ChapterXXXII
OfTrueandFalseIdeas1。Truthandfalsehoodproperlybelongtopropositions，nottoideas。Thoughtruthandfalsehoodbelong，inproprietyofspeech，onlytopropositions:yetideasareoftentimestermedtrueorfalse(aswhatwordsaretherethatarenotusedwithgreatlatitude，andwithsomedeviationfromtheirstrictandpropersignifications？)ThoughIthinkthatwhenideasthemselvesaretermedtrueorfalse，thereisstillsomesecretortacitproposition，whichisthefoundationofthatdenomination:asweshallsee，ifweexaminetheparticularoccasionswhereintheycometobecalledtrueorfalse。Inallwhichweshallfindsomekindofaffirmationornegation，whichisthereasonofthatdenomination。Forourideas，beingnothingbutbareappearances，orperceptionsinourminds，cannotproperlyandsimplyinthemselvesbesaidtobetrueorfalse，nomorethanasinglenameofanythingcanbesaidtobetrueorfalse。
2。Ideasandwordsmaybesaidtobetrue，inasmuchastheyreallyareideasandwords。Indeedbothideasandwordsmaybesaidtobetrue，inametaphysicalsenseofthewordtruth；asallotherthingsthatanywayexistaresaidtobetrue，i。e。reallytobesuchastheyexist。Thoughinthingscalledtrue，eveninthatsense，thereisperhapsasecretreferencetoourideas，lookeduponasthestandardsofthattruth；whichamountstoamentalproposition，thoughitbeusuallynottakennoticeof。
3。Noidea，asanappearanceinthemind，eithertrueorfalse。
Butitisnotinthatmetaphysicalsenseoftruthwhichweinquirehere，whenweexamine，whetherourideasarecapableofbeingtrueorfalse，butinthemoreordinaryacceptationofthosewords:andsoIsaythattheideasinourminds，beingonlysomanyperceptionsorappearancesthere，noneofthemarefalse；theideaofacentaurhavingnomorefalsehoodinitwhenitappearsinourminds，thanthenamecentaurhasfalsehoodinit，whenitispronouncedbyourmouths，orwrittenonpaper。Fortruthorfalsehoodlyingalwaysinsomeaffirmationornegation，mentalorverbal，ourideasarenotcapable，anyofthem，ofbeingfalse，tillthemindpassessomejudgmentonthem；thatis，affirmsordeniessomethingofthem。
4。Ideasreferredtoanythingextraneoustothemmaybetrueorfalse。Wheneverthemindrefersanyofitsideastoanythingextraneoustothem，theyarethencapabletobecalledtrueorfalse。Becausethemind，insuchareference，makesatacitsuppositionoftheirconformitytothatthing；whichsupposition，asithappenstobetrueorfalse，sotheideasthemselvescometobedenominated。Themostusualcaseswhereinthishappens，arethesefollowing:
5。Othermen’sideas；realexistence；andsupposedrealessences，arewhatmenusuallyrefertheirideasto。First，whenthemindsupposesanyideaithasconformabletothatinothermen’sminds，calledbythesamecommonname；v。g。whenthemindintendsorjudgesitsideasofjustice，temperance，religion，tobethesamewithwhatothermengivethosenamesto。
Secondly，whenthemindsupposesanyideaithasinitselftobeconformabletosomerealexistence。Thusthetwoideasofamanandacentaur，supposedtobetheideasofrealsubstances，aretheonetrueandtheotherfalse；theonehavingaconformitytowhathasreallyexisted，theothernot。
Thirdly，whenthemindrefersanyofitsideastothatrealconstitutionandessenceofanything，whereonallitspropertiesdepend:andthusthegreatestpart，ifnotallourideasofsubstances，arefalse。
6。Thecauseofsuchreference。Thesesuppositionsthemindisveryapttacitlytomakeconcerningitsownideas。Butyet，ifwewillexamineit，weshallfinditischiefly，ifnotonly，concerningitsabstractcomplexideas。Forthenaturaltendencyofthemindbeingtowardsknowledge；andfindingthat，ifitshouldproceedbyanddwellupononlyparticularthings，itsprogresswouldbeveryslow，anditsworkendless；therefore，toshortenitswaytoknowledge，andmakeeachperceptionmorecomprehensive，thefirstthingitdoes，asthefoundationoftheeasierenlargingitsknowledge，eitherbycontemplationofthethingsthemselvesthatitwouldknow，orconferencewithothersaboutthem，istobindthemintobundles，andrankthemsointosorts，thatwhatknowledgeitgetsofanyofthemitmaytherebywithassuranceextendtoallofthatsort；andsoadvancebylargerstepsinthatwhichisitsgreatbusiness，knowledge。This，asIhaveelsewhereshown，isthereasonwhywecollectthingsundercomprehensiveideas，withnamesannexedtothem，intogeneraandspecies；i。e。intokindsandsorts。
7。Namesofthingssupposedtocarryinthemknowledgeoftheiressences。Ifthereforewewillwarilyattendtothemotionsofthemind，andobservewhatcourseitusuallytakesinitswaytoknowledge，weshallIthinkfind，thatthemindhavinggotanideawhichitthinksitmayhaveuseofeitherincontemplationordiscourse，thefirstthingitdoesistoabstractit，andthengetanametoit；andsolayitupinitsstorehouse，thememory，ascontainingtheessenceofasortofthings，ofwhichthatnameisalwaystobethemark。Henceitis，thatwemayoftenobservethat，whenanyoneseesanewthingofakindthatheknowsnot，hepresentlyasks，whatitis；meaningbythatinquirynothingbutthename。Asifthenamecarriedwithittheknowledgeofthespecies，ortheessenceofit；whereofitisindeedusedasthemark，andisgenerallysupposedannexedtoit。
8。Howmensupposethattheirideasmustcorrespondtothings，andtothecustomarymeaningsofnames。Butthisabstractidea，beingsomethinginthemind，betweenthethingthatexists，andthenamethatisgiventoit；itisinourideasthatboththerightnessofourknowledge，andtheproprietyandintelligiblenessofourspeaking，consists。Andhenceitisthatmenaresoforwardtosuppose，thattheabstractideastheyhaveintheirmindsaresuchasagreetothethingsexistingwithoutthem，towhichtheyarereferred；andarethesamealsotowhichthenamestheygivethemdobytheuseandproprietyofthatlanguagebelong。Forwithoutthisdoubleconformityoftheirideas，theyfindtheyshouldboththinkamissofthingsinthemselves，andtalkofthemunintelligiblytoothers。
9。Simpleideasmaybefalse，inreferencetoothersofthesamename，butareleastliabletobeso。First，then，Isay，thatwhenthetruthofourideasisjudgedofbytheconformitytheyhavetotheideaswhichothermenhave，andcommonlysignifybythesamename，theymaybeanyofthemfalse。Butyetsimpleideasareleastofallliabletobesomistaken。Becauseaman，byhissensesandeveryday’sobservation，mayeasilysatisfyhimselfwhatthesimpleideasarewhichtheirseveralnamesthatareincommonusestandfor；theybeingbutfewinnumber，andsuchas，ifhedoubtsormistakesin，hemayeasilyrectifybytheobjectstheyaretobefoundin。Thereforeitisseldomthatanyonemistakesinhisnamesofsimpleideas，orappliesthenameredtotheideagreen，orthenamesweettotheideabitter:mushlessaremenapttoconfoundthenamesofideasbelongingtodifferentsenses，andcallacolourbythenameofataste，&c。Wherebyitisevidentthatthesimpleideastheycallbyanynamearecommonlythesamethatothershaveandmeanwhentheyusethesamenames。
10。Ideasofmixedmodesmostliabletobefalseinthissense。
Complexideasaremuchmoreliabletobefalseinthisrespect；andthecomplexideasofmixedmodes，muchmorethanthoseofsubstances；becauseinsubstances(especiallythosewhichthecommonandunborrowednamesofanylanguageareappliedto)someremarkablesensiblequalities，servingordinarilytodistinguishonesortfromanother，easilypreservethosewhotakeanycareintheuseoftheirwords，fromapplyingthemtosortsofsubstancestowhichtheydonotatallbelong。Butinmixedmodeswearemuchmoreuncertain；itbeingnotsoeasytodetermineofseveralactions，whethertheyaretobecalledjusticeorcruelly，liberalityorprodigality。Andsoinreferringourideastothoseofothermen，calledbythesamenames，oursmaybefalse；andtheideainourminds，whichweexpressbythewordjustice，mayperhapsbethatwhichoughttohaveanothername。
11。Oratleasttobethoughtfalse。Butwhetherornoourideasofmixedmodesaremoreliablethananysorttobedifferentfromthoseofothermen，whicharemarkedbythesamenames，thisatleastiscertain，Thatthissortoffalsehoodismuchmorefamiliarlyattributedtoourideasofmixedmodesthantoanyother。
Whenamanisthoughttohaveafalseideaofjustice，orgratitude，orglory，itisfornootherreason，butthathisagreesnotwiththeideaswhicheachofthosenamesarethesignsofinothermen。
12。Andwhy。Thereasonwhereofseemstometobethis:Thattheabstractideasofmixedmodes，beingmen’svoluntarycombinationsofsuchaprecisecollectionofsimpleideas，andsotheessenceofeachspeciesbeingmadebymenalone，whereofwehavenoothersensiblestandardexistinganywherebutthenameitself，orthedefinitionofthatname；wehavingnothingelsetorefertheseourideasofmixedmodesto，asastandardtowhichwewouldconformthem，buttheideasofthosewhoarethoughttousethosenamesintheirmostpropersignifications；and，soasourideasconformordifferfromthem，theypassfortrueorfalse。Andthusmuchconcerningthetruthandfalsehoodofourideas，inreferencetotheirnames。
13。Asreferredtorealexistence，noneofourideascanbefalsebutthoseofsubstances。Secondly，astothetruthandfalsehoodofourideas，inreferencetotherealexistenceofthings。Whenthatismadethestandardoftheirtruth，noneofthemcanbetermedfalsebutonlyourcomplexideasofsubstances。
