18。Persons，notsubstances，theobjectsofrewardandpunishment。
Inthispersonalidentityisfoundedalltherightandjusticeofrewardandpunishment；happinessandmiserybeingthatforwhicheveryoneisconcernedforhimself，andnotmatteringwhatbecomesofanysubstance，notjoinedto，oraffectedwiththatconsciousness。For，asitisevidentintheinstanceIgavebutnow，iftheconsciousnesswentalongwiththelittlefingerwhenitwascutoff，thatwouldbethesameselfwhichwasconcernedforthewholebodyyesterday，asmakingpartofitself，whoseactionsthenitcannotbutadmitasitsownnow。Though，ifthesamebodyshouldstilllive，andimmediatelyfromtheseparationofthelittlefingerhaveitsownpeculiarconsciousness，whereofthelittlefingerknewnothing，itwouldnotatallbeconcernedforit，asapartofitself，orcouldownanyofitsactions，orhaveanyofthemimputedtohim。
19。Whichshowswhereinpersonalidentityconsists。Thismayshowuswhereinpersonalidentityconsists:notintheidentityofsubstance，but，asIhavesaid，intheidentityofconsciousness，whereinifSocratesandthepresentmayorofQueinboroughagree，theyarethesameperson:ifthesameSocrateswakingandsleepingdonotpartakeofthesameconsciousness，Socrateswakingandsleepingisnotthesameperson。AndtopunishSocrateswakingforwhatsleepingSocratesthought，andwakingSocrateswasneverconsciousof，wouldbenomoreofright，thantopunishonetwinforwhathisbrother-twindid，whereofheknewnothing，becausetheiroutsidesweresolike，thattheycouldnotbedistinguished；forsuchtwinshavebeenseen。
20。Absoluteoblivionseparateswhatisthusforgottenfromtheperson，butnotfromtheman。Butyetpossiblyitwillstillbeobjected，-SupposeIwhollylosethememoryofsomepartsofmylife，beyondapossibilityofretrievingthem，sothatperhapsIshallneverbeconsciousofthemagain；yetamInotthesamepersonthatdidthoseactions，hadthosethoughtsthatIoncewasconsciousof，thoughIhavenowforgotthem？TowhichIanswer，thatwemustheretakenoticewhatthewordIisappliedto；which，inthiscase，isthemanonly。Andthesamemanbeingpresumedtobethesameperson，I
iseasilyheresupposedtostandalsoforthesameperson。Butifitbepossibleforthesamemantohavedistinctincommunicableconsciousnessatdifferenttimes，itispastdoubtthesamemanwouldatdifferenttimesmakedifferentpersons；which，wesee，isthesenseofmankindinthesolemnestdeclarationoftheiropinions，humanlawsnotpunishingthemadmanforthesoberman’sactions，northesobermanforwhatthemadmandid，-therebymakingthemtwopersons:whichissomewhatexplainedbyourwayofspeakinginEnglishwhenwesaysuchanoneis\"nothimself，\"oris\"besidehimself\"；inwhichphrasesitisinsinuated，asifthosewhonow，oratleastfirstusedthem，thoughtthatselfwaschanged；theselfsamepersonwasnolongerinthatman。
21。Differencebetweenidentityofmanandofperson。ButyetitishardtoconceivethatSocrates，thesameindividualman，shouldbetwopersons。Tohelpusalittleinthis，wemustconsiderwhatismeantbySocrates，orthesameindividualman。
First，itmustbeeitherthesameindividual，immaterial，thinkingsubstance；inshort，thesamenumericalsoul，andnothingelse。
Secondly，orthesameanimal，withoutanyregardtoanimmaterialsoul。
Thirdly，orthesameimmaterialspiritunitedtothesameanimal。
Now，takewhichofthesesuppositionsyouplease，itisimpossibletomakepersonalidentitytoconsistinanythingbutconsciousness；orreachanyfurtherthanthatdoes。
For，bythefirstofthem，itmustbeallowedpossiblethatamanbornofdifferentwomen，andindistanttimes，maybethesameman。
Awayofspeakingwhich，whoeveradmits，mustallowitpossibleforthesamemantobetwodistinctpersons，asanytwothathavelivedindifferentageswithouttheknowledgeofoneanother’sthoughts。
Bythesecondandthird，Socrates，inthislifeandafterit，cannotbethesamemananyway，butbythesameconsciousness；andsomakinghumanidentitytoconsistinthesamethingwhereinweplacepersonalidentity，therewillbenodifficultytoallowthesamemantobethesameperson。Butthentheywhoplacehumanidentityinconsciousnessonly，andnotinsomethingelse，mustconsiderhowtheywillmaketheinfantSocratesthesamemanwithSocratesaftertheresurrection。Butwhatsoevertosomemenmakesaman，andconsequentlythesameindividualman，whereinperhapsfewareagreed，personalidentitycanbyusbeplacedinnothingbutconsciousness，(whichisthatalonewhichmakeswhatwecallself，)
withoutinvolvingusingreatabsurdities。
22。Butisnotamandrunkandsoberthesameperson？whyelseishepunishedforthefacthecommitswhendrunk，thoughhebeneverafterwardsconsciousofit？Justasmuchthesamepersonasamanthatwalks，anddoesotherthingsinhissleep，isthesameperson，andisanswerableforanymischiefheshalldoinit。Humanlawspunishboth，withajusticesuitabletotheirwayofknowledge；-because，inthesecases，theycannotdistinguishcertainlywhatisreal，whatcounterfeit:andsotheignoranceindrunkennessorsleepisnotadmittedasaplea。For，thoughpunishmentbeannexedtopersonality，andpersonalitytoconsciousness，andthedrunkardperhapsbenotconsciousofwhathedid，yethumanjudicaturesjustlypunishhim；becausethefactisprovedagainsthim，butwantofconsciousnesscannotbeprovedforhim。ButintheGreatDay，whereinthesecretsofallheartsshallbelaidopen，itmaybereasonabletothink，nooneshallbemadetoanswerforwhatheknowsnothingof，butshallreceivehisdoom，hisconscienceaccusingorexcusinghim。
23。Consciousnessaloneunitesremoteexistencesintooneperson。
Nothingbutconsciousnesscanuniteremoteexistencesintothesameperson:theidentityofsubstancewillnotdoit；forwhateversubstancethereis，howeverframed，withoutconsciousnessthereisnoperson:andacarcassmaybeaperson，aswellasanysortofsubstancebeso，withoutconsciousness。
Couldwesupposetwodistinctincommunicableconsciousnessesactingthesamebody，theoneconstantlybyday，theotherbynight；
and，ontheotherside，thesameconsciousness，actingbyintervals，twodistinctbodies:Iask，inthefirstcase，whetherthedayandthenight-manwouldnotbetwoasdistinctpersonsasSocratesandPlato？
Andwhether，inthesecondcase，therewouldnotbeonepersonintwodistinctbodies，asmuchasonemanisthesameintwodistinctclothings？Norisitatallmaterialtosay，thatthissame，andthisdistinctconsciousness，inthecasesabovementioned，isowingtothesameanddistinctimmaterialsubstances，bringingitwiththemtothosebodies；which，whethertrueorno，altersnotthecase:sinceitisevidentthepersonalidentitywouldequallybedeterminedbytheconsciousness，whetherthatconsciousnesswereannexedtosomeindividualimmaterialsubstanceorno。For，grantingthatthethinkingsubstanceinmanmustbenecessarilysupposedimmaterial，itisevidentthatimmaterialthinkingthingmaysometimespartwithitspastconsciousness，andberestoredtoitagain:asappearsintheforgetfulnessmenoftenhaveoftheirpastactions；andthemindmanytimesrecoversthememoryofapastconsciousness，whichithadlostfortwentyyearstogether。Maketheseintervalsofmemoryandforgetfulnesstotaketheirturnsregularlybydayandnight，andyouhavetwopersonswiththesameimmaterialspirit，asmuchasintheformerinstancetwopersonswiththesamebody。Sothatselfisnotdeterminedbyidentityordiversityofsubstance，whichitcannotbesureof，butonlybyidentityofconsciousness。
24。Notthesubstancewithwhichtheconsciousnessmaybeunited。
Indeeditmayconceivethesubstancewhereofitisnowmadeuptohaveexistedformerly，unitedinthesameconsciousbeing:but，consciousnessremoved，thatsubstanceisnomoreitself，ormakesnomoreapartofit，thananyothersubstance；asisevidentintheinstancewehavealreadygivenofalimbcutoff，ofwhoseheat，orcold，orotheraffections，havingnolongeranyconsciousness，itisnomoreofaman’sselfthananyothermatteroftheuniverse。Inlikemanneritwillbeinreferencetoanyimmaterialsubstance，whichisvoidofthatconsciousnesswherebyIammyselftomyself:iftherebeanypartofitsexistencewhichIcannotuponrecollectionjoinwiththatpresentconsciousnesswherebyIamnowmyself，itis，inthatpartofitsexistence，nomoremyselfthananyotherimmaterialbeing。For，whatsoeveranysubstancehasthoughtordone，whichI
cannotrecollect，andbymyconsciousnessmakemyownthoughtandaction，itwillnomorebelongtome，whetherapartofmethoughtordidit，thanifithadbeenthoughtordonebyanyotherimmaterialbeinganywhereexisting。
25。Consciousnessunitessubstances，materialorspiritual，withthesamepersonality。Iagree，themoreprobableopinionis，thatthisconsciousnessisannexedto，andtheaffectionof，oneindividualimmaterialsubstance。
Butletmen，accordingtotheirdiversehypotheses，resolveofthatastheyplease。Thiseveryintelligentbeing，sensibleofhappinessormisery，mustgrant-thatthereissomethingthatishimself，thatheisconcernedfor，andwouldhavehappy；thatthisselfhasexistedinacontinueddurationmorethanoneinstant，andthereforeitispossiblemayexist，asithasdone，monthsandyearstocome，withoutanycertainboundstobesettoitsduration；andmaybethesameself，bythesameconsciousnesscontinuedonforthefuture。Andthus，bythisconsciousnesshefindshimselftobethesameselfwhichdidsuchandsuchanactionsomeyearssince，bywhichhecomestobehappyormiserablenow。Inallwhichaccountofself，thesamenumericalsubstanceisnotconsideredasmakingthesameself，butthesamecontinuedconsciousness，inwhichseveralsubstancesmayhavebeenunited，andagainseparatedfromit，which，whilsttheycontinuedinavitalunionwiththatwhereinthisconsciousnessthenresided，madeapartofthatsameself。Thusanypartofourbodies，vitallyunitedtothatwhichisconsciousinus，makesapartofourselves:butuponseparationfromthevitalunionbywhichthatconsciousnessiscommunicated，thatwhichamomentsincewaspartofourselves，isnownomoresothanapartofanotherman’sselfisapartofme:anditisnotimpossiblebutinalittletimemaybecomearealpartofanotherperson。Andsowehavethesamenumericalsubstancebecomeapartoftwodifferentpersons；andthesamepersonpreservedunderthechangeofvarioussubstances。Couldwesupposeanyspiritwhollystrippedofallitsmemoryorconsciousnessofpastactions，aswefindourmindsalwaysareofagreatpartofours，andsometimesofthemall；theunionorseparationofsuchaspiritualsubstancewouldmakenovariationofpersonalidentity，anymorethanthatofanyparticleofmatterdoes。Anysubstancevitallyunitedtothepresentthinkingbeingisapartofthatverysameselfwhichnowis；anythingunitedtoitbyaconsciousnessofformeractions，makesalsoapartofthesameself，whichisthesameboththenandnow。
26。\"Person\"aforensicterm。Person，asItakeit，isthenameforthisself。Whereveramanfindswhathecallshimself，there，I
think，anothermaysayisthesameperson。Itisaforensicterm，appropriatingactionsandtheirmerit；andsobelongsonlytointelligentagents，capableofalaw，andhappiness，andmisery。
