorlittleshouldholdproportiononlytotheirknowledge。
3。Butyetnecessarytothosewhosearchaftertruth。Butthoughthemarketandexchangemustbelefttotheirownwaysoftalking，andgossipingsnotberobbedoftheirancientprivilege:thoughtheschools，andmenofargumentwouldperhapstakeitamisstohaveanythingoffered，toabatethelengthorlessenthenumberoftheirdisputes；yetmethinksthosewhopretendseriouslytosearchafterormaintaintruth，shouldthinkthemselvesobligedtostudyhowtheymightdeliverthemselveswithoutobscurity，doubtfulness，orequivocation，towhichmen’swordsarenaturallyliable，ifcarebenottaken。
4。Misuseofwordsthegreatcauseoferrors。Forhethatshallwellconsidertheerrorsandobscurity，themistakesandconfusion，thatarespreadintheworldbyanilluseofwords，willfindsomereasontodoubtwhetherlanguage，asithasbeenemployed，hascontributedmoretotheimprovementorhindranceofknowledgeamongstmankind。Howmanyarethere，that，whentheywouldthinkonthings，fixtheirthoughtsonlyonwords，especiallywhentheywouldapplytheirmindstomoralmatters？Andwhothencanwonderiftheresultofsuchcontemplationsandreasonings，aboutlittlemorethansounds，whilsttheideastheyannextothemareveryconfusedandveryunsteady，orperhapsnoneatall；whocanwonder，Isay，thatsuchthoughtsandreasoningsendinnothingbutobscurityandmistake，withoutanyclearjudgmentorknowledge？
5。Hasmademenmoreconceitedandobstinate。Thisinconvenience，inanilluseofwords，mensufferintheirownprivatemeditations:
butmuchmoremanifestarethedisorderswhichfollowfromit，inconversation，discourse，andarguingswithothers。Forlanguagebeingthegreatconduit，wherebymenconveytheirdiscoveries，reasonings，andknowledge，fromonetoanother，hethatmakesanilluseofit，thoughhedoesnotcorruptthefountainsofknowledge，whichareinthingsthemselves，yethedoes，asmuchasinhimlies，breakorstopthepipeswherebyitisdistributedtothepublicuseandadvantageofmankind。Hethatuseswordswithoutanyclearandsteadymeaning，whatdoeshebutleadhimselfandothersintoerrors？Andhethatdesignedlydoesit，oughttobelookedonasanenemytotruthandknowledge。Andyetwhocanwonderthatallthesciencesandpartsofknowledgehavebeensooverchargedwithobscureandequivocalterms，andinsignificantanddoubtfulexpressions，capabletomakethemostattentiveorquick-sightedverylittle，ornotatall，themoreknowingororthodox:sincesubtlety，inthosewhomakeprofessiontoteachordefendtruth，hathpassedsomuchforavirtue:avirtue，indeed，which，consistingforthemostpartinnothingbutthefallaciousandillusoryuseofobscureordeceitfulterms，isonlyfittomakemenmoreconceitedintheirignorance，andmoreobstinateintheirerrors。
6。Addictedtowranglingaboutsounds。Letuslookintothebooksofcontroversyofanykind，thereweshallseethattheeffectofobscure，unsteady，orequivocaltermsisnothingbutnoiseandwranglingaboutsounds，withoutconvincingorbetteringaman’sunderstanding。Foriftheideabenotagreedon，betwixtthespeakerandhearer，forwhichthewordsstand，theargumentisnotaboutthings，butnames。Asoftenassuchawordwhosesignificationisnotascertainedbetwixtthem，comesinuse，theirunderstandingshavenootherobjectwhereintheyagree，butbarelythesound；thethingsthattheythinkonatthattime，asexpressedbythatword，beingquitedifferent。
7。Instance，batandbird。Whetherabatbeabirdorno，isnotaquestion，Whetherabatbeanotherthingthanindeeditis，orhaveotherqualitiesthanindeedithas；forthatwouldbeextremelyabsurdtodoubtof。Butthequestionis，(1)Eitherbetweenthosethatacknowledgedthemselvestohavebutimperfectideasofoneorbothofthissortofthings，forwhichthesenamesaresupposedtostand。
Andthenitisarealinquiryconcerningthenatureofabirdorabat，tomaketheiryetimperfectideasofitmorecomplete；byexaminingwhetherallthesimpleideastowhich，combinedtogether，theybothgivethenamebird，bealltobefoundinabat:butthisisaquestiononlyofinquirers(notdisputers)whoneitheraffirmnordeny，butexamine:Or，(2)Itisaquestionbetweendisputants；
whereoftheoneaffirms，andtheotherdeniesthatabatisabird。
Andthenthequestionisbarelyaboutthesignificationofoneorboththesewords；inthattheynothavingboththesamecomplexideastowhichtheygivethesetwonames，oneholdsandtheotherdenies，thatthesetwonamesmaybeaffirmedoneofanother。Weretheyagreedinthesignificationofthesetwonames，itwereimpossibletheyshoulddisputeaboutthem。Fortheywouldpresentlyandclearlysee(werethatadjustedbetweenthem)，whetherallthesimpleideasofthemoregeneralnamebirdwerefoundinthecomplexideaofabatorno；andsotherecouldbenodoubtwhetherabatwereabirdorno。
AndhereIdesireitmaybeconsidered，andcarefullyexamined，whetherthegreatestpartofthedisputesintheworldarenotmerelyverbal，andaboutthesignificationofwords；andwhether，ifthetermstheyaremadeinweredefined，andreducedintheirsignification(astheymustbewheretheysignifyanything)todeterminedcollectionsofthesimpleideastheydoorshouldstandfor，thosedisputeswouldnotendofthemselves，andimmediatelyvanish。Ileaveitthentobeconsidered，whatthelearningofdisputationis，andhowwelltheyareemployedfortheadvantageofthemselvesorothers，whosebusinessisonlythevainostentationofsounds；i。e。thosewhospendtheirlivesindisputesandcontroversies。WhenIshallseeanyofthosecombatantsstripallhistermsofambiguityandobscurity，(whicheveryonemaydointhewordsheuseshimself)，Ishallthinkhimachampionforknowledge，truth，andpeace，andnottheslaveofvain-glory，ambition，oraparty。
8。Remedies。Toremedythedefectsofspeechbeforementionedtosomedegree，andtopreventtheinconveniencesthatfollowfromthem，Iimaginetheobservationofthesefollowingrulesmaybeofuse，tillsomebodybetterableshalljudgeitworthhiswhiletothinkmorematurelyonthismatter，andobligetheworldwithhisthoughtsonit。
Firstremedy:Tousenowordwithoutanideaannexedtoit。First，A
manshalltakecaretousenowordwithoutasignification，nonamewithoutanideaforwhichhemakesitstand。Thisrulewillnotseemaltogetherneedlesstoanyonewhoshalltakethepainstorecollecthowoftenhehasmetwithsuchwordsasinstinct，sympathy，andantipathy，&c。，inthediscourseofothers，somadeuseofashemighteasilyconcludethatthosethatusedthemhadnoideasintheirmindstowhichtheyappliedthem，butspokethemonlyassounds，whichusuallyservedinsteadofreasonsonthelikeoccasions。Notbutthatthesewords，andthelike，haveverypropersignificationsinwhichtheymaybeused；buttherebeingnonaturalconnexionbetweenanywordsandanyideas，these，andanyother，maybelearnedbyrote，andpronouncedorwritbymenwhohavenoideasintheirmindstowhichtheyhaveannexedthem，andforwhichtheymakethemstand；
whichisnecessarytheyshould，ifmenwouldspeakintelligiblyeventothemselvesalone。
9。Secondremedy:Tohavedistinct，determinateideasannexedtowords，especiallyinmixedmodes。Secondly，Itisnotenoughamanuseshiswordsassignsofsomeideas:thoseheannexesthemto，iftheybesimple，mustbeclearanddistinct；ifcomplex，mustbedeterminate，i。e。theprecisecollectionofsimpleideassettledinthemind，withthatsoundannexedtoit，asthesignofthatprecisedeterminedcollection，andnoother。Thisisverynecessaryinnamesofmodes，andespeciallymoralwords；which，havingnosettledobjectsinnature，fromwhencetheirideasaretaken，asfromtheiroriginal，areapttobeveryconfused。Justiceisawordineveryman’smouth，butmostcommonlywithaveryundertermined，loosesignification；whichwillalwaysbeso，unlessamanhasinhismindadistinctcomprehensionofthecomponentpartsthatcomplexideaconsistsof:andifitbedecompounded，mustbeabletoresolveitstillon，tillheatlastcomestothesimpleideasthatmakeitup:
andunlessthisbedone，amanmakesanilluseoftheword，letitbejustice，forexample，oranyother。Idonotsay，amanneedsstandtorecollect，andmakethisanalysisatlarge，everytimethewordjusticecomesinhisway:butthisatleastisnecessary，thathehavesoexaminedthesignificationofthatname，andsettledtheideaofallitspartsinhismind，thathecandoitwhenhepleases。Ifanyonewhomakeshiscomplexideaofjusticetobe，suchatreatmentofthepersonorgoodsofanotherasisaccordingtolaw，hathnotaclearanddistinctideawhatlawis，whichmakesapartofhiscomplexideaofjustice，itisplainhisideaofjusticeitselfwillbeconfusedandimperfect。Thisexactnesswill，perhaps，bejudgedverytroublesome；andthereforemostmenwillthinktheymaybeexcusedfromsettlingthecomplexideasofmixedmodessopreciselyintheirminds。ButyetImustsay，tillthisbedone，itmustnotbewondered，thattheyhaveagreatdealofobscurityandconfusionintheirownminds，andagreatdealofwranglingintheirdiscoursewithothers。
10。Anddistinctandconformableideasinwordsthatstandforsubstances。Inthenamesofsubstances，forarightuseofthem，somethingmoreisrequiredthanbarelydeterminedideas。Inthesethenamesmustalsobeconformabletothingsastheyexist；butofthisIshallhaveoccasiontospeakmoreatlargebyandby。Thisexactnessisabsolutelynecessaryininquiriesafterphilosophicalknowledge，andincontroversiesabouttruth。Andthoughitwouldbewell，too，ifitextendeditselftocommonconversationandtheordinaryaffairsoflife；yetIthinkthatisscarcetobeexpected。
Vulgarnotionssuitvulgardiscourses:andboth，thoughconfusedenough，yetserveprettywellthemarketandthewake。Merchantsandlovers，cooksandtailors，havewordswherewithaltodispatchtheirordinaryaffairs:andso，Ithink，mightphilosophersanddisputantstoo，iftheyhadamindtounderstand，andtobeclearlyunderstood。