14。Simpleideasinthissensenotfalse，andwhy。First，oursimpleideas，beingbarelysuchperceptionsasGodhasfittedustoreceive，andgivenpowertoexternalobjectstoproduceinusbyestablishedlawsandways，suitabletohiswisdomandgoodness，thoughincomprehensibletous，theirtruthconsistsinnothingelsebutinsuchappearancesasareproducedinus，andmustbesuitabletothosepowershehasplacedinexternalobjectsorelsetheycouldnotbeproducedinus:andthusansweringthosepowers，theyarewhattheyshouldbe，trueideas。Nordotheybecomeliabletoanyimputationoffalsehood，ifthemind(asinmostmenIbelieveitdoes)judgestheseideastobeinthethingsthemselves。ForGodinhiswisdomhavingsetthemasmarksofdistinctioninthings，wherebywemaybeabletodiscernonethingfromanother，andsochooseanyofthemforourusesaswehaveoccasion；italtersnotthenatureofoursimpleidea，whetherwethinkthattheideaofbluebeinthevioletitself，orinourmindonly；andonlythepowerofproducingitbythetextureofitsparts，reflectingtheparticlesoflightafteracertainmanner，tobeinthevioletitself。Forthattextureintheobject，byaregularandconstantoperationproducingthesameideaofblueinus，itservesustodistinguish，byoureyes，thatfromanyotherthing；whetherthatdistinguishingmark，asitisreallyintheviolet，beonlyapeculiartextureofparts，orelsethatverycolour，theideawhereof(whichisinus)istheexactresemblance。Anditisequallyfromthatappearancetobedenominatedblue，whetheritbethatrealcolour，oronlyapeculiartextureinit，thatcausesinusthatidea:sincethename，blue，notesproperlynothingbutthatmarkofdistinctionthatisinaviolet，discernibleonlybyoureyes，whateveritconsistsin；thatbeingbeyondourcapacitiesdistinctlytoknow，andperhapswouldbeoflessusetous，ifwehadfacultiestodiscern。
15。Thoughoneman’sideaofblueshouldbedifferentfromanother’s。Neitherwoulditcarryanyimputationoffalsehoodtooursimpleideas，ifbythedifferentstructureofourorgansitweresoordered，thatthesameobjectshouldproduceinseveralmen’smindsdifferentideasatthesametime；v。g。iftheideathatavioletproducedinoneman’smindbyhiseyeswerethesamethatamarigoldproducedinanotherman’s，andviceversa。For，sincethiscouldneverbeknown，becauseoneman’smindcouldnotpassintoanotherman’sbody，toperceivewhatappearanceswereproducedbythoseorgans；
neithertheideashereby，northenames，wouldbeatallconfounded，oranyfalsehoodbeineither。Forallthingsthathadthetextureofaviolet，producingconstantlytheideathathecalledblue，andthosewhichhadthetextureofamarigold，producingconstantlytheideawhichheasconstantlycalledyellow，whateverthoseappearanceswereinhismind；hewouldbeableasregularlytodistinguishthingsforhisusebythoseappearances，andunderstandandsignifythosedistinctionsmarkedbythenameblueandyellow，asiftheappearancesorideasinhismindreceivedfromthosetwoflowerswereexactlythesamewiththeideasinothermen’sminds。I
amneverthelessveryapttothinkthatthesensibleideasproducedbyanyobjectindifferentmen’sminds，aremostcommonlyverynearandundiscerniblyalike。Forwhichopinion，Ithink，theremightbemanyreasonsoffered:butthatbeingbesidesmypresentbusiness，I
shallnottroublemyreaderwiththem；butonlymindhim，thatthecontrarysupposition，ifitcouldbeproved，isoflittleuse，eitherfortheimprovementofourknowledge，orconveniencyoflife，andsoweneednottroubleourselvestoexamineit。
16。Simpleideascannoneofthembefalseinrespectofrealexistence。Fromwhathasbeensaidconcerningoursimpleideas，I
thinkitevidentthatoursimpleideascannoneofthembefalseinrespectofthingsexistingwithoutus。Forthetruthoftheseappearancesorperceptionsinourmindsconsisting，ashasbeensaid，onlyintheirbeinganswerabletothepowersinexternalobjectstoproducebyoursensessuchappearancesinus，andeachofthembeinginthemindsuchasitis，suitabletothepowerthatproducedit，andwhichaloneitrepresents，itcannotuponthataccount，orasreferredtosuchapattern，befalse。Blueandyellow，bitterorsweet，canneverbefalseideas:theseperceptionsinthemindarejustsuchastheyarethere，answeringthepowersappointedbyGodtoproducethem；andsoaretrulywhattheyare，andareintendedtobe。Indeedthenamesmaybemisapplied，butthatinthisrespectmakesnofalsehoodintheideas；asifamanignorantintheEnglishtongueshouldcallpurplescarlet。
17。Modesnotfalsecannotbefalseinreferencetoessencesofthings。Secondly，neithercanourcomplexideasofmodes，inreferencetotheessenceofanythingreallyexisting，befalse；becausewhatevercomplexideasIhaveofanymode，ithathnoreferencetoanypatternexisting，andmadebynature；itisnotsupposedtocontaininitanyotherideasthanwhatithath；nortorepresentanythingbutsuchacomplicationofideasasitdoes。Thus，whenIhavetheideaofsuchanactionofamanwhoforbearstoaffordhimselfsuchmeat，drink，andclothing，andotherconveniencesoflife，ashisrichesandestatewillbesufficienttosupplyandhisstationrequires，Ihavenofalseidea；butsuchanoneasrepresentsanaction，eitherasI
findorimagineit，andsoiscapableofneithertruthnorfalsehood。ButwhenIgivethenamefrugalityorvirtuetothisaction，thenitmaybecalledafalseidea，iftherebyitbesupposedtoagreewiththatideatowhich，inproprietyofspeech，thenameoffrugalitydothbelong，ortobeconformabletothatlawwhichisthestandardofvirtueandvice。
18。Ideasofsubstancesmaybefalseinreferencetoexistingthings。Thirdly，ourcomplexideasofsubstances，beingallreferredtopatternsinthingsthemselves，maybefalse。Thattheyareallfalse，whenlookeduponastherepresentationsoftheunknownessencesofthings，issoevidentthatthereneedsnothingtobesaidofit。
Ishallthereforepassoverthatchimericalsupposition，andconsiderthemascollectionsofsimpleideasinthemind，takenfromcombinationsofsimpleideasexistingtogetherconstantlyinthings，ofwhichpatternstheyarethesupposedcopies；andinthisreferenceofthemtotheexistenceofthings，theyarefalseideas:-
(1)Whentheyputtogethersimpleideas，whichintherealexistenceofthingshavenounion；aswhentotheshapeandsizethatexisttogetherinahorse，isjoinedinthesamecomplexideathepowerofbarkinglikeadog:whichthreeideas，howeverputtogetherintooneinthemind，wereneverunitedinnature；andthis，therefore，maybecalledafalseideaofahorse。(2)Ideasofsubstancesare，inthisrespect，alsofalse，when，fromanycollectionofsimpleideasthatdoalwaysexisttogether，thereisseparated，byadirectnegation，anyothersimpleideawhichisconstantlyjoinedwiththem。Thus，iftoextension，solidity，fusibility，thepeculiarweightiness，andyellowcolourofgold，anyonejoininhisthoughtsthenegationofagreaterdegreeoffixednessthanisinleadorcopper，hemaybesaidtohaveafalsecomplexidea，aswellaswhenhejoinstothoseothersimpleonestheideaofperfectabsolutefixedness。Foreitherway，thecomplexideaofgoldbeingmadeupofsuchsimpleonesashavenounioninnature，maybetermedfalse。But，ifheleaveoutofthishiscomplexideathatoffixednessquite，withouteitheractuallyjoiningtoorseparatingitfromtherestinhismind，itis，Ithink，tobelookedonasaninadequateandimperfectidea，ratherthanafalseone；since，thoughitcontainsnotallthesimpleideasthatareunitedinnature，yetitputsnonetogetherbutwhatdoreallyexisttogether。
19。Truthorfalsehoodalwayssupposesaffirmationornegation。
Though，incompliancewiththeordinarywayofspeaking，Ihaveshowninwhatsenseanduponwhatgroundourideasmaybesometimescalledtrueorfalse；yetifwewilllookalittlenearerintothematter，inallcaseswhereanyideaiscalledtrueorfalse，itisfromsomejudgmentthatthemindmakes，orissupposedtomake，thatistrueorfalse。Fortruthorfalsehood，beingneverwithoutsomeaffirmationornegation，expressortacit，itisnottobefoundbutwheresignsarejoinedorseparated，accordingtotheagreementordisagreementofthethingstheystandfor。Thesignswechieflyuseareeitherideasorwords；wherewithwemakeeithermentalorverbalpropositions。Truthliesinsojoiningorseparatingtheserepresentatives，asthethingstheystandfordointhemselvesagreeordisagree；andfalsehoodinthecontrary，asshallbemorefullyshownhereafter。
20。Ideasinthemselvesneithertruenorfalse。Anyidea，then，whichwehaveinourminds，whetherconformableornottotheexistenceofthings，ortoanyideainthemindsofothermen，cannotproperlyforthisalonebecalledfalse。Fortheserepresentations，iftheyhavenothinginthembutwhatisreallyexistinginthingswithout，cannotbethoughtfalse，beingexactrepresentationsofsomething:noryetiftheyhaveanythinginthemdifferingfromtherealityofthings，cantheyproperlybesaidtobefalserepresentations，orideasofthingstheydonotrepresent。
Butthemistakeandfalsehoodis:
21。Butarefalse-whenjudgedagreeabletoanotherman’sidea，withoutbeingso。First，whenthemindhavinganyidea，itjudgesandconcludesitthesamethatisinothermen’sminds，signifiedbythesamename；orthatitisconformabletotheordinaryreceivedsignificationordefinitionofthatword，whenindeeditisnot:whichisthemostusualmistakeinmixedmodes，thoughotherideasalsoareliabletoit。
22。Whenjudgedtoagreetorealexistence，whentheydonot。(2)
Whenithavingacomplexideamadeupofsuchacollectionofsimpleonesasnatureneverputstogether，itjudgesittoagreetoaspeciesofcreaturesreallyexisting；aswhenitjoinstheweightoftintothecolour，fusibility，andfixednessofgold。
23。Whenjudgedadequate，withoutbeingso。(3)Wheninitscomplexideaithasunitedacertainnumberofsimpleideasthatdoreallyexisttogetherinsomesortofcreatures，buthasalsoleftoutothersasmuchinseparable，itjudgesthistobeaperfectcompleteideaofasortofthingswhichreallyitisnot；v。g。havingjoinedtheideasofsubstance，yellow，malleable，mostheavy，andfusible，ittakesthatcomplexideatobethecompleteideaofgold，whenyetitspeculiarfixedness，andsolubilityinaquaregia，areasinseparablefromthoseotherideas，orqualities，ofthatbodyastheyareonefromanother。
