ChapterXVIII
OtherSimpleModes1。Othersimplemodesofsimpleideasofsensation。ThoughIhave，intheforegoingchapters，shownhow，fromsimpleideastakeninbysensation，themindcomestoextenditselfeventoinfinity；which，howeveritmayofallothersseemmostremotefromanysensibleperception，yetatlasthathnothinginitbutwhatismadeoutofsimpleideas:receivedintothemindbythesenses，andafterwardsthereputtogether，bythefacultythemindhastorepeatitsownideas；-Though，Isay，thesemightbeinstancesenoughofsimplemodesofthesimpleideasofsensation，andsufficetoshowhowthemindcomesbythem，yetIshall，formethod’ssake，thoughbriefly，giveanaccountofsomefewmore，andthenproceedtomorecomplexideas。
2。Simplemodesofmotion。Toslide，roll，tumble，walk，creep，run，dance，leap，skip，andabundanceofothersthatmightbenamed，arewordswhicharenosoonerheardbuteveryonewhounderstandsEnglishhaspresentlyinhisminddistinctideas，whichareallbutthedifferentmodificationsofmotion。Modesofmotionanswerthoseofextension；swiftandslowaretwodifferentideasofmotion，themeasureswhereofaremadeofthedistancesoftimeandspaceputtogether；sotheyarecomplexideas，comprehendingtimeandspacewithmotion。
3。Modesofsounds。Thelikevarietyhaveweinsounds。Everyarticulatewordisadifferentmodificationofsound；bywhichweseethat，fromthesenseofhearing，bysuchmodifications，themindmaybefurnishedwithdistinctideas，toalmostaninfinitenumber。
Soundsalso，besidesthedistinctcriesofbirdsandbeasts，aremodifiedbydiversityofnotesofdifferentlengthputtogether，whichmakethatcomplexideacalledatune，whichamusicianmayhaveinhismindwhenhehearsormakesnosoundatall，byreflectingontheideasofthosesounds，soputtogethersilentlyinhisownfancy。
4。Modesofcolours。Thoseofcoloursarealsoveryvarious:somewetakenoticeofasthedifferentdegrees，orastheyweretermedshades，ofthesamecolour。Butsinceweveryseldommakeassemblagesofcolours，eitherforuseordelight，butfigureistakeninalso，andhasitspartinit，asinpainting，weaving，needleworks，&c。；thosewhicharetakennoticeofdomostcommonlybelongtomixedmodes，asbeingmadeupofideasofdiverskinds，viz。figureandcolour，suchasbeauty，rainbow，&c。
5。Modesoftastes。Allcompoundedtastesandsmellsarealsomodes，madeupofthesimpleideasofthosesenses。Butthey，beingsuchasgenerallywehavenonamesfor，arelesstakennoticeof，andcannotbesetdowninwriting；andthereforemustbeleftwithoutenumerationtothethoughtsandexperienceofmyreader。
6。Somesimplemodeshavenonames。Ingeneralitmaybeobserved，thatthosesimplemodeswhichareconsideredbutasdifferentdegreesofthesamesimpleidea，thoughtheyareinthemselvesmanyofthemverydistinctideas，yethaveordinarilynodistinctnames，noraremuchtakennoticeof，asdistinctideas，wherethedifferenceisbutverysmallbetweenthem。Whethermenhaveneglectedthesemodes，andgivennonamestothem，aswantingmeasuresnicelytodistinguishthem；orbecause，whentheyweresodistinguished，thatknowledgewouldnotbeofgeneralornecessaryuse，Ileaveittothethoughtsofothers。Itissufficienttomypurposetoshow，thatalloursimpleideascometoourmindsonlybysensationandreflection；andthatwhenthemindhasthem，itcanvariouslyrepeatandcompoundthem，andsomakenewcomplexideas。But，thoughwhite，red，orsweet，&c。havenotbeenmodified，ormadeintocomplexideas，byseveralcombinations，soastobenamed，andtherebyrankedintospecies；yetsomeothersofthesimpleideas，viz。thoseofunity，duration，andmotion，&c。，aboveinstancedin，asalsopowerandthinking，havebeenthusmodifiedtoagreatvarietyofcomplexideas，withnamesbelongingtothem。
7。Whysomemodeshave，andothershavenot，names。Thereasonwhereof，Isuppose，hasbeenthis，-Thatthegreatconcernmentofmenbeingwithmenoneamongstanother，theknowledgeofmen，andtheiractions，andthesignifyingofthemtooneanother，wasmostnecessary；andthereforetheymadeideasofactionsverynicelymodified，andgavethosecomplexideasnames，thattheymightthemoreeasilyrecordanddiscourseofthosethingstheyweredailyconversantin，withoutlongambagesandcircumlocutions；andthatthethingstheywerecontinuallytogiveandreceiveinformationaboutmightbetheeasierandquickerunderstood。Thatthisisso，andthatmeninframingdifferentcomplexideas，andgivingthemnames，havebeenmuchgovernedbytheendofspeechingeneral，(whichisaveryshortandexpeditewayofconveyingtheirthoughtsonetoanother)，isevidentinthenameswhichinseveralartshavebeenfoundout，andappliedtoseveralcomplexideasofmodifiedactions，belongingtotheirseveraltrades，fordispatchsake，intheirdirectionordiscoursesaboutthem。Whichideasarenotgenerallyframedinthemindsofmennotconversantabouttheseoperations。Andthencethewordsthatstandforthem，bythegreatestpartofmenofthesamelanguage，arenotunderstood:v。g。coltshire，drilling，filtration，cohobation，arewordsstandingforcertaincomplexideas，whichbeingseldominthemindsofanybutthosefewwhoseparticularemploymentsdoateveryturnsuggestthemtotheirthoughts，thosenamesofthemarenotgenerallyunderstoodbutbysmithsandchymists；who，havingframedthecomplexideaswhichthesewordsstandfor，andhavinggivennamestothem，orreceivedthemfromothers，uponhearingofthesenamesincommunication，readilyconceivethoseideasintheirminds；-asbycohobationallthesimpleideasofdistilling，andthepouringtheliquordistilledfromanythingbackupontheremainingmatter，anddistillingitagain。Thusweseethattherearegreatvarietiesofsimpleideas，asoftastesandsmells，whichhavenonames；andofmodesmanymore；whicheithernothavingbeengenerallyenoughobserved，orelsenotbeingofanygreatusetobetakennoticeofintheaffairsandconverseofmen，theyhavenothadnamesgiventothem，andsopassnotforspecies。Thisweshallhaveoccasionhereaftertoconsidermoreatlarge，whenwecometospeakofwords。
ChapterXIX
OftheModesofThinking1。Sensation，remembrance，contemplation，&c。，modesofthinking。
Whenthemindturnsitsviewinwardsuponitself，andcontemplatesitsownactions，thinkingisthefirstthatoccurs。Initthemindobservesagreatvarietyofmodifications，andfromthencereceivesdistinctideas。Thustheperceptionorthoughtwhichactuallyaccompanies，andisannexedto，anyimpressiononthebody，madebyanexternalobject，beingdistinctfromallothermodificationsofthinking，furnishesthemindwithadistinctidea，whichwecallsensation；-whichis，asitwere，theactualentranceofanyideaintotheunderstandingbythesenses。Thesameidea，whenitagainrecurswithouttheoperationofthelikeobjectontheexternalsensory，isremembrance:ifitbesoughtafterbythemind，andwithpainandendeavourfound，andbroughtagaininview，itisrecollection:ifitbeheldtherelongunderattentiveconsideration，itiscontemplation:whenideasfloatinourmind，withoutanyreflectionorregardoftheunderstanding，itisthatwhichtheFrenchcallreverie；
ourlanguagehasscarceanameforit:whentheideasthatofferthemselves(for，asIhaveobservedinanotherplace，whilstweareawake，therewillalwaysbeatrainofideassucceedingoneanotherinourminds)aretakennoticeof，and，asitwere，registeredinthememory，itisattention:whenthemindwithgreatearnestness，andofchoice，fixesitsviewonanyidea，considersitonallsides，andwillnotbecalledoffbytheordinarysolicitationofotherideas，itisthatwecallintentionorstudy:sleep，withoutdreaming，isrestfromallthese:anddreamingitselfisthehavingofideas(whilsttheoutwardsensesarestopped，sothattheyreceivenotoutwardobjectswiththeirusualquickness)inthemind，notsuggestedbyanyexternalobjects，orknownoccasion；norunderanychoiceorconductoftheunderstandingatall:andwhetherthatwhichwecallecstasybenotdreamingwiththeeyesopen，Ileavetobeexamined。
2。Othermodesofthinking。Thesearesomefewinstancesofthosevariousmodesofthinking，whichthemindmayobserveinitself，andsohaveasdistinctideasofasithathofwhiteandred，asquareoracircle。Idonotpretendtoenumeratethemall，nortotreatatlargeofthissetofideas，whicharegotfromreflection:thatwouldbetomakeavolume。Itsufficestomypresentpurposetohaveshownhere，bysomefewexamples，ofwhatsorttheseideasare，andhowthemindcomesbythem；especiallysinceIshallhaveoccasionhereaftertotreatmoreatlargeofreasoning，judging，volition，andknowledge，whicharesomeofthemostconsiderableoperationsofthemind，andmodesofthinking。
3。Thevariousdegreesofattentioninthinking。Butperhapsitmaynotbeanunpardonabledigression，norwhollyimpertinenttoourpresentdesign，ifwereflecthereuponthedifferentstateofthemindinthinking，whichthoseinstancesofattention，reverie，anddreaming，&c。，beforementioned，naturallyenoughsuggest。Thatthereareideas，someorother，alwayspresentinthemindofawakingman，everyone’sexperienceconvinceshim；thoughthemindemploysitselfaboutthemwithseveraldegreesofattention。Sometimesthemindfixesitselfwithsomuchearnestnessonthecontemplationofsomeobjects，thatitturnstheirideasonallsides；markstheirrelationsandcircumstances；andviewseverypartsonicelyandwithsuchintention，thatitshutsoutallotherthoughts，andtakesnonoticeoftheordinaryimpressionsmadethenonthesenses，whichatanotherseasonwouldproduceverysensibleperceptions:atothertimesitbarelyobservesthetrainofideasthatsucceedintheunderstanding，withoutdirectingandpursuinganyofthem:andatothertimesitletsthempassalmostquiteunregarded，asfaintshadowsthatmakenoimpression。