11。Thirdremedy:Toapplywordstosuchideasascommonusehasannexedthemto。Thirdly，itisnotenoughthatmenhaveideas，determinedideas，forwhichtheymakethesesignsstand；buttheymustalsotakecaretoapplytheirwordsasnearasmaybetosuchideasascommonusehasannexedthemto。Forwords，especiallyoflanguagesalreadyframed，beingnoman’sprivatepossession，butthecommonmeasureofcommerceandcommunication，itisnotforanyoneatpleasuretochangethestamptheyarecurrentin，noraltertheideastheyareaffixedto；oratleast，whenthereisanecessitytodoso，heisboundtogivenoticeofit。Men’sintentionsinspeakingare，oratleastshouldbe，tobeunderstood；whichcannotbewithoutfrequentexplanations，demands，andotherthelikeincommodiousinterruptions，wheremendonotfollowcommonuse。
Proprietyofspeechisthatwhichgivesourthoughtsentranceintoothermen’smindswiththegreatesteaseandadvantage:andthereforedeservessomepartofourcareandstudy，especiallyinthenamesofmoralwords。Thepropersignificationanduseoftermsisbesttobelearnedfromthosewhointheirwritingsanddiscoursesappeartohavehadtheclearestnotions，andappliedtothemtheirtermswiththeexactestchoiceandfitness。Thiswayofusingaman’swords，accordingtotheproprietyofthelanguage，thoughithavenotalwaysthegoodfortunetobeunderstood；yetmostcommonlyleavestheblameofitonhimwhoissounskilfulinthelanguagehespeaks，asnottounderstanditwhenmadeuseofasitoughttobe。
12。Fourthremedy:Todeclarethemeaninginwhichweusethem。
Fourthly，But，becausecommonusehasnotsovisiblyannexedanysignificationtowords，astomakemenknowalwayscertainlywhattheypreciselystandfor:andbecausemenintheimprovementoftheirknowledge，cometohaveideasdifferentfromthevulgarandordinaryreceivedones，forwhichtheymusteithermakenewwords，(whichmenseldomventuretodo，forfearofbeingthoughguiltyofaffectationornovelty)，orelsemustuseoldonesinanewsignification:
therefore，aftertheobservationoftheforegoingrules，itissometimesnecessary，fortheascertainingthesignificationofwords，todeclaretheirmeaning；whereeithercommonusehasleftituncertainandloose，(asithasinmostnamesofverycomplexideas)；orwheretheterm，beingverymaterialinthediscourse，andthatuponwhichitchieflyturns，isliabletoanydoubtfulnessormistake。
13。Andthatinthreeways。Astheideasmen’swordsstandforareofdifferentsorts，sothewayofmakingknowntheideastheystandfor，whenthereisoccasion，isalsodifferent。Forthoughdefiningbethoughttheproperwaytomakeknownthepropersignificationofwords；yettherearesomewordsthatwillnotbedefined，asthereareotherswhoseprecisemeaningcannotbemadeknownbutbydefinition:
andperhapsathird，whichpartakesomewhatofboththeother，asweshallseeinthenamesofsimpleideas，modes，andsubstances。
14。I。Insimpleideas，eitherbysynonymousterms，orbyshowingexamples。First，whenamanmakesuseofthenameofanysimpleidea，whichheperceivesisnotunderstood，orisindangertobemistaken，heisobliged，bythelawsofingenuityandtheendofspeech，todeclarehismeaning，andmakeknownwhatideahemakesitstandfor。This，ashasbeenshown，cannotbedonebydefinition:
andtherefore，whenasynonymouswordfailstodoit，thereisbutoneofthesewaysleft。First，Sometimesthenamingthesubjectwhereinthatsimpleideaistobefound，willmakeitsnametobeunderstoodbythosewhoareacquaintedwiththatsubject，andknowitbythatname。Sotomakeacountrymanunderstandwhatfeuillemortecoloursignifies，itmaysufficetotellhim，itisthecolourofwitheredleavesfallinginautumn。Secondly，buttheonlysurewayofmakingknownthesignificationofthenameofanysimpleidea，isbypresentingtohissensesthatsubjectwhichmayproduceitinhismind，andmakehimactuallyhavetheideathatwordstandsfor。
15。II。Inmixedmodes，bydefinition。Secondly，Mixedmodes，especiallythosebelongingtomorality，beingmostofthemsuchcombinationsofideasasthemindputstogetherofitsownchoice，andwhereoftherearenotalwaysstandingpatternstobefoundexisting，thesignificationoftheirnamescannotbemadeknown，asthoseofsimpleideas，byanyshowing:but，inrecompensethereof，maybeperfectlyandexactlydefined。Fortheybeingcombinationsofseveralideasthatthemindofmanhasarbitrarilyputtogether，withoutreferencetoanyarchetypes，menmay，iftheyplease，exactlyknowtheideasthatgotoeachcomposition，andsobothusethesewordsinacertainandundoubtedsignification，andperfectlydeclare，whenthereisoccasion，whattheystandfor。This，ifwellconsidered，wouldlaygreatblameonthosewhomakenottheirdiscoursesaboutmoralthingsveryclearanddistinct。Forsincetheprecisesignificationofthenamesofmixedmodes，or，whichisallone，therealessenceofeachspeciesistobeknown，theybeingnotofnature’s，butman’smaking，itisagreatnegligenceandperversenesstodiscourseofmoralthingswithuncertaintyandobscurity；whichismorepardonableintreatingofnaturalsubstances，wheredoubtfultermsarehardlytobeavoided，foraquitecontraryreason，asweshallseebyandby。
16。Moralitycapableofdemonstration。UponthisgrounditisthatI
amboldtothinkthatmoralityiscapableofdemonstration，aswellasmathematics:sincethepreciserealessenceofthethingsmoralwordsstandformaybeperfectlyknown，andsothecongruityandincongruityofthethingsthemselvesbecertainlydiscovered；inwhichconsistsperfectknowledge。Norletanyoneobject，thatthenamesofsubstancesareoftentobemadeuseofinmorality，aswellasthoseofmodes，fromwhichwillariseobscurity。For，astosubstances，whenconcernedinmoraldiscourses，theirdiversnaturesarenotsomuchinquiredintoassupposed:v。g。whenwesaythatmanissubjecttolaw，wemeannothingbymanbutacorporealrationalcreature:whattherealessenceorotherqualitiesofthatcreatureareinthiscaseisnowayconsidered。And，therefore，whetherachildorchangelingbeaman，inaphysicalsense，mayamongstthenaturalistsbeasdisputableasitwill，itconcernsnotatallthemoralman，asImaycallhim，whichisthisimmovable，unchangeableidea，acorporealrationalbeing。For，werethereamonkey，oranyothercreature，tobefoundthathadtheuseofreasontosuchadegree，astobeabletounderstandgeneralsigns，andtodeduceconsequencesaboutgeneralideas，hewouldnodoubtbesubjecttolaw，andinthatsensebeaman，howmuchsoeverhedifferedinshapefromothersofthatname。Thenamesofsubstances，iftheybeusedinthemastheyshould，cannomoredisturbmoralthantheydomathematicaldiscourses；where，ifthemathematicianspeaksofacubeorglobeofgold，orofanyotherbody，hehashisclear，settledidea，whichvariesnot，thoughitmaybymistakebeappliedtoaparticularbodytowhichitbelongsnot。
17。Definitionscanmakemoraldiscoursesclear。ThisIhaveherementioned，bytheby，toshowofwhatconsequenceitisformen，intheirnamesofmixedmodes，andconsequentlyinalltheirmoraldiscourses，todefinetheirwordswhenthereisoccasion:sincetherebymoralknowledgemaybebroughttosogreatclearnessandcertainty。Anditmustbegreatwantofingenuousness(tosaynoworseofit)torefusetodoit:sinceadefinitionistheonlywaywherebytheprecisemeaningofmoralwordscanbeknown；andyetawaywherebytheirmeaningmaybeknowncertainly，andwithoutleavinganyroomforanycontestaboutit。Andthereforethenegligenceorperversenessofmankindcannotbeexcused，iftheirdiscoursesinmoralitybenotmuchmoreclearthanthoseinnaturalphilosophy:
sincetheyareaboutideasinthemind，whicharenoneofthemfalseordisproportionate；theyhavingnoexternalbeingsforthearchetypeswhichtheyarereferredtoandmustcorrespondwith。Itisfareasierformentoframeintheirmindsanidea，whichshallbethestandardtowhichtheywillgivethenamejustice；withwhichpatternsomade，allactionsthatagreeshallpassunderthatdenomination，than，havingseenAristides，toframeanideathatshallinallthingsbeexactlylikehim；whoisasheis，letmenmakewhatideatheypleaseofhim。Fortheone，theyneedbutknowthecombinationofideasthatareputtogetherintheirownminds；fortheother，theymustinquireintothewholenature，andabstrusehiddenconstitution，andvariousqualitiesofathingexistingwithoutthem。
18。Andistheonlywayinwhichthemeaningofmixedmodescanbemadeknown。Anotherreasonthatmakesthedefiningofmixedmodessonecessary，especiallyofmoralwords，iswhatImentionedalittlebefore，viz。thatitistheonlywaywherebythesignificationofthemostofthemcanbeknownwithcertainty。Fortheideastheystandfor，beingforthemostpartsuchwhosecomponentpartsnowhereexisttogether，butscatteredandmingledwithothers，itisthemindalonethatcollectsthem，andgivesthemtheunionofoneidea:
anditisonlybywordsenumeratingtheseveralsimpleideaswhichthemindhasunited，thatwecanmakeknowntootherswhattheirnamesstandfor；theassistanceofthesensesinthiscasenothelpingus，bytheproposalofsensibleobjects，toshowtheideaswhichournamesofthiskindstandfor，asitdoesofteninthenamesofsensiblesimpleideas，andalsotosomedegreeinthoseofsubstances。
