ChapterIX
OfPerception1。Perceptionthefirstsimpleideaofreflection。PERCEPTION，asitisthefirstfacultyofthemindexercisedaboutourideas；soitisthefirstandsimplestideawehavefromreflection，andisbysomecalledthinkingingeneral。Thoughthinking，intheproprietyoftheEnglishtongue，signifiesthatsortofoperationinthemindaboutitsideas，whereinthemindisactive；whereit，withsomedegreeofvoluntaryattention，considersanything。Forinbarenakedperception，themindis，forthemostpart，onlypassive；andwhatitperceives，itcannotavoidperceiving。
2。Reflectionalonecangiveustheideaofwhatperceptionis。Whatperceptionis，everyonewillknowbetterbyreflectingonwhathedoeshimself，whenhesees，hears，feels，&c。，orthinks，thanbyanydiscourseofmine。Whoeverreflectsonwhatpassesinhisownmindcannotmissit。Andifhedoesnotreflect，allthewordsintheworldcannotmakehimhaveanynotionofit。
3。Arisesinsensationonlywhenthemindnoticestheorganicimpression。Thisiscertain，thatwhateveralterationsaremadeinthebody，iftheyreachnotthemind；whateverimpressionsaremadeontheoutwardparts，iftheyarenottakennoticeofwithin，thereisnoperception。Firemayburnourbodieswithnoothereffectthanitdoesabillet，unlessthemotionbecontinuedtothebrain，andtherethesenseofheat，orideaofpain，beproducedinthemind；whereinconsistsactualperception。
4。Impulseontheorganinsufficient。Howoftenmayamanobserveinhimself，thatwhilsthismindisintentlyemployedinthecontemplationofsomeobjects，andcuriouslysurveyingsomeideasthatarethere，ittakesnonoticeofimpressionsofsoundingbodiesmadeupontheorganofhearing，withthesamealterationthatusestobefortheproducingtheideaofsound？Asufficientimpulsetheremaybeontheorgan；butitnotreachingtheobservationofthemind，therefollowsnoperception:andthoughthemotionthatusestoproducetheideaofsoundbemadeintheear，yetnosoundisheard。Wantofsensation，inthiscase，isnotthroughanydefectintheorgan，orthattheman’searsarelessaffectedthanatothertimeswhenhedoeshear:butthatwhichusestoproducetheidea，thoughconveyedinbytheusualorgan，notbeingtakennoticeofintheunderstanding，andsoimprintingnoideainthemind，therefollowsnosensation。Sothatwhereverthereissenseorperception，theresomeideaisactuallyproduced，andpresentintheunderstanding。
5。Children，thoughtheymayhaveideasinthewomb，havenoneinnate。ThereforeIdoubtnotbutchildren，bytheexerciseoftheirsensesaboutobjectsthataffecttheminthewomb，receivesomefewideasbeforetheyareborn，astheunavoidableeffects，eitherofthebodiesthatenvironthem，orelseofthosewantsordiseasestheysuffer；amongstwhich(ifonemayconjectureconcerningthingsnotverycapableofexamination)Ithinktheideasofhungerandwarmtharetwo:whichprobablyaresomeofthefirstthatchildrenhave，andwhichtheyscarceeverpartwithagain。
6。Theeffectsofsensationinthewomb。Butthoughitbereasonabletoimaginethatchildrenreceivesomeideasbeforetheycomeintotheworld，yetthesesimpleideasarefarfromthoseinnateprincipleswhichsomecontendfor，andwe，above，haverejected。Theseherementioned，beingtheeffectsofsensation，areonlyfromsomeaffectionsofthebody，whichhappentothemthere，andsodependonsomethingexteriortothemind；nootherwisedifferingintheirmannerofproductionfromotherideasderivedfromsense，butonlyintheprecedencyoftime。Whereasthoseinnateprinciplesaresupposedtobequiteofanothernature；notcomingintothemindbyanyaccidentalalterationsin，oroperationsonthebody；but，asitwere，originalcharactersimpresseduponit，intheveryfirstmomentofitsbeingandconstitution。
7。Whichideasappearfirst，isnotevident，norimportant。Astherearesomeideaswhichwemayreasonablysupposemaybeintroducedintothemindsofchildreninthewomb，subservienttothenecessitiesoftheirlifeandbeingthere:so，aftertheyareborn，thoseideasaretheearliestimprintedwhichhappentobethesensiblequalitieswhichfirstoccurtothem；amongstwhichlightisnottheleastconsiderable，noroftheweakestefficacy。Andhowcovetousthemindistobefurnishedwithallsuchideasashavenopainaccompanyingthem，maybealittleguessedbywhatisobservableinchildrennew-born；whoalwaysturntheireyestothatpartfromwhencethelightcomes，laythemhowyouplease。Buttheideasthataremostfamiliaratfirst，beingvariousaccordingtothediverscircumstancesofchildren’sfirstentertainmentintheworld，theorderwhereintheseveralideascomeatfirstintothemindisveryvarious，anduncertainalso；neitherisitmuchmaterialtoknowit。
8。Sensationsoftenchangedbythejudgment。Wearefurthertoconsiderconcerningperception，thattheideaswereceivebysensationareoften，ingrownpeople，alteredbythejudgment，withoutourtakingnoticeofit。Whenwesetbeforeoureyesaroundglobeofanyuniformcolour，v。g。gold，alabaster，orjet，itiscertainthattheideatherebyimprintedonourmindisofaflatcircle，variouslyshadowed，withseveraldegreesoflightandbrightnesscomingtooureyes。Butwehaving，byuse，beenaccustomedtoperceivewhatkindofappearanceconvexbodiesarewonttomakeinus；whatalterationsaremadeinthereflectionsoflightbythedifferenceofthesensiblefiguresofbodies；-thejudgmentpresently，byanhabitualcustom，alterstheappearancesintotheircauses。