4。Henceitisprobablethatthinkingistheaction，nottheessenceofthesoul。Thisdifferenceofintention，andremissionofthemindinthinking，withagreatvarietyofdegreesbetweenearneststudyandverynearmindingnothingatall，everyone，Ithink，hasexperimentedinhimself。Traceitalittlefurther，andyoufindthemindinsleepretiredasitwerefromthesenses，andoutofthereachofthosemotionsmadeontheorgansofsense，whichatothertimesproduceveryvividandsensibleideas。Ineednot，forthis，instanceinthosewhosleepoutwholestormynights，withouthearingthethunder，orseeingthelightning，orfeelingtheshakingofthehouse，whicharesensibleenoughtothosewhoarewaking。Butinthisretirementofthemindfromthesenses，itoftenretainsayetmorelooseandincoherentmannerofthinking，whichwecalldreaming。And，lastofall，soundsleepclosesthescenequite，andputsanendtoallappearances。This，Ithinkalmosteveryonehasexperienceofinhimself，andhisownobservationwithoutdifficultyleadshimthusfar。ThatwhichIwouldfurtherconcludefromhenceis，thatsincethemindcansensiblyputon，atseveraltimes，severaldegreesofthinking，andbesometimes，eveninawakingman，soremiss，astohavethoughtsdimandobscuretothatdegreethattheyareverylittleremovedfromnoneatall；andatlast，inthedarkretirementsofsoundsleep，losesthesightperfectlyofallideaswhatsoever:since，Isay，thisisevidentlysoinmatteroffactandconstantexperience，Iaskwhetheritbenotprobable，thatthinkingistheactionandnottheessenceofthesoul？Sincetheoperationsofagentswilleasilyadmitofintentionandremission:buttheessencesofthingsarenotconceivedcapableofanysuchvariation。
Butthisbytheby。
ChapterXX
OfModesofPleasureandPain1。Pleasureandpain，simpleideas。Amongstthesimpleideaswhichwereceivebothfromsensationandreflection，painandpleasurearetwoveryconsiderableones。Forasinthebodythereissensationbarelyinitself，oraccompaniedwithpainorpleasure，sothethoughtorperceptionofthemindissimplyso，orelseaccompaniedalsowithpleasureorpain，delightortrouble，callithowyouplease。
These，likeothersimpleideas，cannotbedescribed，northeirnamesdefined；thewayofknowingthemis，asofthesimpleideasofthesenses，onlybyexperience。For，todefinethembythepresenceofgoodorevil，isnootherwisetomakethemknowntousthanbymakingusreflectonwhatwefeelinourselves，upontheseveralandvariousoperationsofgoodandeviluponourminds，astheyaredifferentlyappliedtoorconsideredbyus。
2。Goodandevil，what。Thingsthenaregoodorevil，onlyinreferencetopleasureorpain。Thatwecallgood，whichisapttocauseorincreasepleasure，ordiminishpaininus；orelsetoprocureorpreserveusthepossessionofanyothergoodorabsenceofanyevil。And，onthecontrary，wenamethatevilwhichisapttoproduceorincreaseanypain，ordiminishanypleasureinus:orelsetoprocureusanyevil，ordepriveusofanygood。Bypleasureandpain，Imustbeunderstoodtomeanofbodyormind，astheyarecommonlydistinguished；thoughintruththeybeonlydifferentconstitutionsofthemind，sometimesoccasionedbydisorderinthebody，sometimesbythoughtsofthemind。
3。Ourpassionsmovedbygoodandevil。Pleasureandpainandthatwhichcausesthem，-goodandevil，arethehingesonwhichourpassionsturn。Andifwereflectonourselves，andobservehowthese，undervariousconsiderations，operateinus；whatmodificationsortempersofmind，whatinternalsensations(ifImaysocallthem)
theyproduceinuswemaythenceformtoourselvestheideasofourpassions。
4。Love。Thusanyonereflectinguponthethoughthehasofthedelightwhichanypresentorabsentthingisapttoproduceinhim，hastheideawecalllove。Forwhenamandeclaresinautumnwhenheiseatingthem，orinspringwhentherearenone，thathelovesgrapes，itisnomorebutthatthetasteofgrapesdelightshim:letanalterationofhealthorconstitutiondestroythedelightoftheirtaste，andhethencanbesaidtolovegrapesnolonger。
5。Hatred。Onthecontrary，thethoughtofthepainwhichanythingpresentorabsentisapttoproduceinus，iswhatwecallhatred。
Wereitmybusinessheretoinquireanyfurtherthanintothebareideasofourpassions，astheydependondifferentmodificationsofpleasureandpain，Ishouldremark，thatourloveandhatredofinanimateinsensiblebeingsiscommonlyfoundedonthatpleasureandpainwhichwereceivefromtheiruseandapplicationanywaytooursenses，thoughwiththeirdestruction。Buthatredorlove，tobeingscapableofhappinessormisery，isoftentheuneasinessordelightwhichwefindinourselves，arisingfromaconsiderationoftheirverybeingorhappiness。Thusthebeingandwelfareofaman’schildrenorfriends，producingconstantdelightinhim，heissaidconstantlytolovethem。Butitsufficestonote，thatourideasofloveandhatredarebutthedispositionsofthemind，inrespectofpleasureandpainingeneral，howevercausedinus。
6。Desire。Theuneasinessamanfindsinhimselfupontheabsenceofanythingwhosepresentenjoymentcarriestheideaofdelightwithit，isthatwecalldesire；whichisgreaterorless，asthatuneasinessismoreorlessvehement。Where，bytheby，itmayperhapsbeofsomeusetoremark，thatthechief，ifnotonlyspurtohumanindustryandactionisuneasiness。Forwhatsoevergoodisproposed，ifitsabsencecarriesnodispleasureorpainwithit，ifamanbeeasyandcontentwithoutit，thereisnodesireofit，norendeavourafterit；thereisnomorebutabarevelleity，thetermusedtosignifythelowestdegreeofdesire，andthatwhichisnexttononeatall，whenthereissolittleuneasinessintheabsenceofanything，thatitcarriesamannofurtherthansomefaintwishesforit，withoutanymoreeffectualorvigoroususeofthemeanstoattainit。Desirealsoisstoppedorabatedbytheopinionoftheimpossibilityorunattainablenessofthegoodproposed，asfarastheuneasinessiscuredorallayedbythatconsideration。Thismightcarryourthoughtsfurther，wereitseasonableinthisplace。
7。Joyisadelightofthemind，fromtheconsiderationofthepresentorassuredapproachingpossessionofagood；andwearethenpossessedofanygood，whenwehaveitsoinourpowerthatwecanuseitwhenweplease。Thusamanalmoststarvedhasjoyatthearrivalofrelief，evenbeforehehasthepleasureofusingit:andafather，inwhomtheverywell-beingofhischildrencausesdelight，isalways，aslongashischildrenareinsuchastate，inthepossessionofthatgood；forheneedsbuttoreflectonit，tohavethatpleasure。
8。Sorrowisuneasinessinthemind，uponthethoughtofagoodlost，whichmighthavebeenenjoyedlonger；orthesenseofapresentevil。
9。Hopeisthatpleasureinthemind，whicheveryonefindsinhimself，uponthethoughtofaprobablefutureenjoymentofathingwhichisapttodelighthim。
10。Fearisanuneasinessofthemind，uponthethoughtoffutureevillikelytobefalus。
11。Despairisthethoughtoftheunattainablenessofanygood，whichworksdifferentlyinmen’sminds，sometimesproducinguneasinessorpain，sometimesrestandindolency。
12。Angerisuneasinessordiscomposureofthemind，uponthereceiptofanyinjury，withapresentpurposeofrevenge。
13。Envyisanuneasinessofthemind，causedbytheconsiderationofagoodwedesireobtainedbyonewethinkshouldnothavehaditbeforeus。
14。Whatpassionsallmenhave。Thesetwolast，envyandanger，notbeingcausedbypainandpleasuresimplyinthemselves，buthavinginthemsomemixedconsiderationsofourselvesandothers，arenotthereforetobefoundinallmen，becausethoseotherparts，ofvaluingtheirmerits，orintendingrevenge，iswantinginthem。Butalltherest，terminatingpurelyinpainandpleasure，are，Ithink，tobefoundinallmen。Forwelove，desire，rejoice，andhope，onlyinrespectofpleasure；wehate，fear，andgrieve，onlyinrespectofpainultimately。Infine，allthesepassionsaremovedbythings，onlyastheyappeartobethecausesofpleasureandpain，ortohavepleasureorpainsomewayorotherannexedtothem。Thusweextendourhatredusuallytothesubject(atleast，ifasensibleorvoluntaryagent)whichhasproducedpaininus；becausethefearitleavesisaconstantpain:butwedonotsoconstantlylovewhathasdoneusgood；becausepleasureoperatesnotsostronglyonusaspain，andbecausewearenotsoreadytohavehopeitwilldosoagain。
Butthisbytheby。
15。Pleasureandpain，what。Bypleasureandpain，delightanduneasiness，Imustallalongbeunderstood(asIhaveaboveintimated)
tomeannotonlybodilypainandpleasure，butwhatsoeverdelightoruneasinessisfeltbyus，whetherarisingfromanygratefulorunacceptablesensationorreflection。
16。Removalorlesseningofeither。Itisfurthertobeconsidered，that，inreferencetothepassions，theremovalorlesseningofapainisconsidered，andoperates，asapleasure:andthelossordiminishingofapleasure，asapain。
17。Shame。Thepassionstoohavemostofthem，inmostpersons，operationsonthebody，andcausevariouschangesinit；whichnotbeingalwayssensible，donotmakeanecessarypartoftheideaofeachpassion。Forshame，whichisanuneasinessoftheminduponthethoughtofhavingdonesomethingwhichisindecent，orwilllessenthevaluedesteemwhichothershaveforus，hasnotalwaysblushingaccompanyingit。
18。Theseinstancestoshowhowourideasofthepassionsaregotfromsensationandreflection。Iwouldnotbemistakenhere，asifI