19。III。Insubstances，bothbyshowingandbydefining。Thirdly，fortheexplainingthesignificationofthenamesofsubstances，astheystandfortheideaswehaveoftheirdistinctspecies，boththeforementionedways，viz。ofshowinganddefining，arerequisite，inmanycases，tobemadeuseof。For，therebeingordinarilyineachsortsomeleadingqualities，towhichwesupposetheotherideaswhichmakeupourcomplexideaofthatspeciesannexed，weforwardlygivethespecificnametothatthingwhereinthatcharacteristicalmarkisfound，whichwetaketobethemostdistinguishingideaofthatspecies。Theseleadingorcharacteristical(asImaycallthem)ideas，inthesortsofanimalsandvegetables，are(ashasbeenbeforeremarked，ch。vi。SS29，andch。ix。SS15)mostlyfigure；andininanimatebodies，colour；andinsome，bothtogether。Now，20。Ideasoftheleadingqualitiesofsubstancesarebestgotbyshowing。Theseleadingsensiblequalitiesarethosewhichmakethechiefingredientsofourspecificideas，andconsequentlythemostobservableandinvariablepartinthedefinitionsofourspecificnames，asattributedtosortsofsubstancescomingunderourknowledge。Forthoughthesoundman，initsownnature，beasapttosignifyacomplexideamadeupofanimalityandrationality，unitedinthesamesubject，astosignifyanyothercombination；yet，usedasamarktostandforasortofcreatureswecountofourownkind，perhapstheoutwardshapeisasnecessarytobetakenintoourcomplexidea，signifiedbythewordman，asanyotherwefindinit:andtherefore，whyPlato’sanimalimplumebipeslatisunguibusshouldnotbeagooddefinitionofthenameman，standingforthatsortofcreatures，willnotbeeasytoshow:foritistheshape，astheleadingquality，thatseemsmoretodeterminethatspecies，thanafacultyofreasoning，whichappearsnotatfirst，andinsomenever。
Andifthisbenotallowedtobeso，Idonotknowhowtheycanbeexcusedfrommurderwhokillmonstrousbirths，(aswecallthem)，becauseofanunordinaryshape，withoutknowingwhethertheyhavearationalsoulorno；whichcanbenomorediscernedinawell-formedthanill-shapedinfant，assoonasborn。Andwhoisithasinformedusthatarationalsoulcaninhabitnotenement，unlessithasjustsuchasortoffrontispiece；orcanjoinitselfto，andinformnosortofbody，butonethatisjustofsuchanoutwardstructure？
21。Andcanhardlybemadeknownotherwise。Nowtheseleadingqualitiesarebestmadeknownbyshowing，andcanhardlybemadeknownotherwise。Fortheshapeofahorseorcassowarywillbebutrudelyandimperfectlyimprintedonthemindbywords；thesightoftheanimalsdothitathousandtimesbetter。Andtheideaoftheparticularcolourofgoldisnottobegotbyanydescriptionofit，butonlybythefrequentexerciseoftheeyesaboutit；asisevidentinthosewhoareusedtothismetal，whowillfrequentlydistinguishtruefromcounterfeit，purefromadulterate，bythesight，whereothers(whohaveasgoodeyes，butyetbyusehavenotgotthepreciseniceideaofthatpeculiaryellow)shallnotperceiveanydifference。Thelikemaybesaidofthoseothersimpleideas，peculiarintheirkindtoanysubstance；forwhichpreciseideastherearenopeculiarnames。Theparticularringingsoundthereisingold，distinctfromthesoundofotherbodies，hasnoparticularnameannexedtoit，nomorethantheparticularyellowthatbelongstothatmetal。
22。TheIdeasofthepowersofsubstancesarebestknownbydefinition。Butbecausemanyofthesimpleideasthatmakeupourspecificideasofsubstancesarepowerswhichlienotobvioustooursensesinthethingsastheyordinarilyappear；therefore，inthesignificationofournamesofsubstances，somepartofthesignificationwillbebettermadeknownbyenumeratingthosesimpleideas，thanbyshowingthesubstanceitself。For，hethattotheyellowshiningcolourofgold，gotbysight，shall，frommyenumeratingthem，havetheideasofgreatductility，fusibility，fixedness，andsolubilityinaquaregia，willhaveaperfecterideaofgoldthanhecanhavebyseeingapieceofgold，andtherebyimprintinginhismindonlyitsobviousqualities。Butiftheformalconstitutionofthisshining，heavy，ductilething，(fromwhencealltheseitspropertiesflow)，layopentooursenses，astheformalconstitutionoressenceofatriangledoes，thesignificationofthewordgoldmightaseasilybeascertainedasthatoftriangle。
23。Areflectionontheknowledgeofcorporealthingspossessedbyspiritsseparatefrombodies。Hencewemaytakenotice，howmuchthefoundationofallourknowledgeofcorporealthingsliesinoursenses。Forhowspirits，separatefrombodies，(whoseknowledgeandideasofthesethingsarecertainlymuchmoreperfectthanours)，knowthem，wehavenonotion，noideaatall。Thewholeextentofourknowledgeorimaginationreachesnotbeyondourownideaslimitedtoourwaysofperception。Thoughyetitbenottobedoubtedthatspiritsofahigherrankthanthoseimmersedinfleshmayhaveasclearideasoftheradicalconstitutionofsubstancesaswehaveofatriangle，andsoperceivehowalltheirpropertiesandoperationsflowfromthence:butthemannerhowtheycomebythatknowledgeexceedsourconceptions。
24。IVIdeasofsubstancesmustbeconformabletothings。
Fourthly，But，thoughdefinitionswillservetoexplainthenamesofsubstancesastheystandforourideas，yettheyleavethemnotwithoutgreatimperfectionastheystandforthings。Forournamesofsubstancesbeingnotputbarelyforourideas，butbeingmadeuseofultimatelytorepresentthings，andsoareputintheirplace，theirsignificationmustagreewiththetruthofthingsaswellaswithmen’sideas。Andtherefore，insubstances，wearenotalwaystorestintheordinarycomplexideacommonlyreceivedasthesignificationofthatword，butmustgoalittlefurther，andinquireintothenatureandpropertiesofthethingsthemselves，andtherebyperfect，asmuchaswecan，ourideasoftheirdistinctspecies；orelselearnthemfromsuchasareusedtothatsortofthings，andareexperiencedinthem。For，sinceitisintendedtheirnamesshouldstandforsuchcollectionsofsimpleideasasdoreallyexistinthingsthemselves，aswellasforthecomplexideainothermen’sminds，whichintheirordinaryacceptationtheystandfor，therefore，todefinetheirnamesright，naturalhistoryistobeinquiredinto，andtheirpropertiesare，withcareandexamination，tobefoundout。Foritisnotenough，fortheavoidinginconveniencesindiscourseandarguingsaboutnaturalbodiesandsubstantialthings，tohavelearned，fromtheproprietyofthelanguage，thecommon，butconfused，orveryimperfect，ideatowhicheachwordisapplied，andtokeepthemtothatideainouruseofthem；butwemust，byacquaintingourselveswiththehistoryofthatsortofthings，rectifyandsettleourcomplexideabelongingtoeachspecificname；andindiscoursewithothers，(ifwefindthemmistakeus)，weoughttotellwhatthecomplexideaisthatwemakesuchanamestandfor。Thisisthemorenecessarytobedonebyallthosewhosearchafterknowledgeandphilosophicalverity，inthatchildren，beingtaughtwords，whilsttheyhavebutimperfectnotionsofthings，applythematrandom，andwithoutmuchthinking，andseldomframedeterminedideastobesignifiedbythem。Whichcustom(itbeingeasy，andservingwellenoughfortheordinaryaffairsoflifeandconversation)theyareapttocontinuewhentheyaremen:andsobeginatthewrongend，learningwordsfirstandperfectly，butmakethenotionstowhichtheyapplythosewordsafterwardsveryovertly。Bythismeansitcomestopass，thatmenspeakingthelanguageoftheircountry，i。e。accordingtogrammarrulesofthatlanguage，doyetspeakveryimproperlyofthingsthemselves；and，bytheirarguingonewithanother，makebutsmallprogressinthediscoveriesofusefultruths，andtheknowledgeofthings，astheyaretobefoundinthemselves，andnotinourimaginations；anditmattersnotmuchfortheimprovementofourknowledgehowtheyarecalled。
25。Noteasytobemadeso。Itwerethereforetobewished，Thatmenversedinphysicalinquiries，andacquaintedwiththeseveralsortsofnaturalbodies，wouldsetdownthosesimpleideaswhereintheyobservetheindividualsofeachsortconstantlytoagree。Thiswouldremedyagreatdealofthatconfusionwhichcomesfromseveralpersonsapplyingthesamenametoacollectionofasmallerorgreaternumberofsensiblequalities，proportionablyastheyhavebeenmoreorlessacquaintedwith，oraccurateinexamining，thequalitiesofanysortofthingswhichcomeunderonedenomination。Butadictionaryofthissort，containing，asitwere，anaturalhistory，requirestoomanyhandsaswellastoomuchtime，cost，pains，andsagacityevertobehopedfor；andtillthatbedone，wemustcontentourselveswithsuchdefinitionsofthenamesofsubstancesasexplainthesensemenusethemin。Anditwouldbewell，wherethereisoccasion，iftheywouldaffordussomuch。Thisyetisnotusuallydone；butmentalktooneanother，anddisputeinwords，whosemeaningisnotagreedbetweenthem，outofamistakethatthesignificationsofcommonwordsarecertainlyestablished，andthepreciseideastheystandforperfectlyknown；andthatitisashametobeignorantofthem。Bothwhichsuppositionsarefalse；nonamesofcomplexideashavingsosettleddeterminedsignifications，thattheyareconstantlyusedforthesamepreciseideas。Norisitashameforamannottohaveacertainknowledgeofanything，butbythenecessarywaysofattainingit；andsoitisnodiscreditnottoknowwhatpreciseideaanysoundstandsforinanotherman’smind，withouthedeclareittomebysomeotherwaythanbarelyusingthatsound，therebeingnootherway，withoutsuchadeclaration，certainlytoknowit。Indeedthenecessityofcommunicationbylanguagebringsmentoanagreementinthesignificationofcommonwords，withinsometolerablelatitude，thatmayserveforordinaryconversation:andsoamancannotbesupposedwhollyignorantoftheideaswhichareannexedtowordsbycommonuse，inalanguagefamiliartohim。Butcommonusebeingbutaveryuncertainrule，whichreducesitselfatlasttotheideasofparticularmen，provesoftenbutaveryvariablestandard。ButthoughsuchaDictionaryasIhaveabovementionedwillrequiretoomuchtime，cost，andpainstobehopedforinthisage；yetmethinksitisnotunreasonabletopropose，thatwordsstandingforthingswhichareknownanddistinguishedbytheiroutwardshapesshouldbeexpressedbylittledraughtsandprintsmadeofthem。Avocabularymadeafterthisfashionwouldperhapswithmoreease，andinlesstime，teachthetruesignificationofmanyterms，especiallyinlanguagesofremotecountriesorages，andsettletruerideasinmen’smindsofseveralthings，whereofwereadthenamesinancientauthors，thanallthelargeandlaboriouscommentsoflearnedcritics。Naturalists，thattreatofplantsandanimals，havefoundthebenefitofthisway:andhethathashadoccasiontoconsultthemwillhavereasontoconfessthathehasaclearerideaofapiumoribex，fromalittleprintofthatherborbeast，thanhecouldhavefromalongdefinitionofthenamesofeitherofthem。Andsonodoubthewouldhaveofstrigilandsistrum，if，insteadofcurrycombandcymbal，(whicharetheEnglishnamesdictionariesrenderthemby，)