Sothatfromthatwhichistrulyvarietyofshadoworcolour，collectingthefigure，itmakesitpassforamarkoffigure，andframestoitselftheperceptionofaconvexfigureandanuniformcolour；whentheideawereceivefromthenceisonlyaplanevariouslycoloured，asisevidentinpainting。TowhichpurposeIshallhereinsertaproblemofthatveryingeniousandstudiouspromoterofrealknowledge，thelearnedandworthyMr。Molyneux，whichhewaspleasedtosendmeinalettersomemonthssince；anditisthis:-\"Supposeamanbornblind，andnowadult，andtaughtbyhistouchtodistinguishbetweenacubeandasphereofthesamemetal，andnighlyofthesamebigness，soastotell，whenhefeltoneandtheother，whichisthecube，whichthesphere。Supposethenthecubeandsphereplacedonatable，andtheblindmanbemadetosee:quaere，whetherbyhissight，beforehetouchedthem，hecouldnowdistinguishandtellwhichistheglobe，whichthecube？\"Towhichtheacuteandjudiciousproposeranswers，\"Not。For，thoughhehasobtainedtheexperienceofhowaglobe，howacubeaffectshistouch，yethehasnotyetobtainedtheexperience，thatwhataffectshistouchsoorso，mustaffecthissightsoorso；orthataprotuberantangleinthecube，thatpressedhishandunequally，shallappeartohiseyeasitdoesinthecube。\"-Iagreewiththisthinkinggentleman，whomIamproudtocallmyfriend，inhisanswertothisproblem；andamofopinionthattheblindman，atfirstsight，wouldnotbeablewithcertaintytosaywhichwastheglobe，whichthecube，whilstheonlysawthem；
thoughhecouldunerringlynamethembyhistouch，andcertainlydistinguishthembythedifferenceoftheirfiguresfelt。ThisI
havesetdown，andleavewithmyreader，asanoccasionforhimtoconsiderhowmuchhemaybebeholdentoexperience，improvement，andacquirednotions，wherehethinkshehadnottheleastuseof，orhelpfromthem。Andtherather，becausethisobservinggentlemanfurtheradds，that\"having，upontheoccasionofmybook，proposedthistodiversveryingeniousmen，hehardlyevermetwithonethatatfirstgavetheanswertoitwhichhethinkstrue，tillbyhearinghisreasonstheywereconvinced。\"
9。Thisjudgmentapttobemistakenfordirectperception。Butthisisnot，Ithink，usualinanyofourideas，butthosereceivedbysight。Becausesight，themostcomprehensiveofalloursenses，conveyingtoourmindstheideasoflightandcolours，whicharepeculiaronlytothatsense；andalsothefardifferentideasofspace，figure，andmotion，theseveralvarietieswhereofchangetheappearancesofitsproperobject，viz。lightandcolours；webringourselvesbyusetojudgeoftheonebytheother。This，inmanycasesbyasettledhabit，-inthingswhereofwehavefrequentexperience，isperformedsoconstantlyandsoquick，thatwetakethatfortheperceptionofoursensationwhichisanideaformedbyourjudgment；
sothatone，viz。thatofsensation，servesonlytoexcitetheother，andisscarcetakennoticeofitself；-asamanwhoreadsorhearswithattentionandunderstanding，takeslittlenoticeofthecharactersorsounds，butoftheideasthatareexcitedinhimbythem。
10。How，byhabit，ideasofsensationareunconsciouslychangedintoideasofjudgment。Norneedwewonderthatthisisdonewithsolittlenotice，ifweconsiderhowquicktheactionsofthemindareperformed。For，asitselfisthoughttotakeupnospace，tohavenoextension；soitsactionsseemtorequirenotime，butmanyofthemseemtobecrowdedintoaninstant。Ispeakthisincomparisontotheactionsofthebody。Anyonemayeasilyobservethisinhisownthoughts，whowilltakethepainstoreflectonthem。How，asitwereinaninstant，doourminds，withoneglance，seeallthepartsofademonstration，whichmayverywellbecalledalongone，ifweconsiderthetimeitwillrequiretoputitintowords，andstepbystepshowitanother？Secondly，weshallnotbesomuchsurprisedthatthisisdoneinuswithsolittlenotice，ifweconsiderhowthefacilitywhichwegetofdoingthings，byacustomofdoing，makesthemoftenpassinuswithoutournotice。Habits，especiallysuchasarebegunveryearly，comeatlasttoproduceactionsinus，whichoftenescapeourobservation。Howfrequentlydowe，inaday，coveroureyeswithoureyelids，withoutperceivingthatweareatallinthedark！Menthat，bycustom，havegottheuseofaby-word，doalmostineverysentencepronouncesoundswhich，thoughtakennoticeofbyothers，theythemselvesneitherhearnorobserve。Andthereforeitisnotsostrange，thatourmindshouldoftenchangetheideaofitssensationintothatofitsjudgment，andmakeoneserveonlytoexcitetheother，withoutourtakingnoticeofit。
11。Perceptionputsthedifferencebetweenanimalsandvegetables。
Thisfacultyofperceptionseemstometobe，thatwhichputsthedistinctionbetwixttheanimalkingdomandtheinferiorpartsofnature。For，howevervegetableshave，manyofthem，somedegreesofmotion，anduponthedifferentapplicationofotherbodiestothem，doverybrisklyaltertheirfiguresandmotions，andsohaveobtainedthenameofsensitiveplants，fromamotionwhichhassomeresemblancetothatwhichinanimalsfollowsuponsensation:yetIsupposeitisallbaremechanism；andnootherwiseproducedthantheturningofawildoat-beard，bytheinsinuationoftheparticlesofmoisture，ortheshorteningofarope，bytheaffusionofwater。Allwhichisdonewithoutanysensationinthesubject，orthehavingorreceivinganyideas。
12。Perceptioninallanimals。Perception，Ibelieve，is，insomedegree，inallsortsofanimals；thoughinsomepossiblytheavenuesprovidedbynatureforthereceptionofsensationsaresofew，andtheperceptiontheyarereceivedwithsoobscureanddull，thatitcomesextremelyshortofthequicknessandvarietyofsensationwhichisinotheranimals；butyetitissufficientfor，andwiselyadaptedto，thestateandconditionofthatsortofanimalswhoarethusmade。