meantthisasaDiscourseofthePassions；theyaremanymorethanthoseIhaveherenamed:andthoseIhavetakennoticeofwouldeachofthemrequireamuchlargerandmoreaccuratediscourse。Ihaveonlymentionedthesehere，assomanyinstancesofmodesofpleasureandpainresultinginourmindsfromvariousconsiderationsofgoodandevil。Imightperhapshaveinstancedinothermodesofpleasureandpain，moresimplethanthese；asthepainofhungerandthirst，andthepleasureofeatinganddrinkingtoremovethem:thepainofteethsetonedge；thepleasureofmusic；painfromcaptiousuninstructivewrangling，andthepleasureofrationalconversationwithafriend，orofwell-directedstudyinthesearchanddiscoveryoftruth。Butthepassionsbeingofmuchmoreconcernmenttous，I
rathermadechoicetoinstanceinthem，andshowhowtheideaswehaveofthemarederivedfromsensationorreflection。
ChapterXXI
OfPower1。Thisideahowgot。Themindbeingeverydayinformed，bythesenses，ofthealterationofthosesimpleideasitobservesinthingswithout；andtakingnoticehowonecomestoanend，andceasestobe，andanotherbeginstoexistwhichwasnotbefore；
reflectingalsoonwhatpasseswithinitself，andobservingaconstantchangeofitsideas，sometimesbytheimpressionofoutwardobjectsonthesenses，andsometimesbythedeterminationofitsownchoice；
andconcludingfromwhatithassoconstantlyobservedtohavebeen，thatthelikechangeswillforthefuturebemadeinthesamethings，bylikeagents，andbythelikeways，-considersinonethingthepossibilityofhavinganyofitssimpleideaschanged，andinanotherthepossibilityofmakingthatchange；andsocomesbythatideawhichwecallpower。Thuswesay，Firehasapowertomeltgold，i。e。todestroytheconsistencyofitsinsensibleparts，andconsequentlyitshardness，andmakeitfluid；andgoldhasapowertobemelted；thatthesunhasapowertoblanchwax，andwaxapowertobeblanchedbythesun，wherebytheyellownessisdestroyed，andwhitenessmadetoexistinitsroom。Inwhich，andthelikecases，thepowerweconsiderisinreferencetothechangeofperceivableideas。Forwecannotobserveanyalterationtobemadein，oroperationuponanything，butbytheobservablechangeofitssensibleideas；norconceiveanyalterationtobemade，butbyconceivingachangeofsomeofitsideas。
2。Power，activeandpassive。Powerthusconsideredistwo-fold，viz。asabletomake，orabletoreceiveanychange。Theonemaybecalledactive，andtheotherpassivepower。Whethermatterbenotwhollydestituteofactivepower，asitsauthor，God，istrulyaboveallpassivepower；andwhethertheintermediatestateofcreatedspiritsbenotthatalonewhichiscapableofbothactiveandpassivepower，maybeworthconsideration。Ishallnotnowenterintothatinquiry，mypresentbusinessbeingnottosearchintotheoriginalofpower，buthowwecomebytheideaofit。Butsinceactivepowersmakesogreatapartofourcomplexideasofnaturalsubstances，(asweshallseehereafter，)andImentionthemassuch，accordingtocommonapprehension；yettheybeingnot，perhaps，sotrulyactivepowersasourhastythoughtsareapttorepresentthem，I
judgeitnotamiss，bythisintimation，todirectourmindstotheconsiderationofGodandspirits，fortheclearestideaofactivepower。
3。Powerincludesrelation。Iconfesspowerincludesinitsomekindofrelation，(arelationtoactionorchange，)asindeedwhichofourideas，ofwhatkindsoever，whenattentivelyconsidered，doesnot？
For，ourideasofextension，duration，andnumber，dotheynotallcontaininthemasecretrelationoftheparts？Figureandmotionhavesomethingrelativeinthemmuchmorevisibly。Andsensiblequalities，ascoloursandsmells，&c。，whataretheybutthepowersofdifferentbodies，inrelationtoourperception，&c。？And，ifconsideredinthethingsthemselves，dotheynotdependonthebulk，figure，texture，andmotionoftheparts？Allwhichincludesomekindofrelationinthem。Ourideathereforeofpower，Ithink，maywellhaveaplaceamongstothersimpleideas，andbeconsideredasoneofthem；beingoneofthosethatmakeaprincipalingredientinourcomplexideasofsubstances，asweshallhereafterhaveoccasiontoobserve。
4。Theclearestideaofactivepowerhadfromspirit。Weareabundantlyfurnishedwiththeideaofpassivepowerbyalmostallsortsofsensiblethings。Inmostofthemwecannotavoidobservingtheirsensiblequalities，nay，theirverysubstances，tobeinacontinualflux。Andthereforewithreasonwelookonthemasliablestilltothesamechange。Norhaveweofactivepower(whichisthemorepropersignificationofthewordpower)fewerinstances。Sincewhateverchangeisobserved，themindmustcollectapowersomewhereabletomakethatchange，aswellasapossibilityinthethingitselftoreceiveit。Butyet，ifwewillconsideritattentively，bodies，byoursenses，donotaffordussoclearanddistinctanideaofactivepower，aswehavefromreflectionontheoperationsofourminds。
Forallpowerrelatingtoaction，andtherebeingbuttwosortsofactionwhereofwehaveanidea，viz。thinkingandmotion，letusconsiderwhencewehavetheclearestideasofthepowerswhichproducetheseactions。(1)Ofthinking，bodyaffordsusnoideaatall；itisonlyfromreflectionthatwehavethat。(2)Neitherhavewefrombodyanyideaofthebeginningofmotion。Abodyatrestaffordsusnoideaofanyactivepowertomove；andwhenitissetinmotionitself，thatmotionisratherapassionthananactioninit。For，whentheballobeysthemotionofabilliard-stick，itisnotanyactionoftheball，butbarepassion。Alsowhenbyimpulseitsetsanotherballinmotionthatlayinitsway，itonlycommunicatesthemotionithadreceivedfromanother，andlosesinitselfsomuchastheotherreceived:whichgivesusbutaveryobscureideaofanactivepowerofmovinginbody，whilstweobserveitonlytotransfer，butnotproduceanymotion。Foritisbutaveryobscureideaofpowerwhichreachesnottheproductionoftheaction，butthecontinuationofthepassion。
Forsoismotioninabodyimpelledbyanother；thecontinuationofthealterationmadeinitfromresttomotionbeinglittlemoreanaction，thanthecontinuationofthealterationofitsfigurebythesameblowisanaction。Theideaofthebeginningofmotionwehaveonlyfromreflectiononwhatpassesinourselves；wherewefindbyexperience，that，barelybywillingit，barelybyathoughtofthemind，wecanmovethepartsofourbodies，whichwerebeforeatrest。Sothatitseemstome，wehave，fromtheobservationoftheoperationofbodiesbyoursenses，butaveryimperfectobscureideaofactivepower；sincetheyaffordusnotanyideainthemselvesofthepowertobeginanyaction，eithermotionorthought。Butif，fromtheimpulsebodiesareobservedtomakeoneuponanother，anyonethinkshehasaclearideaofpower，itservesaswelltomypurpose；sensationbeingoneofthosewayswherebythemindcomesbyitsideas:onlyIthoughtitworthwhiletoconsiderhere，bytheway，whethertheminddothnotreceiveitsideaofactivepowerclearerfromreflectiononitsownoperations，thanitdothfromanyexternalsensation。
5。Willandunderstandingtwopowersinmindorspirit。This，atleast，Ithinkevident，-Thatwefindinourselvesapowertobeginorforbear，continueorendseveralactionsofourminds，andmotionsofourbodies，barelybyathoughtorpreferenceofthemindordering，orasitwerecommanding，thedoingornotdoingsuchorsuchaparticularaction。Thispowerwhichthemindhasthustoordertheconsiderationofanyidea，ortheforbearingtoconsiderit；ortopreferthemotionofanypartofthebodytoitsrest，andviceversa，inanyparticularinstance，isthatwhichwecalltheWill。Theactualexerciseofthatpower，bydirectinganyparticularaction，oritsforbearance，isthatwhichwecallvolitionorwilling。Theforbearanceofthataction，consequenttosuchorderorcommandofthemind，iscalledvoluntary。Andwhatsoeveractionisperformedwithoutsuchathoughtofthemind，iscalledinvoluntary。ThepowerofperceptionisthatwhichwecalltheUnderstanding。Perception，whichwemaketheactoftheunderstanding，isofthreesorts:-1。Theperceptionofideasinourminds。2。Theperceptionofthesignificationofsigns。3。Theperceptionoftheconnexionorrepugnancy，agreementordisagreement，thatthereisbetweenanyofourideas。Alltheseareattributedtotheunderstanding，orperceptivepower，thoughitbethetwolatteronlythatuseallowsustosayweunderstand。
6。Faculties，notrealbeings。Thesepowersofthemind，viz。ofperceiving，andofpreferring，areusuallycalledbyanothername。Andtheordinarywayofspeakingis，thattheunderstandingandwillaretwofacultiesofthemind；awordproperenough，ifitbeused，asallwordsshouldbe，soasnottobreedanyconfusioninmen’sthoughts，bybeingsupposed(asIsuspectithasbeen)tostandforsomerealbeingsinthesoulthatperformedthoseactionsofunderstandingandvolition。Forwhenwesaythewillisthecommandingandsuperiorfacultyofthesoul；thatitisorisnotfree；thatitdeterminestheinferiorfaculties；thatitfollowsthedictatesoftheunderstanding，&c。，-thoughtheseandthelikeexpressions，bythosethatcarefullyattendtotheirownideas，andconducttheirthoughtsmorebytheevidenceofthingsthanthesoundofwords，maybeunderstoodinaclearanddistinctsense-yetIsuspect，Isay，thatthiswayofspeakingoffacultieshasmisledmanyintoaconfusednotionofsomanydistinctagentsinus，whichhadtheirseveralprovincesandauthorities，anddidcommand，obey，andperformseveralactions，assomanydistinctbeings；whichhasbeennosmalloccasionofwrangling，obscurity，anduncertainty，inquestionsrelatingtothem。
7。Whencetheideasoflibertyandnecessity。Everyone，Ithink，findsinhimselfapowertobeginorforbear，continueorputanendtoseveralactionsinhimself。Fromtheconsiderationoftheextentofthispowerofthemindovertheactionsoftheman，whicheveryonefindsinhimself，arisetheideasoflibertyandnecessity。