hecouldseestampedinthemarginsmallpicturesoftheseinstruments，astheywereinuseamongsttheancients。Toga，tunica，pallium，arewordseasilytranslatedbygown，coat，andcloak；butwehavetherebynomoretrueideasofthefashionofthosehabitsamongsttheRomans，thanwehaveofthefacesofthetailorswhomadethem。Suchthingsasthese，whichtheeyedistinguishesbytheirshapes，wouldbebestletintothemindbydraughtsmadeofthem，andmoredeterminethesignificationofsuchwords，thananyotherwordssetforthem，ormadeuseoftodefinethem。Butthisisonlybythebye。
26。V。Fifthremedy:Tousethesamewordconstantlyinthesamesense。Fifthly，Ifmenwillnotbeatthepainstodeclarethemeaningoftheirwords，anddefinitionsoftheirtermsarenottobehad，yetthisistheleastthatcanbeexpected，that，inalldiscourseswhereinonemanpretendstoinstructorconvinceanother，heshouldusethesamewordconstantlyinthesamesense。Ifthisweredone，(whichnobodycanrefusewithoutgreatdisingenuity，)manyofthebooksextantmightbespared；manyofthecontroversiesindisputewouldbeatanend；severalofthosegreatvolumes，swollenwithambiguouswords，nowusedinonesense，andbyandbyinanother，wouldshrinkintoaverynarrowcompass；andmanyofthephilosophers，(tomentionnoother)aswellaspoetsworks，mightbecontainedinanutshell。
27。Whennotsoused，thevariationistoheexplained。Butafterall，theprovisionofwordsissoscantyinrespecttothatinfinitevarietyofthoughts，thatmen，wantingtermstosuittheirprecisenotions，will，notwithstandingtheirutmostcaution，beforcedoftentousethesamewordinsomewhatdifferentsenses。Andthoughinthecontinuationofadiscourse，orthepursuitofanargument，therecanbehardlyroomtodigressintoaparticulardefinition，asoftenasamanvariesthesignificationofanyterm；yettheimportofthediscoursewill，forthemostpart，iftherebenodesignedfallacy，sufficientlyleadcandidandintelligentreadersintothetruemeaningofit；butwherethereisnotsufficienttoguidethereader，thereitconcernsthewritertoexplainhismeaning，andshowinwhatsensehethereusesthatterm。
BOOKIV
OfKnowledgeandProbabilityChapterI
OfKnowledgeinGeneral1。Ourknowledgeconversantaboutourideasonly。Sincethemind，inallitsthoughtsandreasonings，hathnootherimmediateobjectbutitsownideas，whichitalonedoesorcancontemplate，itisevidentthatourknowledgeisonlyconversantaboutthem。
2。Knowledgeistheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementoftwoideas。Knowledgethenseemstometobenothingbuttheperceptionoftheconnexionofandagreement，ordisagreementandrepugnancyofanyofourideas。Inthisaloneitconsists。Wherethisperceptionis，thereisknowledge，andwhereitisnot，there，thoughwemayfancy，guess，orbelieve，yetwealwayscomeshortofknowledge。Forwhenweknowthatwhiteisnotblack，whatdoweelsebutperceive，thatthesetwoideasdonotagree？Whenwepossessourselveswiththeutmostsecurityofthedemonstration，thatthethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltotworightones，whatdowemorebutperceive，thatequalitytotworightonesdoesnecessarilyagreeto，andisinseparablefrom，thethreeanglesofatriangle？
3。Thisagreementordisagreementmaybeanyoffoursorts。Buttounderstandalittlemoredistinctlywhereinthisagreementordisagreementconsists，Ithinkwemayreduceitalltothesefoursorts:
I。Identity，ordiversity。
II。Relation。
III。Co-existence，ornecessaryconnexion。
IV。Realexistence。
4。Ofidentity，ordiversityinideas。First，Astothefirstsortofagreementordisagreement，viz。identityordiversity。Itisthefirstactofthemind，whenithasanysentimentsorideasatall，toperceiveitsideas；andsofarasitperceivesthem，toknoweachwhatitis，andtherebyalsotoperceivetheirdifference，andthatoneisnotanother。Thisissoabsolutelynecessary，thatwithoutittherecouldbenoknowledge，noreasoning，noimagination，nodistinctthoughtsatall。Bythisthemindclearlyandinfalliblyperceiveseachideatoagreewithitself，andtobewhatitis；andalldistinctideastodisagree，i。e。theonenottobetheother:andthisitdoeswithoutpains，labour，ordeduction；butatfirstview，byitsnaturalpowerofperceptionanddistinction。Andthoughmenofarthavereducedthisintothosegeneralrules，Whatis，is，andItisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe，forreadyapplicationinallcases，whereintheremaybeoccasiontoreflectonit:yetitiscertainthatthefirstexerciseofthisfacultyisaboutparticularideas。Amaninfalliblyknows，assoonaseverhehastheminhismind，thattheideashecallswhiteandroundaretheveryideastheyare；andthattheyarenototherideaswhichhecallsredorsquare。Norcananymaximorpropositionintheworldmakehimknowitclearerorsurerthanhedidbefore，andwithoutanysuchgeneralrule。Thisthenisthefirstagreementordisagreementwhichthemindperceivesinitsideas；whichitalwaysperceivesatfirstsight:
andifthereeverhappenanydoubtaboutit，itwillalwaysbefoundtobeaboutthenames，andnottheideasthemselves，whoseidentityanddiversitywillalwaysbeperceived，assoonandclearlyastheideasthemselvesare；norcanitpossiblybeotherwise。
5。Ofabstractrelationsbetweenideas。Secondly，thenextsortofagreementordisagreementthemindperceivesinanyofitsideasmay，Ithink，becalledrelative，andisnothingbuttheperceptionoftherelationbetweenanytwoideas，ofwhatkindsoever，whethersubstances，modes，oranyother。For，sincealldistinctideasmusteternallybeknownnottobethesame，andsobeuniversallyandconstantlydeniedoneofanother，therecouldbenoroomforanypositiveknowledgeatall，ifwecouldnotperceiveanyrelationbetweenourideas，andfindouttheagreementordisagreementtheyhaveonewithanother，inseveralwaysthemindtakesofcomparingthem。
6。Oftheirnecessaryco-existenceinsubstances。Thirdly，Thethirdsortofagreementordisagreementtobefoundinourideas，whichtheperceptionofthemindisemployedabout，isco-existenceornon-co-existenceinthesamesubject；andthisbelongsparticularlytosubstances。Thuswhenwepronounceconcerninggold，thatitisfixed，ourknowledgeofthistruthamountstonomorebutthis，thatfixedness，orapowertoremaininthefireunconsumed，isanideathatalwaysaccompaniesandisjoinedwiththatparticularsortofyellowness，weight，fusibility，malleableness，andsolubilityinaquaregia，whichmakeourcomplexideasignifiedbythewordgold，7。Ofrealexistenceagreeingtoanyidea。Fourthly，Thefourthandlastsortisthatofactualrealexistenceagreeingtoanyidea。
Withinthesefoursortsofagreementordisagreementis，I
suppose，containedalltheknowledgewehave，orarecapableofForalltheinquirieswecanmakeconcerninganyofourideas，allthatweknoworcanaffirmconcerninganyofthem，is，Thatitis，orisnot，thesamewithsomeother；thatitdoesordoesnotalwayscoexistwithsomeotherideainthesamesubject；thatithasthisorthatrelationwithsomeotheridea；orthatithasarealexistencewithoutthemind。Thus，\"blueisnotyellow，\"isofidentity。\"Twotrianglesuponequalbasesbetweentwoparallelsareequal，\"isofrelation。
\"Ironissusceptibleofmagneticalimpressions，\"isofco-existence。
\"Godis，\"isofrealexistence。Thoughidentityandco-existencearetrulynothingbutrelations，yettheyaresuchpeculiarwaysofagreementordisagreementofourideas，thattheydeservewelltobeconsideredasdistinctheads，andnotunderrelationingeneral；sincetheyaresodifferentgroundsofaffirmationandnegation，aswilleasilyappeartoanyone，whowillbutreflectonwhatissaidinseveralplacesofthisEssay。
Ishouldnowproceedtoexaminetheseveraldegreesofourknowledge，butthatitisnecessaryfirst，toconsiderthedifferentacceptationsofthewordknowledge。
8。Knowledgeiseitheractualorhabitual。Thereareseveralwayswhereinthemindispossessedoftruth；eachofwhichiscalledknowledge。
I。Thereisactualknowledge，whichisthepresentviewthemindhasoftheagreementordisagreementofanyofitsideas，oroftherelationtheyhaveonetoanother。
II。Amanissaidtoknowanyproposition，whichhavingbeenoncelaidbeforehisthoughts，heevidentlyperceivedtheagreementordisagreementoftheideaswhereofitconsists；andsolodgeditinhismemory，thatwheneverthatpropositioncomesagaintobereflectedon，he，withoutdoubtorhesitation，embracestherightside，assentsto，andiscertainofthetruthofit。This，Ithink，onemaycallhabitualknowledge。Andthusamanmaybesaidtoknowallthosetruthswhicharelodgedinhismemory，byaforegoingclearandfullperception，whereofthemindisassuredpastdoubtasoftenasithasoccasiontoreflectonthem。Forourfiniteunderstandingsbeingabletothinkclearlyanddistinctlybutononethingatonce，ifmenhadnoknowledgeofanymorethanwhattheyactuallythoughton，theywouldallbeveryignorant:andhethatknewmost，wouldknowbutonetruth，thatbeingallhewasabletothinkonatonetime。