SothatthewisdomandgoodnessoftheMakerplainlyappearinallthepartsofthisstupendousfabric，andalltheseveraldegreesandranksofcreaturesinit。
13。Accordingtotheircondition。Wemay，Ithink，fromthemakeofanoysterorcockle，reasonablyconcludethatithasnotsomany，norsoquicksensesasaman，orseveralotheranimals；norifithad，wouldit，inthatstateandincapacityoftransferringitselffromoneplacetoanother，bebetteredbythem。Whatgoodwouldsightandhearingdotoacreaturethatcannotmoveitselftoorfromtheobjectswhereinatadistanceitperceivesgoodorevil？Andwouldnotquicknessofsensationbeaninconveniencetoananimalthatmustliestillwherechancehasonceplacedit，andtherereceivetheaffluxofcolderorwarmer，cleanorfoulwater，asithappenstocometoit？
14。Decayofperceptioninoldage。ButyetIcannotbutthinkthereissomesmalldullperception，wherebytheyaredistinguishedfromperfectinsensibility。Andthatthismaybeso，wehaveplaininstances，eveninmankinditself。Takeoneinwhomdecrepitoldagehasblottedoutthememoryofhispastknowledge，andclearlywipedouttheideashismindwasformerlystoredwith，andhas，bydestroyinghissight，hearing，andsmellquite，andhistastetoagreatdegree，stoppedupalmostallthepassagesfornewonestoenter；oriftherebesomeoftheinletsyethalfopen，theimpressionsmadearescarcelyperceived，ornotatallretained。Howfarsuchanone(notwithstandingallthatisboastedofinnateprinciples)isinhisknowledgeandintellectualfacultiesabovetheconditionofacockleoranoyster，Ileavetobeconsidered。Andifamanhadpassedsixtyyearsinsuchastate，asitispossiblehemight，aswellasthreedays，Iwonderwhatdifferencetherewouldbe，inanyintellectualperfections，betweenhimandthelowestdegreeofanimals。
15。Perceptiontheinletofallmaterialsofknowledge。Perceptionthenbeingthefirststepanddegreetowardsknowledge，andtheinletofallthematerialsofit；thefewersensesanyman，aswellasanyothercreature，hath；andthefeweranddullertheimpressionsarethataremadebythem，andthedullerthefacultiesarethatareemployedaboutthem，-themoreremotearetheyfromthatknowledgewhichistobefoundinsomemen。Butthisbeingingreatvarietyofdegrees(asmaybeperceivedamongstmen)cannotcertainlybediscoveredintheseveralspeciesofanimals，muchlessintheirparticularindividuals。Itsufficesmeonlytohaveremarkedhere，-
thatperceptionisthefirstoperationofallourintellectualfaculties，andtheinletofallknowledgeinourminds。AndIamapttootoimagine，thatitisperception，inthelowestdegreeofit，whichputstheboundariesbetweenanimalsandtheinferiorranksofcreatures。ButthisImentiononlyasmyconjecturebytheby；itbeingindifferenttothematterinhandwhichwaythelearnedshalldetermineofit。
ChapterX
OfRetention1。Contemplation。Thenextfacultyofthemind，wherebyitmakesafurtherprogresstowardsknowledge，isthatwhichIcallretention；orthekeepingofthosesimpleideaswhichfromsensationorreflectionithathreceived。Thisisdonetwoways。
First，bykeepingtheideawhichisbroughtintoit，forsometimeactuallyinview，whichiscalledcontemplation。
2。Memory。Theotherwayofretentionis，thepowertoreviveagaininourmindsthoseideaswhich，afterimprinting，havedisappeared，orhavebeenasitwerelaidasideoutofsight。Andthuswedo，whenweconceiveheatorlight，yelloworsweet，-theobjectbeingremoved。Thisismemory，whichisasitwerethestorehouseofourideas。For，thenarrowmindofmannotbeingcapableofhavingmanyideasunderviewandconsiderationatonce，itwasnecessarytohavearepository，tolayupthoseideaswhich，atanothertime，itmighthaveuseof。But，ourideasbeingnothingbutactualperceptionsinthemind，whichceasetobeanythingwhenthereisnoperceptionofthem；thislayingupofourideasintherepositoryofthememorysignifiesnomorebutthis，-thatthemindhasapowerinmanycasestoreviveperceptionswhichithasoncehad，withthisadditionalperceptionannexedtothem，thatithashadthembefore。Andinthissenseitisthatourideasaresaidtobeinourmemories，whenindeedtheyareactuallynowhere；-butonlythereisanabilityinthemindwhenitwilltorevivethemagain，andasitwerepaintthemanewonitself，thoughsomewithmore，somewithlessdifficulty；somemorelively，andothersmoreobscurely。Andthusitis，bytheassistanceofthisfaculty，thatwearesaidtohaveallthoseideasinourunderstandingswhich，thoughwedonotactuallycontemplate，yetwecanbringinsight，andmakeappearagain，andbetheobjectsofourthoughts，withoutthehelpofthosesensiblequalitieswhichfirstimprintedthemthere。
3。Attention，repetition，pleasureandpain，fixideas。Attentionandrepetitionhelpmuchtothefixinganyideasinthememory。Butthosewhichnaturallyatfirstmakethedeepestandmostlastingimpressions，arethosewhichareaccompaniedwithpleasureorpain。
Thegreatbusinessofthesensesbeing，tomakeustakenoticeofwhathurtsoradvantagesthebody，itiswiselyorderedbynature，ashasbeenshown，thatpainshouldaccompanythereceptionofseveralideas；
which，supplyingtheplaceofconsiderationandreasoninginchildren，andactingquickerthanconsiderationingrownmen，makesboththeoldandyoungavoidpainfulobjectswiththathastewhichisnecessaryfortheirpreservation；andinbothsettlesinthememoryacautionforthefuture。
4。Ideasfadeinthememory。Concerningtheseveraldegreesoflasting，wherewithideasareimprintedonthememory，wemayobserve，-