Thispersonalityextendsitselfbeyondpresentexistencetowhatispast，onlybyconsciousness，-wherebyitbecomesconcernedandaccountable；ownsandimputestoitselfpastactions，justuponthesamegroundandforthesamereasonasitdoesthepresent。Allwhichisfoundedinaconcernforhappiness，theunavoidableconcomitantofconsciousness；thatwhichisconsciousofpleasureandpain，desiringthatthatselfthatisconsciousshouldbehappy。
Andthereforewhateverpastactionsitcannotreconcileorappropriatetothatpresentselfbyconsciousness，itcanbenomoreconcernedinthaniftheyhadneverbeendone:andtoreceivepleasureorpain，i。e。rewardorpunishment，ontheaccountofanysuchaction，isalloneastobemadehappyormiserableinitsfirstbeing，withoutanydemeritatall。For，supposingamanpunishednowforwhathehaddoneinanotherlife，whereofhecouldbemadetohavenoconsciousnessatall，whatdifferenceistherebetweenthatpunishmentandbeingcreatedmiserable？Andtherefore，conformabletothis，theapostletellsus，that，atthegreatday，wheneveryoneshall\"receiveaccordingtohisdoings，thesecretsofallheartsshallbelaidopen。\"Thesentenceshallbejustifiedbytheconsciousnessallpersonsshallhave，thattheythemselves，inwhatbodiessoevertheyappear，orwhatsubstancessoeverthatconsciousnessadheresto，arethesamethatcommittedthoseactions，anddeservethatpunishmentforthem。
27。Suppositionsthatlookstrangearepardonableinourignorance。IamaptenoughtothinkIhave，intreatingofthissubject，madesomesuppositionsthatwilllookstrangetosomereaders，andpossiblytheyaresointhemselves。Butyet，Ithinktheyaresuchasarepardonable，inthisignoranceweareinofthenatureofthatthinkingthingthatisinus，andwhichwelookonasourselves。Didweknowwhatitwas，orhowitwastiedtoacertainsystemoffleetinganimalspirits；orwhetheritcouldorcouldnotperformitsoperationsofthinkingandmemoryoutofabodyorganizedasoursis；andwhetherithaspleasedGodthatnoonesuchspiritshalleverbeunitedtoanybutonesuchbody，upontherightconstitutionofwhoseorgansitsmemoryshoulddepend；wemightseetheabsurdityofsomeofthosesuppositionsIhavemade。Buttaking，asweordinarilynowdo(inthedarkconcerningthesematters)，thesoulofamanforanimmaterialsubstance，independentfrommatter，andindifferentaliketoitall；therecan，fromthenatureofthings，benoabsurdityatalltosupposethatthesamesoulmayatdifferenttimesbeunitedtodifferentbodies，andwiththemmakeupforthattimeoneman:aswellaswesupposeapartofasheep’sbodyyesterdayshouldbeapartofaman’sbodyto-morrow，andinthatunionmakeavitalpartofMeliboeushimself，aswellasitdidofhisram。
28。Thedifficultyfromilluseofnames。Toconclude:Whateversubstancebeginstoexist，itmust，duringitsexistence，necessarilybethesame:whatevercompositionsofsubstancesbegintoexist，duringtheunionofthosesubstances，theconcretemustbethesame:whatsoevermodebeginstoexist，duringitsexistenceitisthesame:andsoifthecompositionbeofdistinctsubstancesanddifferentmodes，thesameruleholds。Wherebyitwillappear，thatthedifficultyorobscuritythathasbeenaboutthismatterratherrisesfromthenamesill-used，thanfromanyobscurityinthingsthemselves。
Forwhatevermakesthespecificideatowhichthenameisapplied，ifthatideabesteadilykeptto，thedistinctionofanythingintothesameanddiverswilleasilybeconceived，andtherecanarisenodoubtaboutit。
29。Continuanceofthatwhichwehavemadetoheourcomplexideaofmanmakesthesameman。For，supposingarationalspiritbetheideaofaman，itiseasytoknowwhatisthesameman，viz。thesamespirit-whetherseparateorinabody-willbethesameman。Supposingarationalspiritvitallyunitedtoabodyofacertainconformationofpartstomakeaman；whilstthatrationalspirit，withthatvitalconformationofparts，thoughcontinuedinafleetingsuccessivebody，remains，itwillbethesameman。Butiftoanyonetheideaofamanbebutthevitalunionofpartsinacertainshape；aslongasthatvitalunionandshaperemaininaconcrete，nootherwisethesamebutbyacontinuedsuccessionoffleetingparticles，itwillbethesameman。For，whateverbethecompositionwhereofthecomplexideaismade，wheneverexistencemakesitoneparticularthingunderanydenominationthesameexistencecontinuedpreservesitthesameindividualunderthesamedenomination。
ChapterXXVIII
OfOtherRelations1。Ideasofproportionalrelations。Besidesthebefore-mentionedoccasionsoftime，place，andcausalityofcomparingorreferringthingsonetoanother，thereare，asIhavesaid，infiniteothers，somewhereofIshallmention。
First，ThefirstIshallnameissomeonesimpleidea，which，beingcapableofpartsordegrees，affordsanoccasionofcomparingthesubjectswhereinitistooneanother，inrespectofthatsimpleidea，v。g。whiter，sweeter，equal，more，&c。Theserelationsdependingontheequalityandexcessofthesamesimpleidea，inseveralsubjects，maybecalled，ifonewill，proportional；andthattheseareonlyconversantaboutthosesimpleideasreceivedfromsensationorreflectionissoevidentthatnothingneedbesaidtoevinceit。
2。Naturalrelation。Secondly，Anotheroccasionofcomparingthingstogether，orconsideringonething，soastoincludeinthatconsiderationsomeotherthing，isthecircumstancesoftheiroriginorbeginning；whichbeingnotafterwardstobealtered，maketherelationsdependingthereonaslastingasthesubjectstowhichtheybelong，v。g。fatherandson，brothers，cousin-germans，&c。，whichhavetheirrelationsbyonecommunityofblood，whereintheypartakeinseveraldegrees:countrymen，i。e。thosewhowereborninthesamecountryortractofground；andtheseIcallnaturalrelations:
whereinwemayobserve，thatmankindhavefittedtheirnotionsandwordstotheuseofcommonlife，andnottothetruthandextentofthings。Foritiscertain，that，inreality，therelationisthesamebetwixtthebegetterandthebegotten，intheseveralracesofotheranimalsaswellasmen；butyetitisseldomsaid，thisbullisthegrandfatherofsuchacalf，orthattwopigeonsarecousin-germans。Itisveryconvenientthat，bydistinctnames，theserelationsshouldbeobservedandmarkedoutinmankind，therebeingoccasion，bothinlawsandothercommunicationsonewithanother，tomentionandtakenoticeofmenundertheserelations:fromwhencealsoarisetheobligationsofseveraldutiesamongstmen:whereas，inbrutes，menhavingverylittleornocausetomindtheserelations，theyhavenotthoughtfittogivethemdistinctandpeculiarnames。
This，bytheway，maygiveussomelightintothedifferentstateandgrowthoflanguages；whichbeingsuitedonlytotheconvenienceofcommunication，areproportionedtothenotionsmenhave，andthecommerceofthoughtsfamiliaramongstthem；andnottotherealityorextentofthings，nortothevariousrespectsmightbefoundamongthem；northedifferentabstractconsiderationsmightbeframedaboutthem。Wheretheyhadnophilosophicalnotions，theretheyhadnotermstoexpressthem:anditisnowondermenshouldhaveframednonamesforthosethingstheyfoundnooccasiontodiscourseof。Fromwhenceitiseasytoimaginewhy，asinsomecountries，theymayhavenotsomuchasthenameforahorse；andinothers，wheretheyaremorecarefulofthepedigreesoftheirhorses，thanoftheirown，thattheretheymayhavenotonlynamesforparticularhorses，butalsooftheirseveralrelationsofkindredonetoanother。
3。Ideasofinstitutedorvoluntaryrelations。Thirdly，Sometimesthefoundationofconsideringthings，withreferencetooneanother，issomeactwherebyanyonecomesbyamoralright，power，orobligationtodosomething。Thus，ageneralisonethathathpowertocommandanarmy；andanarmyunderageneralisacollectionofarmedmen，obligedtoobeyoneman。Acitizen，oraburgher，isonewhohasarighttocertainprivilegesinthisorthatplace。Allthissortdependinguponmen’swills，oragreementinsociety，I
callinstituted，orvoluntary；andmaybedistinguishedfromthenatural，inthattheyaremost，ifnotallofthem，somewayorotheralterable，andseparablefromthepersonstowhomtheyhavesometimesbelonged，thoughneitherofthesubstances，sorelated，bedestroyed。Now，thoughtheseareallreciprocal，aswellastherest，andcontaininthemareferenceoftwothingsonetotheother；yet，becauseoneofthetwothingsoftenwantsarelativename，importingthatreference，menusuallytakenonoticeofit，andtherelationiscommonlyoverlooked:v。g。apatronandclientireeasilyallowedtoberelations，butaconstableordictatorarenotsoreadilyatfirsthearingconsideredassuch。Becausethereisnopeculiarnameforthosewhoareunderthecommandofadictatororconstable，expressingarelationtoeitherofthem；thoughitbecertainthateitherofthemhathacertainpoweroversomeothers，andsoissofarrelatedtothem，aswellasapatronistohisclient，orgeneraltohisarmy。
4。Ideasofmoralrelations。Fourthly，Thereisanothersortofrelation，whichistheconformityordisagreementmen’svoluntaryactionshavetoaruletowhichtheyarereferred，andbywhichtheyarejudgedof；which，Ithink，maybecalledmoralrelation，asbeingthatwhichdenominatesourmoralactions，anddeserveswelltobeexamined；therebeingnopartofknowledgewhereinweshouldbemorecarefultogetdeterminedideas，andavoid，asmuchasmaybe，obscurityandconfusion。Humanactions，whenwiththeirvariousends，objects，manners，andcircumstances，theyareframedintodistinctcomplexideas，are，ashasbeenshownsomanymixedmodes，agreatpartwhereofhavenamesannexedtothem。Thus，supposinggratitudetobeareadinesstoacknowledgeandreturnkindnessreceived；polygamytobethehavingmorewivesthanoneatonce:
whenweframethesenotionsthusinourminds，wehavetheresomanydeterminedideasofmixedmodes。Butthisisnotallthatconcernsouractions:itisnotenoughtohavedeterminedideasofthem，andtoknowwhatnamesbelongtosuchandsuchcombinationsofideas。Wehaveafurtherandgreaterconcernment，andthatis，toknowwhethersuchactions，somadeup，aremorallygoodorbad。
5。Moralgoodandevil。Goodandevil，ashathbeenshown，(Bk。
II。chap。xx。SS2，andchap。xxi。SS43，)arenothingbutpleasureorpain，orthatwhichoccasionsorprocurespleasureorpaintous。
Moralgoodandevil，then，isonlytheconformityordisagreementofourvoluntaryactionstosomelaw，wherebygoodorevilisdrawnonus，fromthewillandpowerofthelaw-maker；whichgoodandevil，pleasureorpain，attendingourobservanceorbreachofthelawbythedecreeofthelawmaker，isthatwecallrewardandpunishment。
6。Moralrules。Ofthesemoralrulesorlaws，towhichmengenerallyrefer，andbywhichtheyjudgeoftherectitudeorpravityoftheiractions，thereseemtometobethreesorts，withtheirthreedifferentenforcements，orrewardsandpunishments。For，sinceitwouldbeutterlyinvaintosupposearulesettothefreeactionsofmen，withoutannexingtoitsomeenforcementofgoodandeviltodeterminehiswill，wemust，whereverwesupposealaw，supposealsosomerewardorpunishmentannexedtothatlaw。Itwouldbeinvainforoneintelligentbeingtosetaruletotheactionsofanother，ifhehaditnotinhispowertorewardthecompliancewith，andpunishdeviationfromhisrule，bysomegoodandevil，thatisnotthenaturalproductandconsequenceoftheactionitselfForthat，beinganaturalconvenienceorinconvenience，wouldoperateofitself，withoutalaw。This，ifImistakenot，isthetruenatureofalllaw，properlysocalled。