9。Habitualknowledgeisoftwodegrees。Ofhabitualknowledgethereare，also，vulgarlyspeaking。twodegrees:
First，Theoneisofsuchtruthslaidupinthememoryas，whenevertheyoccurtothemind，itactuallyperceivestherelationisbetweenthoseideas。Andthisisinallthosetruthswhereofwehaveanintuitiveknowledge；wheretheideasthemselves，byanimmediateview，discovertheiragreementordisagreementonewithanother。
Secondly，Theotherisofsuchtruthswhereofthemindhavingbeenconvinced，itretainsthememoryoftheconviction，withouttheproofs。Thus，amanthatrememberscertainlythatheonceperceivedthedemonstration，thatthethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltotworightones，iscertainthatheknowsit，becausehecannotdoubtthetruthofit。Inhisadherencetoatruth，wherethedemonstrationbywhichitwasatfirstknownisforgot，thoughamanmaybethoughtrathertobelievehismemorythanreallytoknow，andthiswayofentertainingatruthseemedformerlytomelikesomethingbetweenopinionandknowledge；asortofassurancewhichexceedsbarebelief，forthatreliesonthetestimonyofanother；-yetuponadueexaminationIfinditcomesnotshortofperfectcertainty，andisineffecttrueknowledge。Thatwhichisapttomisleadourfirstthoughtsintoamistakeinthismatteris，thattheagreementordisagreementoftheideasinthiscaseisnotperceived，asitwasatfirst，byanactualviewofalltheintermediateideaswherebytheagreementordisagreementofthoseinthepropositionwasatfirstperceived；butbyotherintermediateideas，thatshowtheagreementordisagreementoftheideascontainedinthepropositionwhosecertaintyweremember。Forexample:inthisproposition，that\"thethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltotworightones，\"onewhohasseenandclearlyperceivedthedemonstrationofthistruthknowsittobetrue，whenthatdemonstrationisgoneoutofhismind；sothatatpresentitisnotactuallyinview，andpossiblycannotberecollected:butheknowsitinadifferentwayfromwhathedidbefore。Theagreementofthetwoideasjoinedinthatpropositionisperceived；butitisbytheinterventionofotherideasthanthosewhichatfirstproducedthatperception。Heremembers，i。e。heknows(forremembranceisbuttherevivingofsomepastknowledge)thathewasoncecertainofthetruthofthisproposition，thatthethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltotworightones。Theimmutabilityofthesamerelationsbetweenthesameimmutablethingsisnowtheideathatshowshim，thatifthethreeanglesofatrianglewereonceequaltotworightones，theywillalwaysbeequaltotworightones。Andhencehecomestobecertain，thatwhatwasoncetrueinthecase，isalwaystrue；whatideasonceagreedwillalwaysagree；andconsequentlywhatheonceknewtobetrue，hewillalwaysknowtobetrue；aslongashecanrememberthatheonceknewit。Uponthisgrounditis，thatparticulardemonstrationsinmathematicsaffordgeneralknowledge。Ifthentheperception，thatthesameideaswilleternallyhavethesamehabitudesandrelations，benotasufficientgroundofknowledge，therecouldbenoknowledgeofgeneralpropositionsinmathematics；fornomathematicaldemonstrationwouldbeanyotherthanparticular:andwhenamanhaddemonstratedanypropositionconcerningonetriangleorcircle，hisknowledgewouldnotreachbeyondthatparticulardiagram。Ifhewouldextenditfurther，hemustrenewhisdemonstrationinanotherinstance，beforehecouldknowittobetrueinanotherliketriangle，andsoon:bywhichmeansonecouldnevercometotheknowledgeofanygeneralpropositions。
Nobody，Ithink，candeny，thatMr。Newtoncertainlyknowsanypropositionthathenowatanytimereadsinhisbooktobetrue；
thoughhehasnotinactualviewthatadmirablechainofintermediateideaswherebyheatfirstdiscoveredittobetrue。
Suchamemoryasthat，abletoretainsuchatrainofparticulars，maybewellthoughtbeyondthereachofhumanfaculties，whentheverydiscovery，perception，andlayingtogetherthatwonderfulconnexionofideas，isfoundtosurpassmostreaders’comprehension。Butyetitisevidenttheauthorhimselfknowsthepropositiontobetrue，rememberingheoncesawtheconnexionofthoseideas；ascertainlyasheknowssuchamanwoundedanother，rememberingthathesawhimrunhimthrough。Butbecausethememoryisnotalwayssoclearasactualperception，anddoesinallmenmoreorlessdecayinlengthoftime，this，amongstotherdifferences，isonewhichshowsthatdemonstrativeknowledgeismuchmoreimperfectthanintuitive，asweshallseeinthefollowingchapter。
ChapterII
OftheDegreesofourKnowledge1。Ofthedegrees，ordifferencesinclearness，ofourknowledge:1。
Intuitive。Allourknowledgeconsisting，asIhavesaid，intheviewthemindhasofitsownideas，whichistheutmostlightandgreatestcertaintywe，withourfaculties，andinourwayofknowledge，arecapableof，itmaynotbeamisstoconsideralittlethedegreesofitsevidence。Thedifferentclearnessofourknowledgeseemstometolieinthedifferentwayofperceptionthemindhasoftheagreementordisagreementofanyofitsideas。Forifwewillreflectonourownwaysofthinking，wewillfind，thatsometimesthemindperceivestheagreementordisagreementoftwoideasimmediatelybythemselves，withouttheinterventionofanyother:andthisIthinkwemaycallintuitiveknowledge。Forinthisthemindisatnopainsofprovingorexamining，butperceivesthetruthastheeyedothlight，onlybybeingdirectedtowardsit。Thusthemindperceivesthatwhiteisnotblack，thatacircleisnotatriangle，thatthreearemorethantwoandequaltooneandtwo。
Suchkindsoftruthsthemindperceivesatthefirstsightoftheideastogether，bybareintuition；withouttheinterventionofanyotheridea:andthiskindofknowledgeistheclearestandmostcertainthathumanfrailtyiscapableof。Thispartofknowledgeisirresistible，and，likebrightsunshine，forcesitselfimmediatelytobeperceived，assoonaseverthemindturnsitsviewthatway；andleavesnoroomforhesitation，doubt，orexamination，butthemindispresentlyfilledwiththeclearlightofit。Itisonthisintuitionthatdependsallthecertaintyandevidenceofallourknowledge；Whichcertaintyeveryonefindstobesogreat，thathecannotimagine，andthereforenotrequireagreater:foramancannotconceivehimselfcapableofagreatercertaintythantoknowthatanyideainhismindissuchasheperceivesittobe；andthattwoideas，whereinheperceivesadifference，aredifferentandnotpreciselythesame。Hethatdemandsagreatercertaintythanthis，demandsheknowsnotwhat，andshowsonlythathehasamindtobeasceptic，withoutbeingabletobeso。Certaintydependssowhollyonthisintuition，that，inthenextdegreeofknowledgewhichIcalldemonstrative，thisintuitionisnecessaryinalltheconnexionsoftheintermediateideas，withoutwhichwecannotattainknowledgeandcertainty。
2。II。Demonstrative。Thenextdegreeofknowledgeis，wherethemindperceivestheagreementordisagreementofanyideas，butnotimmediately。Thoughwhereverthemindperceivestheagreementordisagreementofanyofitsideas，therebecertainknowledge；yetitdoesnotalwayshappen，thatthemindseesthatagreementordisagreement，whichthereisbetweenthem，evenwhereitisdiscoverable；andinthatcaseremainsinignorance，andatmostgetsnofurtherthanaprobableconjecture。Thereasonwhythemindcannotalwaysperceivepresentlytheagreementordisagreementoftwoideas，is，becausethoseideas，concerningwhoseagreementordisagreementtheinquiryismade，cannotbythemindbesoputtogetherastoshowit。Inthiscasethen，whenthemindcannotsobringitsideastogetherasbytheirimmediatecomparison，andasitwerejuxta-positionorapplicationonetoanother，toperceivetheiragreementordisagreement，itisfain，bytheinterventionofotherideas(oneormore，asithappens)todiscovertheagreementordisagreementwhichitsearches；andthisisthatwhichwecallreasoning。Thus，themindbeingwillingtoknowtheagreementordisagreementinbignessbetweenthethreeanglesofatriangleandtworightones，cannotbyanimmediateviewandcomparingthemdoit:
becausethethreeanglesofatrianglecannotbebroughtatonce，andbecomparedwithanyotherone，ortwo，angles；andsoofthisthemindhasnoimmediate，nointuitiveknowledge。Inthiscasethemindisfaintofindoutsomeotherangles，towhichthethreeanglesofatrianglehaveanequality；and，findingthoseequaltotworightones。comestoknowtheirequalitytotworightones。
3。Demonstrationdependsonclearlyperceivedproofs。Thoseinterveningideas，whichservetoshowtheagreementofanytwoothers，arecalledproofs；andwheretheagreementanddisagreementisbythismeansplainlyandclearlyperceived，itiscalleddemonstration；itbeingshowntotheunderstanding，andthemindmadetoseethatitisso。Aquicknessinthemindtofindouttheseintermediateideas，(thatshalldiscovertheagreementordisagreementofanyother，)andtoapplythemright，is，Isuppose，thatwhichiscalledsagacity。
4。Ascertain，butnotsoeasyandreadyasintuitiveknowledge。
Thisknowledge，byinterveningproofs，thoughitbecertain，yettheevidenceofitisnotaltogethersoclearandbright，northeassentsoready，asinintuitiveknowledge。For，thoughindemonstrationtheminddoesatlastperceivetheagreementordisagreementoftheideasitconsiders；yetitisnotwithoutpainsandattention:theremustbemorethanonetransientviewtofindit。Asteadyapplicationandpursuitarerequiredtothisdiscovery:andtheremustbeaprogressionbystepsanddegrees，beforethemindcaninthiswayarriveatcertainty，andcometoperceivetheagreementorrepugnancybetweentwoideasthatneedproofsandtheuseofreasontoshowit。