thatsomeofthemhavebeenproducedintheunderstandingbyanobjectaffectingthesensesonceonly，andnomorethanonce；others，thathavemorethanonceofferedthemselvestothesenses，haveyetbeenlittletakennoticeof:themind，eitherheedless，asinchildren，orotherwiseemployed，asinmenintentonlyononething；notsettingthestampdeepintoitself。Andinsome，wheretheyaresetonwithcareandrepeatedimpressions，eitherthroughthetemperofthebody，orsomeotherfault，thememoryisveryweak。Inallthesecases，ideasinthemindquicklyfade，andoftenvanishquiteoutoftheunderstanding，leavingnomorefootstepsorremainingcharactersofthemselvesthanshadowsdoflyingoverfieldsofcorn，andthemindisasvoidofthemasiftheyhadneverbeenthere。
5。Causesofoblivion。Thusmanyofthoseideaswhichwereproducedinthemindsofchildren，inthebeginningoftheirsensation，(someofwhichperhaps，asofsomepleasuresandpains，werebeforetheywereborn，andothersintheirinfancy，)ifthefuturecourseoftheirlivestheyarenotrepeatedagain，arequitelost，withouttheleastglimpseremainingofthem。Thismaybeobservedinthosewhobysomemischancehavelosttheirsightwhentheywereveryyoung；inwhomtheideasofcolourshavingbeenbutslightlytakennoticeof，andceasingtoberepeated，doquitewearout；sothatsomeyearsafter，thereisnomorenotionnormemoryofcoloursleftintheirminds，thaninthoseofpeoplebornblind。Thememoryofsomemen，itistrue，isverytenacious，eventoamiracle。Butyetthereseemstobeaconstantdecayofallourideas，evenofthosewhicharestruckdeepest，andinmindsthemostretentive；sothatiftheybenotsometimesrenewed，byrepeatedexerciseofthesenses，orreflectiononthosekindsofobjectswhichatfirstoccasionedthem，theprintwearsout，andatlastthereremainsnothingtobeseen。Thustheideas，aswellaschildren，ofouryouth，oftendiebeforeus:andourmindsrepresenttousthosetombstowhichweareapproaching；where，thoughthebrassandmarbleremain，yettheinscriptionsareeffacedbytime，andtheimagerymouldersaway。Thepicturesdrawninourmindsarelaidinfadingcolours；andifnotsometimesrefreshed，vanishanddisappear。Howmuchtheconstitutionofourbodiesandthemakeofouranimalspiritsareconcernedinthis；andwhetherthetemperofthebrainmakesthisdifference，thatinsomeitretainsthecharactersdrawnonitlikemarble，inotherslikefreestone，andinotherslittlebetterthansand，Ishallnothereinquire；thoughitmayseemprobablethattheconstitutionofthebodydoessometimesinfluencethememory，sinceweoftentimesfindadiseasequitestripthemindofallitsideas，andtheflamesofafeverinafewdayscalcineallthoseimagestodustandconfusion，whichseemedtobeaslastingasifgravedinmarble。
6。Constantlyrepeatedideascanscarcebelost。Butconcerningtheideasthemselves，itiseasytoremark，thatthosethatareoftenestrefreshed(amongstwhicharethosethatareconveyedintothemindbymorewaysthanone)byafrequentreturnoftheobjectsoractionsthatproducethem，fixthemselvesbestinthememory，andremainclearestandlongestthere；andthereforethosewhichareoftheoriginalqualitiesofbodies，vis。solidity，extension，figure，motion，andrest；andthosethatalmostconstantlyaffectourbodies，asheatandcold；andthosewhicharetheaffectionsofallkindsofbeings，asexistence，duration，andnumber，whichalmosteveryobjectthataffectsoursenses，everythoughtwhichemploysourminds，bringalongwiththem；-these，Isay，andthelikeideas，areseldomquitelost，whilstthemindretainsanyideasatall。
7。Inremembering，themindisoftenactive。Inthissecondaryperception，asImaysocallit，orviewingagaintheideasthatarelodgedinthememory，themindisoftentimesmorethanbarelypassive；
theappearanceofthosedormantpicturesdependingsometimesonthewill。Themindveryoftensetsitselfonworkinsearchofsomehiddenidea，andturnsasitweretheeyeofthesouluponit；thoughsometimestootheystartupinourmindsoftheirownaccord，andofferthemselvestotheunderstanding；andveryoftenarerousedandtumbledoutoftheirdarkcellsintoopendaylight，byturbulentandtempestuouspassions；ouraffectionsbringingideastoourmemory，whichhadotherwiselainquietandunregarded。Thisfurtheristobeobserved，concerningideaslodgedinthememory，anduponoccasionrevivedbythemind，thattheyarenotonly(asthewordreviveimports)noneofthemnewones，butalsothatthemindtakesnoticeofthemasofaformerimpression，andrenewsitsacquaintancewiththem，aswithideasithadknownbefore。Sothatthoughideasformerlyimprintedarenotallconstantlyinview，yetinremembrancetheyareconstantlyknowntobesuchashavebeenformerlyimprinted；
i。e。inview，andtakennoticeofbefore，bytheunderstanding。
8。Twodefectsinthememory，oblivionandslowness。Memory，inanintellectualcreature，isnecessaryinthenextdegreetoperception。Itisofsogreatmoment，that，whereitiswanting，alltherestofourfacultiesareinagreatmeasureuseless。Andweinourthoughts，reasonings，andknowledge，couldnotproceedbeyondpresentobjects，wereitnotfortheassistanceofourmemories；
whereintheremaybetwodefects:-
First，Thatitlosestheideaquite，andsofaritproducesperfectignorance。For，sincewecanknownothingfurtherthanwehavetheideaofit，whenthatisgone，weareinperfectignorance。