8。Liberty，what。Alltheactionsthatwehaveanyideaofreducingthemselves，ashasbeensaid，tothesetwo，viz。thinkingandmotion；sofarasamanhaspowertothinkornottothink，tomoveornottomove，accordingtothepreferenceordirectionofhisownmind，sofarisamanfree。Whereveranyperformanceorforbearancearenotequallyinaman’spower；whereverdoingornotdoingwillnotequallyfollowuponthepreferenceofhisminddirectingit，thereheisnotfree，thoughperhapstheactionmaybevoluntary。Sothattheideaoflibertyis，theideaofapowerinanyagenttodoorforbearanyparticularaction，accordingtothedeterminationorthoughtofthemind，wherebyeitherofthemispreferredtotheother:
whereeitherofthemisnotinthepoweroftheagenttobeproducedbyhimaccordingtohisvolition，thereheisnotatliberty；thatagentisundernecessity。Sothatlibertycannotbewherethereisnothought，novolition，nowill；buttheremaybethought，theremaybewill，theremaybevolition，wherethereisnoliberty。A
littleconsiderationofanobviousinstanceortwomaymakethisclear。
9。Supposesunderstandingandwill。Atennis-ball，whetherinmotionbythestrokeofaracket，orlyingstillatrest，isnotbyanyonetakentobeafreeagent。Ifweinquireintothereason，weshallfinditisbecauseweconceivenotatennis-balltothink，andconsequentlynottohaveanyvolition，orpreferenceofmotiontorest，orviceversa；andthereforehasnotliberty，isnotafreeagent；butallitsbothmotionandrestcomeunderourideaofnecessary，andaresocalled。Likewiseamanfallingintothewater，(abridgebreakingunderhim)，hasnothereinliberty，isnotafreeagent。Forthoughhehasvolition，thoughheprefershisnotfallingtofalling；yettheforbearanceofthatmotionnotbeinginhispower，thestoporcessationofthatmotionfollowsnotuponhisvolition；andthereforethereinheisnotfree。Soamanstrikinghimself，orhisfriend，byaconvulsivemotionofhisarm，whichitisnotinhispower，byvolitionorthedirectionofhismind，tostoporforbear，nobodythinkshehasinthisliberty；everyonepitieshim，asactingbynecessityandconstraint。
10。Belongsnottovolition。Again:supposeamanbecarried，whilstfastasleep，intoaroomwhereisapersonhelongstoseeandspeakwith；andbetherelockedfastin，beyondhispowertogetout:heawakes，andisgladtofindhimselfinsodesirablecompany，whichhestayswillinglyin，i。e。prefershisstaytogoingaway。Iask，isnotthisstayvoluntary？Ithinknobodywilldoubtit:andyet，beinglockedfastin，itisevidentheisnotatlibertynottostay，hehasnotfreedomtobegone。Sothatlibertyisnotanideabelongingtovolition，orpreferring；buttothepersonhavingthepowerofdoing，orforbearingtodo，accordingasthemindshallchooseordirect。Ourideaoflibertyreachesasfarasthatpower，andnofarther。Forwhereverrestraintcomestocheckthatpower，orcompulsiontakesawaythatindifferencyofabilitytoact，ortoforbearacting，thereliberty，andournotionofit，presentlyceases。
11。Voluntaryopposedtoinvoluntary，nottonecessary。Wehaveinstancesenough，andoftenmorethanenough，inourownbodies。A
man’sheartbeats，andthebloodcirculates，whichitisnotinhispowerbyanythoughtorvolitiontostop；andthereforeinrespectofthesemotions，whererestdependsnotonhischoice，norwouldfollowthedeterminationofhismind，ifitshouldpreferit，heisnotafreeagent。Convulsivemotionsagitatehislegs，sothatthoughhewillsiteversomuch，hecannotbyanypowerofhismindstoptheirmotion，(asinthatodddiseasecalledchoreasanctiviti)，butheisperpetuallydancing；heisnotatlibertyinthisaction，butunderasmuchnecessityofmoving，asastonethatfalls，oratennis-ballstruckwitharacket。Ontheotherside，apalsyorthestockshinderhislegsfromobeyingthedeterminationofhismind，ifitwouldtherebytransferhisbodytoanotherplace。Inallthesethereiswantoffreedom；thoughthesittingstill，evenofaparalytic，whilstheprefersittoaremoval，istrulyvoluntary。
Voluntary，then，isnotopposedtonecessary，buttoinvoluntary。
Foramanmaypreferwhathecando，towhathecannotdo；thestateheisin，toitsabsenceorchange；thoughnecessityhasmadeitinitselfunalterable。
12。Liberty，what。Asitisinthemotionsofthebody，soitisinthethoughtsofourminds:whereanyoneissuch，thatwehavepowertotakeitup，orlayitby，accordingtothepreferenceofthemind，thereweareatliberty。Awakingman，beingunderthenecessityofhavingsomeideasconstantlyinhismind，isnotatlibertytothinkornottothink；nomorethanheisatliberty，whetherhisbodyshalltouchanyotherorno:butwhetherhewillremovehiscontemplationfromoneideatoanotherismanytimesinhischoice；andthenheis，inrespectofhisideas，asmuchatlibertyasheisinrespectofbodiesherestson；hecanatpleasureremovehimselffromonetoanother。Butyetsomeideastothemind，likesomemotionstothebody，aresuchasincertaincircumstancesitcannotavoid，norobtaintheirabsencebytheutmosteffortitcanuse。Amanontherackisnotatlibertytolaybytheideaofpain，anddiverthimselfwithothercontemplations:andsometimesaboisterouspassionhurriesourthoughts，asahurricanedoesourbodies，withoutleavingusthelibertyofthinkingonotherthings，whichwewouldratherchoose。Butassoonasthemindregainsthepowertostoporcontinue，beginorforbear，anyofthesemotionsofthebodywithout，orthoughtswithin，accordingasitthinksfittoprefereithertotheother，wethenconsiderthemanasafreeagentagain。
13。Necessity，what。Whereverthoughtiswhollywanting，orthepowertoactorforbearaccordingtothedirectionofthought，therenecessitytakesplace。This，inanagentcapableofvolition，whenthebeginningorcontinuationofanyactioniscontrarytothatpreferenceofhismind，iscalledcompulsion；whenthehinderingorstoppinganyactioniscontrarytohisvolition，itiscalledrestraint。Agentsthathavenothought，novolitionatall，areineverythingnecessaryagents。
14。Libertybelongsnottothewill。Ifthisbeso，(asIimagineitis，)Ileaveittobeconsidered，whetheritmaynothelptoputanendtothatlongagitated，and，Ithink，unreasonable，becauseunintelligiblequestion，viz。Whetherman’swillbefreeorno？ForifImistakenot，itfollowsfromwhatIhavesaid，thatthequestionitselfisaltogetherimproper；anditisasinsignificanttoaskwhetherman’swillbefree，astoaskwhetherhissleepbeswift，orhisvirtuesquare:libertybeingaslittleapplicabletothewill，asswiftnessofmotionistosleep，orsquarenesstovirtue。Everyonewouldlaughattheabsurdityofsuchaquestionaseitherofthese:
becauseitisobviousthatthemodificationsofmotionbelongnottosleep，northedifferenceoffiguretovirtue；andwhenonewellconsidersit，Ithinkhewillasplainlyperceivethatliberty，whichisbutapower，belongsonlytoagents，andcannotbeanattributeormodificationofthewill，whichisalsobutapower。
15。Volition。Suchisthedifficultyofexplainingandgivingclearnotionsofinternalactionsbysounds，thatImustherewarnmyreader，thatordering，directing，choosing，preferring，&c。，whichIhavemadeuseof，willnotdistinctlyenoughexpressvolition，unlesshewillreflectonwhathehimselfdoeswhenhewills。Forexample，preferring，whichseemsperhapsbesttoexpresstheactofvolition，doesitnotprecisely。Forthoughamanwouldpreferflyingtowalking，yetwhocansayheeverwillsit？Volition，itisplain，isanactofthemindknowinglyexertingthatdominionittakesitselftohaveoveranypartoftheman，byemployingitin，orwithholdingitfrom，anyparticularaction。Andwhatisthewill，butthefacultytodothis？Andisthatfacultyanythingmoreineffectthanapower；thepowerofthemindtodetermineitsthought，totheproducing，continuing，orstoppinganyaction，asfarasitdependsonus？Forcanitbedeniedthatwhateveragenthasapowertothinkonitsownactions，andtoprefertheirdoingoromissioneithertoother，hasthatfacultycalledwill？Will，then，isnothingbutsuchapower。Liberty，ontheotherside，isthepoweramanhastodoorforbeardoinganyparticularactionaccordingasitsdoingorforbearancehastheactualpreferenceinthemind；whichisthesamethingastosay，accordingashehimselfwillsit。
16。Powers，belongingtoagents。Itisplainthenthatthewillisnothingbutonepowerorability，andfreedomanotherpowerorabilitysothat，toask，whetherthewillhasfreedom，istoaskwhetheronepowerhasanotherpower，oneabilityanotherability；aquestionatfirstsighttoogrosslyabsurdtomakeadispute，orneedananswer。
For，whoisitthatseesnotthatpowersbelongonlytoagents，andareattributesonlyofsubstances，andnotofpowersthemselves？Sothatthiswayofputtingthequestion(viz。whetherthewillbefree)isineffecttoask，whetherthewillbeasubstance，anagent，oratleasttosupposeit，sincefreedomcanproperlybeattributedtonothingelse。Iffreedomcanwithanyproprietyofspeechbeappliedtopower，itmaybeattributedtothepowerthatisinamantoproduce，orforbearproducing，motioninpartsofhisbody，bychoiceorpreference；whichisthatwhichdenominateshimfree，andisfreedomitself。Butifanyoneshouldask，whetherfreedomwerefree，hewouldbesuspectednottounderstandwellwhathesaid；andhewouldbethoughttodeserveMidas’sears，who，knowingthatrichwasadenominationforthepossessionofriches，shoulddemandwhetherrichesthemselveswererich。