5。Thedemonstratedconclusionnotwithoutdoubt，precedenttothedemonstration。Anotherdifferencebetweenintuitiveanddemonstrativeknowledgeis，that，thoughinthelatteralldoubtberemovedwhen，bytheinterventionoftheintermediateideas，theagreementordisagreementisperceived，yetbeforethedemonstrationtherewasadoubt；whichinintuitiveknowledgecannothappentothemindthathasitsfacultyofperceptionlefttoadegreecapableofdistinctideas；nomorethanitcanbeadoubttotheeye(thatcandistinctlyseewhiteandblack)，Whetherthisinkandthispaperbeallofacolour。Iftherebesightintheeyes，itwill，atfirstglimpse，withouthesitation，perceivethewordsprintedonthispaperdifferentfromthecolourofthepaper:andsoifthemindhavethefacultyofdistinctperception，itwillperceivetheagreementordisagreementofthoseideasthatproduceintuitiveknowledge。Iftheeyeshavelostthefacultyofseeing，orthemindofperceiving，weinvaininquireafterthequicknessofsightinone，orclearnessofperceptionintheother。
6。Notsoclearasintuitiveknowledge。Itistrue，theperceptionproducedbydemonstrationisalsoveryclear；yetitisoftenwithagreatabatementofthatevidentlustreandfullassurancethatalwaysaccompanythatwhichIcallintuitive:likeafacereflectedbyseveralmirrorsonetoanother，where，aslongasitretainsthesimilitudeandagreementwiththeobject，itproducesaknowledge；butitisstill，ineverysuccessivereflection，withalesseningofthatperfectclearnessanddistinctnesswhichisinthefirst；tillatlast，aftermanyremoves，ithasagreatmixtureofdimness，andisnotatfirstsightsoknowable，especiallytoweakeyes。Thusitiswithknowledgemadeoutbyalongtrainofproof。
7。Eachstepindemonstratedknowledgemusthaveintuitiveevidence。
Now，ineverystepreasonmakesindemonstrativeknowledge，thereisanintuitiveknowledgeofthatagreementordisagreementitseekswiththenextintermediateideawhichitusesasaproof:forifitwerenotso，thatyetwouldneedaproof；sincewithouttheperceptionofsuchagreementordisagreement，thereisnoknowledgeproduced:ifitbeperceivedbyitself，itisintuitiveknowledge:ifitcannotbeperceivedbyitself，thereisneedofsomeinterveningidea，asacommonmeasure，toshowtheiragreementordisagreement。Bywhichitisplainthateverystepinreasoningthatproducesknowledge，hasintuitivecertainty；whichwhenthemindperceives，thereisnomorerequiredbuttorememberit，tomaketheagreementordisagreementoftheideasconcerningwhichweinquirevisibleandcertain。Sothattomakeanythingademonstration，itisnecessarytoperceivetheimmediateagreementoftheinterveningideas，wherebytheagreementordisagreementofthetwoideasunderexamination(whereoftheoneisalwaysthefirst，andtheotherthelastintheaccount)isfound。
Thisintuitiveperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementoftheintermediateideas，ineachstepandprogressionofthedemonstration，mustalsobecarriedexactlyinthemind，andamanmustbesurethatnopartisleftout:which，becauseinlongdeductions，andtheuseofmanyproofs，thememorydoesnotalwayssoreadilyandexactlyretain；thereforeitcomestopass，thatthisismoreimperfectthanintuitiveknowledge，andmenembraceoftenfalsehoodfordemonstrations。
8。Hencethemistake，expraecognitis，etpraeconcessis。Thenecessityofthisintuitiveknowledge，ineachstepofscientificalordemonstrativereasoning，gaveoccasion，Iimagine，tothatmistakenaxiom，Thatallreasoningwasexpracognitisetpraeconcessis:
which，howfaritisamistake，Ishallhaveoccasiontoshowmoreatlarge，whenIcometoconsiderpropositions，andparticularlythosepropositionswhicharecalledmaxims，andtoshowthatitisbyamistakethattheyaresupposedtobethefoundationsofallourknowledgeandreasonings。
9。Demonstrationnotlimitedtoideasofmathematicalquantity。Ithasbeengenerallytakenforgranted，thatmathematicsalonearecapableofdemonstrativecertainty:buttohavesuchanagreementordisagreementasmayintuitivelybeperceived，being，asIimagine，nottheprivilegeoftheideasofnumber，extension，andfigurealone，itmaypossiblybethewantofduemethodandapplicationinus，andnotofsufficientevidenceinthings，thatdemonstrationhasbeenthoughttohavesolittletodoinotherpartsofknowledge，andbeenscarcesomuchasaimedatbyanybutmathematicians。Forwhateverideaswehavewhereinthemindcanperceivetheimmediateagreementordisagreementthatisbetweenthem，therethemindiscapableofintuitiveknowledge；andwhereitcanperceivetheagreementordisagreementofanytwoideas，byanintuitiveperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementtheyhavewithanyintermediateideas，therethemindiscapableofdemonstration:whichisnotlimitedtoideasofextension，figure，number，andtheirmodes。
10。Whyithasbeenthoughttobesolimited。Thereasonwhyithasbeengenerallysoughtfor，andsupposedtobeonlyinthose，I
imaginehasbeen，notonlythegeneralusefulnessofthosesciences:
butbecause，incomparingtheirequalityorexcess，themodesofnumbershaveeverytheleastdifferenceveryclearandperceivable:
andthoughinextensioneverytheleastexcessisnotsoperceptible，yetthemindhasfoundoutwaystoexamine，anddiscoverdemonstratively，thejustequalityoftwoangles，orextensions，orfigures:andboththese，i。e。numbersandfigures，canbesetdownbyvisibleandlastingmarks，whereintheideasunderconsiderationareperfectlydetermined；whichforthemostparttheyarenot，wheretheyaremarkedonlybynamesandwords。
11。Modesofqualitiesnotdemonstrablelikemodesofquantity。
Butinothersimpleideas，whosemodesanddifferencesaremadeandcountedbydegrees，andnotquantity，wehavenotsoniceandaccurateadistinctionoftheirdifferencesastoperceive，orfindwaystomeasure，theirjustequality，ortheleastdifferences。Forthoseothersimpleideas，beingappearancesofsensationsproducedinus，bythesize，figure，number，andmotionofminutecorpusclessinglyinsensible；theirdifferentdegreesalsodependuponthevariationofsomeorofallthosecauses:which，sinceitcannotbeobservedbyus，inparticlesofmatterwhereofeachistoosubtiletobeperceived，itisimpossibleforustohaveanyexactmeasuresofthedifferentdegreesofthesesimpleideas。For，supposingthesensationorideawenamewhitenessbeproducedinusbyacertainnumberofglobules，which，havingaverticityabouttheirowncentres，strikeupontheretinaoftheeye，withacertaindegreeofrotation，aswellasprogressiveswiftness；itwillhenceeasilyfollow，thatthemorethesuperficialpartsofanybodyaresoorderedastoreflectthegreaternumberofglobulesoflight，andtogivethemtheproperrotation，whichisfittoproducethissensationofwhiteinus，themorewhitewillthatbodyappear，thatfromanequalspacesendstotheretinathegreaternumberofsuchcorpuscles，withthatpeculiarsortofmotion。Idonotsaythatthenatureoflightconsistsinverysmallroundglobules；norofwhitenessinsuchatextureofpartsasgivesacertainrotationtotheseglobuleswhenitreflectsthem:forIamnotnowtreatingphysicallyoflightorcolours。ButthisIthinkImaysay，thatIcannot(andIwouldbegladanyonewouldmakeintelligiblethathedid)，conceivehowbodieswithoutuscananywaysaffectoursenses，butbytheimmediatecontactofthesensiblebodiesthemselves，asintastingandfeeling，ortheimpulseofsomesensibleparticlescomingfromthem，asinseeing，hearing，andsmelling；bythedifferentimpulseofwhichparts，causedbytheirdifferentsize，figure，andmotion，thevarietyofsensationsisproducedinus。
12。Particlesoflightandsimpleideasofcolour。Whetherthentheybeglobulesorno；orwhethertheyhaveaverticityabouttheirowncentresthatproducestheideaofwhitenessinus；thisiscertain，thatthemoreparticlesoflightarereflectedfromabody，fittedtogivethemthatpeculiarmotionwhichproducesthesensationofwhitenessinus；andpossiblytoo，thequickerthatpeculiarmotionis，-thewhiterdoesthebodyappearfromwhichthegreatestnumberarereflected，asisevidentinthesamepieceofpaperputinthesunbeams，intheshade，andinadarkhole；ineachofwhichitwillproduceinustheideaofwhitenessinfardifferentdegrees。
13。Thesecondaryqualitiesofthingsnotdiscoveredbydemonstration。Notknowing，therefore，whatnumberofparticles，norwhatmotionofthem，isfittoproduceanyprecisedegreeofwhiteness，wecannotdemonstratethecertainequalityofanytwodegreesofwhiteness；becausewehavenocertainstandardtomeasurethemby，normeanstodistinguisheverytheleastrealdifference，theonlyhelpwehavebeingfromoursenses，whichinthispointfailus。Butwherethedifferenceissogreatastoproduceinthemindclearlydistinctideas，whosedifferencescanbeperfectlyretained，theretheseideasorcolours，asweseeindifferentkinds，asblueandred，areascapableofdemonstrationasideasofnumberandextension。WhatIhaveheresaidofwhitenessandcolours，Ithinkholdstrueinallsecondaryqualitiesandtheirmodes。