24。Whenjudgedtorepresenttherealessence。(4)Themistakeisyetgreater，whenIjudgethatthiscomplexideacontainsinittherealessenceofanybodyexisting；whenatleastitcontainsbutsomefewofthosepropertieswhichflowfromitsrealessenceandconstitution。Isayonlysomefewofthoseproperties；forthosepropertiesconsistingmostlyintheactiveandpassivepowersithasinreferencetootherthings，allthatarevulgarlyknownofanyonebody，ofwhichthecomplexideaofthatkindofthingsisusuallymade，arebutaveryfew，incomparisonofwhatamanthathasseveralwaystriedandexamineditknowsofthatonesortofthings；andallthatthemostexpertmanknowsarebutafew，incomparisonofwhatarereallyinthatbody，anddependonitsinternaloressentialconstitution。Theessenceofatriangleliesinaverylittlecompass，consistsinaveryfewideas:threelinesincludingaspacemakeupthatessence:butthepropertiesthatflowfromthisessencearemorethancanbeeasilyknownorenumerated。SoIimagineitisinsubstances；theirrealessenceslieinalittlecompass，thoughthepropertiesflowingfromthatinternalconstitutionareendless。
25。Ideas，whencalledfalse。Toconclude，amanhavingnonotionofanythingwithouthim，butbytheideahehasofitinhismind，(whichideahehasapowertocallbywhatnamehepleases)，hemayindeedmakeanideaneitheransweringthereasonofthings，noragreeingtotheideacommonlysignifiedbyotherpeople’swords；butcannotmakeawrongorfalseideaofathingwhichisnootherwiseknowntohimbutbytheideahehasofit:v。g。whenIframeanideaofthelegs，arms，andbodyofaman，andjointothisahorse’sheadandneck，I
donotmakeafalseideaofanything；becauseitrepresentsnothingwithoutme。ButwhenIcallitamanorTartar，andimagineittorepresentsomerealbeingwithoutme，ortobethesameideathatotherscallbythesamename；ineitherofthesecasesImayerr。
Anduponthisaccountitisthatitcomestobetermedafalseidea；
thoughindeedthefalsehoodliesnotintheidea，butinthattacitmentalproposition，whereinaconformityandresemblanceisattributedtoitwhichithasnot。Butyet，if，havingframedsuchanideainmymindwithoutthinkingeitherthatexistence，orthenamemanorTartar，belongstoit，IwillcallitmanorTartar，Imaybejustlythoughtfantasticalinthenaming；butnoterroneousinmyjudgment；
northeideaanywayfalse。
26。Moreproperlytobecalledrightorwrong。Uponthewhole，matter，Ithinkthatourideas，astheyareconsideredbythemind，-
eitherinreferencetothepropersignificationoftheirnames；orinreferencetotherealityofthings，-mayveryfitlybecalledrightorwrongideas，accordingastheyagreeordisagreetothosepatternstowhichtheyarereferred。Butifanyonehadrathercallthemtrueorfalse，itisfitheusealiberty，whicheveryonehas，tocallthingsbythosenameshethinksbest；though，inproprietyofspeech，truthorfalsehoodwill，Ithink，scarceagreetothem，butasthey，somewayorother，virtuallycontaininthemsomementalproposition。Theideasthatareinaman’smind，simplyconsidered，cannotbewrong；unlesscomplexones，whereininconsistentpartsarejumbledtogether。Allotherideasareinthemselvesright，andtheknowledgeaboutthemrightandtrueknowledge；butwhenwecometoreferthemtoanything，astotheirpatternsandarchetypes，thentheyarecapableofbeingwrong，asfarastheydisagreewithsucharchetypes。
ChapterXXXIII
OftheAssociationofIdeas1。Somethingunreasonableinmostmen。Thereisscarceanyonethatdoesnotobservesomethingthatseemsoddtohim，andisinitselfreallyextravagant，intheopinions，reasonings，andactionsofothermen。Theleastflawofthiskind，ifatalldifferentfromhisown，everyoneisquick-sightedenoughtoespyinanother，andwillbytheauthorityofreasonforwardlycondemn；thoughhebeguiltyofmuchgreaterunreasonablenessinhisowntenetsandconduct，whichheneverperceives，andwillveryhardly，ifatall，beconvincedof。
2。Notwhollyfromself-love。Thisproceedsnotwhollyfromself-love，thoughthathasoftenagreathandinit。Menoffairminds，andnotgivenuptotheoverweeningofself-flattery，arefrequentlyguiltyofit；andinmanycasesonewithamazementhearsthearguings，andisastonishedattheobstinacyofaworthyman，whoyieldsnottotheevidenceofreason，thoughlaidbeforehimasclearasdaylight。
3。Notfromeducation。Thissortofunreasonablenessisusuallyimputedtoeducationandprejudice，andforthemostparttrulyenough，thoughthatreachesnotthebottomofthedisease，norshowsdistinctlyenoughwhenceitrises，orwhereinitlies。Educationisoftenrightlyassignedforthecause，andprejudiceisagoodgeneralnameforthethingitself:butyet，Ithink，heoughttolookalittlefurther，whowouldtracethissortofmadnesstotherootitspringsfrom，andsoexplainit，astoshowwhencethisflawhasitsoriginalinverysoberandrationalminds，andwhereinitconsists。
4。Adegreeofmadnessfoundinmostmen。Ishallbepardonedforcallingitbysoharshanameasmadness，whenitisconsideredthatoppositiontoreasondeservesthatname，andisreallymadness；andthereisscarceamansofreefromit，butthatifheshouldalways，onalloccasions，argueordoasinsomecasesheconstantlydoes，wouldnotbethoughtfitterforBedlamthancivilconversation。Idonotheremeanwhenheisunderthepowerofanunrulypassion，butinthesteadycalmcourseofhislife。Thatwhichwillyetmoreapologizeforthisharshname，andungratefulimputationonthegreatestpartofmankind，is，that，inquiringalittlebythebyeintothenatureofmadness(Bk。ii。ch。xi。SS13)，Ifoundittospringfromtheverysameroot，andtodependontheverysamecauseweareherespeakingof。Thisconsiderationofthethingitself，atatimewhenIthoughtnottheleastonthesubjectwhichIamnowtreatingof，suggestedittome。Andifthisbeaweaknesstowhichallmenaresoliable，ifthisbeataintwhichsouniversallyinfectsmankind，thegreatercareshouldbetakentolayitopenunderitsduename，therebytoexcitethegreatercareinitspreventionandcure。
5。Fromawrongconnexionofideas。Someofourideashaveanaturalcorrespondenceandconnexiononewithanother:itistheofficeandexcellencyofourreasontotracethese，andholdthemtogetherinthatunionandcorrespondencewhichisfoundedintheirpeculiarbeings。Besidesthis，thereisanotherconnexionofideaswhollyowingtochanceorcustom。Ideasthatinthemselvesarenotallofkin，cometobesounitedinsomemen’sminds，thatitisveryhardtoseparatethem；theyalwayskeepincompany，andtheonenosooneratanytimecomesintotheunderstanding，butitsassociateappearswithit；andiftheyaremorethantwowhicharethusunited，thewholegang，alwaysinseparable，showthemselvestogether。
6。Thisconnexionmadebycustom。Thisstrongcombinationofideas，notalliedbynature，themindmakesinitselfeithervoluntarilyorbychance；andhenceitcomesindifferentmentobeverydifferent，accordingtotheirdifferentinclinations，education，interests，&c。Customsettleshabitsofthinkingintheunderstanding，aswellasofdetermininginthewill，andofmotionsinthebody:allwhichseemstobebuttrainsofmotionsintheanimalspirits，which，oncesetagoing，continueinthesamestepstheyhaveusedto；which，byoftentreading，arewornintoasmoothpath，andthemotioninitbecomeseasy，andasitwerenatural。Asfaraswecancomprehendthinking，thusideasseemtobeproducedinourminds；or，iftheyarenot，thismayservetoexplaintheirfollowingoneanotherinanhabitualtrain，whenoncetheyareputintotheirtrack，aswellasitdoestoexplainsuchmotionsofthebody。Amusicianusedtoanytunewillfindthat，letitbutoncebegininhishead，theideasoftheseveralnotesofitwillfollowoneanotherorderlyinhisunderstanding，withoutanycareorattention，asregularlyashisfingersmoveorderlyoverthekeysoftheorgantoplayoutthetunehehasbegun，thoughhisunattentivethoughtsbeelsewhereawandering。Whetherthenaturalcauseoftheseideas，aswellasofthatregulardancingofhisfingersbethemotionofhisanimalspirits，Iwillnotdetermine，howprobablesoever，bythisinstance，itappearstobeso:butthismayhelpusalittletoconceiveofintellectualhabits，andofthetyingtogetherofideas。
7。Someantipathiesaneffectofit。Thattherearesuchassociationsofthemmadebycustom，inthemindsofmostmen，Ithinknobodywillquestion，whohaswellconsideredhimselforothers；andtothis，perhaps，mightbejustlyattributedmostofthesympathiesandantipathiesobservableinmen，whichworkasstrongly，andproduceasregulareffectsasiftheywerenatural；andarethereforecalledso，thoughtheyatfirsthadnootheroriginalbuttheaccidentalconnexionoftwoideas，whicheitherthestrengthofthefirstimpression，orfutureindulgencesounited，thattheyalwaysafterwardskeptcompanytogetherinthatman’smind，asiftheywerebutoneidea。Isaymostoftheantipathies，Idonotsayall；forsomeofthemaretrulynatural，dependuponouroriginalconstitution，andarebornwithus；butagreatpartofthosewhicharecountednatural，wouldhavebeenknowntobefromunheeded，thoughperhapsearly，impressions，orwantonfanciesatfirst，whichwouldhavebeenacknowledgedtheoriginalofthem，iftheyhadbeenwarilyobserved。Agrownpersonsurfeitingwithhoneynosoonerhearsthenameofit，buthisfancyimmediatelycarriessicknessandqualmstohisstomach，andhecannotbeartheveryideaofit；otherideasofdislike，andsickness，andvomiting，presentlyaccompanyit，andheisdisturbed；butheknowsfromwhencetodatethisweakness，andcantellhowhegotthisindisposition。Hadthishappenedtohimbyanover-doseofhoneywhenachild，allthesameeffectswouldhavefollowed；butthecausewouldhavebeenmistaken，andtheantipathycountednatural。
8。Influenceofassociationtobewatchededucatingyoungchildren。Imentionthis，notoutofanygreatnecessitythereisinthispresentargumenttodistinguishnicelybetweennaturalandacquiredantipathies；butItakenoticeofitforanotherpurpose，viz。thatthosewhohavechildren，orthechargeoftheireducation，wouldthinkitworththeirwhilediligentlytowatch，andcarefullytopreventtheundueconnexionofideasinthemindsofyoungpeople。
Thisisthetimemostsusceptibleoflastingimpressions；andthoughthoserelatingtothehealthofthebodyarebydiscreetpeoplemindedandfencedagainst，yetIamapttodoubt，thatthosewhichrelatemorepeculiarlytothemind，andterminateintheunderstandingorpassions，havebeenmuchlessheededthanthethingdeserves:nay，thoserelatingpurelytotheunderstanding，have，asIsuspect，beenbymostmenwhollyoverlooked。