17。Howthewill，insteadoftheman，iscalledfree。However，thenamefaculty，whichmenhavegiventothispowercalledthewill，andwherebytheyhavebeenledintoawayoftalkingofthewillasacting，may，byanappropriationthatdisguisesitstruesense，servealittletopalliatetheabsurdity；yetthewill，intruth，signifiesnothingbutapowerorabilitytopreferorchoose:andwhenthewill，underthenameofafaculty，isconsideredasitis，barelyasanabilitytodosomething，theabsurdityinsayingitisfree，ornotfree，willeasilydiscoveritselfFor，ifitbereasonabletosupposeandtalkoffacultiesasdistinctbeingsthatcanact，(aswedo，whenwesaythewillorders，andthewillisfree，)itisfitthatweshouldmakeaspeakingfaculty，andawalkingfaculty，andadancingfaculty，bywhichtheseactionsareproduced，whicharebutseveralmodesofmotion；aswellaswemakethewillandunderstandingtobefaculties，bywhichtheactionsofchoosingandperceivingareproduced，whicharebutseveralmodesofthinking。
Andwemayasproperlysaythatitisthesingingfacultysings，andthedancingfacultydances，asthatthewillchooses，orthattheunderstandingconceives；or，asisusual，thatthewilldirectstheunderstanding，ortheunderstandingobeysorobeysnotthewill:itbeingaltogetherasproperandintelligibletosaythatthepowerofspeakingdirectsthepowerofsinging，orthepowerofsingingobeysordisobeysthepowerofspeaking。
18。Thiswayoftalkingcausesconfusionofthought。Thiswayoftalking，nevertheless，hasprevailed，and，asIguess，producedgreatconfusion。Forthesebeingalldifferentpowersinthemind，orintheman，todoseveralactions，heexertsthemashethinksfit:
butthepowertodooneactionisnotoperatedonbythepowerofdoinganotheraction。Forthepowerofthinkingoperatesnotonthepowerofchoosing，northepowerofchoosingonthepowerofthinking；
nomorethanthepowerofdancingoperatesonthepowerofsinging，orthepowerofsingingonthepowerofdancing，asanyonewhoreflectsonitwilleasilyperceive。Andyetthisisitwhichwesaywhenwethusspeak，thatthewilloperatesontheunderstanding，ortheunderstandingonthewill。
19。Powersarerelations，notagents。Igrant，thatthisorthatactualthoughtmaybetheoccasionofvolition，orexercisingthepoweramanhastochoose；ortheactualchoiceofthemind，thecauseofactualthinkingonthisorthatthing:astheactualsingingofsuchatunemaybethecauseofdancingsuchadance，andtheactualdancingofsuchadancetheoccasionofsingingsuchatune。Butinalltheseitisnotonepowerthatoperatesonanother:butitisthemindthatoperates，andexertsthesepowers；itisthemanthatdoestheaction；itistheagentthathaspower，orisabletodo。Forpowersarerelations，notagents:andthatwhichhasthepowerornotthepowertooperate，isthatalonewhichisorisnotfree，andnotthepoweritselfForfreedom，ornotfreedom，canbelongtonothingbutwhathasorhasnotapowertoact。
20。Libertybelongsnottothewill。Theattributingtofacultiesthatwhichbelongednottothem，hasgivenoccasiontothiswayoftalking:buttheintroducingintodiscoursesconcerningthemind，withthenameoffaculties，anotionoftheiroperating，has，Isuppose，aslittleadvancedourknowledgeinthatpartofourselves，asthegreatuseandmentionofthelikeinventionoffaculties，intheoperationsofthebody，hashelpedusintheknowledgeofphysic。
NotthatIdenytherearefaculties，bothinthebodyandmind:theybothofthemhavetheirpowersofoperating，elseneithertheonenortheothercouldoperate。Fornothingcanoperatethatisnotabletooperate；andthatisnotabletooperatethathasnopowertooperate。NordoIdenythatthosewords，andthelike，aretohavetheirplaceinthecommonuseoflanguagesthathavemadethemcurrent。Itlooksliketoomuchaffectationwhollytolaythemby:andphilosophyitself，thoughitlikesnotagaudydress，yet，whenitappearsinpublic，musthavesomuchcomplacencyastobeclothedintheordinaryfashionandlanguageofthecountry，sofarasitcanconsistwithtruthandperspicuity。Butthefaulthasbeen，thatfacultieshavebeenspokenofandrepresentedassomanydistinctagents。For，itbeingasked，whatitwasthatdigestedthemeatinourstomachs？itwasareadyandverysatisfactoryanswertosay，thatitwasthedigestivefaculty。Whatwasitthatmadeanythingcomeoutofthebody？theexpulsivefaculty。Whatmoved？themotivefaculty。Andsointhemind，theintellectualfaculty，ortheunderstanding，understood；andtheelectivefaculty，orthewill，willedorcommanded。Thisis，inshort，tosay，thattheabilitytodigest，digested；andtheabilitytomove，moved；andtheabilitytounderstand，understood。Forfaculty，ability，andpower，Ithink，arebutdifferentnamesofthesamethings:whichwaysofspeaking，whenputintomoreintelligiblewords，will，Ithink，amounttothusmuch；-Thatdigestionisperformedbysomethingthatisabletodigest，motionbysomethingabletomove，andunderstandingbysomethingabletounderstand。And，intruth，itwouldbeverystrangeifitshouldbeotherwise；asstrangeasitwouldbeforamantobefreewithoutbeingabletobefree。
21。Buttotheagent，orman。Toreturn，then，totheinquiryaboutliberty，Ithinkthequestionisnotproper，whetherthewillbefree，butwhetheramanbefree。Thus，Ithink，First，Thatsofarasanyonecan，bythedirectionorchoiceofhismind，preferringtheexistenceofanyactiontothenon-existenceofthataction，andviceversa，makeittoexistornotexist，sofarheisfree。ForifIcan，byathoughtdirectingthemotionofmyfinger，makeitmovewhenitwasatrest，orviceversa，itisevident，thatinrespectofthatIamfree:andifIcan，byalikethoughtofmymind，preferringonetotheother，produceeitherwordsorsilence，Iamatlibertytospeakorholdmypeace:andasfarasthispowerreaches，ofactingornotacting，bythedeterminationofhisownthoughtpreferringeither，sofarisamanfree。Forhowcanwethinkanyonefreer，thantohavethepowertodowhathewill？Andsofarasanyonecan，bypreferringanyactiontoitsnotbeing，orresttoanyaction，producethatactionorrest，sofarcanhedowhathewill。Forsuchapreferringofactiontoitsabsence，isthewillingofit:andwecanscarcetellhowtoimagineanybeingfreer，thantobeabletodowhathewills。Sothatinrespectofactionswithinthereachofsuchapowerinhim，amanseemsasfreeasitispossibleforfreedomtomakehim。
22。Inrespectofwilling，amanisnotfree。Buttheinquisitivemindofman，willingtoshiftofffromhimself，asfarashecan，allthoughtsofguilt，thoughitbebyputtinghimselfintoaworsestatethanthatoffatalnecessity，isnotcontentwiththis:freedom，unlessitreachesfurtherthanthis，willnotservetheturn:anditpassesforagoodplea，thatamanisnotfreeatall，ifhebenotasfreetowillasheistoactwhathewills。Concerningaman’sliberty，thereyet，therefore，israisedthisfurtherquestion，Whetheramanbefreetowill？WhichIthinkiswhatismeant，whenitisdisputedwhetherthewillbefree。AndastothatIimagine。
23。Howamancannotbefreetowill。Secondly，Thatwilling，orvolition，beinganaction，andfreedomconsistinginapowerofactingornotacting，amaninrespectofwillingortheactofvolition，whenanyactioninhispowerisonceproposedtohisthoughts，aspresentlytobedone，cannotbefree。Thereasonwhereofisverymanifest。For，itbeingunavoidablethattheactiondependingonhiswillshouldexistornotexist，anditsexistenceornotexistencefollowingperfectlythedeterminationandpreferenceofhiswill，hecannotavoidwillingtheexistenceornon-existenceofthataction；itisabsolutelynecessarythathewilltheoneortheother；i。e。prefertheonetotheother:sinceoneofthemmustnecessarilyfollow；andthatwhichdoesfollowfollowsbythechoiceanddeterminationofhismind；thatis，byhiswillingit:forifhedidnotwillit，itwouldnotbe。Sothat，inrespectoftheactofwilling，amaninsuchacaseisnotfree:libertyconsistinginapowertoactornottoact；which，inregardofvolition，aman，uponsuchaproposalhasnot。Foritisunavoidablynecessarytopreferthedoingorforbearanceofanactioninaman’spower，whichisoncesoproposedtohisthoughts；amanmustnecessarilywilltheoneortheotherofthem；uponwhichpreferenceorvolition，theactionoritsforbearancecertainlyfollows，andistrulyvoluntary。Buttheactofvolition，orpreferringoneofthetwo，beingthatwhichhecannotavoid，aman，inrespectofthatactofwilling，isunderanecessity，andsocannotbefree；unlessnecessityandfreedomcanconsisttogether，andamancanbefreeandboundatonce。Besidestomakeamanfreeafterthismanner，bymakingtheactionofwillingtodependonhiswill，theremustbeanotherantecedentwill，todeterminetheactsofthiswill，andanothertodeterminethat，andsoininfinitum:forwhereveronestops，theactionsofthelastwillcannotbefree。Norisanybeing，asfarIcancomprehendbeingsaboveme，capableofsuchafreedomofwill，thatitcanforbeartowill，i。e。topreferthebeingornotbeingofanythinginitspower，whichithasonceconsideredassuch。
24。Libertyisfreedomtoexecutewhatiswilled。This，then，isevident，Thatamanisnotatlibertytowill，ornottowill，anythinginhispowerthatheonceconsidersof:libertyconsistinginapowertoactortoforbearacting，andinthatonly。Foramanthatsitsstillissaidyettobeatliberty；becausehecanwalkifhewillsit。Amanthatwalksisatlibertyalso，notbecausehewalksormoves；butbecausehecanstandstillifhewillsit。Butifamansittingstillhasnotapowertoremovehimself，heisnotatliberty；solikewiseamanfallingdownaprecipice，thoughinmotion，isnotatliberty，becausehecannotstopthatmotionifhewould。
Thisbeingso，itisplainthatamanthatiswalking，towhomitisproposedtogiveoffwalking，isnotatliberty，whetherhewilldeterminehimselftowalk，orgiveoffwalkingornot:hemustnecessarilypreferoneortheotherofthem；walkingornotwalking。