14。Sensitiveknowledgeoftheparticularexistenceoffinitebeingswithoutus。Thesetwo，viz。intuitionanddemonstration，arethedegreesofourknowledge；whatevercomesshortofoneofthese，withwhatassurancesoeverembraced，isbutfaithoropinion，butnotknowledge，atleastinallgeneraltruths。Thereis，indeed，anotherperceptionofthemind，employedabouttheparticularexistenceoffinitebeingswithoutus，which，goingbeyondbareprobability，andyetnotreachingperfectlytoeitheroftheforegoingdegreesofcertainty，passesunderthenameofknowledge。Therecanbenothingmorecertainthanthattheideawereceivefromanexternalobjectisinourminds:thisisintuitiveknowledge。Butwhethertherebeanythingmorethanbarelythatideainourminds；whetherwecanthencecertainlyinfertheexistenceofanythingwithoutus，whichcorrespondstothatidea，isthatwhereofsomementhinktheremaybeaquestionmade；becausemenmayhavesuchideasintheirminds，whennosuchthingexists，nosuchobjectaffectstheirsenses。ButyethereIthinkweareprovidedwithanevidencethatputsuspastdoubting。ForIaskanyone，Whetherhebenotinvinciblyconscioustohimselfofadifferentperception，whenhelooksonthesunbyday，andthinksonitbynight；whenheactuallytasteswormwood，orsmellsarose，oronlythinksonthatsavourorodour？Weasplainlyfindthedifferencethereisbetweenanyidearevivedinourmindsbyourownmemory，andactuallycomingintoourmindsbyoursenses，aswedobetweenanytwodistinctideas。Ifanyonesay，adreammaydothesamething，andalltheseideasmaybeproducedinuswithoutanyexternalobjects；hemaypleasetodreamthatImakehimthisanswer:-
1。Thatitisnogreatmatter，whetherIremovehisscrupleorno:
whereallisbutdream，reasoningandargumentsareofnouse，truthandknowledgenothing。2。ThatIbelievehewillallowaverymanifestdifferencebetweendreamingofbeinginthefire，andbeingactuallyinit。Butyetifheberesolvedtoappearsoscepticalastomaintain，thatwhatIcallbeingactuallyinthefireisnothingbutadream；andthatwecannottherebycertainlyknow，thatanysuchthingasfireactuallyexistswithoutus:Ianswer，Thatwecertainlyfindingthatpleasureorpainfollowsupontheapplicationofcertainobjectstous，whoseexistenceweperceive，ordreamthatweperceive，byoursenses；thiscertaintyisasgreatasourhappinessormisery，beyondwhichwehavenoconcernmenttoknowortobe。Sothat，Ithink，wemayaddtothetwoformersortsofknowledgethisalso，oftheexistenceofparticularexternalobjects，bythatperceptionandconsciousnesswehaveoftheactualentranceofideasfromthem，andallowthesethreedegreesofknowledge，viz。intuitive，demonstrative，andsensitive:ineachofwhichtherearedifferentdegreesandwaysofevidenceandcertainty。
15。Knowledgenotalwaysclear，wheretheideasthatenterintoitareclear。Butsinceourknowledgeisfoundedonandemployedaboutourideasonly，willitnotfollowfromthencethatitisconformabletoourideas；andthatwhereourideasareclearanddistinct，orobscureandconfused，ourknowledgewillbesotoo？TowhichIanswer，No:forourknowledgeconsistingintheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanytwoideas，itsclearnessorobscurityconsistsintheclearnessorobscurityofthatperception，andnotintheclearnessorobscurityoftheideasthemselves:v。g。
amanthathasasclearideasoftheanglesofatriangle，andofequalitytotworightones，asanymathematicianintheworld，mayyethavebutaveryobscureperceptionoftheiragreement，andsohavebutaveryobscureknowledgeofit。Butideaswhich，byreasonoftheirobscurityorotherwise，areconfused，cannotproduceanyclearordistinctknowledge；because，asfarasanyideasareconfused，sofarthemindcannotperceiveclearlywhethertheyagreeordisagree。
Ortoexpressthesamethinginawaylessapttobemisunderstood:hethathathnotdeterminedideastothewordsheuses，cannotmakepropositionsofthemofwhosetruthhecanbecertain。
ChapterIII
OftheExtentofHumanKnowledge1。Extentofourknowledge。Knowledge，ashasbeensaid，lyingintheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanyofourideas，itfollowsfromhenceThat，Itextendsnofurtherthanwehaveideas。First，wecanhaveknowledgenofurtherthanwehaveideas。
2。Itextendsnofurtherthanwecanperceivetheiragreementordisagreement。Secondly，Thatwecanhavenoknowledgefurtherthanwecanhaveperceptionofthatagreementordisagreement。Whichperceptionbeing:1。Eitherbyintuition，ortheimmediatecomparinganytwoideas；or，2。Byreason，examiningtheagreementordisagreementoftwoideas，bytheinterventionofsomeothers；or，3。Bysensation，perceivingtheexistenceofparticularthings:
henceitalsofollows:
3。Intuitiveknowledgeextendsitselfnottoalltherelationsofallourideas。Thirdly，Thatwecannothaveanintuitiveknowledgethatshallextenditselftoallourideas，andallthatwewouldknowaboutthem；becausewecannotexamineandperceivealltherelationstheyhaveonetoanother，byjuxta-position，oranimmediatecomparisononewithanother。Thus，havingtheideasofanobtuseandanacuteangledtriangle，bothdrawnfromequalbases，andbetweenparallels，Ican，byintuitiveknowledge，perceivetheonenottobetheother，butcannotthatwayknowwhethertheybeequalorno；
becausetheiragreementordisagreementinequalitycanneverbeperceivedbyanimmediatecomparingthem:thedifferenceoffiguremakestheirpartsincapableofanexactimmediateapplication；andthereforethereisneedofsomeinterveningqualitiestomeasurethemby，whichisdemonstration，orrationalknowledge。
4。Nordoesdemonstrativeknowledge。Fourthly，Itfollows，also，fromwhatisaboveobserved，thatourrationalknowledgecannotreachtothewholeextentofourideas:becausebetweentwodifferentideaswewouldexamine，wecannotalwaysfindsuchmediumsaswecanconnectonetoanotherwithanintuitiveknowledgeinallthepartsofthededuction；andwhereverthatfails，wecomeshortofknowledgeanddemonstration。
5。Sensitiveknowledgenarrowerthaneither。Fifthly，Sensitiveknowledgereachingnofurtherthantheexistenceofthingsactuallypresenttooursenses，isyetmuchnarrowerthaneitheroftheformer。
6。Ourknowledge，therefore，narrowerthanourideas。Sixthly，Fromallwhichitisevident，thattheextentofourknowledgecomesnotonlyshortoftherealityofthings，butevenoftheextentofourownideas。Thoughourknowledgebelimitedtoourideas，andcannotexceedthemeitherinextentorperfection；andthoughthesebeverynarrowbounds，inrespectoftheextentofAll-being，andfarshortofwhatwemayjustlyimaginetobeinsomeevencreatedunderstandings，nottieddowntothedullandnarrowinformationthatistobereceivedfromsomefew，andnotveryacute，waysofperception，suchasareoursenses；yetitwouldbewellwithusifourknowledgewerebutaslargeasourideas，andtherewerenotmanydoubtsandinquiriesconcerningtheideaswehave，whereofwearenot，norIbelieveevershallbeinthisworldresolved。
NeverthelessIdonotquestionbutthathumanknowledge，underthepresentcircumstancesofourbeingsandconstitutions，maybecarriedmuchfurtherthanithashithertobeen，ifmenwouldsincerely，andwithfreedomofmind，employallthatindustryandlabourofthought，inimprovingthemeansofdiscoveringtruth，whichtheydoforthecolouringorsupportoffalsehood，tomaintainasystem，interest，orpartytheyareonceengagedin。Butyetafterall，IthinkImay，withoutinjurytohumanperfection，beconfident，thatourknowledgewouldneverreachtoallwemightdesiretoknowconcerningthoseideaswehave；norbeabletosurmountallthedifficulties，andresolveallthequestionsthatmightariseconcerninganyofthem。Wehavetheideasofasquare，acircle，andequality；andyet，perhaps，shallneverbeabletofindacircleequaltoasquare，andcertainlyknowthatitisso。Wehavetheideasofmatterandthinking，butpossiblyshallneverbeabletoknowwhetheranymerematerialbeingthinksorno；itbeingimpossibleforus，bythecontemplationofourownideas，withoutrevelation，todiscoverwhetherOmnipotencyhasnotgiventosomesystemsofmatter，fitlydisposed，apowertoperceiveandthink，orelsejoinedandfixedtomatter，sodisposed，athinkingimmaterialsubstance:itbeing，inrespectofournotions，notmuchmoreremotefromourcomprehensiontoconceivethatGODcan，ifhepleases，superaddtomatterafacultyofthinking，thanthatheshouldsuperaddtoitanothersubstancewithafacultyofthinking；sinceweknownotwhereinthinkingconsists，nortowhatsortofsubstancestheAlmightyhasbeenpleasedtogivethatpower，whichcannotbeinanycreatedbeing，butmerelybythegoodpleasureandbountyoftheCreator。
WhetherMattermaynotbemadebyGodtothinkismorethanmancanknow。ForIseenocontradictioninit，thatthefirstEternalthinkingBeing，orOmnipotentSpirit，should，ifhepleased，givetocertainsystemsofcreatedsenselessmatter，puttogetherashethinksfit，somedegreesofsense，perception，andthought:though，asI
thinkIhaveproved，Bk。iv。ch。10，SS14，&c。，itisnolessthanacontradictiontosupposematter(whichisevidentlyinitsownnaturevoidofsenseandthought)shouldbethatEternalfirst-thinkingBeing。Whatcertaintyofknowledgecananyonehave，thatsomeperceptions，suchas，v。g。，pleasureandpain，shouldnotbeinsomebodiesthemselves，afteracertainmannermodifiedandmoved，aswellasthattheyshouldbeinanimmaterialsubstance，uponthemotionofthepartsofbody:Body，asfaraswecanconceive，beingableonlytostrikeandaffectbody，andmotion，accordingtotheutmostreachofourideas，beingabletoproducenothingbutmotion；sothatwhenweallowittoproducepleasureorpain，ortheideaofacolourorsound，wearefaintoquitourreason，gobeyondourideas，andattributeitwhollytothegoodpleasureofourMaker。For，sincewemustallowHehasannexedeffectstomotionwhichwecannowayconceivemotionabletoproduce，whatreasonhavewetoconcludethatHecouldnotorderthemaswelltobeproducedinasubjectwecannotconceivecapableofthem，aswellasinasubjectwecannotconceivethemotionofmattercananywayoperateupon？Isaynotthis，thatIwouldanywaylessenthebeliefofthesoul’simmateriality:Iamnotherespeakingofprobability，butknowledge；