7。Laws。Thelawsthatmengenerallyrefertheiractionsto，tojudgeoftheirrectitudeorobliquity，seemtometobethesethree:-1。Thedivinelaw。2。Thecivillaw。3。Thelawofopinionorreputation，ifImaysocallit。Bytherelationtheybeartothefirstofthese，menjudgewhethertheiractionsaresinsorduties；bythesecond，whethertheybecriminalorinnocent；andbythethird，whethertheybevirtuesorvices。
8。Divinelawthemeasureofsinandduty。First，thedivinelaw，wherebythatlawwhichGodhassettotheactionsofmen，-whetherpromulgatedtothembythelightofnature，orthevoiceofrevelation。ThatGodhasgivenarulewherebymenshouldgovernthemselves，Ithinkthereisnobodysobrutishastodeny。Hehasarighttodoit；wearehiscreatures:hehasgoodnessandwisdomtodirectouractionstothatwhichisbest:andhehaspowertoenforceitbyrewardsandpunishmentsofinfiniteweightanddurationinanotherlife；fornobodycantakeusoutofhishands。
Thisistheonlytruetouchstoneofmoralrectitude；and，bycomparingthemtothislaw，itisthatmenjudgeofthemostconsiderablemoralgoodoreviloftheiractions；thatis，whether，asdutiesorsins，theyareliketoprocurethemhappinessormiseryfromthehandsoftheALMIGHTY。
9。Civillawthemeasureofcrimesandinnocence。Secondly，thecivillaw-therulesetbythecommonwealthtotheactionsofthosewhobelongtoit-isanotherruletowhichmenrefertheiractions；tojudgewhethertheybecriminalorno。Thislawnobodyoverlooks:therewardsandpunishmentsthatenforceitbeingreadyathand，andsuitabletothepowerthatmakesit:whichistheforceoftheCommonwealth，engagedtoprotectthelives，liberties，andpossessionsofthosewholiveaccordingtoitslaws，andhaspowertotakeawaylife，liberty，orgoods，fromhimwhodisobeys；whichisthepunishmentofoffencescommittedagainsthislaw。
10。Philosophicallawthemeasureofvirtueandvice。Thirdly，thelawofopinionorreputation。Virtueandvicearenamespretendedandsupposedeverywheretostandforactionsintheirownnaturerightandwrong:andasfarastheyreallyaresoapplied，theysofararecoincidentwiththedivinelawabovementioned。Butyet，whateverispretended，thisisvisible，thatthesenames，virtueandvice，intheparticularinstancesoftheirapplication，throughtheseveralnationsandsocietiesofmenintheworld，areconstantlyattributedonlytosuchactionsasineachcountryandsocietyareinreputationordiscredit。Norisittobethoughtstrange，thatmeneverywhereshouldgivethenameofvirtuetothoseactions，whichamongstthemarejudgedpraiseworthy；andcallthatvice，whichtheyaccountblamable:sinceotherwisetheywouldcondemnthemselves，iftheyshouldthinkanythingright，towhichtheyallowednotcommendation，anythingwrong，whichtheyletpasswithoutblame。
Thusthemeasureofwhatiseverywherecalledandesteemedvirtueandviceisthisapprobationordislike，praiseorblame，which，byasecretandtacitconsent，establishesitselfintheseveralsocieties，tribes，andclubsofmenintheworld:wherebyseveralactionscometofindcreditordisgraceamongstthem，accordingtothejudgment，maxims，orfashionofthatplace。For，thoughmenunitingintopoliticsocieties，haveresigneduptothepublicthedisposingofalltheirforce，sothattheycannotemployitagainstanyfellow-citizensanyfurtherthanthelawofthecountrydirects:yettheyretainstillthepowerofthinkingwellorill，approvingordisapprovingoftheactionsofthosewhomtheyliveamongst，andconversewith:andbythisapprobationanddisliketheyestablishamongstthemselveswhattheywillcallvirtueandvice。
11。Themeasurethatmencommonlyapplytodeterminewhattheycallvirtueandvice。Thatthisisthecommonmeasureofvirtueandvice，willappeartoanyonewhoconsiders，that，thoughthatpassesforviceinonecountrywhichiscountedavirtue，oratleastnotvice，inanother，yeteverywherevirtueandpraise，viceandblame，gotogether。Virtueiseverywhere，thatwhichisthoughtpraiseworthy；
andnothingelsebutthatwhichhastheallowanceofpublicesteemiscalledvirtue。Virtueandpraisearesounited，thattheyarecalledoftenbythesamename。Suntsuapraemialaudi，saysVirgil；
andsoCicero，Nihilhabetnaturapraestantius，quamhonestatem，quamlaudem，quamdignitatem，quamdecus，whichhetellsyouareallnamesforthesamething。Thisisthelanguageoftheheathenphilosophers，whowellunderstoodwhereintheirnotionsofvirtueandviceconsisted。Andthoughperhaps，bythedifferenttemper，education，fashion，maxims，orinterestofdifferentsortsofmen，itfellout，thatwhatwasthoughtpraiseworthyinoneplace，escapednotcensureinanother；andsoindifferentsocieties，virtuesandviceswerechanged:yet，astothemain，theyforthemostpartkeptthesameeverywhere。For，sincenothingcanbemorenaturalthantoencouragewithesteemandreputationthatwhereineveryonefindshisadvantage，andtoblameanddiscountenancethecontrary；
itisnowonderthatesteemanddiscredit，virtueandvice，should，inagreatmeasure，everywherecorrespondwiththeunchangeableruleofrightandwrong，whichthelawofGodhathestablished；therebeingnothingthatsodirectlyandvisiblysecuresandadvancesthegeneralgoodofmankindinthisworld，asobediencetothelawshehassetthem，andnothingthatbreedssuchmischiefsandconfusion，astheneglectofthem。Andthereforemen，withoutrenouncingallsenseandreason，andtheirowninterest，whichtheyaresoconstantlytrueto，couldnotgenerallymistake，inplacingtheircommendationandblameonthatsidethatreallydeserveditnot。Nay，eventhosemenwhosepracticewasotherwise，failednottogivetheirapprobationright，fewbeingdepravedtothatdegreeasnottocondemn，atleastinothers，thefaultstheythemselveswereguiltyof；whereby，eveninthecorruptionofmanners，thetrueboundariesofthelawofnature，whichoughttobetheruleofvirtueandvice，wereprettywellpreferred。Sothateventheexhortationsofinspiredteachers，havenotfearedtoappealtocommonrepute:\"Whatsoeverislovely，whatsoeverisofgoodreport，iftherebeanyvirtue，iftherebeanypraise，\"&c。(Phil。4。8。)
12。Itsenforcementiscommendationanddiscredit。IfanyoneshallimaginethatIhaveforgotmyownnotionofalaw，whenImakethelaw，wherebymenjudgeofvirtueandvice，tobenothingelsebuttheconsentofprivatemen，whohavenotauthorityenoughtomakealaw:especiallywantingthatwhichissonecessaryandessentialtoalaw，apowertoenforceit:IthinkImaysay，thathewhoimaginescommendationanddisgracenottobestrongmotivestomentoaccommodatethemselvestotheopinionsandrulesofthosewithwhomtheyconverse，seemslittleskilledinthenatureorhistoryofmankind:thegreatestpartwhereofweshallfindtogovernthemselveschiefly，ifnotsolely，bythislawoffashion；andsotheydothatwhichkeepstheminreputationwiththeircompany，littleregardthelawsofGod，orthemagistrate。ThepenaltiesthatattendthebreachofGod’slawssome，nayperhapsmostmen，seldomseriouslyreflecton:andamongstthosethatdo，many，whilsttheybreakthelaw，entertainthoughtsoffuturereconciliation，andmakingtheirpeaceforsuchbreaches。Andastothepunishmentsduefromthelawsofthecommonwealth，theyfrequentlyflatterthemselveswiththehopesofimpunity。Butnomanescapesthepunishmentoftheircensureanddislike，whooffendsagainstthefashionandopinionofthecompanyhekeeps，andwouldrecommendhimselfto。Noristhereoneoftenthousand，whoisstiffandinsensibleenough，tobearupundertheconstantdislikeandcondemnationofhisownclub。Hemustbeofastrangeandunusualconstitution，whocancontenthimselftoliveinconstantdisgraceanddisreputewithhisownparticularsociety。Solitudemanymenhavesought，andbeenreconciledto:butnobodythathastheleastthoughtorsenseofamanabouthim，canliveinsocietyundertheconstantdislikeandillopinionofhisfamiliars，andthoseheconverseswith。Thisisaburdentooheavyforhumansufferance:andhemustbemadeupofirreconcilablecontradictions，whocantakepleasureincompany，andyetbeinsensibleofcontemptanddisgracefromhiscompanions。
13。Thesethreelawstherulesofmoralgoodandevil。Thesethreethen，first，thelawofGod；secondly，thelawofpoliticsocieties；
thirdly，thelawoffashion，orprivatecensure，arethosetowhichmenvariouslycomparetheiractions:anditisbytheirconformitytooneoftheselawsthattheytaketheirmeasures，whentheywouldjudgeoftheirmoralrectitude，anddenominatetheiractionsgoodorbad。
14。Moralityistherelationofvoluntaryactionstotheserules。
Whethertheruletowhich，astoatouchstone，webringourvoluntaryactions，toexaminethemby，andtrytheirgoodness，andaccordinglytonamethem，whichis，asitwere，themarkofthevaluewesetuponthem:whether，Isay，wetakethatrulefromthefashionofthecountry，orthewillofalaw-maker，themindiseasilyabletoobservetherelationanyactionhathtoit，andtojudgewhethertheactionagreesordisagreeswiththerule；andsohathanotionofmoralgoodnessorevil，whichiseitherconformityornotconformityofanyactiontothatrule:andthereforeisoftencalledmoralrectitude。Thisrulebeingnothingbutacollectionofseveralsimpleideas，theconformitytheretoisbutsoorderingtheaction，thatthesimpleideasbelongingtoitmaycorrespondtothosewhichthelawrequires。Andthusweseehowmoralbeingsandnotionsarefoundedon，andterminatedin，thesesimpleideaswehavereceivedfromsensationorreflection。Forexample:letusconsiderthecomplexideawesignifybythewordmurder:andwhenwehavetakenitasunder，andexaminedalltheparticulars，weshallfindthemtoamounttoacollectionofsimpleideasderivedfromreflectionorsensation，viz。First，fromreflectionontheoperationsofourownminds，wehavetheideasofwilling，considering，purposingbeforehand，malice，orwishingilltoanother；andalsooflife，orperception，andself-motion。Secondly，fromsensationwehavethecollectionofthosesimplesensibleideaswhicharetobefoundinaman，andofsomeaction，wherebyweputanendtoperceptionandmotionintheman；allwhichsimpleideasarecomprehendedinthewordmurder。
Thiscollectionofsimpleideas，beingfoundbymetoagreeordisagreewiththeesteemofthecountryIhavebeenbredin，andtobeheldbymostmenthereworthypraiseorblame，Icalltheactionvirtuousorvicious:ifIhavethewillofasupremeinvisibleLawgiverformyrule，then，asIsupposedtheactioncommandedorforbiddenbyGod，Icallitgoodorevil，sinorduty:andifI
compareittothecivillaw，therulemadebythelegislativepowerofthecountry，Icallitlawfulorunlawful，acrimeornocrime。Sothatwhencesoeverwetaketheruleofmoralactions；orbywhatstandardsoeverweframeinourmindstheideasofvirtuesorvices，theyconsistonly，andaremadeupofcollectionsofsimpleideas，whichweoriginallyreceivedfromsenseorreflection:andtheirrectitudeorobliquityconsistsintheagreementordisagreementwiththosepatternsprescribedbysomelaw。