Secondly，Thatitmovesslowly，andretrievesnottheideasthatithas，andarelaidupinstore，quickenoughtoservetheminduponoccasion。This，ifitbetoagreatdegree，isstupidity；andhewho，throughthisdefaultinhismemory，hasnottheideasthatarereallypreservedthere，readyathandwhenneedandoccasioncallsforthem，werealmostasgoodbewithoutthemquite，sincetheyservehimtolittlepurpose。Thedullman，wholosestheopportunity，whilstheisseekinginhismindforthoseideasthatshouldservehisturn，isnotmuchmorehappyinhisknowledgethanonethatisperfectlyignorant。Itisthebusinessthereforeofthememorytofurnishtothemindthosedormantideaswhichithaspresentoccasionfor；inthehavingthemreadyathandonalloccasions，consiststhatwhichwecallinvention，fancy，andquicknessofparts。
9。Adefectwhichbelongstothememoryofman，asfinite。Thesearedefectswemayobserveinthememoryofonemancomparedwithanother。
Thereisanotherdefectwhichwemayconceivetobeinthememoryofmaningeneral；-comparedwithsomesuperiorcreatedintellectualbeings，whichinthisfacultymaysofarexcelman，thattheymayhaveconstantlyinviewthewholesceneofalltheirformeractions，whereinnooneofthethoughtstheyhaveeverhadmayslipoutoftheirsight。TheomniscienceofGod，whoknowsallthings，past，present，andtocome，andtowhomthethoughtsofmen’sheartsalwayslieopen，maysatisfyusofthepossibilityofthis。ForwhocandoubtbutGodmaycommunicatetothosegloriousspirits，hisimmediateattendants，anyofhisperfections；inwhatproportionshepleases，asfarascreatedfinitebeingscanbecapable？Itisreportedofthatprodigyofparts，MonsieurPascal，thattillthedecayofhishealthhadimpairedhismemory，heforgotnothingofwhathehaddone，read，orthought，inanypartofhisrationalage。Thisisaprivilegesolittleknowntomostmen，thatitseemsalmostincredibletothosewho，aftertheordinaryway，measureallothersbythemselves；butyet，whenconsidered，mayhelpustoenlargeourthoughtstowardsgreaterperfectionsofit，insuperiorranksofspirits。ForthisofMonsieurPascalwasstillwiththenarrownessthathumanmindsareconfinedtohere，-ofhavinggreatvarietyofideasonlybysuccession，notallatonce。Whereastheseveraldegreesofangelsmayprobablyhavelargerviews；andsomeofthembeendowedwithcapacitiesabletoretaintogether，andconstantlysetbeforethem，asinonepicture，alltheirpastknowledgeatonce。
This，wemayconceive，wouldbenosmalladvantagetotheknowledgeofathinkingman，-ifallhispastthoughtsandreasoningscouldbealwayspresenttohim。Andthereforewemaysupposeitoneofthoseways，whereintheknowledgeofseparatespiritsmayexceedinglysurpassours。
10。Bruteshavememory。Thisfacultyoflayingupandretainingtheideasthatarebroughtintothemind，severalotheranimalsseemtohavetoagreatdegree，aswellasman。For，topassbyotherinstances，birdslearningoftunes，andtheendeavoursonemayobserveinthemtohitthenotesright，putitpastdoubtwithme，thattheyhaveperception，andretainideasintheirmemories，andusethemforpatterns。Foritseemstomeimpossiblethattheyshouldendeavourtoconformtheirvoicestonotes(asitisplaintheydo)ofwhichtheyhadnoideas。For，thoughIshouldgrantsoundmaymechanicallycauseacertainmotionoftheanimalspiritsinthebrainsofthosebirds，whilstthetuneisactuallyplaying；andthatmotionmaybecontinuedontothemusclesofthewings，andsothebirdmechanicallybedrivenawaybycertainnoises，becausethismaytendtothebird’spreservation；yetthatcanneverbesupposedareasonwhyitshouldcausemechanically-eitherwhilstthetuneisplaying，muchlessafterithasceased-suchamotionoftheorgansinthebird’svoiceasshouldconformittothenotesofaforeignsound，whichimitationcanbeofnousetothebird’spreservation。But，whichismore，itcannotwithanyappearanceofreasonbesupposed(muchlessproved)thatbirds，withoutsenseandmemory，canapproachtheirnotesnearerandnearerbydegreestoatuneplayedyesterday；whichiftheyhavenoideaofintheirmemory，isnownowhere，norcanbeapatternforthemtoimitate，orwhichanyrepeatedessayscanbringthemnearerto。Sincethereisnoreasonwhythesoundofapipeshouldleavetracesintheirbrains，which，notatfirst，butbytheirafter-endeavours，shouldproducethelikesounds；andwhythesoundstheymakethemselves，shouldnotmaketraceswhichtheyshouldfollow，aswellasthoseofthepipe，isimpossibletoconceive。
ChapterXI
OfDiscerning，andotheroperationsoftheMind1。Noknowledgewithoutdiscernment。Anotherfacultywemaytakenoticeofinourmindsisthatofdiscerninganddistinguishingbetweentheseveralideasithas。Itisnotenoughtohaveaconfusedperceptionofsomethingingeneral。Unlessthemindhadadistinctperceptionofdifferentobjectsandtheirqualities，itwouldbecapableofverylittleknowledge，thoughthebodiesthataffectuswereasbusyaboutusastheyarenow，andthemindwerecontinuallyemployedinthinking。Onthisfacultyofdistinguishingonethingfromanotherdependstheevidenceandcertaintyofseveral，evenverygeneral，propositions，whichhavepassedforinnatetruths；-becausemen，overlookingthetruecausewhythosepropositionsfinduniversalassent，imputeitwhollytonativeuniformimpressions；whereasitintruthdependsuponthiscleardiscerningfacultyofthemind，wherebyitperceivestwoideastobethesame，ordifferent。Butofthismorehereafter。