andIthinknotonlythatitbecomesthemodestyofphilosophynottopronouncemagisterially，wherewewantthatevidencethatcanproduceknowledge；butalso，thatitisofusetoustodiscernhowfarourknowledgedoesreach；forthestateweareatpresentin，notbeingthatofvision，wemustinmanythingscontentourselveswithfaithandprobability:andinthepresentquestion，abouttheImmaterialityoftheSoul，ifourfacultiescannotarriveatdemonstrativecertainty，weneednotthinkitstrange。Allthegreatendsofmoralityandreligionarewellenoughsecured，withoutphilosophicalproofsofthesoul’simmateriality；sinceitisevident，thathewhomadeusatthebeginningtosubsisthere，sensibleintelligentbeings，andforseveralyearscontinuedusinsuchastate，canandwillrestoreustothelikestateofsensibilityinanotherworld，andmakeuscapabletheretoreceivetheretributionhehasdesignedtomen，accordingtotheirdoingsinthislife。Andthereforeitisnotofsuchmightynecessitytodetermineonewayortheother，assome，over-zealousfororagainsttheimmaterialityofthesoul，havebeenforwardtomaketheworldbelieve。Who，eitherontheoneside，indulgingtoomuchtheirthoughtsimmersedaltogetherinmatter，canallownoexistencetowhatisnotmaterial:orwho，ontheotherside，findingnotcogitationwithinthenaturalpowersofmatter，examinedoverandoveragainbytheutmostintentionofmind，havetheconfidencetoconclude-ThatOmnipotencyitselfcannotgiveperceptionandthoughttoasubstancewhichhasthemodificationofsolidity。Hethatconsidershowhardlysensationis，inourthoughts，reconcilabletoextendedmatter；orexistencetoanythingthathasnoextensionatall，willconfessthatheisveryfarfromcertainlyknowingwhathissoulis。Itisapointwhichseemstometobeputoutofthereachofourknowledge:andhewhowillgivehimselfleavetoconsiderfreely，andlookintothedarkandintricatepartofeachhypothesis，willscarcefindhisreasonabletodeterminehimfixedlyfororagainstthesoul’smateriality。Since，onwhichsidesoeverheviewsit，eitherasanunextendedsubstance，orasathinkingextendedmatter，thedifficultytoconceiveeitherwill，whilsteitheraloneisinhisthoughts，stilldrivehimtothecontraryside。Anunfairwaywhichsomementakewiththemselves:who，becauseoftheinconceivablenessofsomethingtheyfindinone，throwthemselvesviolentlyintothecontraryhypothesis，thoughaltogetherasunintelligibletoanunbiassedunderstanding。Thisservesnotonlytoshowtheweaknessandthescantinessofourknowledge，buttheinsignificanttriumphofsuchsortofarguments；
which，drawnfromourownviews，maysatisfyusthatwecanfindnocertaintyononesideofthequestion:butdonotatalltherebyhelpustotruthbyrunningintotheoppositeopinion；which，onexamination，willbefoundcloggedwithequaldifficulties。Forwhatsafety，whatadvantagetoanyoneisit，fortheavoidingtheseemingabsurdities，andtohimunsurmountablerubs，hemeetswithinoneopinion，totakerefugeinthecontrary，whichisbuiltonsomethingaltogetherasinexplicable，andasfarremotefromhiscomprehension？Itispastcontroversy，thatwehaveinussomethingthatthinks；ourverydoubtsaboutwhatitis，confirmthecertaintyofitsbeing，thoughwemustcontentourselvesintheignoranceofwhatkindofbeingitis:anditisinvaintogoabouttobescepticalinthis，asitisunreasonableinmostothercasestobepositiveagainstthebeingofanything，becausewecannotcomprehenditsnature。ForIwouldfainknowwhatsubstanceexists，thathasnotsomethinginitwhichmanifestlybafflesourunderstandings。Otherspirits，whoseeandknowthenatureandinwardconstitutionofthings，howmuchmusttheyexceedusinknowledge？Towhich，ifweaddlargercomprehension，whichenablesthematoneglancetoseetheconnexionandagreementofverymanyideas，andreadilysuppliestothemtheintermediateproofs，whichwebysingleandslowsteps，andlongporinginthedark，hardlyatlastfindout，andareoftenreadytoforgetonebeforewehavehuntedoutanother；wemayguessatsomepartofthehappinessofsuperiorranksofspirits，whohaveaquickerandmorepenetratingsight，aswellasalargerfieldofknowledge。
Buttoreturntotheargumentinhand:ourknowledge，Isay，isnotonlylimitedtothepaucityandimperfectionsoftheideaswehave，andwhichweemployitabout，butevencomesshortofthattoo:buthowfaritreaches，letusnowinquire。
7。Howfarourknowledgereaches。Theaffirmationsornegationswemakeconcerningtheideaswehave，may，asIhavebeforeintimatedingeneral，bereducedtothesefoursorts，viz。identity，co-existence，relation，andrealexistence。Ishallexaminehowfarourknowledgeextendsineachofthese:
8。Ourknowledgeofidentityanddiversityinideasextendsasfarasourideasthemselves。First，astoidentityanddiversity。Inthiswayofagreementordisagreementofourideas，ourintuitiveknowledgeisasfarextendedasourideasthemselves:andtherecanbenoideainthemind，whichitdoesnot，presently，byanintuitiveknowledge，perceivetobewhatitis，andtobedifferentfromanyother。
9。Oftheirco-existence，extendsonlyaverylittleway。
Secondly，astothesecondsort，whichistheagreementordisagreementofourideasinco-existence，inthisourknowledgeisveryshort；thoughinthisconsiststhegreatestandmostmaterialpartofourknowledgeconcerningsubstances。Forourideasofthespeciesofsubstancesbeing，asIhaveshowed，nothingbutcertaincollectionsofsimpleideasunitedinonesubject，andsoco-existingtogether；v。g。ourideaofflameisabodyhot，luminous，andmovingupward；ofgold，abodyheavytoacertaindegree，yellow，malleable，andfusible:forthese，orsomesuchcomplexideasasthese，inmen’sminds，dothesetwonamesofthedifferentsubstances，flameandgold，standfor。Whenwewouldknowanythingfurtherconcerningthese，oranyothersortofsubstances，whatdoweinquire，butwhatotherqualitiesorpowersthesesubstanceshaveorhavenot？Whichisnothingelsebuttoknowwhatothersimpleideasdo，ordonotco-existwiththosethatmakeupthatcomplexidea？
10。Becausetheconnexionbetweensimpleideasinsubstancesisforthemostpartunknown。This，howweightyandconsiderableapartsoeverofhumanscience，isyetverynarrow，andscarceanyatall。
Thereasonwhereofis，thatthesimpleideaswhereofourcomplexideasofsubstancesaremadeupare，forthemostpart，suchascarrywiththem，intheirownnature，novisiblenecessaryconnexionorinconsistencywithanyothersimpleideas，whoseco-existencewiththemwewouldinformourselvesabout。
11。Especiallyofthesecondaryqualitiesofbodies。Theideasthatourcomplexonesofsubstancesaremadeupof，andaboutwhichourknowledgeconcerningsubstancesismostemployed，arethoseoftheirsecondaryqualities；whichdependingall(ashasbeenshown)
upontheprimaryqualitiesoftheirminuteandinsensibleparts；or，ifnotuponthem，uponsomethingyetmoreremotefromourcomprehension；itisimpossibleweshouldknowwhichhaveanecessaryunionorinconsistencyonewithanother。For，notknowingtheroottheyspringfrom，notknowingwhatsize，figure，andtextureofpartstheyare，onwhichdepend，andfromwhichresultthosequalitieswhichmakeourcomplexideaofgold，itisimpossibleweshouldknowwhatotherqualitiesresultfrom，orareincompatiblewith，thesameconstitutionoftheinsensiblepartsofgold；andsoconsequentlymustalwaysco-existwiththatcomplexideawehaveofit，orelseareinconsistentwithit。
12。Becausenecessaryconnexionbetweenanysecondaryandtheprimaryqualitiesisundiscoverablebyus。Besidesthisignoranceoftheprimaryqualitiesoftheinsensiblepartsofbodies，onwhichdependalltheirsecondaryqualities，thereisyetanotherandmoreincurablepartofignorance，whichsetsusmoreremotefromacertainknowledgeoftheco-existenceorinco-existence(ifImaysosay)ofdifferentideasinthesamesubject；andthatis，thatthereisnodiscoverableconnexionbetweenanysecondaryqualityandthoseprimaryqualitieswhichitdependson。
13。Wehavenoperfectknowledgeoftheirprimaryqualities。Thatthesize，figure，andmotionofonebodyshouldcauseachangeinthesize，figure，andmotionofanotherbody，isnotbeyondourconception；theseparationofthepartsofonebodyupontheintrusionofanother；andthechangefromresttomotionuponimpulse；theseandthelikeseemtohavesomeconnexiononewithanother。Andifweknewtheseprimaryqualitiesofbodies，wemighthavereasontohopewemightbeabletoknowagreatdealmoreoftheseoperationsofthemoneuponanother:butourmindsnotbeingabletodiscoveranyconnexionbetwixttheseprimaryqualitiesofbodiesandthesensationsthatareproducedinusbythem，wecanneverbeabletoestablishcertainandundoubtedrulesoftheconsequenceorco-existenceofanysecondaryqualities，thoughwecoulddiscoverthesize，figure，ormotionofthoseinvisiblepartswhichimmediatelyproducethem。Wearesofarfromknowingwhatfigure，size，ormotionofpartsproduceayellowcolour，asweettaste，orasharpsound，thatwecanbynomeansconceivehowanysize，figure，ormotionofanyparticles，canpossiblyproduceinustheideaofanycolour，taste，orsoundwhatsoever:thereisnoconceivableconnexionbetweentheoneandtheother。
14。Andseekinvainforcertainanduniversalknowledgeofunperceivedqualitiesinsubstances。Invain，therefore，shallweendeavourtodiscoverbyourideas(theonlytruewayofcertainanduniversalknowledge)whatotherideasaretobefoundconstantlyjoinedwiththatofourcomplexideaofanysubstance:sinceweneitherknowtherealconstitutionoftheminutepartsonwhichtheirqualitiesdodepend；nor，didweknowthem，couldwediscoveranynecessaryconnexionbetweenthemandanyofthesecondaryqualities:whichisnecessarytobedonebeforewecancertainlyknowtheirnecessaryco-existence。So，that，letourcomplexideaofanyspeciesofsubstancesbewhatitwill，wecanhardly，fromthesimpleideascontainedinit，certainlydeterminethenecessaryco-existenceofanyotherqualitywhatsoever。Ourknowledgeinalltheseinquiriesreachesverylittlefurtherthanourexperience。