Andsoitisinregardofallotheractionsinourpowersoproposed，whicharethefargreaternumber。For，consideringthevastnumberofvoluntaryactionsthatsucceedoneanothereverymomentthatweareawakeinthecourseofourlives，therearebutfewofthemthatarethoughtonorproposedtothewill，tillthetimetheyaretobedone；andinallsuchactions，asIhaveshown，themind，inrespectofwilling，hasnotapowertoactornottoact，whereinconsistsliberty。Themind，inthatcase，hasnotapowertoforbearwilling；itcannotavoidsomedeterminationconcerningthem，lettheconsiderationbeasshort，thethoughtasquickasitwill，iteitherleavesthemaninthestatehewasbeforethinking，orchangesit；continuestheaction，orputsanendtoit。Wherebyitismanifest，thatitordersanddirectsone，inpreferenceto，orwithneglectoftheother，andtherebyeitherthecontinuationorchangebecomesunavoidablyvoluntary。
25。Thewilldeterminedbysomethingwithoutit。Sincethenitisplainthat，inmostcases，amanisnotatliberty，whetherhewillorno，(for，whenanactioninhispowerisproposedtohisthoughts，hecannotforbearvolition；hemustdetermineonewayortheother)；
thenextthingdemandedis，-Whetheramanbeatlibertytowillwhichofthetwohepleases，motionorrest？Thisquestioncarriestheabsurdityofitsomanifestlyinitself，thatonemighttherebysufficientlybeconvincedthatlibertyconcernsnotthewill。For，toaskwhetheramanbeatlibertytowilleithermotionorrest，speakingorsilence，whichhepleases，istoaskwhetheramancanwillwhathewills，orbepleasedwithwhatheispleasedwith？A
questionwhich，Ithink，needsnoanswer:andtheywhocanmakeaquestionofitmustsupposeonewilltodeterminetheactsofanother，andanothertodeterminethat，andsoonininfinitum。
26。Theideasoflibertyandvolitionmustbedefined。Toavoidtheseandthelikeabsurdities，nothingcanbeofgreaterusethantoestablishinourmindsdeterminedideasofthethingsunderconsideration。Iftheideasoflibertyandvolitionwerewellfixedinourunderstandings，andcarriedalongwithusinourminds，astheyought，throughallthequestionsthatareraisedaboutthem，Isupposeagreatpartofthedifficultiesthatperplexmen’sthoughts，andentangletheirunderstandings，wouldbemucheasierresolved；andweshouldperceivewheretheconfusedsignificationofterms，orwherethenatureofthethingcausedtheobscurity。
27。Freedom。First，then，itiscarefullytoberemembered，Thatfreedomconsistsinthedependenceoftheexistence，ornotexistenceofanyaction，uponourvolitionofit；andnotinthedependenceofanyaction，oritscontrary，onourpreference。Amanstandingonacliff，isatlibertytoleaptwentyyardsdownwardsintothesea，notbecausehehasapowertodothecontraryaction，whichistoleaptwentyyardsupwards，forthathecannotdo；butheisthereforefree，becausehehasapowertoleapornottoleap。Butifagreaterforcethanhis，eitherholdshimfast，ortumbleshimdown，heisnolongerfreeinthatcase；becausethedoingorforbearanceofthatparticularactionisnolongerinhispower。Hethatisacloseprisonerinaroomtwentyfeetsquare，beingatthenorthsideofhischamber，isatlibertytowalktwentyfeetsouthward，becausehecanwalkornotwalkit；butisnot，atthesametime，atlibertytodothecontrary，i。e。towalktwentyfeetnorthward。
Inthis，then，consistsfreedom，viz。inourbeingabletoactornottoact，accordingasweshallchooseorwill。
28。Whatvolitionandactionmean。Secondly，wemustremember，thatvolitionorwillingisanactoftheminddirectingitsthoughttotheproductionofanyaction，andtherebyexertingitspowertoproduceit。Toavoidmultiplyingofwords，Iwouldcraveleavehere，underthewordaction，tocomprehendtheforbearancetooofanyactionproposed:sittingstill，orholdingone’speace，whenwalkingorspeakingareproposed，thoughmereforbearances，requiringasmuchthedeterminationofthewill，andbeingasoftenweightyintheirconsequences，asthecontraryactions，may，onthatconsideration，wellenoughpassforactionstoo:butthisIsay，thatImaynotbemistaken，if(forbrevity’ssake)Ispeakthus。
29。Whatdeterminesthewill。Thirdly，thewillbeingnothingbutapowerinthemindtodirecttheoperativefacultiesofamantomotionorrest，asfarastheydependonsuchdirection；tothequestion，Whatisitdeterminesthewill？thetrueandproperansweris，Themind。Forthatwhichdeterminesthegeneralpowerofdirecting，tothisorthatparticulardirection，isnothingbuttheagentitselfexercisingthepowerithasthatparticularway。Ifthisanswersatisfiesnot，itisplainthemeaningofthequestion，Whatdeterminesthewill？isthis，-Whatmovesthemind，ineveryparticularinstance，todetermineitsgeneralpowerofdirecting，tothisorthatparticularmotionorrest？AndtothisIanswer，-Themotiveforcontinuinginthesamestateoraction，isonlythepresentsatisfactioninit；themotivetochangeisalwayssomeuneasiness:
nothingsettingusuponthechangeofstate，oruponanynewaction，butsomeuneasiness。Thisisthegreatmotivethatworksonthemindtoputituponaction，whichforshortness’sakewewillcalldeterminingofthewill，whichIshallmoreatlargeexplain。
30。Willanddesiremustnotbeconfounded。But，inthewaytoit，itwillbenecessarytopremise，that，thoughIhaveaboveendeavouredtoexpresstheactofvolition，bychoosing，preferring，andtheliketerms，thatsignifydesireaswellasvolition，forwantofotherwordstomarkthatactofthemindwhosepropernameiswillingorvolition；yet，itbeingaverysimpleact，whosoeverdesirestounderstandwhatitis，willbetterfinditbyreflectingonhisownmind，andobservingwhatitdoeswhenitwills，thanbyanyvarietyofarticulatesoundswhatsoever。Thiscautionofbeingcarefulnottobemisledbyexpressionsthatdonotenoughkeepupthedifferencebetweenthewillandseveralactsofthemindthatarequitedistinctfromit，Ithinkthemorenecessary，becauseIfindthewilloftenconfoundedwithseveraloftheaffections，especiallydesire，andoneputfortheother；andthatbymenwhowouldnotwillinglybethoughtnottohavehadverydistinctnotionsofthings，andnottohavewritveryclearlyaboutthem。This，Iimagine，hasbeennosmalloccasionofobscurityandmistakeinthismatter；
andthereforeis，asmuchasmaybe，tobeavoided。Forhethatshallturnhisthoughtsinwardsuponwhatpassesinhismindwhenhewills，shallseethatthewillorpowerofvolitionisconversantaboutnothingbutourownactions；terminatesthere；andreachesnofurther；andthatvolitionisnothingbutthatparticulardeterminationofthemind，whereby，barelybyathoughtthemindendeavourstogiverise，continuation，orstop，toanyactionwhichittakestobeinitspower。This，wellconsidered，plainlyshowsthatthewillisperfectlydistinguishedfromdesire；which，intheverysameaction，mayhaveaquitecontrarytendencyfromthatwhichourwillsetsusupon。Aman，whomIcannotdeny，mayobligemetousepersuasionstoanother，which，atthesametimeIamspeaking，Imaywishmaynotprevailonhim。Inthiscase，itisplainthewillanddesireruncounter。Iwilltheaction；thattendsoneway，whilstmydesiretendsanother，andthatthedirectcontraryway。Amanwho，byaviolentfitofthegoutinhislimbs，findsadozinessinhishead，orawantofappetiteinhisstomachremoved，desirestobeeasedtooofthepainofhisfeetorhands，(forwhereverthereispain，thereisadesiretoberidofit)，thoughyet，whilstheapprehendsthattheremovalofthepainmaytranslatethenoxioushumourtoamorevitalpart，hiswillisneverdeterminedtoanyoneactionthatmayservetoremovethispain。Whenceitisevidentthatdesiringandwillingaretwodistinctactsofthemind；andconsequently，thatthewill，whichisbutthepowerofvolition，ismuchmoredistinctfromdesire。
31。Uneasinessdeterminesthewill。Toreturn，then，totheinquiry，whatisitthatdeterminesthewillinregardtoouractions？Andthat，uponsecondthoughts，Iamapttoimagineisnot，asisgenerallysupposed，thegreatergoodinview；butsome(andforthemostpartthemostpressing)uneasinessamanisatpresentunder。
Thisisthatwhichsuccessivelydeterminesthewill，andsetsusuponthoseactionsweperform。Thisuneasinesswemaycall，asitis，desire；whichisanuneasinessofthemindforwantofsomeabsentgood。Allpainofthebody，ofwhatsortsoever，anddisquietofthemind，isuneasiness:andwiththisisalwaysjoineddesire，equaltothepainoruneasinessfelt；andisscarcedistinguishablefromit。
Fordesirebeingnothingbutanuneasinessinthewantofanabsentgood，inreferencetoanypainfelt，easeisthatabsentgood；andtillthateasebeattained，wemaycallitdesire；nobodyfeelingpainthathewishesnottobeeasedof，withadesireequaltothatpain，andinseparablefromit。Besidesthisdesireofeasefrompain，thereisanotherofabsentpositivegood；andherealsothedesireanduneasinessareequal。Asmuchaswedesireanyabsentgood，somuchareweinpainforit。Buthereallabsentgooddoesnot，accordingtothegreatnessithas，orisacknowledgedtohave，causepainequaltothatgreatness；asallpaincausesdesireequaltoitself:
becausetheabsenceofgoodisnotalwaysapain，asthepresenceofpainis。Andthereforeabsentgoodmaybelookedonandconsideredwithoutdesire。Butsomuchasthereisanywhereofdesire，somuchthereisofuneasiness。
32。Desireisuneasiness。Thatdesireisastateofuneasiness，everyonewhoreflectsonhimselfwillquicklyfind。Whoistherethathasnotfeltindesirewhatthewisemansaysofhope，(whichisnotmuchdifferentfromit)，thatitbeing\"deferredmakestheheartsick\"；andthatstillproportionabletothegreatnessofthedesire，whichsometimesraisestheuneasinesstothatpitch，thatitmakespeoplecryout，\"Givemechildren。\"givemethethingdesired，\"orI