15。Moralactionsmayberegardedeitherabsolutely，orasideasofrelation。Toconceiverightlyofmoralactions，wemusttakenoticeofthemunderthistwo-foldconsideration。First，astheyareinthemselves，eachmadeupofsuchacollectionofsimpleideas。Thusdrunkenness，orlying，signifysuchorsuchacollectionofsimpleideas，whichIcallmixedmodes:andinthissensetheyareasmuchpositiveabsoluteideas，asthedrinkingofahorse，orspeakingofaparrot。Secondly，ouractionsareconsideredasgood，bad，orindifferent；andinthisrespecttheyarerelative，itbeingtheirconformityto，ordisagreementwithsomerulethatmakesthemtoberegularorirregular，goodorbad；andso，asfarastheyarecomparedwitharule，andthereupondenominated，theycomeunderrelation。Thusthechallengingandfightingwithaman，asitisacertainpositivemode，orparticularsortofaction，byparticularideas，distinguishedfromallothers，iscalledduelling:which，whenconsideredinrelationtothelawofGod，willdeservethenameofsin；tothelawoffashion，insomecountries，valourandvirtue；andtothemunicipallawsofsomegovernments，acapitalcrime。Inthiscase，whenthepositivemodehasonename，andanothernameasitstandsinrelationtothelaw，thedistinctionmayaseasilybeobservedasitisinsubstances，whereonename，v。g。man，isusedtosignifythething；another，v。g。father，tosignifytherelation。
16。Thedenominationsofactionsoftenmisleadus。Butbecauseveryfrequentlythepositiveideaoftheaction，anditsmoralrelation，arecomprehendedtogetherunderonename，andthegamewordmadeuseoftoexpressboththemodeoraction，anditsmoralrectitudeorobliquity:thereforetherelationitselfislesstakennoticeof；andthereisoftennodistinctionmadebetweenthepositiveideaoftheaction，andthereferenceithastoarule。Bywhichconfusionofthesetwodistinctconsiderationsunderoneterm，thosewhoyieldtooeasilytotheimpressionsofsounds，andareforwardtotakenamesforthings，areoftenmisledintheirjudgmentofactions。Thus，thetakingfromanotherwhatishis，withouthisknowledgeorallowance，isproperlycalledstealing:butthatname，beingcommonlyunderstoodtosignifyalsothemoralpravityoftheaction，andtodenoteitscontrarietytothelaw，menareapttocondemnwhatevertheyhearcalledstealing，asanillaction，disagreeingwiththeruleofright。Andyettheprivatetakingawayhisswordfromamadman，topreventhisdoingmischief，thoughitbeproperlydenominatedstealing，asthenameofsuchamixedmode；yetwhencomparedtothelawofGod，andconsideredinitsrelationtothatsupremerule，itisnosinortransgression，thoughthenamestealingordinarilycarriessuchanintimationwithit。
17。Relationsinnumerable，andonlythemostconsiderableherementioned。Andthusmuchfortherelationofhumanactionstoalaw，which，therefore，Icallmoralrelations。
Itwouldmakeavolumetogooverallsortsofrelations:itisnot，therefore，tobeexpectedthatIshouldherementionthemall。Itsufficestoourpresentpurposetoshowbythese，whattheideasarewehaveofthiscomprehensiveconsiderationcalledrelation。Whichissovarious，andtheoccasionsofitsomany，(asmanyastherecanbeofcomparingthingsonetoanother，)thatitisnotveryeasytoreduceittorules，orunderjustheads。ThoseIhavementioned，Ithink，aresomeofthemostconsiderable；andsuchasmayservetoletusseefromwhencewegetourideasofrelations，andwhereintheyarefounded。ButbeforeIquitthisargument，fromwhathasbeensaidgivemeleavetoobserve:
18。Allrelationsterminateinsimpleideas。First，Thatitisevident，thatallrelationterminatesin，andisultimatelyfoundedon，thosesimpleideaswehavegotfromsensationorreflection:sothatallwehaveinourthoughtsourselves，(ifwethinkofanything，orhaveanymeaning)，orwouldsignifytoothers，whenweusewordsstandingforrelations，isnothingbutsomesimpleideas，orcollectionsofsimpleideas，comparedonewithanother。Thisissomanifestinthatsortcalledproportional，thatnothingcanbemore。
Forwhenamansays\"honeyissweeterthanwax，\"itisplainthathisthoughtsinthisrelationterminateinthissimpleidea，sweetness；whichisequallytrueofalltherest:though，wheretheyarecompounded，ordecompounded，thesimpleideastheyaremadeupof，are，perhaps，seldomtakennoticeof:v。g。whenthewordfatherismentioned:first，thereismeantthatparticularspecies，orcollectiveidea，signifiedbythewordman；secondly，thosesensiblesimpleideas，signifiedbythewordgeneration；and，thirdly，theeffectsofit，andallthesimpleideassignifiedbythewordchild。
Sothewordfriend，beingtakenforamanwholovesandisreadytodogoodtoanother，hasallthesefollowingideastothemakingofitup:
first，allthesimpleideas，comprehendedinthewordman，orintelligentbeing；secondly，theideaoflove；thirdly，theideaofreadinessordisposition；fourthly，theideaofaction，whichisanykindofthoughtormotion；fifthly，theideaofgood，whichsignifiesanythingthatmayadvancehishappiness，andterminatesatlast，ifexamined，inparticularsimpleideas，ofwhichthewordgoodingeneralsignifiesanyone:but，ifremovedfromallsimpleideasquite，itsignifiesnothingatall。Andthusalsoallmoralwordsterminateatlast，thoughperhapsmoreremotely，inacollectionofsimpleideas:theimmediatesignificationofrelativewords，beingveryoftenothersupposedknownrelations；which，iftracedonetoanother，stillendinsimpleideas。
19。Wehaveordinarilyasclearanotionoftherelation，asofthesimpleideasinthingsonwhichitisfounded。Secondly，Thatinrelations，wehaveforthemostpart，ifnotalways，asclearanotionoftherelationaswehaveofthosesimpleideaswhereinitisfounded:agreementordisagreement，whereonrelationdepends，beingthingswhereofwehavecommonlyasclearideasasofanyotherwhatsoever；itbeingbutthedistinguishingsimpleideas，ortheirdegreesonefromanother，withoutwhichwecouldhavenodistinctknowledgeatall。For，ifIhaveaclearideaofsweetness，light，orextension，Ihave，too，ofequal，ormore，orless，ofeachofthese:ifIknowwhatitisforonemantobebornofawoman，viz。
Sempronia，IknowwhatitisforanothermantobebornofthesamewomanSempronia；andsohaveasclearanotionofbrothersasofbirths，andperhapsclearer。ForifIbelievedthatSemproniadiggedTitusoutoftheparsley-bed，(astheyusedtotellchildren)，andtherebybecamehismother；andthatafterwards，inthesamemanner，shediggedCaiusoutoftheparsley-bed，Ihadasclearanotionoftherelationofbrothersbetweenthem，asifIhadalltheskillofamidwife:thenotionthatthesamewomancontributed，asmother，equallytotheirbirths，(thoughIwereignorantormistakeninthemannerofit)，beingthatonwhichIgroundedtherelation；andthattheyagreedinthatcircumstanceofbirth，letitbewhatitwill。Thecomparingthemthenintheirdescentfromthesameperson，withoutknowingtheparticularcircumstancesofthatdescent，isenoughtofoundmynotionoftheirhaving，ornothavingtherelationofbrothers。Butthoughtheideasofparticularrelationsarecapableofbeingasclearanddistinctinthemindsofthosewhowilldulyconsiderthemasthoseofmixedmodes，andmoredeterminatethanthoseofsubstances:yetthenamesbelongingtorelationareoftenofasdoubtfulanduncertainsignificationasthoseofsubstancesormixedmodes；andmuchmorethanthoseofsimpleideas。Becauserelativewords，beingthemarksofthiscomparison，whichismadeonlybymen’sthoughts，andisanideaonlyinmen’sminds，menfrequentlyapplythemtodifferentcomparisonsofthings，accordingtotheirownimaginations；whichdonotalwayscorrespondwiththoseofothersusingthesamename。
20。Thenotionofrelationisthesame，whethertheruleanyactioniscomparedtobetrueorfalse。Thirdly，ThatintheseI
callmoralrelations，Ihaveatruenotionofrelation，bycomparingtheactionwiththerule，whethertherulebetrueorfalse。ForifImeasureanythingbyayard，IknowwhetherthethingImeasurebelongerorshorterthanthatsupposedyard，thoughperhapstheyardI
measurebybenotexactlythestandard:whichindeedisanotherinquiry。Forthoughtherulebeerroneous，andImistakeninit；yettheagreementordisagreementobservableinthatwhichIcomparewith，makesmeperceivetherelation。Though，measuringbyawrongrule，I
shalltherebybebroughttojudgeamissofitsmoralrectitude；
becauseIhavetrieditbythatwhichisnotthetruerule:yetIamnotmistakenintherelationwhichthatactionbearstothatruleI
compareitto，whichisagreementordisagreement。
ChapterXXIX
OfClearandObscure，DistinctandConfusedIdeas1。Ideas，someclearanddistinct，othersobscureandconfused。
Havingshowntheoriginalofourideas，andtakenaviewoftheirseveralsorts；consideredthedifferencebetweenthesimpleandthecomplex；andobservedhowthecomplexonesaredividedintothoseofmodes，substances，andrelations-allwhich，Ithink，isnecessarytobedonebyanyonewhowouldacquainthimselfthoroughlywiththeprogressofthemind，initsapprehensionandknowledgeofthings-
itwill，perhaps，bethoughtIhavedweltlongenoughupontheexaminationofideas。Imustnevertheless，craveleavetooffersomefewotherconsiderationsconcerningthem。
Thefirstis，thatsomeareclearandothersobscure；somedistinctandothersconfused。
2。Clearandobscureexplainedbysight。Theperceptionofthemindbeingmostaptlyexplainedbywordsrelatingtothesight，weshallbestunderstandwhatismeantbyclearandobscureinourideas，byreflectingonwhatwecallclearandobscureintheobjectsofsight。Lightbeingthatwhichdiscoverstousvisibleobjects，wegivethenameofobscuretothatwhichisnotplacedinalightsufficienttodiscoverminutelytousthefigureandcolourswhichareobservableinit，andwhich，inabetterlight，wouldbediscernible。Inlikemanner，oursimpleideasareclear，whentheyaresuchastheobjectsthemselvesfromwhencetheyweretakendidormight，inawell-orderedsensationorperception，presentthem。Whilstthememoryretainsthemthus，andcanproducethemtothemindwheneverithasoccasiontoconsiderthem，theyareclearideas。Sofarastheyeitherwantanythingoftheoriginalexactness，orhavelostanyoftheirfirstfreshness，andare，asitwere，fadedortarnishedbytime，sofararetheyobscure。Complexideas，astheyaremadeupofsimpleones，sotheyareclear，whentheideasthatgototheircompositionareclear，andthenumberandorderofthosesimpleideasthataretheingredientsofanycomplexoneisdeterminateandcertain。
3。Causesofobscurity。Thecausesofobscurity，insimpleideas，seemtobeeitherdullorgans；orveryslightandtransientimpressionsmadebytheobjects；orelseaweaknessinthememory，notabletoretainthemasreceived。Fortoreturnagaintovisibleobjects，tohelpustoapprehendthismatter。Iftheorgans，orfacultiesofperception，likewaxover-hardenedwithcold，willnotreceivetheimpressionoftheseal，fromtheusualimpulsewonttoimprintit；or，likewaxofatempertoosoft，willnotholditwell，whenwellimprinted；orelsesupposingthewaxofatemperfit，butthesealnotappliedwithasufficientforcetomakeaclearimpression:inanyofthesecases，theprintleftbythesealwillbeobscure。This，Isuppose，needsnoapplicationtomakeitplainer。