9。Wrongconnexionofideasagreatcauseoferrors。Thiswrongconnexioninourmindsofideasinthemselveslooseandindependentofoneanother，hassuchaninfluence，andisofsogreatforcetosetusawryinouractions，aswellmoralasnatural，passions，reasonings，andnotionsthemselves，thatperhapsthereisnotanyonethingthatdeservesmoretobelookedafter。
10。Aninstance。Theideasofgoblinsandspriteshavereallynomoretodowithdarknessthanlight:yetletbutafoolishmaidinculcatetheseoftenonthemindofachild，andraisethemtheretogether，possiblyheshallneverbeabletoseparatethemagainsolongashelives，butdarknessshalleverafterwardsbringwithitthosefrightfulideas，andtheyshallbesojoined，thathecannomorebeartheonethantheother。
11。Anotherinstance。Amanreceivesasensibleinjuryfromanother，thinksonthemanandthatactionoverandover，andbyruminatingonthemstrongly，ormuch，inhismind，socementsthosetwoideastogether，thathemakesthemalmostone；neverthinksontheman，butthepainanddispleasurehesufferedcomesintohismindwithit，sothathescarcedistinguishesthem，buthasasmuchanaversionfortheoneastheother。Thushatredsareoftenbegottenfromslightandinnocentoccasions，andquarrelspropagatedandcontinuedintheworld。
12。Athirdinstance。Amanhassufferedpainorsicknessinanyplace；hesawhisfrienddieinsucharoom:thoughthesehaveinnaturenothingtodoonewithanother，yetwhentheideaoftheplaceoccurstohismind，itbrings(theimpressionbeingoncemade)
thatofthepainanddispleasurewithit:heconfoundstheminhismind，andcanaslittlebeartheoneastheother。
13。Whytimecuressomedisordersinthemind，whichreasoncannotcure。Whenthiscombinationissettled，andwhileitlasts，itisnotinthepowerofreasontohelpus，andrelieveusfromtheeffectsofit。Ideasinourminds，whentheyarethere，willoperateaccordingtotheirnaturesandcircumstances。Andhereweseethecausewhytimecurescertainaffections，whichreason，thoughintheright，andallowedtobeso，hasnotpowerover，norisableagainstthemtoprevailwiththosewhoareapttohearkentoitinothercases。Thedeathofachildthatwasthedailydelightofitsmother’seyes，andjoyofhersoul，rendsfromherheartthewholecomfortofherlife，andgivesherallthetormentimaginable:usetheconsolationsofreasoninthiscase，andyouwereasgoodpreacheasetooneontherack，andhopetoallay，byrationaldiscourses，thepainofhisjointstearingasunder。Tilltimehasbydisuseseparatedthesenseofthatenjoymentanditsloss，fromtheideaofthechildreturningtohermemory，allrepresentations，thougheversoreasonable，areinvain；andthereforesomeinwhomtheunionbetweentheseideasisneverdissolved，spendtheirlivesinmourning，andcarryanincurablesorrowtotheirgraves。
14。Anotherinstanceoftheeffectoftheassociationofideas。A
friendofmineknewoneperfectlycuredofmadnessbyaveryharshandoffensiveoperation。Thegentlemanwhowasthusrecovered，withgreatsenseofgratitudeandacknowledgmentownedthecureallhislifeafter，asthegreatestobligationhecouldhavereceived；but，whatevergratitudeandreasonsuggestedtohim，hecouldneverbearthesightoftheoperator:thatimagebroughtbackwithittheideaofthatagonywhichhesufferedfromhishands，whichwastoomightyandintolerableforhimtoendure。
15。Moreinstances。Manychildren，imputingthepaintheyenduredatschooltotheirbookstheywerecorrectedfor，sojointhoseideastogether，thatabookbecomestheiraversion，andtheyareneverreconciledtothestudyanduseofthemalltheirlivesafter；andthusreadingbecomesatormenttothem，whichotherwisepossiblytheymighthavemadethegreatpleasureoftheirlives。Thereareroomsconvenientenough，thatsomemencannotstudyin，andfashionsofvessels，which，thougheversocleanandcommodious，theycannotdrinkoutof，andthatbyreasonofsomeaccidentalideaswhichareannexedtothem，andmakethemoffensive；andwhoistherethathathnotobservedsomemantoflagattheappearance，orinthecompanyofsomecertainpersonnototherwisesuperiortohim，butbecause，havingonceonsomeoccasiongottheascendant，theideaofauthorityanddistancegoesalongwiththatoftheperson，andhethathasbeenthussubjected，isnotabletoseparatethem。
16。Acuriousinstance。Instancesofthiskindaresoplentifuleverywhere，thatifIaddonemore，itisonlyforthepleasantoddnessofit。Itisofayounggentleman，who，havinglearnttodance，andthattogreatperfection，therehappenedtostandanoldtrunkintheroomwherehelearnt。Theideaofthisremarkablepieceofhouseholdstuffhadsomixeditselfwiththeturnsandstepsofallhisdances，thatthoughinthatchamberhecoulddanceexcellentlywell，yetitwasonlywhilstthattrunkwasthere；norcouldheperformwellinanyotherplace，unlessthatorsomesuchothertrunkhaditsduepositionintheroom。Ifthisstoryshallbesuspectedtobedressedupwithsomecomicalcircumstances，alittlebeyondprecisenature，IanswerformyselfthatIhaditsomeyearssincefromaverysoberandworthyman，uponhisownknowledge，asI
reportit；andIdaresaythereareveryfewinquisitivepersonswhoreadthis，whohavenotmetwithaccounts，ifnotexamples，ofthisnature，thatmayparallel，oratleastjustifythis。
17。Influenceofassociationonintellectualhabits。Intellectualhabitsanddefectsthiswaycontracted，arenotlessfrequentandpowerful，thoughlessobserved。Lettheideasofbeingandmatterbestronglyjoined，eitherbyeducationormuchthought；whilstthesearestillcombinedinthemind，whatnotions，whatreasonings，willtherebeaboutseparatespirits？LetcustomfromtheverychildhoodhavejoinedfigureandshapetotheideaofGod，andwhatabsurditieswillthatmindbeliabletoabouttheDeity？Lettheideaofinfallibilitybeinseparablyjoinedtoanyperson，andthesetwoconstantlytogetherpossessthemind；andthenonebodyintwoplacesatonce，shallunexaminedbeswallowedforacertaintruth，byanimplicitfaith，wheneverthatimaginedinfalliblepersondictatesanddemandsassentwithoutinquiry。
18。Observableintheoppositionbetweendifferentsectsofphilosophyandofreligion。Somesuchwrongandunnaturalcombinationsofideaswillbefoundtoestablishtheirreconcilableoppositionbetweendifferentsectsofphilosophyandreligion；forwecannotimagineeveryoneoftheirfollowerstoimposewilfullyonhimself，andknowinglyrefusetruthofferedbyplainreason。Interest，thoughitdoesagreatdealinthecase，yetcannotbethoughttoworkwholesocietiesofmentosouniversalaperverseness，asthateveryoneofthemtoamanshouldknowinglymaintainfalsehood:someatleastmustbeallowedtodowhatallpretendto，i。e。topursuetruthsincerely；andthereforetheremustbesomethingthatblindstheirunderstandings，andmakesthemnotseethefalsehoodofwhattheyembraceforrealtruth。Thatwhichthuscaptivatestheirreasons，andleadsmenofsincerityblindfoldfromcommonsense，will，whenexamined，befoundtobewhatwearespeakingof:someindependentideas，ofnoalliancetooneanother，are，byeducation，custom，andtheconstantdinoftheirparty，socoupledintheirminds，thattheyalwaysappeartheretogether；andtheycannomoreseparatethemintheirthoughtsthaniftheywerebutoneidea，andtheyoperateasiftheywereso。Thisgivessensetojargon，demonstrationtoabsurdities，andconsistencytononsense，andisthefoundationofthegreatest，Ihadalmostsaidofalltheerrorsintheworld；or，ifitdoesnotreachsofar，itisatleastthemostdangerousone，since，sofarasitobtains，ithindersmenfromseeingandexamining。Whentwothings，inthemselvesdisjoined，appeartothesightconstantlyunited；iftheeyeseesthesethingsrivetedwhichareloose，wherewillyoubegintorectifythemistakesthatfollowintwoideasthattheyhavebeenaccustomedsotojoinintheirmindsastosubstituteonefortheother，and，asIamapttothink，oftenwithoutperceivingitthemselves？This，whilsttheyareunderthedeceitofit，makesthemincapableofconviction，andtheyapplaudthemselvesaszealouschampionsfortruth，whenindeedtheyarecontendingforerror；andtheconfusionoftwodifferentideas，whichacustomaryconnexionofthemintheirmindshathtothemmadeineffectbutone，fillstheirheadswithfalseviews，andtheirreasoningswithfalseconsequences。
19。Conclusion。Havingthusgivenanaccountoftheoriginal，sorts，andextentofourIDEAS，withseveralotherconsiderationsaboutthese(IknownotwhetherImaysay)instruments，ormaterialsofourknowledge，themethodIatfirstproposedtomyselfwouldnowrequirethatIshouldimmediatelyproceedtoshow，whatusetheunderstandingmakesofthem，andwhatKNOWLEDGEwehavebythem。
Thiswasthatwhich，inthefirstgeneralviewIhadofthissubject，wasallthatIthoughtIshouldhavetodo:but，uponanearerapproach，IfindthatthereissocloseaconnexionbetweenideasandWORDS，andourabstractideasandgeneralwordshavesoconstantarelationonetoanother，thatitisimpossibletospeakclearlyanddistinctlyofourknowledge，whichallconsistsinpropositions，withoutconsidering，first，thenature，use，andsignificationofLanguage；which，therefore，mustbethebusinessofthenextBook。
BOOKIII
OfWordsChapterI
OfWordsorLanguageinGeneral1。Manfittedtoformarticulatesounds。God，havingdesignedmanforasociablecreature，madehimnotonlywithaninclination，andunderanecessitytohavefellowshipwiththoseofhisownkind，butfurnishedhimalsowithlanguage，whichwastobethegreatinstrumentandcommontieofsociety。Man，therefore，hadbynaturehisorganssofashioned，astobefittoframearticulatesounds，whichwecallwords。Butthiswasnotenoughtoproducelanguage；forparrots，andseveralotherbirds，willbetaughttomakearticulatesoundsdistinctenough，whichyetbynomeansarecapableoflanguage。