die。\"Lifeitself，andallitsenjoyments，isaburdencannotbeborneunderthelastingandunremovedpressureofsuchanuneasiness。
33。Theuneasinessofdesiredeterminesthewill。Goodandevil，presentandabsent，itistrue，workuponthemind。Butthatwhichimmediatelydeterminesthewill，fromtimetotime，toeveryvoluntaryaction，istheuneasinessofdesire，fixedonsomeabsentgood:eithernegative，asindolencetooneinpain；orpositive，asenjoymentofpleasure。Thatitisthisuneasinessthatdeterminesthewilltothesuccessivevoluntaryactions，whereofthegreatestpartofourlivesismadeup，andbywhichweareconductedthroughdifferentcoursestodifferentends，Ishallendeavourtoshow，bothfromexperience，andthereasonofthething。
34。Thisisthespringofaction。Whenamanisperfectlycontentwiththestateheisin-whichiswhenheisperfectlywithoutanyuneasiness-whatindustry，whataction，whatwillisthereleft，buttocontinueinit？Ofthiseveryman’sobservationwillsatisfyhim。
Andthusweseeourall-wiseMaker，suitablytoourconstitutionandframe，andknowingwhatitisthatdeterminesthewill，hasputintomantheuneasinessofhungerandthirst，andothernaturaldesires，thatreturnattheirseasons，tomoveanddeterminetheirwills，forthepreservationofthemselves，andthecontinuationoftheirspecies。
ForIthinkwemayconclude，that，ifthebarecontemplationofthesegoodendstowhichwearecarriedbytheseseveraluneasinesseshadbeensufficienttodeterminethewill，andsetusonwork，weshouldhavehadnoneofthesenaturalpains，andperhapsinthisworldlittleornopainatall。\"Itisbettertomarrythantoburn，\"saysSt。Paul，wherewemayseewhatitisthatchieflydrivesmenintotheenjoymentsofaconjugallife。Alittleburningfeltpushesusmorepowerfullythangreaterpleasuresinprospectdraworallure。
35。Thegreatestpositivegooddeterminesnotthewill，butpresentuneasinessalone。Itseemssoestablishedandsettledamaxim，bythegeneralconsentofallmankind，thatgood，thegreatergood，determinesthewill，thatIdonotatallwonderthat，whenIfirstpublishedmythoughtsonthissubjectItookitforgranted；andI
imaginethat，byagreatmany，Ishallbethoughtmoreexcusableforhavingthendoneso，thanthatnowIhaveventuredtorecedefromsoreceivedanopinion。Butyet，uponastricterinquiry，Iamforcedtoconcludethatgood，thegreatergood，thoughapprehendedandacknowledgedtobeso，doesnotdeterminethewill，untilourdesire，raisedproportionablytoit，makesusuneasyinthewantofit。Convinceamanneversomuch，thatplentyhasitsadvantagesoverpoverty；makehimseeandown，thatthehandsomeconveniencesoflifearebetterthannastypenury:yet，aslongasheiscontentwiththelatter，andfindsnouneasinessinit，hemovesnot；hiswillneverisdeterminedtoanyactionthatshallbringhimoutofit。
Letamanbeeversowellpersuadedoftheadvantagesofvirtue，thatitisasnecessarytoamanwhohasanygreataimsinthisworld，orhopesinthenext，asfoodtolife:yet，tillhehungersorthirstsafterrighteousness，tillhefeelsanuneasinessinthewantofit，hiswillwillnotbedeterminedtoanyactioninpursuitofthisconfessedgreatergood；butanyotheruneasinesshefeelsinhimselfshalltakeplace，andcarryhiswilltootheractions。Ontheotherside，letadrunkardseethathishealthdecays，hisestatewastes；
discreditanddiseases，andthewantofallthings，evenofhisbeloveddrink，attendshiminthecoursehefollows:yetthereturnsofuneasinesstomisshiscompanions，thehabitualthirstafterhiscupsattheusualtime，driveshimtothetavern，thoughhehasinhisviewthelossofhealthandplenty，andperhapsofthejoysofanotherlife:theleastofwhichisnoinconsiderablegood，butsuchasheconfessesisfargreaterthantheticklingofhispalatewithaglassofwine，ortheidlechatofasoakingclub。Itisnotwantofviewingthegreatergood；forheseesandacknowledgesit，and，intheintervalsofhisdrinkinghours，willtakeresolutionstopursuethegreatergood；butwhentheuneasinesstomisshisaccustomeddelightreturns，thegreatacknowledgedgoodlosesitshold，andthepresentuneasinessdeterminesthewilltotheaccustomedaction；whichtherebygetsstrongerfootingtoprevailagainstthenextoccasion，thoughheatthesametimemakessecretpromisestohimselfthathewilldosonomore；thisisthelasttimehewillactagainsttheattainmentofthosegreatergoods。Andthusheis，fromtimetotime，inthestateofthatunhappycomplainer，Videomeliora，proboque，deteriorasequor:whichsentence，allowedfortrue，andmadegoodbyconstantexperience，mayinthis，andpossiblynootherway，beeasilymadeintelligible。
36。Becausetheremovalofuneasinessisthefirststeptohappiness。Ifweinquireintothereasonofwhatexperiencemakessoevidentinfact，andexamine，whyitisuneasinessaloneoperatesonthewill，anddeterminesitinitschoice，weshallfindthat，webeingcapablebutofonedeterminationofthewilltooneactionatonce，thepresentuneasinessthatweareunderdoesnaturallydeterminethewill，inordertothathappinesswhichweallaimatinallouractions。For，asmuchaswhilstweareunderanyuneasiness，wecannotapprehendourselveshappy，orinthewaytoit；painanduneasinessbeing，byeveryone，concludedandfelttobeinconsistentwithhappiness，spoilingtherelishevenofthosegoodthingswhichwehave:alittlepainservingtomarallthepleasurewerejoicedin。And，therefore，thatwhichofcoursedeterminesthechoiceofourwilltothenextactionwillalwaysbe-theremovingofpain，aslongaswehaveanyleft，asthefirstandnecessarysteptowardshappiness。
37。Becauseuneasinessaloneispresent。Anotherreasonwhyitisuneasinessalonedeterminesthewill，isthis:becausethataloneispresentand，itisagainstthenatureofthings，thatwhatisabsentshouldoperatewhereitisnot。Itmaybesaidthatabsentgoodmay，bycontemplation，bebroughthometothemindandmadepresent。Theideaofitindeedmaybeinthemind，andviewedaspresentthere；butnothingwillbeinthemindasapresentgood，abletocounterbalancetheremovalofanyuneasinesswhichweareunder，tillitraisesourdesire；andtheuneasinessofthathastheprevalencyindeterminingthewill。Tillthen，theideainthemindofwhateverisgoodisthereonly，likeotherideas，theobjectofbareunactivespeculation；butoperatesnotonthewill，norsetsusonwork；thereasonwhereofIshallshowbyandby。Howmanyaretobefoundthathavehadlivelyrepresentationssetbeforetheirmindsoftheunspeakablejoysofheaven，whichtheyacknowledgebothpossibleandprobabletoo，whoyetwouldbecontenttotakeupwiththeirhappinesshere？Andsotheprevailinguneasinessoftheirdesires，letlooseaftertheenjoymentsofthislife，taketheirturnsinthedeterminingtheirwills；andallthatwhiletheytakenotonestep，arenotonejotmoved，towardsthegoodthingsofanotherlife，consideredaseversogreat。
38。Becauseallwhoallowthejoysofheavenpossible，pursuethemnot。Werethewilldeterminedbytheviewsofgood，asitappearsincontemplationgreaterorlesstotheunderstanding，whichisthestateofallabsentgood，andthatwhich，inthereceivedopinion，thewillissupposedtomoveto，andtobemovedby，-Idonotseehowitcouldevergetloosefromtheinfiniteeternaljoysofheaven，onceproposedandconsideredaspossible。For，allabsentgood，bywhichalone，barelyproposed，andcominginview，thewillisthoughttobedetermined，andsotosetusonaction，beingonlypossible，butnotinfalliblycertain，itisunavoidablethattheinfinitelygreaterpossiblegoodshouldregularlyandconstantlydeterminethewillinallthesuccessiveactionsitdirects；andthenweshouldkeepconstantlyandsteadilyinourcoursetowardsheaven，withouteverstandingstill，ordirectingouractionstoanyotherend:theeternalconditionofafuturestateinfinitelyoutweighingtheexpectationofriches，orhonour，oranyotherworldlypleasurewhichwecanproposetoourselves，thoughweshouldgrantthesethemoreprobabletobeobtained:fornothingfutureisyetinpossession，andsotheexpectationevenofthesemaydeceiveus。Ifitweresothatthegreatergoodinviewdeterminesthewill，sogreatagood，onceproposed，couldnotbutseizethewill，andholditfasttothepursuitofthisinfinitelygreatestgood，withouteverlettingitgoagain:forthewillhavingapowerover，anddirectingthethoughts，aswellasotheractions，would，ifitwereso，holdthecontemplationofthemindfixedtothatgood。
39。Butanygreatuneasinessisneverneglected。Thiswouldbethestateofthemind，andregulartendencyofthewillinallitsdeterminations，wereitdeterminedbythatwhichisconsideredandinviewthegreatergood。Butthatitisnotso，isvisibleinexperience；theinfinitelygreatestconfessedgoodbeingoftenneglected，tosatisfythesuccessiveuneasinessofourdesirespursuingtrifles。But，thoughthegreatestallowed，evenever-lastingunspeakable，good，whichhassometimesmovedandaffectedthemind，doesnotstedfastlyholdthewill，yetweseeanyverygreatandprevailinguneasinesshavingoncelaidholdonthewill，letitnotgo；bywhichwemaybeconvinced，whatitisthatdeterminesthewill。Thusanyvehementpainofthebody；theungovernablepassionofamanviolentlyinlove；ortheimpatientdesireofrevenge，keepsthewillsteadyandintent；andthewill，thusdetermined，neverletstheunderstandinglaybytheobject，butallthethoughtsofthemindandpowersofthebodyareuninterruptedlyemployedthatway，bythedeterminationofthewill，influencedbythattoppinguneasiness，aslongasitlasts；wherebyitseemstomeevident，thatthewill，orpowerofsettingusupononeactioninpreferencetoallothers，isdeterminedinusbyuneasiness:andwhetherthisbenotso，Idesireeveryonetoobserveinhimself。