4。Distinctandconfused，what。Asaclearideaisthatwhereofthemindhassuchafullandevidentperception，asitdoesreceivefromanoutwardobjectoperatingdulyonawell-disposedorgan，soadistinctideaisthatwhereinthemindperceivesadifferencefromallother；andaconfusedideaissuchanoneasisnotsufficientlydistinguishablefromanother，fromwhichitoughttobedifferent。
5。Objection。Ifnoideabeconfused，butsuchasisnotsufficientlydistinguishablefromanotherfromwhichitshouldbedifferent，itwillbehard，mayanyonesay，tofindanywhereaconfusedidea。For，letanyideabeasitwill，itcanbenootherbutsuchasthemindperceivesittobe；andthatveryperceptionsufficientlydistinguishesitfromallotherideas，whichcannotbeother，i。e。different，withoutbeingperceivedtobeso。Noidea，therefore，canbeundistinguishablefromanotherfromwhichitoughttobedifferent，unlessyouwouldhaveitdifferentfromitself:forfromallotheritisevidentlydifferent。
6。Confusionofideasisinreferencetotheirnames。Toremovethisdifficulty，andtohelpustoconceivearightwhatitisthatmakestheconfusionideasareatanytimechargeablewith，wemustconsider，thatthingsrankedunderdistinctnamesaresupposeddifferentenoughtobedistinguished，thatsoeachsortbyitspeculiarnamemaybemarked，anddiscoursedofapartuponanyoccasion:andthereisnothingmoreevident，thanthatthegreatestpartofdifferentnamesaresupposedtostandfordifferentthings。Noweveryideaamanhas，beingvisiblywhatitis，anddistinctfromallotherideasbutitself；thatwhichmakesitconfused，is，whenitissuchthatitmayaswellbecalledbyanothernameasthatwhichitisexpressedby；thedifferencewhichkeepsthethings(toberankedunderthosetwodifferentnames)distinct，andmakessomeofthembelongrathertotheoneandsomeofthemtotheotherofthosenames，beingleftout；andsothedistinction，whichwasintendedtobekeptupbythosedifferentnames，isquitelost。
7。Defaultswhichmakethisconfusion。Thedefaultswhichusuallyoccasionthisconfusion，Ithink，arechieflythesefollowing:
ComplexIdeasmadeupoftoofewsimpleones。First，whenanycomplexidea(foritiscomplexideasthataremostliabletoconfusion)ismadeupoftoosmallanumberofsimpleideas，andsuchonlyasarecommontootherthings，wherebythedifferencesthatmakeitdeserveadifferentname，areleftout。Thus，hethathasanideamadeupofbarelythesimpleonesofabeastwithspots，hasbutaconfusedideaofaleopard；itnotbeingtherebysufficientlydistinguishedfromalynx，andseveralothersortsofbeaststhatarespotted。Sothatsuchanidea，thoughithaththepeculiarnameleopard，isnotdistinguishablefromthosedesignedbythenameslynxorpanther，andmayaswellcomeunderthenamelynxasleopard。Howmuchthecustomofdefiningofwordsbygeneraltermscontributestomaketheideaswewouldexpressbythemconfusedandundetermined，Ileaveotherstoconsider。Thisisevident，thatconfusedideasaresuchasrendertheuseofwordsuncertain，andtakeawaythebenefitofdistinctnames。Whentheideas，forwhichweusedifferentterms，havenotadifferenceanswerabletotheirdistinctnames，andsocannotbedistinguishedbythem，thereitisthattheyaretrulyconfused。
8。Theirsimpleonesjumbleddisorderlytogether。Secondly，Anotherfaultwhichmakesourideasconfusedis，when，thoughtheparticularsthatmakeupanyideaareinnumberenough，yettheyaresojumbledtogether，thatitisnoteasilydiscerniblewhetheritmorebelongstothenamethatisgivenitthantoanyother。Thereisnothingproperertomakeusconceivethisconfusionthanasortofpictures，usuallyshownassurprisingpiecesofart，whereinthecolours，astheyarelaidbythepencilonthetableitself，markoutveryoddandunusualfigures，andhavenodiscernibleorderintheirposition。Thisdraught，thusmadeupofpartswhereinnosymmetrynororderappears，isinitselfnomoreaconfusedthing，thanthepictureofacloudysky；wherein，thoughtherebeaslittleorderofcoloursorfigurestobefound，yetnobodythinksitaconfusedpicture。Whatisit，then，thatmakesitbethoughtconfused，sincethewantofsymmetrydoesnot？Asitisplainitdoesnot:foranotherdraughtmadebarelyinimitationofthiscouldnotbecalledconfused。Ianswer，Thatwhichmakesitbethoughtconfusedis，theapplyingittosomenametowhichitdoesnomorediscerniblybelongthantosomeother:v。g。whenitissaidtobethepictureofaman，orCaesar，thenanyonewithreasoncountsitconfused；becauseitisnotdiscernibleinthatstatetobelongmoretothenameman，orCaesar，thantothenamebaboon，orPompey:whicharesupposedtostandfordifferentideasfromthosesignifiedbyman，orCaesar。
Butwhenacylindricalmirror，placedright，hadreducedthoseirregularlinesonthetableintotheirdueorderandproportion，thentheconfusionceases，andtheeyepresentlyseesthatitisaman，orCaesar；i。e。thatitbelongstothosenames；andthatitissufficientlydistinguishablefromababoon，orPompey；i。e。fromtheideassignifiedbythosenames。Justthusitiswithourideas，whichareasitwerethepicturesofthings。Nooneofthesementaldraughts，howeverthepartsareputtogether，canbecalledconfused(fortheyareplainlydiscernibleastheyare)tillitberankedundersomeordinarynametowhichitcannotbediscernedtobelong，anymorethanitdoestosomeothernameofanalloweddifferentsignification。
9。Theirsimpleonesmutableandundetermined。Thirdly，Athirddefectthatfrequentlygivesthenameofconfusedtoourideas，is，whenanyoneofthemisuncertainandundetermined。Thuswemayobservemenwho，notforbearingtousetheordinarywordsoftheirlanguagetilltheyhavelearnedtheirprecisesignification，changetheideatheymakethisorthattermstandfor，almostasoftenastheyuseit。Hethatdoesthisoutofuncertaintyofwhatheshouldleaveout，orputintohisideaofchurch，oridolatry，everytimehethinksofeither，andholdsnotsteadytoanyoneprecisecombinationofideasthatmakesitup，issaidtohaveaconfusedideaofidolatryorthechurch:thoughthisbestillforthesamereasonastheformer，viz。becauseamutableidea(ifwewillallowittobeoneidea)cannotbelongtoonenameratherthananother，andsolosesthedistinctionthatdistinctnamesaredesignedfor。
10。Confusionwithoutreferencetonames，hardlyconceivable。Bywhathasbeensaid，wemayobservehowmuchnames，assupposedsteadysignsofthings，andbytheirdifferencetostandfor，andkeepthingsdistinctthatinthemselvesaredifferent，aretheoccasionofdenominatingideasdistinctorconfused，byasecretandunobservedreferencethemindmakesofitsideastosuchnames。Thisperhapswillbefullerunderstood，afterwhatIsayofWordsinthethirdBookhasbeenreadandconsidered。Butwithouttakingnoticeofsuchareferenceofideastodistinctnames，asthesignsofdistinctthings，itwillbehardtosaywhataconfusedideais。Andthereforewhenamandesigns，byanyname，asortofthings，oranyoneparticularthing，distinctfromallothers，thecomplexideaheannexestothatnameisthemoredistinct，themoreparticulartheideasare，andthegreaterandmoredeterminatethenumberandorderofthemis，whereofitismadeup。For，themoreithasofthese，themoreithasstilloftheperceivabledifferences，wherebyitiskeptseparateanddistinctfromallideasbelongingtoothernames，eventhosethatapproachnearesttoit，andtherebyallconfusionwiththemisavoided。
11。Confusionconcernsalwaystwoideas。Confusionmakingitadifficultytoseparatetwothingsthatshouldbeseparated，concernsalwaystwoideas；andthosemostwhichmostapproachoneanother。
Whenever，therefore，wesuspectanyideatobeconfused，wemustexaminewhatotheritisindangertobeconfoundedwith，orwhichitcannoteasilybeseparatedfrom；andthatwillalwaysbefoundanideabelongingtoanothername，andsoshouldbeadifferentthing，fromwhichyetitisnotsufficientlydistinct:beingeitherthesamewithit，ormakingapartofit，oratleastasproperlycalledbythatnameastheotheritisrankedunder；andsokeepsnotthatdifferencefromthatotherideawhichthedifferentnamesimport。
12。Causesofconfusedideas。This，Ithink，istheconfusionpropertoideas；whichstillcarrieswithitasecretreferencetonames。
Atleast，iftherebeanyotherconfusionofideas，thisisthatwhichmostofalldisordersmen’sthoughtsanddiscourses:ideas，asrankedundernames，beingthosethatforthemostpartmenreasonofwithinthemselves，andalwaysthosewhichtheycommuneaboutwithothers。Andthereforewheretherearesupposedtwodifferentideas，markedbytwodifferentnames，whicharenotasdistinguishableasthesoundsthatstandforthem，thereneverfailstobeconfusion；andwhereanyideasaredistinctastheideasofthosetwosoundstheyaremarkedby，therecanbebetweenthemnoconfusion。Thewaytopreventitistocollectanduniteintoonecomplexidea，aspreciselyasispossible，allthoseingredientswherebyitisdifferencedfromothers；andtothem，sounitedinadeterminatenumberandorder，applysteadilythesamename。Butthisneitheraccommodatingmen’seaseorvanity，norservinganydesignbutthatofnakedtruth，whichisnotalwaysthethingaimedat，suchexactnessisrathertobewishedthanhopedfor。Andsincethelooseapplicationofnames，toundetermined，variable，andalmostnoideas，servesbothtocoverourownignorance，aswellastoperplexandconfoundothers，whichgoesforlearningandsuperiorityinknowledge，itisnowonderthatmostmenshoulduseitthemselves，whilsttheycomplainofitinothers。ThoughIthinknosmallpartoftheconfusiontobefoundinthenotionsofmenmight，bycareandingenuity，beavoided，yetI
amfarfromconcludingiteverywherewilful。Someideasaresocomplex，andmadeupofsomanyparts，thatthememorydoesnoteasilyretaintheverysameprecisecombinationofsimpleideasunderonename:muchlessareweableconstantlytodivineforwhatprecisecomplexideasuchanamestandsinanotherman’suseofit。Fromthefirstofthese，followsconfusioninaman’sownreasoningsandopinionswithinhimself；fromthelatter，frequentconfusionindiscoursingandarguingwithothers。ButhavingmoreatlargetreatedofWords，theirdefects，andabuses，inthefollowingBook，Ishallheresaynomoreofit。
13。Complexideasmaybedistinctinonepart，andconfusedinanother。Ourcomplexideas，beingmadeupofcollections，andsovarietyofsimpleones，mayaccordinglybeveryclearanddistinctinonepart，andveryobscureandconfusedinanother。Inamanwhospeaksofachiliaedron，orabodyofathousandsides，theideasofthefiguremaybeveryconfused，thoughthatofthenumberbeverydistinct；sothathebeingabletodiscourseanddemonstrateconcerningthatpartofhiscomplexideawhichdependsuponthenumberofthousand，heisapttothinkhehasadistinctideaofachiliaedron；thoughitbeplainhehasnopreciseideaofitsfigure，soastodistinguishit，bythat，fromonethathasbut999
sides:thenotobservingwhereofcausesnosmallerrorinmen’sthoughts，andconfusionintheirdiscourses。
14。This，ifnotheeded，causesconfusioninourarguings。Hethatthinkshehasadistinctideaofthefigureofachiliaedron，lethimfortrialsaketakeanotherparcelofthesameuniformmatter，viz。goldorwaxofanequalbulk，andmakeitintoafigureof999