2。Thedifferenceofwitandjudgment。Howmuchtheimperfectionofaccuratelydiscriminatingideasonefromanotherlies，eitherinthedulnessorfaultsoftheorgansofsense；orwantofacuteness，exercise，orattentionintheunderstanding；orhastinessandprecipitancy，naturaltosometempers，Iwillnothereexamine:itsufficestotakenotice，thatthisisoneoftheoperationsthatthemindmayreflectonandobserveinitselfItisofthatconsequencetoitsotherknowledge，thatsofarasthisfacultyisinitselfdull，ornotrightlymadeuseof，forthedistinguishingonethingfromanother，-sofarournotionsareconfused，andourreasonandjudgmentdisturbedormisled。Ifinhavingourideasinthememoryreadyathandconsistsquicknessofparts；inthis，ofhavingthemunconfused，andbeingablenicelytodistinguishonethingfromanother，wherethereisbuttheleastdifference，consists，inagreatmeasure，theexactnessofjudgment，andclearnessofreason，whichistobeobservedinonemanaboveanother。Andhenceperhapsmaybegivensomereasonofthatcommonobservation，-thatmenwhohaveagreatdealofwit，andpromptmemories，havenotalwaystheclearestjudgmentordeepestreason。Forwitlyingmostintheassemblageofideas，andputtingthosetogetherwithquicknessandvariety，whereincanbefoundanyresemblanceorcongruity，therebytomakeuppleasantpicturesandagreeablevisionsinthefancy；judgment，onthecontrary，liesquiteontheotherside，inseparatingcarefully，onefromanother，ideaswhereincanbefoundtheleastdifference，therebytoavoidbeingmisledbysimilitude，andbyaffinitytotakeonethingforanother。Thisisawayofproceedingquitecontrarytometaphorandallusion；whereinforthemostpartliesthatentertainmentandpleasantryofwit，whichstrikessolivelyonthefancy，andthereforeissoacceptabletoallpeople，becauseitsbeautyappearsatfirstsight，andthereisrequirednolaborofthoughttoexaminewhattruthorreasonthereisinit。Themind，withoutlookinganyfurther，restssatisfiedwiththeagreeablenessofthepictureandthegaietyofthefancy。Anditisakindofaffronttogoabouttoexamineit，bythesevererulesoftruthandgoodreason；wherebyitappearsthatitconsistsinsomethingthatisnotperfectlyconformabletothem。
3。Clearnessdonehindersconfusion。Tothewelldistinguishingourideas，itchieflycontributesthattheybeclearanddeterminate。Andwhentheyareso，itwillnotbreedanyconfusionormistakeaboutthem，thoughthesensesshould(assometimestheydo)
conveythemfromthesameobjectdifferentlyondifferentoccasions，andsoseemtoerr。For，thoughamaninafevershouldfromsugarhaveabittertaste，whichatanothertimewouldproduceasweetone，yettheideaofbitterinthatman’smindwouldbeasclearanddistinctfromtheideaofsweetasifhehadtastedonlygall。Nordoesitmakeanymoreconfusionbetweenthetwoideasofsweetandbitter，thatthesamesortofbodyproducesatonetimeone，andatanothertimeanotherideabythetaste，thanitmakesaconfusionintwoideasofwhiteandsweet，orwhiteandround，thatthesamepieceofsugarproducesthembothinthemindatthesametime。Andtheideasoforange-colourandazure，thatareproducedinthemindbythesameparceloftheinfusionoflignumnephriticum，arenolessdistinctideasthanthoseofthesamecolourstakenfromtwoverydifferentbodies。
4。Comparing。TheCOMPARINGthemonewithanother，inrespectofextent，degrees，time，place，oranyothercircumstances，isanotheroperationofthemindaboutitsideas，andisthatuponwhichdependsallthatlargetribeofideascomprehendedunderrelation；
which，ofhowvastanextentitis，Ishallhaveoccasiontoconsiderhereafter。
5。Brutescomparebutimperfectly。Howfarbrutespartakeinthisfaculty，isnoteasytodetermine。Iimaginetheyhaveitnotinanygreatdegree:for，thoughtheyprobablyhaveseveralideasdistinctenough，yetitseemstometobetheprerogativeofhumanunderstanding，whenithassufficientlydistinguishedanyideas，soastoperceivethemtobeperfectlydifferent，andsoconsequentlytwo，tocastaboutandconsiderinwhatcircumstancestheyarecapabletobecompared。Andtherefore，Ithink，beastscomparenottheirideasfurtherthansomesensiblecircumstancesannexedtotheobjectsthemselves。Theotherpowerofcomparing，whichmaybeobservedinmen，belongingtogeneralideas，andusefulonlytoabstractreasonings，wemayprobablyconjecturebeastshavenot。
6。Compounding。ThenextoperationwemayobserveinthemindaboutitsideasisCOMPOSITION；wherebyitputstogetherseveralofthosesimpleonesithasreceivedfromsensationandreflection，andcombinesthemintocomplexones。Underthisofcompositionmaybereckonedalsothatofenlarging，wherein，thoughthecompositiondoesnotsomuchappearasinmorecomplexones，yetitisneverthelessaputtingseveralideastogether，thoughofthesamekind。Thus，byaddingseveralunitstogether，wemaketheideaofadozen；andputtingtogethertherepeatedideasofseveralperches，weframethatofafurlong。
7。Brutescompoundbutlittle。Inthisalso，Isuppose，brutescomefarshortofman。For，thoughtheytakein，andretaintogether，severalcombinationsofsimpleideas，aspossiblytheshape，smell，andvoiceofhismastermakeupthecomplexideaadoghasofhim，orratheraresomanydistinctmarkswherebyheknowshim；yetIdonotthinktheydoofthemselvesevercompoundthemandmakecomplexideas。Andperhapsevenwherewethinktheyhavecomplexideas，itisonlyonesimpleonethatdirectsthemintheknowledgeofseveralthings，whichpossiblytheydistinguishlessbytheirsightthanweimagine。ForIhavebeencrediblyinformedthatabitchwillnurse，playwith，andbefondofyoungfoxes，asmuchas，andinplaceofherpuppies，ifyoucanbutgetthemoncetosuckhersolongthathermilkmaygothroughthem。Andthoseanimalswhichhaveanumerousbroodofyoungonesatonce，appearnottohaveanyknowledgeoftheirnumber；forthoughtheyaremightilyconcernedforanyoftheiryoungthataretakenfromthemwhilsttheyareinsightorhearing，yetifoneortwoofthembestolenfromthemintheirabsence，orwithoutnoise，theyappearnottomissthem，ortohaveanysensethattheirnumberislessened。