2。Tousethesesoundsassignsofideas。Besidesarticulatesounds，therefore，itwasfurthernecessarythatheshouldbeabletousethesesoundsassignsofinternalconceptions；andtomakethemstandasmarksfortheideaswithinhisownmind，wherebytheymightbemadeknowntoothers，andthethoughtsofmen’smindsbeconveyedfromonetoanother。
3。Tomakethemgeneralsigns。Butneitherwasthissufficienttomakewordssousefulastheyoughttobe。Itisnotenoughfortheperfectionoflanguage，thatsoundscanbemadesignsofideas，unlessthosesignscanbesomadeuseofastocomprehendseveralparticularthings:forthemultiplicationofwordswouldhaveperplexedtheiruse，hadeveryparticularthingneedofadistinctnametobesignifiedby。Toremedythisinconvenience，languagehadyetafurtherimprovementintheuseofgeneralterms，wherebyonewordwasmadetomarkamultitudeofparticularexistences:whichadvantageoususeofsoundswasobtainedonlybythedifferenceoftheideastheyweremadesignsof:thosenamesbecominggeneral，whicharemadetostandforgeneralideas，andthoseremainingparticular，wheretheideastheyareusedforareparticular。
4。Tomakethemsignifytheabsenceofpositiveideas。Besidesthesenameswhichstandforideas，therebeotherwordswhichmenmakeuseof，nottosignifyanyidea，butthewantorabsenceofsomeideas，simpleorcomplex，orallideastogether；suchasarenihilinLatin，andinEnglish，ignoranceandbarrenness。Allwhichnegativeorprivativewordscannotbesaidproperlytobelongto，orsignifynoideas:forthentheywouldbeperfectlyinsignificantsounds；buttheyrelatetopositiveideas，andsignifytheirabsence。
5。Wordsultimatelyderivedfromsuchassignifysensibleideas。
Itmayalsoleadusalittletowardstheoriginalofallournotionsandknowledge，ifweremarkhowgreatadependenceourwordshaveoncommonsensibleideas；andhowthosewhicharemadeuseoftostandforactionsandnotionsquiteremovedfromsense，havetheirrisefromthence，andfromobvioussensibleideasaretransferredtomoreabstrusesignifications，andmadetostandforideasthatcomenotunderthecognizanceofoursenses；v。g。toimagine，apprehend，comprehend，adhere，conceive，instil，disgust，disturbance，tranquillity，&c。，areallwordstakenfromtheoperationsofsensiblethings，andappliedtocertainmodesofthinking。Spirit，initsprimarysignification，isbreath；angel，amessenger:andIdoubtnotbut，ifwecouldtracethemtotheirsources，weshouldfind，inalllanguages，thenameswhichstandforthingsthatfallnotunderoursensestohavehadtheirfirstrisefromsensibleideas。Bywhichwemaygivesomekindofguesswhatkindofnotionstheywere，andwhencederived，whichfilledtheirmindswhowerethefirstbeginnersoflanguages，andhownature，eveninthenamingofthings，unawaressuggestedtomentheoriginalsandprinciplesofalltheirknowledge:whilst，togivenamesthatmightmakeknowntoothersanyoperationstheyfeltinthemselves，oranyotherideasthatcamenotundertheirsenses，theywerefaintoborrowwordsfromordinaryknownideasofsensation，bythatmeanstomakeothersthemoreeasilytoconceivethoseoperationstheyexperimentedinthemselves，whichmadenooutwardsensibleappearances；andthen，whentheyhadgotknownandagreednamestosignifythoseinternaloperationsoftheirownminds，theyweresufficientlyfurnishedtomakeknownbywordsalltheirotherideas；sincetheycouldconsistofnothingbuteitherofoutwardsensibleperceptions，oroftheinwardoperationsoftheirmindsaboutthem；wehaving，ashasbeenproved，noideasatall，butwhatoriginallycomeeitherfromsensibleobjectswithout，orwhatwefeelwithinourselves，fromtheinwardworkingsofourownspirits，ofwhichweareconscioustoourselveswithin。
6。Distributionofsubjectstobetreatedof。ButtounderstandbettertheuseandforceofLanguage，assubservienttoinstructionandknowledge，itwillbeconvenienttoconsider:
First，Towhatitisthatnames，intheuseoflanguage，areimmediatelyapplied。
Secondly，Sinceall(exceptproper)namesaregeneral，andsostandnotparticularlyforthisorthatsinglething，butforsortsandranksofthings，itwillbenecessarytoconsider，inthenextplace，whatthesortsandkinds，or，ifyouratherliketheLatinnames，whattheSpeciesandGeneraofthingsare，whereintheyconsist，andhowtheycometobemade。Thesebeing(astheyought)
welllookedinto，weshallthebettercometofindtherightuseofwords；thenaturaladvantagesanddefectsoflanguage；andtheremediesthatoughttobeused，toavoidtheinconveniencesofobscurityoruncertaintyinthesignificationofwords:withoutwhichitisimpossibletodiscoursewithanyclearnessororderconcerningknowledge:which，beingconversantaboutpropositions，andthosemostcommonlyuniversalones，hasgreaterconnexionwithwordsthanperhapsissuspected。
Theseconsiderations，therefore，shallbethematterofthefollowingchapters。
ChapterII
OftheSignificationofWords1。Wordsaresensiblesigns，necessaryforcommunicationofideas。
Man，thoughhehavegreatvarietyofthoughts，andsuchfromwhichothersaswellashimselfmightreceiveprofitanddelight；yettheyareallwithinhisownbreast，invisibleandhiddenfromothers，norcanofthemselvesbemadetoappear。Thecomfortandadvantageofsocietynotbeingtobehadwithoutcommunicationofthoughts，itwasnecessarythatmanshouldfindoutsomeexternalsensiblesigns，whereofthoseinvisibleideas，whichhisthoughtsaremadeupof，mightbemadeknowntoothers。Forthispurposenothingwassofit，eitherforplentyorquickness，asthosearticulatesounds，whichwithsomucheaseandvarietyhefoundhimselfabletomake。Thuswemayconceivehowwords，whichwerebynaturesowelladaptedtothatpurpose，cametobemadeuseofbymenasthesignsoftheirideas；
notbyanynaturalconnexionthatthereisbetweenparticulararticulatesoundsandcertainideas，forthentherewouldbebutonelanguageamongstallmen；butbyavoluntaryimposition，wherebysuchawordismadearbitrarilythemarkofsuchanidea。Theuse，then，ofwords，istobesensiblemarksofideas；andtheideastheystandforaretheirproperandimmediatesignification。
2。Words，intheirimmediatesignification，arethesensiblesignsofhisideaswhousesthem。Theusemenhaveofthesemarksbeingeithertorecordtheirownthoughts，fortheassistanceoftheirownmemoryor，asitwere，tobringouttheirideas，andlaythembeforetheviewofothers:words，intheirprimaryorimmediatesignification，standfornothingbuttheideasinthemindofhimthatusesthem，howimperfectlysoeverorcarelesslythoseideasarecollectedfromthethingswhichtheyaresupposedtorepresent。Whenamanspeakstoanother，itisthathemaybeunderstood:andtheendofspeechis，thatthosesounds，asmarks，maymakeknownhisideastothehearer。Thatthenwhichwordsarethemarksofaretheideasofthespeaker:norcananyoneapplythemasmarks，immediately，toanythingelsebuttheideasthathehimselfhath:forthiswouldbetomakethemsignsofhisownconceptions，andyetapplythemtootherideas；whichwouldbetomakethemsignsandnotsignsofhisideasatthesametime，andsoineffecttohavenosignificationatall。Wordsbeingvoluntarysigns，theycannotbevoluntarysignsimposedbyhimonthingsheknowsnot。Thatwouldbetomakethemsignsofnothing，soundswithoutsignification。Amancannotmakehiswordsthesignseitherofqualitiesinthings，orofconceptionsinthemindofanother，whereofhehasnoneinhisown。Tillhehassomeideasofhisown，hecannotsupposethemtocorrespondwiththeconceptionsofanotherman；norcanheuseanysignsforthemofanotherman；norcanheuseanysignsforthem:forthustheywouldbethesignsofheknowsnotwhat，whichisintruthtobethesignsofnothing。Butwhenherepresentstohimselfothermen’sideasbysomeofhisown，ifheconsenttogivethemthesamenamesthatothermendo，itisstilltohisownideas；toideasthathehas，andnottoideasthathehasnot。
3。Examplesofthis。Thisissonecessaryintheuseoflanguage，thatinthisrespecttheknowingandtheignorant，thelearnedandtheunlearned，usethewordstheyspeak(withanymeaning)allalike。
They，ineveryman’smouth，standfortheideashehas，andwhichhewouldexpressbythem。Achildhavingtakennoticeofnothinginthemetalhehearscalledgold，butthebrightshiningyellowcolour，heappliesthewordgoldonlytohisownideaofthatcolour，andnothingelse；andthereforecallsthesamecolourinapeacock’stailgold。
Anotherthathathbetterobserved，addstoshiningyellowgreatweight:andthenthesoundgold，whenheusesit，standsforacomplexideaofashiningyellowandaveryweightysubstance。Anotheraddstothosequalitiesfusibility:andthenthewordgoldsignifiestohimabody，bright，yellow，fusible，andveryheavy。Anotheraddsmalleability。Eachoftheseusesequallythewordgold，whentheyhaveoccasiontoexpresstheideawhichtheyhaveapplieditto:butitisevidentthateachcanapplyitonlytohisownidea；norcanhemakeitstandasasignofsuchacomplexideaashehasnot。
4。Wordsareoftensecretlyreferredfirsttotheideassupposedtobeinothermen’sminds。Butthoughwords，astheyareusedbymen，canproperlyandimmediatelysignifynothingbuttheideasthatareinthemindofthespeaker；yettheyintheirthoughtsgivethemasecretreferencetotwootherthings。
First，Theysupposetheirwordstobemarksoftheideasinthemindsalsoofothermen，withwhomtheycommunicate:forelsetheyshouldtalkinvain，andcouldnotbeunderstood，ifthesoundstheyappliedtooneideaweresuchasbythehearerwereappliedtoanother，whichistospeaktwolanguages。Butinthismenstandnotusuallytoexamine，whethertheideathey，andthosetheydiscoursewithhaveintheirmindsbethesame:butthinkitenoughthattheyusetheword，astheyimagine，inthecommonacceptationofthatlanguage；inwhichtheysupposethattheideatheymakeitasignofispreciselythesametowhichtheunderstandingmenofthatcountryapplythatname。