sides。Hewill，Idoubtnot，beabletodistinguishthesetwoideasonefromanother，bythenumberofsides；andreasonandarguedistinctlyaboutthem，whilsthekeepshisthoughtsandreasoningtothatpartonlyoftheseideaswhichiscontainedintheirnumbers；
asthatthesidesoftheonecouldbedividedintotwoequalnumbers，andoftheothersnot，&c。Butwhenhegoesabouttodistinguishthembytheirfigure，hewilltherebepresentlyataloss，andnotbeable，Ithink，toframeinhismindtwoideas，oneofthemdistinctfromtheother，bythebarefigureofthesetwopiecesofgold；ashecould，ifthesameparcelsofgoldweremadeoneintoacube，theotherafigureoffivesides。Inwhichincompleteideas，weareveryapttoimposeonourselves，andwranglewithothers，especiallywheretheyhaveparticularandfamiliarnames。For，beingsatisfiedinthatpartoftheideawhichwehaveclear；andthenamewhichisfamiliartous，beingappliedtothewhole，containingthatpartalsowhichisimperfectandobscure，weareapttouseitforthatconfusedpart，anddrawdeductionsfromitintheobscurepartofitssignification，asconfidentlyaswedofromtheother。
15。Instanceineternity。HavingfrequentlyinourmouthsthenameEternity，weareapttothinkwehaveapositivecomprehensiveideaofit，whichisasmuchastosay，thatthereisnopartofthatdurationwhichisnotclearlycontainedinouridea。Itistruethathethatthinkssomayhaveaclearideaofduration；hemayalsohaveaclearideaofaverygreatlengthofduration；hemayalsohaveaclearideaofthecomparisonofthatgreatonewithstillagreater:
butitnotbeingpossibleforhimtoincludeinhisideaofanyduration，letitbeasgreatasitwill，thewholeextenttogetherofaduration，wherehesupposesnoend，thatpartofhisidea，whichisstillbeyondtheboundsofthatlargedurationherepresentstohisownthoughts，isveryobscureandundetermined。
Andhenceitisthatindisputesandreasoningsconcerningeternity，oranyotherinfinite，weareveryapttoblunder，andinvolveourselvesinmanifestabsurdities。
16。Infinitedivisibilityofmatter。Inmatter，wehavenoclearideasofthesmallnessofpartsmuchbeyondthesmallestthatoccurtoanyofoursenses:andtherefore，whenwetalkofthedivisibilityofmatterininfinitum，thoughwehaveclearideasofdivisionanddivisibility，andhavealsoclearideasofpartsmadeoutofawholebydivision；yetwehavebutveryobscureandconfusedideasofcorpuscles，orminutebodies，sotobedivided，when，byformerdivisions，theyarereducedtoasmallnessmuchexceedingtheperceptionofanyofoursenses；andsoallthatwehaveclearanddistinctideasofisofwhatdivisioningeneralorabstractedlyis，andtherelationoftotumandpars:butofthebulkofthebody，tobethusinfinitelydividedaftercertainprogressions，Ithink，wehavenoclearnordistinctideaatall。ForIaskanyone，whether，takingthesmallestatomofdustheeversaw，hehasanydistinctidea(batingstillthenumber，whichconcernsnotextension)betwixtthe1，000，000thandthe1，000，000，000thpartofit。Orifhethinkhecanrefinehisideastothatdegree，withoutlosingsightofthem，lethimaddtencypherstoeachofthosenumbers。Suchadegreeofsmallnessisnotunreasonabletobesupposed；sinceadivisioncarriedonsofarbringsitnonearertheendofinfinitedivision，thanthefirstdivisionintotwohalvesdoes。Imustconfess，formypart，I
havenocleardistinctideasofthedifferentbulkorextensionofthosebodies，havingbutaveryobscureoneofeitherofthem。Sothat，Ithink，whenwetalkofdivisionofbodiesininfinitum，ourideaoftheirdistinctbulks，whichisthesubjectandfoundationofdivision，comes，afteralittleprogression，tobeconfounded，andalmostlostinobscurity。Forthatideawhichistorepresentonlybignessmustbeveryobscureandconfused，whichwecannotdistinguishfromonetentimesasbig，butonlybynumber:sothatwehavecleardistinctideas，wemaysay，oftenandone，butnodistinctideasoftwosuchextensions。Itisplainfromhence，that，whenwetalkofinfinitedivisibilityofbodyorextension，ourdistinctandclearideasareonlyofnumbers:butthecleardistinctideasofextensionaftersomeprogressofdivision，arequitelost；andofsuchminutepartswehavenodistinctideasatall；butitreturns，asallourideasofinfinitedo，atlasttothatofnumberalwaystobeadded；
buttherebyneveramountstoanydistinctideaofactualinfiniteparts。Wehave，itistrue，aclearideaofdivision，asoftenaswethinkofit；buttherebywehavenomoreaclearideaofinfinitepartsinmatter，thanwehaveaclearideaofaninfinitenumber，bybeingablestilltoaddnewnumberstoanyassignednumberswehave:
endlessdivisibilitygivingusnomoreaclearanddistinctideaofactuallyinfiniteparts，thanendlessaddibility(ifImaysospeak)
givesusaclearanddistinctideaofanactuallyinfinitenumber:
theybothbeingonlyinapowerstillofincreasingthenumber，beitalreadyasgreatasitwill。Sothatofwhatremainstobeadded(whereinconsiststheinfinity)wehavebutanobscure，imperfect，andconfusedidea；fromoraboutwhichwecanargueorreasonwithnocertaintyorclearness，nomorethanwecaninarithmetic，aboutanumberofwhichwehavenosuchdistinctideaaswehaveof4or100；butonlythisrelativeobscureone，that，comparedtoanyother，itisstillbigger:andwehavenomoreaclearpositiveideaofit，whenwesayorconceiveitisbigger，ormorethan400，000，000，thanifweshouldsayitisbiggerthan40or4:400，000，000havingnoneareraproportiontotheendofadditionornumberthan4。Forhethataddsonly4to4，andsoproceeds，shallassooncometotheendofalladdition，ashethatadds400，000，000to400，000，000。Andsolikewiseineternity；hethathasanideaofbutfouryears，hasasmuchapositivecompleteideaofeternity，ashethathasoneof400，000，000ofyears:forwhatremainsofeternitybeyondeitherofthesetwonumbersofyears，isascleartotheoneastheother；
i。e。neitherofthemhasanyclearpositiveideaofitatall。Forhethataddsonly4yearsto4，andsoon，shallassoonreacheternityashethatadds400，000，000ofyears，andsoon；or，ifheplease，doublestheincreaseasoftenashewill:theremainingabyssbeingstillasfarbeyondtheendofalltheseprogressionsasitisfromthelengthofadayoranhour。Fornothingfinitebearsanyproportiontoinfinite；andthereforeourideas，whichareallfinite，cannotbearany。Thusitisalsoinourideaofextension，whenweincreaseitbyaddition，aswellaswhenwediminishitbydivision，andwouldenlargeourthoughtstoinfinitespace。Afterafewdoublingsofthoseideasofextension，whicharethelargestweareaccustomedtohave，welosethecleardistinctideaofthatspace:
itbecomesaconfusedlygreatone，withasurplusofstillgreater；
aboutwhich，whenwewouldargueorreason，weshallalwaysfindourselvesataloss；confusedideas，inourarguingsanddeductionsfromthatpartofthemwhichisconfused，alwaysleadingusintoconfusion。
ChapterXXX
OfRealandFantasticalIdeas1。Ideasconsideredinreferencetotheirarchetypes。Besideswhatwehavealreadymentionedconcerningideas，otherconsiderationsbelongtothem，inreferencetothingsfromwhencetheyaretaken，orwhichtheymaybesupposedtorepresent；andthus，Ithink，theymaycomeunderathree-folddistinction，andare:-
First，eitherrealorfantastical；
Secondly，adequateorinadequate；
Thirdly，trueorfalse。
First，byrealideas，Imeansuchashaveafoundationinnature；
suchashaveaconformitywiththerealbeingandexistenceofthings，orwiththeirarchetypes。Fantasticalorchimerical，Icallsuchashavenofoundationinnature，norhaveanyconformitywiththatrealityofbeingtowhichtheyaretacitlyreferred，astotheirarchetypes。Ifweexaminetheseveralsortsofideasbeforementioned，weshallfindthat，2。Simpleideasareallrealappearancesofthings。First，Oursimpleideasareallreal，allagreetotherealityofthings:notthattheyareallofthemtheimagesorrepresentationsofwhatdoesexist；thecontrarywhereof，inallbuttheprimaryqualitiesofbodies，hathbeenalreadyshown。But，thoughwhitenessandcoldnessarenomoreinsnowthanpainis；yetthoseideasofwhitenessandcoldness，pain，&c。，beinginustheeffectsofpowersinthingswithoutus，ordainedbyourMakertoproduceinussuchsensations；
theyarerealideasinus，wherebywedistinguishthequalitiesthatarereallyinthingsthemselves。For，theseseveralappearancesbeingdesignedtobethemarkwherebywearetoknowanddistinguishthingswhichwehavetodowith，ourideasdoaswellserveustothatpurpose，andareasrealdistinguishingcharacters，whethertheybeonlyconstanteffects，orelseexactresemblancesofsomethinginthethingsthemselves:therealitylyinginthatsteadycorrespondencetheyhavewiththedistinctconstitutionsofrealbeings。Butwhethertheyanswertothoseconstitutions，astocausesorpatterns，itmattersnot；itsufficesthattheyareconstantlyproducedbythem。Andthusoursimpleideasareallrealandtrue，becausetheyanswerandagreetothosepowersofthingswhichproducetheminourminds；thatbeingallthatisrequisitetomakethemreal，andnotfictionsatpleasure。Forinsimpleideas(ashasbeenshown)themindiswhollyconfinedtotheoperationofthingsuponit，andcanmaketoitselfnosimpleidea，morethanwhatithasreceived。
3。Complexideasarevoluntarycombinations。Thoughthemindbewhollypassiveinrespectofitssimpleideas；yet，Ithink，wemaysayitisnotsoinrespectofitscomplexideas。Forthosebeingcombinationsofsimpleideasputtogether，andunitedunderonegeneralname，itisplainthatthemindofmanusessomekindoflibertyinformingthosecomplexideas:howelsecomesittopassthatoneman’sideaofgold，orjustice，isdifferentfromanother’s，butbecausehehasputin，orleftoutofhis，somesimpleideawhichtheotherhasnot？Thequestionthenis，Whichofthesearereal，andwhichbarelyimaginarycombinations？Whatcollectionsagreetotherealityofthings，andwhatnot？AndtothisIsaythat，4。Mixedmodesandrelations，madeofconsistentideas，arereal。
Secondly，Mixedmodesandrelations，havingnootherrealitybutwhattheyhaveinthemindsofmen，thereisnothingmorerequiredtothiskindofideastomakethemreal，butthattheybesoframed，thattherebeapossibilityofexistingconformabletothem。Theseideasthemselves，beingarchetypes，cannotdifferfromtheirarchetypes，andsocannotbechimerical，unlessanyonewilljumbletogetherintheminconsistentideas。Indeed，asanyofthemhavethenamesofaknownlanguageassignedtothem，bywhichhethathastheminhismindwouldsignifythemtoothers，sobarepossibilityofexistingisnotenough；theymusthaveaconformitytotheordinarysignificationofthenamethatisgiventhem，thattheymaynotbethoughtfantastical:asifamanwouldgivethenameofjusticetothatideawhichcommonusecallsliberality。Butthisfantasticalnessrelatesmoretoproprietyofspeech，thanrealityofideas。Foramantobeundisturbedindanger，sedatelytoconsiderwhatisfittesttobedone，andtoexecuteitsteadily，isamixedmode，oracomplexideaofanactionwhichmayexist。Buttobeundisturbedindanger，withoutusingone’sreasonorindustry，iswhatisalsopossibletobe；andsoisasrealanideaastheother。Thoughthefirstofthese，havingthenamecouragegiventoit，may，inrespectofthatname，bearightorwrongidea；buttheother，whilstithasnotacommonreceivednameofanyknownlanguageassignedtoit，isnotcapableofanydeformity，beingmadewithnoreferencetoanythingbutitself。