8。Naming。Whenchildrenhave，byrepeatedsensations，gotideasfixedintheirmemories，theybeginbydegreestolearntheuseofsigns。Andwhentheyhavegottheskilltoapplytheorgansofspeechtotheframingofarticulatesounds，theybegintomakeuseofwords，tosignifytheirideastoothers。Theseverbalsignstheysometimesborrowfromothers，andsometimesmakethemselves，asonemayobserveamongthenewandunusualnameschildrenoftengivetothingsinthefirstuseoflanguage。
9。Abstraction。Theuseofwordsthenbeingtostandasoutwardmarksofourinternalideas，andthoseideasbeingtakenfromparticularthings，ifeveryparticularideathatwetakeinshouldhaveadistinctname，namesmustbeendless。Topreventthis，themindmakestheparticularideasreceivedfromparticularobjectstobecomegeneral；whichisdonebyconsideringthemastheyareinthemindsuchappearances，-separatefromallotherexistences，andthecircumstancesofrealexistence，astime，place，oranyotherconcomitantideas。ThisiscalledABSTRACTION，wherebyideastakenfromparticularbeingsbecomegeneralrepresentativesofallofthesamekind；andtheirnamesgeneralnames，applicabletowhateverexistsconformabletosuchabstractideas。Suchprecise，nakedappearancesinthemind，withoutconsideringhow，whence，orwithwhatotherstheycamethere，theunderstandinglaysup(withnamescommonlyannexedtothem)asthestandardstorankrealexistencesintosorts，astheyagreewiththesepatterns，andtodenominatethemaccordingly。Thusthesamecolourbeingobservedto-dayinchalkorsnow，whichthemindyesterdayreceivedfrommilk，itconsidersthatappearancealone，makesitarepresentativeofallofthatkind；andhavinggivenitthenamewhiteness，itbythatsoundsignifiesthesamequalitywheresoevertobeimaginedormetwith；andthusuniversals，whetherideasorterms，aremade。
10。Brutesabstractnot。Ifitmaybedoubtedwhetherbeastscompoundandenlargetheirideasthatwaytoanydegree；this，I
think，Imaybepositivein，-thatthepowerofabstractingisnotatallinthem；andthatthehavingofgeneralideasisthatwhichputsaperfectdistinctionbetwixtmanandbrutes，andisanexcellencywhichthefacultiesofbrutesdobynomeansattainto。Foritisevidentweobservenofootstepsinthemofmakinguseofgeneralsignsforuniversalideas；fromwhichwehavereasontoimaginethattheyhavenotthefacultyofabstracting，ormakinggeneralideas，sincetheyhavenouseofwords，oranyothergeneralsigns。
11。Brutesabstractnot，yetarenotbaremachines。Norcanitbeimputedtotheirwantoffitorganstoframearticulatesounds，thattheyhavenouseorknowledgeofgeneralwords；sincemanyofthem，wefind，canfashionsuchsounds，andpronouncewordsdistinctlyenough，butneverwithanysuchapplication。And，ontheotherside，menwho，throughsomedefectintheorgans，wantwords，yetfailnottoexpresstheiruniversalideasbysigns，whichservetheminsteadofgeneralwords，afacultywhichweseebeastscomeshortin。And，therefore，Ithink，wemaysuppose，thatitisinthisthatthespeciesofbrutesarediscriminatedfromman:anditisthatproperdifferencewhereintheyarewhollyseparated，andwhichatlastwidenstosovastadistance。Foriftheyhaveanyideasatall，andarenotbaremachines，(assomewouldhavethem，)wecannotdenythemtohavesomereason。Itseemsasevidenttome，thattheydosomeofthemincertaininstancesreason，asthattheyhavesense；butitisonlyinparticularideas，justastheyreceivedthemfromtheirsenses。
Theyarethebestofthemtiedupwithinthosenarrowbounds，andhavenot(asIthink)thefacultytoenlargethembyanykindofabstraction。
12。Idiotsandmadmen。Howfaridiotsareconcernedinthewantorweaknessofany，oralloftheforegoingfaculties，anexactobservationoftheirseveralwaysoffaulteringwouldnodoubtdiscover。Forthosewhoeitherperceivebutdully，orretaintheideasthatcomeintotheirmindsbutill，whocannotreadilyexciteorcompoundthem，willhavelittlemattertothinkon。Thosewhocannotdistinguish，compare，andabstract，wouldhardlybeabletounderstandandmakeuseoflanguage，orjudgeorreasontoanytolerabledegree；butonlyalittleandimperfectlyaboutthingspresent，andveryfamiliartotheirsenses。Andindeedanyoftheforementionedfaculties，ifwanting，oroutoforder，producesuitabledefectsinmen’sunderstandingsandknowledge。
13。Differencebetweenidiotsandmadmen。Infine，thedefectinnaturalsseemstoproceedfromwantofquickness，activity，andmotionintheintellectualfaculties，wherebytheyaredeprivedofreason；
whereasmadmen，ontheotherside，seemtosufferbytheotherextreme。Fortheydonotappeartometohavelostthefacultyofreasoning，buthavingjoinedtogethersomeideasverywrongly，theymistakethemfortruths；andtheyerrasmendothatarguerightfromwrongprinciples。For，bytheviolenceoftheirimaginations，havingtakentheirfanciesforrealities，theymakerightdeductionsfromthem。Thusyoushallfindadistractedmanfancyinghimselfaking，witharightinferencerequiresuitableattendance，respect，andobedience:otherswhohavethoughtthemselvesmadeofglass，haveusedthecautionnecessarytopreservesuchbrittlebodies。Henceitcomestopassthatamanwhoisverysober，andofarightunderstandinginallotherthings，mayinoneparticularbeasfranticasanyinBedlam；ifeitherbyanysuddenverystrongimpression，orlongfixinghisfancyupononesortofthoughts，incoherentideashavebeencementedtogethersopowerfully，astoremainunited。Buttherearedegreesofmadness，asoffolly；thedisorderlyjumblingideastogetherisinsomemore，andsomeless。Inshort，hereinseemstoliethedifferencebetweenidiotsandmadmen:thatmadmenputwrongideastogether，andsomakewrongpropositions，butargueandreasonrightfromthem；butidiotsmakeveryfewornopropositions，andreasonscarceatall。