5。Totherealityofthings。Secondly，Becausemenwouldnotbethoughttotalkbarelyoftheirownimagination，butofthingsasreallytheyare；thereforetheyoftensupposethewordstostandalsofortherealityofthings。Butthisrelatingmoreparticularlytosubstancesandtheirnames，asperhapstheformerdoestosimpleideasandmodes，weshallspeakofthesetwodifferentwaysofapplyingwordsmoreatlarge，whenwecometotreatofthenamesofmixedmodesandsubstancesinparticular:thoughgivemeleaveheretosay，thatitisapervertingtheuseofwords，andbringsunavoidableobscurityandconfusionintowheneverwemakethemstandforanythingbutthoseideaswehaveinourownminds。
6。Wordsbyusereadilyexciteideasoftheirobjects。Concerningwords，also，itisfurthertobeconsidered:
First，thattheybeingimmediatelythesignsofmen’sideas，andbythatmeanstheinstrumentswherebymencommunicatetheirconceptions，andexpresstooneanotherthosethoughtsandimaginationstheyhavewithintheirowntheirownbreasts；therecomes，byconstantuse，tobesuchaconnexionbetweencertainsoundsandtheideastheystandfor，thatthenamesheard，almostasreadilyexcitecertainideasasiftheobjectsthemselves，whichareapttoproducethem，didactuallyaffectthesenses。Whichismanifestlysoinallobvioussensiblequalities，andinallsubstancesthatfrequentlyandfamiliarlyoccurtous。
7。Wordsareoftenusedwithoutsignification，andwhy。Secondly，Thatthoughtheproperandimmediatesignificationofwordsareideasinthemindofthespeaker，yet，becausebyfamiliarusefromourcradles，wecometolearncertainarticulatesoundsveryperfectly，andhavethemreadilyonourtongues，andalwaysathandinourmemories，butyetarenotalwayscarefultoexamineorsettletheirsignificationsperfectly；itoftenhappensthatmen，evenwhentheywouldapplythemselvestoanattentiveconsideration，dosettheirthoughtsmoreonwordsthanthings。Nay，becausewordsaremanyofthemlearnedbeforetheideasareknownforwhichtheystand:thereforesome，notonlychildrenbutmen，speakseveralwordsnootherwisethanparrotsdo，onlybecausetheyhavelearnedthem，andhavebeenaccustomedtothosesounds。Butsofaraswordsareofuseandsignification，sofaristhereaconstantconnexionbetweenthesoundandtheidea，andadesignationthattheonestandsfortheother；withoutwhichapplicationofthem，theyarenothingbutsomuchinsignificantnoise。
8。Theirsignificationperfectlyarbitrary，nottheconsequenceofanaturalconnexion。Words，bylongandfamiliaruse，ashasbeensaid，cometoexciteinmencertainideassoconstantlyandreadily，thattheyareapttosupposeanaturalconnexionbetweenthem。Butthattheysignifyonlymen’speculiarideas，andthatbyaperfectarbitraryimposition，isevident，inthattheyoftenfailtoexciteinothers(eventhatusethesamelanguage)thesameideaswetakethemtobesignsof:andeverymanhassoinviolablealibertytomakewordsstandforwhatideashepleases，thatnoonehaththepowertomakeothershavethesameideasintheirmindsthathehas，whentheyusethesamewordsthathedoes。AndthereforethegreatAugustushimself，inthepossessionofthatpowerwhichruledtheworld，acknowledgedhecouldnotmakeanewLatinword:whichwasasmuchastosay，thathecouldnotarbitrarilyappointwhatideaanysoundshouldbeasignof，inthemouthsandcommonlanguageofhissubjects。Itistrue，commonuse，byatacitconsent，appropriatescertainsoundstocertainideasinalllanguages，whichsofarlimitsthesignificationofthatsound，thatunlessamanappliesittothesameidea，hedoesnotspeakproperly:andletmeadd，thatunlessaman’swordsexcitethesameideasinthehearerwhichhemakesthemstandforinspeaking，hedoesnotspeakintelligibly。
Butwhateverbetheconsequenceofanyman’susingofwordsdifferently，eitherfromtheirgeneralmeaning，ortheparticularsenseofthepersontowhomheaddressesthem；thisiscertain，theirsignification，inhisuseofthem，islimitedtohisideas，andtheycanbesignsofnothingelse。
ChapterIII
OfGeneralTerms1。Thegreatestpartofwordsaregeneralterms。Allthingsthatexistbeingparticulars，itmayperhapsbethoughtreasonablethatwords，whichoughttobeconformedtothings，shouldbesotoo，-I
meanintheirsignification:butyetwefindquitethecontrary。Thefargreatestpartofwordsthatmakealllanguagesaregeneralterms:whichhasnotbeentheeffectofneglectorchance，butofreasonandnecessity。
2。Thateveryparticularthingshouldhaveanameforitselfisimpossible。First，Itisimpossiblethateveryparticularthingshouldhaveadistinctpeculiarname。For，thesignificationanduseofwordsdependingonthatconnexionwhichthemindmakesbetweenitsideasandthesoundsitusesassignsofthem，itisnecessary，intheapplicationofnamestothings，thatthemindshouldhavedistinctideasofthethings，andretainalsotheparticularnamethatbelongstoeveryone，withitspeculiarappropriationtothatidea。
Butitisbeyondthepowerofhumancapacitytoframeandretaindistinctideasofalltheparticularthingswemeetwith:everybirdandbeastmensaw；everytreeandplantthataffectedthesenses，couldnotfindaplaceinthemostcapaciousunderstanding。Ifitbelookedonasaninstanceofaprodigiousmemory，thatsomegeneralshavebeenabletocalleverysoldierintheirarmybyhispropername，wemayeasilyfindareasonwhymenhaveneverattemptedtogivenamestoeachsheepintheirflock，orcrowthatfliesovertheirheads；
muchlesstocalleveryleafofplants，orgrainofsandthatcameintheirway，byapeculiarname。
3。Andwouldbeuseless，ifitwerepossible。Secondly，Ifitwerepossible，itwouldyetbeuseless；becauseitwouldnotservetothechiefendoflanguage。Menwouldinvainheapupnamesofparticularthings，thatwouldnotservethemtocommunicatetheirthoughts。Menlearnnames，andusethemintalkwithothers，onlythattheymaybeunderstood:whichisthenonlydonewhen，byuseorconsent，thesoundImakebytheorgansofspeech，excitesinanotherman’smindwhohearsit，theideaIapplyittoinmine，whenIspeakit。Thiscannotbedonebynamesappliedtoparticularthings；whereofIalonehavingtheideasinmymind，thenamesofthemcouldnotbesignificantorintelligibletoanother，whowasnotacquaintedwithallthoseveryparticularthingswhichhadfallenundermynotice。
4。Adistinctnameforeveryparticularthing，notfittedforenlargementofknowledge。Thirdly，Butyet，grantingthisalsofeasible，(whichIthinkisnot)，yetadistinctnameforeveryparticularthingwouldnotbeofanygreatusefortheimprovementofknowledge:which，thoughfoundedinparticularthings，enlargesitselfbygeneralviews；towhichthingsreducedintosorts，undergeneralnames，areproperlysubservient。These，withthenamesbelongingtothem，comewithinsomecompass，anddonotmultiplyeverymoment，beyondwhateitherthemindcancontain，oruserequires。
Andtherefore，inthese，menhaveforthemostpartstopped:butyetnotsoastohinderthemselvesfromdistinguishingparticularthingsbyappropriatednames，whereconveniencedemandsit。Andthereforeintheirownspecies，whichtheyhavemosttodowith，andwhereintheyhaveoftenoccasiontomentionparticularpersons，theymakeuseofpropernames；andtheredistinctindividualshavedistinctdenominations。
5。Whatthingshavepropernames，andwhy。Besidespersons，countriesalso，cities，rivers，mountains，andotherthelikedistinctionsofplacehaveusuallyfoundpeculiarnames，andthatforthesamereason；theybeingsuchasmenhaveoftenanoccasiontomarkparticularly，and，asitwere，setbeforeothersintheirdiscourseswiththem。AndIdoubtnotbut，ifwehadreasontomentionparticularhorsesasoftenaswehavetomentionparticularmen，weshouldhavepropernamesfortheone，asfamiliarasfortheother，andBucephaluswouldbeawordasmuchinuseasAlexander。Andthereforeweseethat，amongstjockeys，horseshavetheirpropernamestobeknownanddistinguishedby，ascommonlyastheirservants:
because，amongstthem，thereisoftenoccasiontomentionthisorthatparticularhorsewhenheisoutofsight。
6。Howgeneralwordsaremade。Thenextthingtobeconsideredis，-Howgeneralwordscometobemade。For，sinceallthingsthatexistareonlyparticulars，howcomewebygeneralterms；orwherefindwethosegeneralnaturestheyaresupposedtostandfor？Wordsbecomegeneralbybeingmadethesignsofgeneralideas:andideasbecomegeneral，byseparatingfromthemthecircumstancesoftimeandplace，andanyotherideasthatmaydeterminethemtothisorthatparticularexistence。Bythiswayofabstractiontheyaremadecapableofrepresentingmoreindividualsthanone；eachofwhichhavinginitaconformitytothatabstractidea，is(aswecallit)ofthatsort。
7。Shownbythewayweenlargeourcomplexideasfrominfancy。
But，todeducethisalittlemoredistinctly，itwillnotperhapsbeamisstotraceournotionsandnamesfromtheirbeginning，andobservebywhatdegreesweproceed，andbywhatstepsweenlargeourideasfromourfirstinfancy。Thereisnothingmoreevident，thanthattheideasofthepersonschildrenconversewith(toinstanceinthemalone)are，likethepersonsthemselves，onlyparticular。Theideasofthenurseandthemotherarewellframedintheirminds；and，likepicturesofthemthere，representonlythoseindividuals。Thenamestheyfirstgavetothemareconfinedtotheseindividuals；andthenamesofnurseandmamma，thechilduses，determinethemselvestothosepersons。Afterwards，whentimeandalargeracquaintancehavemadethemobservethatthereareagreatmanyotherthingsintheworld，thatinsomecommonagreementsofshape，andseveralotherqualities，resembletheirfatherandmother，andthosepersonstheyhavebeenusedto，theyframeanidea，whichtheyfindthosemanyparticularsdopartakein；andtothattheygive，withothers，thenameman，forexample。Andthustheycometohaveageneralname，andageneralidea。Whereintheymakenothingnew；butonlyleaveoutofthecomplexideatheyhadofPeterandJames，MaryandJane，thatwhichispeculiartoeach，andretainonlywhatiscommontothemall。