5。Complexideasofsubstancesarereal，whentheyagreewiththeexistenceofthings。Thirdly，Ourcomplexideasofsubstances，beingmadealloftheminreferencetothingsexistingwithoutus，andintendedtoberepresentationsofsubstancesastheyreallyare，arenofurtherrealthanastheyaresuchcombinationsofsimpleideasasarereallyunited，andco-existinthingswithoutus。Onthecontrary，thosearefantasticalwhicharemadeupofsuchcollectionsofsimpleideasaswerereallyneverunited，neverwerefoundtogetherinanysubstance:v。g。arationalcreature，consistingofahorse’shead，joinedtoabodyofhumanshape，orsuchasthecentaursaredescribed:or，abodyyellow，verymalleable，fusible，andfixed，butlighterthancommonwater:oranuniform，unorganizedbody，consisting，astosense，allofsimilarparts，withperceptionandvoluntarymotionjoinedtoit。Whethersuchsubstancesasthesecanpossiblyexistorno，itisprobablewedonotknow:butbethatasitwill，theseideasofsubstances，beingmadeconformabletonopatternexistingthatweknow；andconsistingofsuchcollectionsofideasasnosubstanceevershowedusunitedtogether，theyoughttopasswithusforbarelyimaginary:butmuchmorearethosecomplexideasso，whichcontaininthemanyinconsistencyorcontradictionoftheirparts。
ChapterXXXI
OfAdequateandInadequateIdeas1。Adequateideasaresuchasperfectlyrepresenttheirarchetypes。Ofourrealideas，someareadequate，andsomeareinadequate。ThoseIcalladequate，whichperfectlyrepresentthosearchetypeswhichthemindsupposesthemtakenfrom:whichitintendsthemtostandfor，andtowhichitrefersthem。Inadequateideasaresuch，whicharebutapartialorincompleterepresentationofthosearchetypestowhichtheyarereferred。Uponwhichaccountitisplain，2。Simpleideasalladequate。First，thatalloursimpleideasareadequate。Because，beingnothingbuttheeffectsofcertainpowersinthings，fittedandordainedbyGodtoproducesuchsensationsinus，theycannotbutbecorrespondentandadequatetothosepowers:andwearesuretheyagreetotherealityofthings。For，ifsugarproduceinustheideaswhichwecallwhitenessandsweetness，wearesurethereisapowerinsugartoproducethoseideasinourminds，orelsetheycouldnothavebeenproducedbyit。Andsoeachsensationansweringthepowerthatoperatesonanyofoursenses，theideasoproducedisarealidea，(andnotafictionofthemind，whichhasnopowertoproduceanysimpleidea)；andcannotbutbeadequate，sinceitoughtonlytoanswerthatpower:andsoallsimpleideasareadequate。Itistrue，thethingsproducinginusthesesimpleideasarebutfewofthemdenominatedbyus，asiftheywereonlythecausesofthem；butasifthoseideaswererealbeingsinthem。
For，thoughfirebecalledpainfultothetouch，wherebyissignifiedthepowerofproducinginustheideaofpain，yetitisdenominatedalsolightandhot；asiflightandheatwerereallysomethinginthefire，morethanapowertoexcitetheseideasinus；andthereforearecalledqualitiesinorofthefire。Butthesebeingnothing，intruth，butpowerstoexcitesuchideasinus，Imustinthatsensebeunderstood，whenIspeakofsecondaryqualitiesasbeinginthings；oroftheirideasasbeingtheobjectsthatexcitetheminus。Suchwaysofspeaking，thoughaccommodatedtothevulgarnotions，withoutwhichonecannotbewellunderstood，yettrulysignifynothingbutthosepowerswhichareinthingstoexcitecertainsensationsorideasinus。Sinceweretherenofitorganstoreceivetheimpressionsfiremakesonthesightandtouch，noramindjoinedtothoseorganstoreceivetheideasoflightandheatbythoseimpressionsfromthefireorsun，therewouldyetbenomorelightorheatintheworldthantherewouldbepainiftherewerenosensiblecreaturetofeelit，thoughthesunshouldcontinuejustasitisnow，andMountAEtnaflamehigherthaneveritdid。Solidityandextension，andtheterminationofit，figure，withmotionandrest，whereofwehavetheideas，wouldbereallyintheworldastheyare，whethertherewereanysensiblebeingtoperceivethemorno:andthereforewehavereasontolookonthoseastherealmodificationsofmatter，andsuchasaretheexcitingcausesofallourvarioussensationsfrombodies。Butthisbeinganinquirynotbelongingtothisplace，Ishallenternofurtherintoit，butproceedtoshowwhatcomplexideasareadequate，andwhatnot。
3。Modesarealladequate。Secondly，ourcomplexideasofmodes，beingvoluntarycollectionsofsimpleideas，whichthemindputstogether，withoutreferencetoanyrealarchetypes，orstandingpatterns，existinganywhere，areandcannotbutbeadequateideas。
Becausethey，notbeingintendedforcopiesofthingsreallyexisting，butforarchetypesmadebythemind，torankanddenominatethingsby，cannotwantanything；theyhavingeachofthemthatcombinationofideas，andtherebythatperfection，whichthemindintendedtheyshould:sothatthemindacquiescesinthem，andcanfindnothingwanting。Thus，byhavingtheideaofafigurewiththreesidesmeetingatthreeangles，Ihaveacompleteidea，whereinIrequirenothingelsetomakeitperfect。Thatthemindissatisfiedwiththeperfectionofthisitsideaisplain，inthatitdoesnotconceivethatanyunderstandinghath，orcanhave，amorecompleteorperfectideaofthatthingitsignifiesbythewordtriangle，supposingittoexist，thanitselfhas，inthatcomplexideaofthreesidesandthreeangles，inwhichiscontainedallthatisorcanbeessentialtoit，ornecessarytocompleteit，whereverorhoweveritexists。Butinourideasofsubstancesitisotherwise。Forthere，desiringtocopythingsastheyreallydoexist，andtorepresenttoourselvesthatconstitutiononwhichalltheirpropertiesdepend，weperceiveourideasattainnotthatperfectionweintend:wefindtheystillwantsomethingweshouldbegladwereinthem；andsoareallinadequate。
Butmixedmodesandrelations，beingarchetypeswithoutpatterns，andsohavingnothingtorepresentbutthemselves，cannotbutbeadequate，everythingbeingsotoitself。Hethatatfirstputtogethertheideaofdangerperceived，absenceofdisorderfromfear，sedateconsiderationofwhatwasjustlytobedone，andexecutingthatwithoutdisturbance，orbeingdeterredbythedangerofit，hadcertainlyinhismindthatcomplexideamadeupofthatcombination:
andintendingittobenothingelsebutwhatis，nortohaveinitanyothersimpleideasbutwhatithath，itcouldnotalsobutbeanadequateidea:andlayingthisupinhismemory，withthenamecourageannexedtoit，tosignifytoothers，anddenominatefromthenceanyactionheshouldobservetoagreewithit，hadtherebyastandardtomeasureanddenominateactionsby，astheyagreedtoit。Thisidea，thusmadeandlaidupforapattern，mustnecessarilybeadequate，beingreferredtonothingelsebutitself，normadebyanyotheroriginalbutthegoodlikingandwillofhimthatfirstmadethiscombination。
4。Modes，inreferencetosettlednames，maybeinadequate。Indeedanothercomingafter，andinconversationlearningfromhimthewordcourage，maymakeanidea，towhichhegivesthenamecourage，differentfromwhatthefirstauthorapplieditto，andhasinhismindwhenheusesit。Andinthiscase，ifhedesignsthathisideainthinkingshouldbeconformabletotheother’sidea，asthenameheusesinspeakingisconformableinsoundtohisfromwhomhelearnedit，hisideamaybeverywrongandinadequate:becauseinthiscase，makingtheotherman’sideathepatternofhisideainthinking，astheotherman’swordorsoundisthepatternofhisinspeaking，hisideaissofardefectiveandinadequate，asitisdistantfromthearchetypeandpatternherefersitto，andintendstoexpressandsignifybythenameheusesforit；whichnamehewouldhavetobeasignoftheotherman’sidea，(towhich，initsproperuse，itisprimarilyannexed)，andofhisown，asagreeingtoit:towhichifhisowndoesnotexactlycorrespond，itisfaultyandinadequate。
5。Becausethenmeant，inproprietyofspeech，tocorrespondtotheideasinsomeothermind。Thereforethesecomplexideasofmodes，whichtheyarereferredbythemind，andintendedtocorrespondtotheideasinthemindofsomeotherintelligentbeing，expressedbythenamesweapplytothem，theymaybeverydeficient，wrong，andinadequate；becausetheyagreenottothatwhichtheminddesignstobetheirarchetypeandpattern:inwhichrespectonlyanyideaofmodescanbewrong，imperfect，orinadequate。Andonthisaccountourideasofmixedmodesarethemostliabletobefaultyofanyother；butthisrefersmoretoproperspeakingthanknowingright。
6。Ideasofsubstances，asreferredtorealessences，notadequate。Thirdly，whatideaswehaveofsubstances，Ihaveaboveshown。Now，thoseideashaveinthemindadoublereference:1。
Sometimestheyarereferredtoasupposedrealessenceofeachspeciesofthings。2。Sometimestheyareonlydesignedtobepicturesandrepresentationsinthemindofthingsthatdoexist，byideasofthosequalitiesthatarediscoverableinthem。Inbothwhichwaysthesecopiesofthoseoriginalsandarchetypesareimperfectandinadequate。
First，itisusualformentomakethenamesofsubstancesstandforthingsassupposedtohavecertainrealessences，wherebytheyareofthisorthatspecies:andnamesstandingfornothingbuttheideasthatareinmen’sminds，theymustconstantlyrefertheirideastosuchrealessences，astotheirarchetypes。Thatmen(especiallysuchashavebeenbredupinthelearningtaughtinthispartoftheworld)dosupposecertainspecificessencesofsubstances，whicheachindividualinitsseveralkindsismadeconformabletoandpartakesof，issofarfromneedingproofthatitwillbethoughtstrangeifanyoneshoulddootherwise。Andthustheyordinarilyapplythespecificnamestheyrankparticularsubstancesunder，tothingsasdistinguishedbysuchspecificrealessences。
Whoistherealmost，whowouldnottakeitamissifitshouldbedoubtedwhetherhecalledhimselfaman，withanyothermeaningthanashavingtherealessenceofaman？Andyetifyoudemandwhatthoserealessencesare，itisplainmenareignorant，andknowthemnot。Fromwhenceitfollows，thattheideastheyhaveintheirminds，beingreferredtorealessences，astoarchetypeswhichareunknown，mustbesofarfrombeingadequatethattheycannotbesupposedtobeanyrepresentationofthematall。Thecomplexideaswehaveofsubstancesare，asithasbeenshown，certaincollectionsofsimpleideasthathavebeenobservedorsupposedconstantlytoexisttogether。Butsuchacomplexideacannotbetherealessenceofanysubstance；forthenthepropertieswediscoverinthatbodywoulddependonthatcomplexidea，andbededuciblefromit，andtheirnecessaryconnexionwithitbeknown；asallpropertiesofatriangledependon，and，asfarastheyarediscoverable，arededuciblefromthecomplexideaofthreelinesincludingaspace。