40。Desireaccompaniesalluneasiness。Ihavehithertochieflyinstancedintheuneasinessofdesire，asthatwhichdeterminesthewill:becausethatisthechiefandmostsensible；andthewillseldomordersanyaction，noristhereanyvoluntaryactionperformed，withoutsomedesireaccompanyingit；whichIthinkisthereasonwhythewillanddesirearesooftenconfounded。Butyetwearenottolookupontheuneasinesswhichmakesup，oratleastaccompanies，mostoftheotherpassions，aswhollyexcludedinthecase。Aversion，fear，anger，envy，shame，&c。haveeachtheiruneasinessestoo，andtherebyinfluencethewill。Thesepassionsarescarceanyofthem，inlifeandpractice，simpleandalone，andwhollyunmixedwithothers；thoughusually，indiscourseandcontemplation，thatcarriesthenamewhichoperatesstrongest，andappearsmostinthepresentstateofthemind。Nay，thereis，Ithink，scarceanyofthepassionstobefoundwithoutdesirejoinedwithit。Iamsurewhereverthereisuneasiness，thereisdesire。Forweconstantlydesirehappiness；andwhateverwefeelofuneasiness，somuchitiscertainwewantofhappiness；eveninourownopinion，letourstateandconditionotherwisebewhatitwill。Besides，thepresentmomentnotbeingoureternity，whateverourenjoymentbe，welookbeyondthepresent，anddesiregoeswithourforesight，andthatstillcarriesthewillwithit。Sothateveninjoyitself，thatwhichkeepsuptheactionwhereontheenjoymentdepends，isthedesiretocontinueit，andfeartoloseit:andwheneveragreateruneasinessthanthattakesplaceinthemind，thewillpresentlyisbythatdeterminedtosomenewaction，andthepresentdelightneglected。
41。Themostpressinguneasinessnaturallydeterminesthewill。
Butwebeinginthisworldbesetwithsundryuneasinesses，distractedwithdifferentdesires，thenextinquirynaturallywillbe，-Whichofthemhastheprecedencyindeterminingthewilltothenextaction？andtothattheansweris，-Thatordinarilywhichisthemostpressingofthosethatarejudgedcapableofbeingthenremoved。For，thewillbeingthepowerofdirectingouroperativefacultiestosomeaction，forsomeend，cannotatanytimebemovedtowardswhatisjudgedatthattimeunattainable:thatwouldbetosupposeanintelligentbeingdesignedlytoactforanend，onlytoloseitslabour；forsoitistoactforwhatisjudgednotattainable；andthereforeverygreatuneasinessesmovenotthewill，whentheyarejudgednotcapableofacure:theyinthatcaseputusnotuponendeavours。But，thesesetapart，themostimportantandurgentuneasinessweatthattimefeel，isthatwhichordinarilydeterminesthewill，successively，inthattrainofvoluntaryactionswhichmakesupourlives。Thegreatestpresentuneasinessisthespurtoaction，thatisconstantlymostfelt，andforthemostpartdeterminesthewillinitschoiceofthenextaction。Forthiswemustcarryalongwithus，thattheproperandonlyobjectofthewillissomeactionofours，andnothingelse。Forweproducingnothingbyourwillingit，butsomeactioninourpower，itistherethewillterminates，andreachesnofurther。
42。Alldesirehappiness。Ifitbefurtherasked，-Whatitismovesdesire？Ianswer，-happiness，andthatalone。Happinessandmiseryarethenamesoftwoextremes，theutmostboundswhereofweknownot；itiswhat\"eyehathnotseen，earhathnotheard，norhathitenteredintotheheartofmantoconceive。\"Butofsomedegreesofbothwehaveverylivelyimpressions；madebyseveralinstancesofdelightandjoyontheoneside，andtormentandsorrowontheother；which，forshortness’sake，Ishallcomprehendunderthenamesofpleasureandpain；therebeingpleasureandpainofthemindaswellasthebody，-\"Withhimisfulnessofjoy，andpleasureforevermore。\"Or，tospeaktruly，theyareallofthemind；thoughsomehavetheirriseinthemindfromthought，othersinthebodyfromcertainmodificationsofmotion。
43。Happinessandmisery，goodandevil，whattheyare。Happiness，then，initsfullextent，istheutmostpleasurewearecapableof，andmiserytheutmostpain；andthelowestdegreeofwhatcanbecalledhappinessissomucheasefromallpain，andsomuchpresentpleasure，aswithoutwhichanyonecannotbecontent。Now，becausepleasureandpainareproducedinusbytheoperationofcertainobjects，eitheronourmindsorourbodies，andindifferentdegrees；therefore，whathasanaptnesstoproducepleasureinusisthatwecallgood，andwhatisapttoproducepaininuswecallevil；
fornootherreasonbutforitsaptnesstoproducepleasureandpaininus，whereinconsistsourhappinessandmisery。Further，thoughwhatisapttoproduceanydegreeofpleasurebeinitselfgood；andwhatisapttoproduceanydegreeofpainbeevil；yetitoftenhappensthatwedonotcallitsowhenitcomesincompetitionwithagreaterofitssort；because，whentheycomeincompetition，thedegreesalsoofpleasureandpainhavejustlyapreference。Sothatifwewillrightlyestimatewhatwecallgoodandevil，weshallfinditliesmuchincomparison:forthecauseofeverylessdegreeofpain，aswellaseverygreaterdegreeofpleasure，hasthenatureofgood，andviceversa。
44。Whatgoodisdesired，whatnot。Thoughthisbethatwhichiscalledgoodandevil，andallgoodbetheproperobjectofdesireingeneral；yetallgood，evenseenandconfessedtobeso，doesnotnecessarilymoveeveryparticularman’sdesire；butonlythatpart，orsomuchofitasisconsideredandtakentomakeanecessarypartofhishappiness。Allothergood，howevergreatinrealityorappearance，excitesnotaman’sdesireswholooksnotonittomakeapartofthathappinesswherewithhe，inhispresentthoughts，cansatisfyhimself。Happiness，underthisview，everyoneconstantlypursues，anddesireswhatmakesanypartofit:otherthings，acknowledgedtobegood，hecanlookuponwithoutdesire，passby，andbecontentwithout。Thereisnobody，Ithink，sosenselessastodenythatthereispleasureinknowledge:andforthepleasuresofsense，theyhavetoomanyfollowerstoletitbequestionedwhethermenaretakenwiththemorno。Now，letonemanplacehissatisfactioninsensualpleasures，anotherinthedelightofknowledge:thougheachofthemcannotbutconfess，thereisgreatpleasureinwhattheotherpursues；yet，neitherofthemmakingtheother’sdelightapartofhishappiness，theirdesiresarenotmoved，buteachissatisfiedwithoutwhattheotherenjoys；andsohiswillisnotdeterminedtothepursuitofit。Butyet，assoonasthestudiousman’shungerandthirstmakehimuneasy，he，whosewillwasneverdeterminedtoanypursuitofgoodcheer，poignantsauces，deliciouswine，bythepleasanttastehehasfoundinthem，is，bytheuneasinessofhungerandthirst，presentlydeterminedtoeatinganddrinking，thoughpossiblywithgreatindifferency，whatwholesomefoodcomesinhisway。And，ontheotherside，theepicurebucklestostudy，whenshame，orthedesiretorecommendhimselftohismistress，shallmakehimuneasyinthewantofanysortofknowledge。Thus，howmuchsoevermenareinearnestandconstantinpursuitofhappiness，yettheymayhaveaclearviewofgood，greatandconfessedgood，withoutbeingconcernedforit，ormovedbyit，iftheythinktheycanmakeuptheirhappinesswithoutit。Thoughastopain，thattheyarealwaysconcernedfor；theycanfeelnouneasinesswithoutbeingmoved。Andtherefore，beinguneasyinthewantofwhateverisjudgednecessarytotheirhappiness，assoonasanygoodappearstomakeapartoftheirportionofhappiness，theybegintodesireit。
45。Whythegreatestgoodisnotalwaysdesired。This，Ithink，anyonemayobserveinhimselfandothers，-Thatthegreatervisiblegooddoesnotalwaysraisemen’sdesiresinproportiontothegreatnessitappears，andisacknowledged，tohave:thougheverylittletroublemovesus，andsetsusonworktogetridofit。Thereasonwhereofisevidentfromthenatureofourhappinessandmiseryitself。Allpresentpain，whateveritbe，makesapartofourpresentmisery。butallabsentgooddoesnotatanytimemakeanecessarypartofourpresenthappiness，northeabsenceofitmakeapartofourmisery。Ifitdid，weshouldbeconstantlyandinfinitelymiserable；therebeinginfinitedegreesofhappinesswhicharenotinourpossession。Alluneasinessthereforebeingremoved，amoderateportionofgoodservesatpresenttocontentmen；andafewdegreesofpleasure，inasuccessionofordinaryenjoyments，makeupahappinesswhereintheycanbesatisfied。Ifthiswerenotso，therecouldbenoroomforthoseindifferentandvisiblytriflingactions，towhichourwillsaresooftendetermined，andwhereinwevoluntarilywastesomuchofourlives；
whichremissnesscouldbynomeansconsistwithaconstantdeterminationofwillordesiretothegreatestapparentgood。Thatthisisso，Ithinkfewpeopleneedgofarfromhometobeconvinced。Andindeedinthislifetherearenotmanywhosehappinessreachessofarastoaffordthemaconstanttrainofmoderatemeanpleasures，withoutanymixtureofuneasiness；andyettheycouldbecontenttostayhereforever:thoughtheycannotdeny，butthatitispossibletheremaybeastateofeternaldurablejoysafterthislife，farsurpassingallthegoodthatistobefoundhere。Nay，theycannotbutseethatitismorepossiblethantheattainmentandcontinuationofthatpittanceofhonour，riches，orpleasurewhichtheypursue，andforwhichtheyneglectthateternalstate。Butyet，infullviewofthisdifference，satisfiedofthepossibilityofaperfect，secure，andlastinghappinessinafuturestate，andunderaclearconvictionthatitisnottobehadhere，-whilsttheyboundtheirhappinesswithinsomelittleenjoymentoraimofthislife，andexcludethejoysofheavenfrommakinganynecessarypartofit，-theirdesiresarenotmovedbythisgreaterapparentgood，northeirwillsdeterminedtoanyaction，orendeavourforitsattainment。