8。Andfurtherenlargeourcomplexideas，bystillleavingoutpropertiescontainedinthem。Bythesamewaythattheycomebythegeneralnameandideaofman，theyeasilyadvancetomoregeneralnamesandnotions。For，observingthatseveralthingsthatdifferfromtheirideaofman，andcannotthereforebecomprehendedunderthatname，haveyetcertainqualitieswhereintheyagreewithman，byretainingonlythosequalities，andunitingthemintooneidea，theyhaveagainanotherandmoregeneralidea；towhichhavinggivenanametheymakeatermofamorecomprehensiveextension:whichnewideaismade，notbyanynewaddition，butonlyasbefore，byleavingouttheshape，andsomeotherpropertiessignifiedbythenameman，andretainingonlyabody，withlife，sense，andspontaneousmotion，comprehendedunderthenameanimal。
9。Generalnaturesarenothingbutabstractandpartialideasofmorecomplexones。Thatthisisthewaywherebymenfirstformedgeneralideas，andgeneralnamestothem，Ithinkissoevident，thatthereneedsnootherproofofitbuttheconsideringofaman’sself，orothers，andtheordinaryproceedingsoftheirmindsinknowledge。Andhethatthinksgeneralnaturesornotionsareanythingelsebutsuchabstractandpartialideasofmorecomplexones，takenatfirstfromparticularexistences，will，Ifear，beatalosswheretofindthem。Forletanyoneeffect，andthentellme，whereindoeshisideaofmandifferfromthatofPeterandPaul，orhisideaofhorsefromthatofBucephalus，butintheleavingoutsomethingthatispeculiartoeachindividual，andretainingsomuchofthoseparticularcomplexideasofseveralparticularexistencesastheyarefoundtoagreein？Ofthecomplexideassignifiedbythenamesmanandhorse，leavingoutbutthoseparticularswhereintheydiffer，andretainingonlythosewhereintheyagree，andofthosemakinganewdistinctcomplexidea，andgivingthenameanimaltoit，onehasamoregeneralterm，thatcomprehendswithmanseveralothercreatures。Leaveoutoftheideaofanimal，senseandspontaneousmotion，andtheremainingcomplexidea，madeupoftheremainingsimpleonesofbody，life，andnourishment，becomesamoregeneralone，underthemorecomprehensiveterm，vivens。And，nottodwelllongeruponthisparticular，soevidentinitself；bythesamewaythemindproceedstobody，substance，andatlasttobeing，thing，andsuchuniversalterms，whichstandforanyofourideaswhatsoever。
Toconclude:thiswholemysteryofgeneraandspecies，whichmakesuchanoiseintheschools，andarewithjusticesolittleregardedoutofthem，isnothingelsebutabstractideas，moreorlesscomprehensive，withnamesannexedtothem。Inallwhichthisisconstantandunvariable，Thateverymoregeneraltermstandsforsuchanidea，andisbutapartofanyofthosecontainedunderit。
10。Whythegenusisordinarilymadeuseofindefinitions。Thismayshowusthereasonwhy，inthedefiningofwords，whichisnothingbutdeclaringtheirsignification，wemakeuseofthegenus，ornextgeneralwordthatcomprehendsit。Whichisnotoutofnecessity，butonlytosavethelabourofenumeratingtheseveralsimpleideaswhichthenextgeneralwordorgenusstandsfor；or，perhaps，sometimestheshameofnotbeingabletodoit。Butthoughdefiningbygenusanddifferentia(Icraveleavetousethesetermsofart，thoughoriginallyLatin，sincetheymostproperlysuitthosenotionstheyareappliedto)，Isay，thoughdefiningbythegenusbetheshortestway，yetIthinkitmaybedoubtedwhetheritbethebest。ThisIamsure，itisnottheonly，andsonotabsolutelynecessary。For，definitionbeingnothingbutmakinganotherunderstandbywordswhatideathetermdefinedstandsfor，adefinitionisbestmadebyenumeratingthosesimpleideasthatarecombinedinthesignificationofthetermdefined:andif，insteadofsuchanenumeration，menhaveaccustomedthemselvestousethenextgeneralterm，ithasnotbeenoutofnecessity，orforgreaterclearness，butforquicknessanddispatchsake。ForIthinkthat，toonewhodesiredtoknowwhatideathewordmanstoodfor；ifitshouldbesaid，thatmanwasasolidextendedsubstance，havinglife，sense，spontaneousmotion，andthefacultyofreasoning，Idoubtnotbutthemeaningofthetermmanwouldbeaswellunderstood，andtheideaitstandsforbeatleastasclearlymadeknown，aswhenitisdefinedtobearationalanimal:which，bytheseveraldefinitionsofanimal，vivens，andcorpus，resolvesitselfintothoseenumeratedideas。Ihave，inexplainingthetermman，followedheretheordinarydefinitionoftheschools；which，thoughperhapsnotthemostexact，yetserveswellenoughtomypresentpurpose。Andonemay，inthisinstance，seewhatgaveoccasiontotherule，thatadefinitionmustconsistofgenusanddifferentia；anditsufficestoshowusthelittlenecessitythereisofsucharule，oradvantageinthestrictobservingofit。For，definitions，ashasbeensaid，beingonlytheexplainingofonewordbyseveralothers，sothatthemeaningorideaitstandsformaybecertainlyknown；languagesarenotalwayssomadeaccordingtotherulesoflogic，thateverytermcanhaveitssignificationexactlyandclearlyexpressedbytwoothers。
Experiencesufficientlysatisfiesustothecontrary；orelsethosewhohavemadethisrulehavedoneill，thattheyhavegivenussofewdefinitionsconformabletoit。Butofdefinitionsmoreinthenextchapter。
11。Generalanduniversalarecreaturesoftheunderstanding，andbelongnottotherealexistenceofthings。Toreturntogeneralwords:itisplain，bywhathasbeensaid，thatgeneralanduniversalbelongnottotherealexistenceofthings；butaretheinventionsandcreaturesoftheunderstanding，madebyitforitsownuse，andconcernonlysigns，whetherwordsorideas。Wordsaregeneral，ashasbeensaid，whenusedforsignsofgeneralideas，andsoareapplicableindifferentlytomanyparticularthings；andideasaregeneralwhentheyaresetupastherepresentativesofmanyparticularthings:butuniversalitybelongsnottothingsthemselves，whichareallofthemparticularintheirexistence，eventhosewordsandideaswhichintheirsignificationaregeneral。
Whenthereforewequitparticulars，thegeneralsthatrestareonlycreaturesofourownmaking；theirgeneralnaturebeingnothingbutthecapacitytheyareputinto，bytheunderstanding，ofsignifyingorrepresentingmanyparticulars。Forthesignificationtheyhaveisnothingbutarelationthat，bythemindofman，isaddedtothem。
12。Abstractideasaretheessencesofgeneraandspecies。Thenextthingthereforetobeconsideredis，Whatkindofsignificationitisthatgeneralwordshave。For，asitisevidentthattheydonotsignifybarelyoneparticularthing；forthentheywouldnotbegeneralterms，butpropernames，so，ontheotherside，itisasevidenttheydonotsignifyaplurality；formanandmenwouldthensignifythesame；andthedistinctionofnumbers(asthegrammarianscallthem)wouldbesuperfluousanduseless。Thatthenwhichgeneralwordssignifyisasortofthings；andeachofthemdoesthat，bybeingasignofanabstractideainthemind；towhichidea，asthingsexistingarefoundtoagree，sotheycometoberankedunderthatname，or，whichisallone，beofthatsort。Wherebyitisevidentthattheessencesofthesorts，or，iftheLatinwordpleasesbetter，speciesofthings，arenothingelsebuttheseabstractideas。Forthehavingtheessenceofanyspecies，beingthatwhichmakesanythingtobeofthatspecies；andtheconformitytotheideatowhichthenameisannexedbeingthatwhichgivesarighttothatname；thehavingtheessence，andthehavingthatconformity，mustneedsbethesamething:sincetobeofanyspecies，andtohavearighttothenameofthatspecies，isallone。As，forexample，tobeaman，orofthespeciesman，andtohaverighttothenameman，isthesamething。Again，tobeaman，orofthespeciesman，andhavetheessenceofaman，isthesamething。Now，sincenothingcanbeaman，orhavearighttothenameman，butwhathasaconformitytotheabstractideathenamemanstandsfor，noranythingbeaman，orhavearighttothespeciesman，butwhathastheessenceofthatspecies；itfollows，thattheabstractideaforwhichthenamestands，andtheessenceofthespecies，isoneandthesame。Fromwhenceitiseasytoobserve，thattheessencesofthesortsofthings，and，consequently，thesortingofthings，istheworkmanshipoftheunderstandingthatabstractsandmakesthosegeneralideas。
13。Theyaretheworkmanshipoftheunderstanding，buthavetheirfoundationinthesimilitudeofthings。Iwouldnotherebethoughttoforget，muchlesstodeny，thatNature，intheproductionofthings，makesseveralofthemalike:thereisnothingmoreobvious，especiallyintheraceofanimals，andallthingspropagatedbyseed。ButyetI
thinkwemaysay，thesortingofthemundernamesistheworkmanshipoftheunderstanding，takingoccasion，fromthesimilitudeitobservesamongstthem，tomakeabstractgeneralideas，andsetthemupinthemind，withnamesannexedtothem，aspatternsorforms，(for，inthatsense，thewordformhasaverypropersignification，)towhichasparticularthingsexistingarefoundtoagree，sotheycometobeofthatspecies，havethatdenomination，orareputintothatclassis。
Forwhenwesaythisisaman，thatahorse；thisjustice，thatcruelty；thisawatch，thatajack；whatdoweelsebutrankthingsunderdifferentspecificnames，asagreeingtothoseabstractideas，ofwhichwehavemadethosenamesthesigns？Andwhataretheessencesofthosespeciessetoutandmarkedbynames，butthoseabstractideasinthemind；whichare，asitwere，thebondsbetweenparticularthingsthatexist，andthenamestheyaretoberankedunder？Andwhengeneralnameshaveanyconnexionwithparticularbeings，theseabstractideasarethemediumthatunitesthem:sothattheessencesofspecies，asdistinguishedanddenominatedbyus，neitherarenorcanbeanythingbutthosepreciseabstractideaswehaveinourminds。
Andthereforethesupposedrealessencesofsubstances，ifdifferentfromourabstractideas，cannotbetheessencesofthespecieswerankthingsinto。Fortwospeciesmaybeone，asrationallyastwodifferentessencesbetheessenceofonespecies:andIdemandwhatarethealterations[which]may，ormaynotbemadeinahorseorlead，withoutmakingeitherofthemtobeofanotherspecies？Indeterminingthespeciesofthingsbyourabstractideas，thisiseasytoresolve:butifanyonewillregulatehimselfhereinbysupposedrealessences，hewill，Isuppose，beataloss:andhewillneverbeabletoknowwhenanythingpreciselyceasestobeofthespeciesofahorseorlead。