Butitisplainthatinourcomplexideasofsubstancesarenotcontainedsuchideas，onwhichalltheotherqualitiesthataretobefoundinthemdodepend。Thecommonideamenhaveofironis，abodyofacertaincolour，weight，andhardness；andapropertythattheylookonasbelongingtoit，ismalleableness。Butyetthispropertyhasnonecessaryconnexionwiththatcomplexidea，oranypartofit:andthereisnomorereasontothinkthatmalleablenessdependsonthatcolour，weight，andhardness，thanthatcolourorthatweightdependsonitsmalleableness。Andyet，thoughweknownothingoftheserealessences，thereisnothingmoreordinarythanthatmenshouldattributethesortsofthingstosuchessences。TheparticularparcelofmatterwhichmakestheringIhaveonmyfingerisforwardlybymostmensupposedtohavearealessence，wherebyitisgold；andfromwhencethosequalitiesflowwhichIfindinit，viz。
itspeculiarcolour，weight，hardness，fusibility，fixedness，andchangeofcolouruponaslighttouchofmercury，&c。Thisessence，fromwhichallthesepropertiesflow，whenIinquireintoitandsearchafterit，IplainlyperceiveIcannotdiscover:thefurthestIcangois，onlytopresumethat，itbeingnothingbutbody，itsrealessenceorinternalconstitution，onwhichthesequalitiesdepend，canbenothingbutthefigure，size，andconnexionofitssolidparts；
ofneitherofwhichhavinganydistinctperceptionatallcanIhaveanyideaofitsessence:whichisthecausethatithasthatparticularshiningyellowness；agreaterweightthananythingIknowofthesamebulk；andafitnesstohaveitscolourchangedbythetouchofquicksilver。Ifanyonewillsay，thattherealessenceandinternalconstitution，onwhichthesepropertiesdepend，isnotthefigure，size，andarrangementorconnexionofitssolidparts，butsomethingelse，calleditsparticularform，IamfurtherfromhavinganyideaofitsrealessencethanIwasbefore。ForIhaveanideaoffigure，size，andsituationofsolidpartsingeneral，thoughI
havenoneoftheparticularfigure，size，orputtingtogetherofparts，wherebythequalitiesabovementionedareproduced；whichqualitiesIfindinthatparticularparcelofmatterthatisonmyfinger，andnotinanotherparcelofmatter，withwhichIcutthepenIwritewith。But，whenIamtoldthatsomethingbesidesthefigure，size，andpostureofthesolidpartsofthatbodyinitsessence，somethingcalledsubstantialform，ofthatIconfessIhavenoideaatall，butonlyofthesoundform；whichisfarenoughfromanideaofitsrealessenceorconstitution。ThelikeignoranceasI
haveoftherealessenceofthisparticularsubstance，Ihavealsooftherealessenceofallothernaturalones:ofwhichessencesI
confessIhavenodistinctideasatall；and，Iamapttosuppose，others，whentheyexaminetheirownknowledge，willfindinthemselves，inthisonepoint，thesamesortofignorance。
7。Becausemenknownottherealessencesofsubstances。Now，then，whenmenapplytothisparticularparcelofmatteronmyfingerageneralnamealreadyinuse，anddenominateitgold，dotheynotordinarily，oraretheynotunderstoodtogiveitthatname，asbelongingtoaparticularspeciesofbodies，havingarealinternalessence；byhavingofwhichessencethisparticularsubstancecomestobeofthatspecies，andtobecalledbythatname？Ifitbeso，asitisplainitis，thenamebywhichthingsaremarkedashavingthatessencemustbereferredprimarilytothatessence；andconsequentlytheideatowhichthatnameisgivenmustbereferredalsotothatessence，andbeintendedtorepresentit。Whichessence，sincetheywhosousethenamesknownot，theirideasofsubstancesmustbeallinadequateinthatrespect，asnotcontaininginthemthatrealessencewhichthemindintendstheyshould。
8。Ideasofsubstances，whenregardedascollectionsoftheirqualities，areallinadequate。Secondly，thosewho，neglectingthatuselesssuppositionofunknownrealessences，wherebytheyaredistinguished，endeavourtocopythesubstancesthatexistintheworld，byputtingtogethertheideasofthosesensiblequalitieswhicharefoundcoexistinginthem，thoughtheycomemuchneareralikenessofthemthanthosewhoimaginetheyknownotwhatrealspecificessences:yettheyarrivenotatperfectlyadequateideasofthosesubstancestheywouldthuscopyintothetheirminds:nordothosecopiesexactlyandfullycontainallthatistobefoundintheirarchetypes。Becausethosequalitiesandpowersofsubstances，whereofwemaketheircomplexideas，aresomanyandvarious，thatnoman’scomplexideacontainsthemall。Thatourcomplexideasofsubstancesdonotcontaininthemallthesimpleideasthatareunitedinthethingsthemselvesisevident，inthatmendorarelyputintotheircomplexideaofanysubstanceallthesimpleideastheydoknowtoexistinit。Because，endeavouringtomakethesignificationoftheirnamesasclearandaslittlecumbersomeastheycan，theymaketheirspecificideasofthesortsofsubstance，forthemostpart，ofafewofthosesimpleideaswhicharetobefoundinthem:
butthesehavingnooriginalprecedency，orrighttobeputin，andmakethespecificidea，morethanothersthatareleftout，itisplainthatboththesewaysourideasofsubstancesaredeficientandinadequate。Thesimpleideaswhereofwemakeourcomplexonesofsubstancesareallofthem(batingonlythefigureandbulkofsomesorts)powers；whichbeingrelationstoothersubstances，wecanneverbesurethatweknowallthepowersthatareinanyonebody，tillwehavetriedwhatchangesitisfittedtogivetoorreceivefromothersubstancesintheirseveralwaysofapplication:whichbeingimpossibletobetrieduponanyonebody，muchlessuponall，itisimpossibleweshouldhaveadequateideasofanysubstancemadeupofacollectionofallitsproperties。
9。Theirpowersusuallymakeupourcomplexideasofsubstances。
Whosoeverfirstlightedonaparcelofthatsortofsubstancewedenotebythewordgold，couldnotrationallytakethebulkandfigureheobservedinthatlumptodependonitsrealessence，orinternalconstitution。Thereforethoseneverwentintohisideaofthatspeciesofbody；butitspeculiarcolour，perhaps，andweight，werethefirstheabstractedfromit，tomakethecomplexideaofthatspecies。
Whichbotharebutpowers；theonetoaffectoureyesaftersuchamanner，andtoproduceinusthatideawecallyellow；andtheothertoforceupwardsanyotherbodyofequalbulk，theybeingputintoapairofequalscales，oneagainstanother。Anotherperhapsaddedtothesetheideasoffusibilityandfixedness，twootherpassivepowers，inrelationtotheoperationoffireuponit；another，itsductilityandsolubilityinaquaregia，twootherpowers，relatingtotheoperationofotherbodies，inchangingitsoutwardfigure，orseparationofitintoinsensibleparts。These，orpartsofthese，puttogether，usuallymakethecomplexideainmen’smindsofthatsortofbodywecallgold。
10。Substanceshaveinnumerablepowersnotcontainedinourcomplexideasofthem。Butnoonewhohathconsideredthepropertiesofbodiesingeneral，orthissortinparticular，candoubtthatthis，calledgold，hasinfiniteotherpropertiesnotcontainedinthatcomplexidea。Somewhohaveexaminedthisspeciesmoreaccuratelycould，Ibelieve，enumeratetentimesasmanypropertiesingold，allofthemasinseparablefromitsinternalconstitution，asitscolourorweight:anditisprobable，ifanyoneknewallthepropertiesthatarebydiversmenknownofthismetal，therewouldbeanhundredtimesasmanyideasgotothecomplexideaofgoldasanyonemanyethasinhis；andyetperhapsthatnotbethethousandthpartofwhatistobediscoveredinit。Thechangesthatthatonebodyisapttoreceive，andmakeinotherbodies，uponadueapplication，exceedingfarnotonlywhatweknow，butwhatweareapttoimagine。
Whichwillnotappearsomuchaparadoxtoanyonewhowillbutconsiderhowfarmenareyetfromknowingallthepropertiesofthatone，noverycompoundfigure，atriangle；thoughitbenosmallnumberthatarealreadybymathematiciansdiscoveredofit。
11。Ideasofsubstances，beinggotonlybycollectingtheirqualities，areallinadequate。Sothatallourcomplexideasofsubstancesareimperfectandinadequate。Whichwouldbesoalsoinmathematicalfigures，ifweweretohaveourcomplexideasofthem，onlybycollectingtheirpropertiesinreferencetootherfigures。Howuncertainandimperfectwouldourideasbeofanellipsis，ifwehadnootherideaofit，butsomefewofitsproperties？Whereas，havinginourplainideathewholeessenceofthatfigure，wefromthencediscoverthoseproperties，anddemonstrativelyseehowtheyflow，andareinseparablefromit。
12。Simpleideas，ektupa，andadequate。Thusthemindhasthreesortsofabstractideasornominalessences:
First，simpleideas，whichareektupaorcopies；butyetcertainlyadequate。Because，beingintendedtoexpressnothingbutthepowerinthingstoproduceinthemindsuchasensation，thatsensationwhenitisproduced，cannotbutbetheeffectofthatpower。SothepaperI
writeon，havingthepowerinthelight(Ispeakaccordingtothecommonnotionoflight)toproduceinmenthesensationwhichIcallwhite，itcannotbutbetheeffectofsuchapowerinsomethingwithoutthemind；sincethemindhasnotthepowertoproduceanysuchideainitself:andbeingmeantfornothingelsebuttheeffectofsuchapower，thatsimpleideaisrealandadequate；thesensationofwhite，inmymind，beingtheeffectofthatpowerwhichisinthepapertoproduceit，isperfectlyadequatetothatpower；orelsethatpowerwouldproduceadifferentidea。
13。Ideasofsubstancesareektupa，andinadequate。Secondly，thecomplexideasofsubstancesareectypes，copiestoo；butnotperfectones，notadequate:whichisveryevidenttothemind，inthatitplainlyperceives，thatwhatevercollectionofsimpleideasitmakesofanysubstancethatexists，itcannotbesurethatitexactlyanswersallthatareinthatsubstance。Since，nothavingtriedalltheoperationsofallothersubstancesuponit，andfoundallthealterationsitwouldreceivefrom，orcausein，othersubstances，itcannothaveanexactadequatecollectionofallitsactiveandpassivecapacities；andsonothaveanadequatecomplexideaofthepowersofanysubstanceexisting，anditsrelations；whichisthatsortofcomplexideaofsubstanceswehave。And，afterall，ifwewouldhave，andactuallyhad，inourcomplexidea，anexactcollectionofallthesecondaryqualitiesorpowersofanysubstance，weshouldnotyettherebyhaveanideaoftheessenceofthatthing。For，sincethepowersorqualitiesthatareobservablebyusarenottherealessenceofthatsubstance，butdependonit，andflowfromit，anycollectionwhatsoeverofthesequalitiescannotbetherealessenceofthatthing。Wherebyitisplain，thatourideasofsubstancesarenotadequate；arenotwhatthemindintendsthemtobe。
Besides，amanhasnoideaofsubstanceingeneral，norknowswhatsubstanceisinitself。
14。Ideasofmodesandrelationsarearchetypesandcannotbeadequate。Thirdly，complexideasofmodesandrelationsareoriginals，andarchetypes；arenotcopies，normadeafterthepatternofanyrealexistence，towhichthemindintendsthemtobeconformable，andexactlytoanswer。Thesebeingsuchcollectionsofsimpleideasthattheminditselfputstogether，andsuchcollectionsthateachofthemcontainsinitpreciselyallthatthemindintendsthatitshould，theyarearchetypesandessencesofmodesthatmayexist；
andsoaredesignedonlyfor，andbelongonlytosuchmodesas，whentheydoexist，haveanexactconformitywiththosecomplexideas。
Theideas，therefore，ofmodesandrelationscannotbutbeadequate。