14。Eachdistinctabstractideaisadistinctessence。NorwillanyonewonderthatIsaytheseessences，orabstractideas(whicharethemeasuresofname，andtheboundariesofspecies)aretheworkmanshipoftheunderstanding，whoconsidersthatatleastthecomplexonesareoften，inseveralmen，differentcollectionsofsimpleideas；andthereforethatiscovetousnesstooneman，whichisnotsotoanother。Nay，eveninsubstances，wheretheirabstractideasseemtobetakenfromthethingsthemselves，theyarenotconstantlythesame；no，notinthatspecieswhichismostfamiliartous，andwithwhichwehavethemostintimateacquaintance:ithavingbeenmorethanoncedoubted，whetherthefoetusbornofawomanwereaman，evensofarasthatithathbeendebated，whetheritwereorwerenottobenourishedandbaptized:whichcouldnotbe，iftheabstractideaoressencetowhichthenamemanbelongedwereofnature’smaking；andwerenottheuncertainandvariouscollectionofsimpleideas，whichtheunderstandingputtogether，andthen，abstractingit，affixedanametoit。Sothat，intruth，everydistinctabstractideaisadistinctessence；andthenamesthatstandforsuchdistinctideasarethenamesofthingsessentiallydifferent。
Thusacircleisasessentiallydifferentfromanovalasasheepfromagoat；andrainisasessentiallydifferentfromsnowaswaterfromearth:thatabstractideawhichistheessenceofonebeingimpossibletobecommunicatedtotheother。Andthusanytwoabstractideas，thatinanypartvaryonefromanother，withtwodistinctnamesannexedtothem，constitutetwodistinctsorts，or，ifyouplease，species，asessentiallydifferentasanytwoofthemostremoteoroppositeintheworld。
15。Severalsignificationsoftheword\"essence。\"Butsincetheessencesofthingsarethoughtbysome(andnotwithoutreason)tobewhollyunknown，itmaynotbeamisstoconsidertheseveralsignificationsofthewordessence。
Realessences。First，Essencemaybetakenfortheverybeingofanything，wherebyitiswhatitis。Andthustherealinternal，butgenerally(insubstances)unknownconstitutionofthings，whereontheirdiscoverablequalitiesdepend，maybecalledtheiressence。Thisistheproperoriginalsignificationoftheword，asisevidentfromtheformationofit；essentia，initsprimarynotation，signifyingproperly，being。Andinthissenseitisstillused，whenwespeakoftheessenceofparticularthings，withoutgivingthemanyname。
Nominalessences。Secondly，Thelearninganddisputesoftheschoolshavingbeenmuchbusiedaboutgenusandspecies，thewordessencehasalmostlostitsprimarysignification:and，insteadoftherealconstitutionofthings，hasbeenalmostwhollyappliedtotheartificialconstitutionofgenusandspecies。Itistrue，thereisordinarilysupposedarealconstitutionofthesortsofthings；anditispastdoubttheremustbesomerealconstitution，onwhichanycollectionofsimpleideasco-existingmustdepend。But，itbeingevidentthatthingsarerankedundernamesintosortsorspecies，onlyastheyagreetocertainabstractideas，towhichwehaveannexedthosenames，theessenceofeachgenus，orsort，comestobenothingbutthatabstractideawhichthegeneral，orsortal(ifImayhaveleavesotocallitfromsort，asIdogeneralfromgenus)，namestandsfor。Andthisweshallfindtobethatwhichthewordessenceimportsinitsmostfamiliaruse。
Thesetwosortsofessences，Isuppose，maynotunfitlybetermed，theonethereal，theothernominalessence。
16。Constantconnexionbetweenthenameandnominalessence。Betweenthenominalessenceandthenamethereissonearaconnexion，thatthenameofanysortofthingscannotbeattributedtoanyparticularbeingbutwhathasthisessence，wherebyitanswersthatabstractideawhereofthatnameisthesign。
17。Supposition，thatspeciesaredistinguishedbytheirrealessences，useless。Concerningtherealessencesofcorporealsubstances(tomentiontheseonly)thereare，ifImistakenot，twoopinions。Theoneisofthosewho，usingthewordessencefortheyknownotwhat，supposeacertainnumberofthoseessences，accordingtowhichallnaturalthingsaremade，andwhereintheydoexactlyeveryoneofthempartake，andsobecomeofthisorthatspecies。
Theotherandmorerationalopinionisofthosewholookonallnaturalthingstohaveareal，butunknown，constitutionoftheirinsensibleparts；fromwhichflowthosesensiblequalitieswhichserveustodistinguishthemonefromanother，accordingaswehaveoccasiontorankthemintosorts，undercommondenominations。Theformeroftheseopinions，whichsupposestheseessencesasacertainnumberofformsormoulds，whereinallnaturalthingsthatexistarecast，anddoequallypartake，has，Iimagine，verymuchperplexedtheknowledgeofnaturalthings。Thefrequentproductionsofmonsters，inallthespeciesofanimals，andofchangelings，andotherstrangeissuesofhumanbirth，carrywiththemdifficulties，notpossibletoconsistwiththishypothesis；sinceitisasimpossiblethattwothingspartakingexactlyofthesamerealessenceshouldhavedifferentproperties，asthattwofigurespartakingofthesamerealessenceofacircleshouldhavedifferentproperties。Butweretherenootherreasonagainstit，yetthesuppositionofessencesthatcannotbeknown；andthemakingofthem，nevertheless，tobethatwhichdistinguishesthespeciesofthings，issowhollyuselessandunserviceabletoanypartofourknowledge，thatthataloneweresufficienttomakeuslayitby，andcontentourselveswithsuchessencesofthesortsorspeciesofthingsascomewithinthereachofourknowledge:which，whenseriouslyconsidered，willbefound，asI
havesaid，tobenothingelsebut，thoseabstractcomplexideastowhichwehaveannexeddistinctgeneralnames。
18。Realandnominalessencethesameinsimpleideasandmodes，differentinsubstances。Essencesbeingthusdistinguishedintonominalandreal，wemayfurtherobserve，that，inthespeciesofsimpleideasandmodes，theyarealwaysthesame；butinsubstancesalwaysquitedifferent。Thus，afigureincludingaspacebetweenthreelines，istherealaswellasnominalessenceofatriangle；itbeingnotonlytheabstractideatowhichthegeneralnameisannexed，buttheveryessentiaorbeingofthethingitself；thatfoundationfromwhichallitspropertiesflow，andtowhichtheyareallinseparablyannexed。Butitisfarotherwiseconcerningthatparcelofmatterwhichmakestheringonmyfinger；whereinthesetwoessencesareapparentlydifferent。For，itistherealconstitutionofitsinsensibleparts，onwhichdependallthosepropertiesofcolour，weight，fusibility，fixedness，&c。，whicharetobefoundinit；whichconstitutionweknownot，andso，havingnoparticularideaof，havingnonamethatisthesignofit。Butyetitisitscolour，weight，fusibility，fixedness，&c。，whichmakesittobegold，orgivesitarighttothatname，whichisthereforeitsnominalessence。Sincenothingcanbecalledgoldbutwhathasaconformityofqualitiestothatabstractcomplexideatowhichthatnameisannexed。Butthisdistinctionofessences，belongingparticularlytosubstances，weshall，whenwecometoconsidertheirnames，haveanoccasiontotreatofmorefully。
19。Essencesingenerableandincorruptible。Thatsuchabstractideas，withnamestothem，aswehavebeenspeakingofareessences，mayfurtherappearbywhatwearetoldconcerningessences，viz。
thattheyareallingenerableandincorruptible。Whichcannotbetrueoftherealconstitutionsofthings，whichbeginandperishwiththem。Allthingsthatexist，besidestheirAuthor，areallliabletochange；especiallythosethingsweareacquaintedwith，andhaverankedintobandsunderdistinctnamesorensigns。Thus，thatwhichwasgrassto-dayisto-morrowthefleshofasheep；and，withinafewdaysafter，becomespartofaman:inallwhichandthelikechanges，itisevidenttheirrealessence-i。e。thatconstitutionwhereonthepropertiesoftheseseveralthingsdepended-isdestroyed，andperisheswiththem。Butessencesbeingtakenforideasestablishedinthemind，withnamesannexedtothem，theyaresupposedtoremainsteadilythesame，whatevermutationstheparticularsubstancesareliableto。For，whateverbecomesofAlexanderandBucephalus，theideastowhichmanandhorseareannexed，aresupposedneverthelesstoremainthesame；andsotheessencesofthosespeciesarepreservedwholeandundestroyed，whateverchangeshappentoanyoralloftheindividualsofthosespecies。Bythismeanstheessenceofaspeciesrestssafeandentire，withouttheexistenceofsomuchasoneindividualofthatkind。For，weretherenownocircleexistinganywhereintheworld，(asperhapsthatfigureexistsnotanywhereexactlymarkedout)，yettheideaannexedtothatnamewouldnotceasetobewhatitis；norceasetobeasapatterntodeterminewhichoftheparticularfigureswemeetwithhaveorhavenotarighttothenamecircle，andsotoshowwhichofthem，byhavingthatessence，wasofthatspecies。Andthoughthereneitherwerenorhadbeeninnaturesuchabeastasanunicorn，orsuchafishasamermaid；yet，supposingthosenamestostandforcomplexabstractideasthatcontainednoinconsistencyinthem，theessenceofamermaidisasintelligibleasthatofaman；andtheideaofanunicornascertain，steady，andpermanentasthatofahorse。Fromwhathasbeensaid，itisevident，thatthedoctrineoftheimmutabilityofessencesprovesthemtobeonlyabstractideas；andisfoundedontherelationestablishedbetweenthemandcertainsoundsassignsofthem；andwillalwaysbetrue，aslongasthesamenamecanhavethesamesignification。
20。Recapitulation。Toconclude。ThisisthatwhichinshortIwouldsay，viz。thatallthegreatbusinessofgeneraandspecies，andtheiressences，amountstonomorebutthis:-Thatmenmakingabstractideas，andsettlingthemintheirmindswithnamesannexedtothem，dotherebyenablethemselvestoconsiderthings，anddiscourseofthem，asitwereinbundles，fortheeasierandreadierimprovementandcommunicationoftheirknowledge，whichwouldadvancebutslowlyweretheirwordsandthoughtsconfinedonlytoparticulars。