14。Methodfollowedinthisexplicationoffaculties。These，I
think，arethefirstfacultiesandoperationsofthemind，whichitmakesuseofinunderstanding；andthoughtheyareexercisedaboutallitsideasingeneral，yettheinstancesIhavehithertogivenhavebeenchieflyinsimpleideas。AndIhavesubjoinedtheexplicationofthesefacultiesofthemindtothatofsimpleideas，beforeI
cometowhatIhavetosayconcerningcomplexones，forthesefollowingreasons:-
First，Becauseseveralofthesefacultiesbeingexercisedatfirstprincipallyaboutsimpleideas，wemight，byfollowingnatureinitsordinarymethod，traceanddiscoverthem，intheirrise，progress，andgradualimprovements。
Secondly，Becauseobservingthefacultiesofthemind，howtheyoperateaboutsimpleideas，-whichareusually，inmostmen’sminds，muchmoreclear，precise，anddistinctthancomplexones，-wemaythebetterexamineandlearnhowthemindextracts，denominates，compares，andexercises，initsotheroperationsaboutthosewhicharecomplex，whereinwearemuchmoreliabletomistake。
Thirdly，Becausetheseveryoperationsofthemindaboutideasreceivedfromsensations，arethemselves，whenreflectedon，anothersetofideas，derivedfromthatothersourceofourknowledge，whichI
callreflection；andthereforefittobeconsideredinthisplaceafterthesimpleideasofsensation。Ofcompounding，comparing，abstracting，&c。，Ihavebutjustspoken，havingoccasiontotreatofthemmoreatlargeinotherplaces。
15。Thetruebeginningofhumanknowledge。AndthusIhavegivenashort，and，Ithink，truehistoryofthefirstbeginningsofhumanknowledge；-whencethemindhasitsfirstobjects；andbywhatstepsitmakesitsprogresstothelayinginandstoringupthoseideas，outofwhichistobeframedalltheknowledgeitiscapableof:whereinI
mustappealtoexperienceandobservationwhetherIamintheright:
thebestwaytocometotruthbeingtoexaminethingsasreallytheyare，andnottoconcludetheyare，aswefancyofourselves，orhavebeentaughtbyotherstoimagine。
16。Appealtoexperience。Todealtruly，thisistheonlywaythatI
candiscover，wherebytheideasofthingsarebroughtintotheunderstanding。Ifothermenhaveeitherinnateideasorinfusedprinciples，theyhavereasontoenjoythem；andiftheyaresureofit，itisimpossibleforotherstodenythemtheprivilegethattheyhaveabovetheirneighbours。IcanspeakbutofwhatIfindinmyself，andisagreeabletothosenotions，which，ifwewillexaminethewholecourseofmenintheirseveralages，countries，andeducations，seemtodependonthosefoundationswhichIhavelaid，andtocorrespondwiththismethodinallthepartsanddegreesthereof。
17。Darkroom。Ipretendnottoteach，buttoinquire；andthereforecannotbutconfesshereagain，-thatexternalandinternalsensationaretheonlypassagesIcanfindofknowledgetotheunderstanding。
Thesealone，asfarasIcandiscover，arethewindowsbywhichlightisletintothisdarkroom。For，methinks，theunderstandingisnotmuchunlikeaclosetwhollyshutfromlight，withonlysomelittleopeningsleft，toletinexternalvisibleresemblances，orideasofthingswithout:wouldthepicturescomingintosuchadarkroombutstaythere，andliesoorderlyastobefounduponoccasion，itwouldverymuchresembletheunderstandingofaman，inreferencetoallobjectsofsight，andtheideasofthem。
Thesearemyguessesconcerningthemeanswherebytheunderstandingcomestohaveandretainsimpleideas，andthemodesofthem，withsomeotheroperationsaboutthem。
Iproceednowtoexaminesomeofthesesimpleideasandtheirmodesalittlemoreparticularly。
ChapterXII
OfComplexIdeas1。Madebythemindoutofsimpleones。Wehavehithertoconsideredthoseideas，inthereceptionwhereofthemindisonlypassive，whicharethosesimpleonesreceivedfromsensationandreflectionbeforementioned，whereofthemindcannotmakeonetoitself，norhaveanyideawhichdoesnotwhollyconsistofthem。Butasthemindiswhollypassiveinthereceptionofallitssimpleideas，soitexertsseveralactsofitsown，wherebyoutofitssimpleideas，asthematerialsandfoundationsoftherest，theothersareframed。Theactsofthemind，whereinitexertsitspoweroveritssimpleideas，arechieflythesethree:(1)Combiningseveralsimpleideasintoonecompoundone；andthusallcomplexideasaremade。
(2)Thesecondisbringingtwoideas，whethersimpleorcomplex，together，andsettingthembyoneanother，soastotakeaviewofthematonce，withoutunitingthemintoone；bywhichwayitgetsallitsideasofrelations。(3)Thethirdisseparatingthemfromallotherideasthataccompanythemintheirrealexistence:thisiscalledabstraction:andthusallitsgeneralideasaremade。Thisshowsman’spower，anditswaysofoperation，tobemuchthesameinthematerialandintellectualworld。Forthematerialsinbothbeingsuchashehasnopowerover，eithertomakeordestroy，allthatmancandoiseithertounitethemtogether，ortosetthembyoneanother，orwhollyseparatethem。Ishallherebeginwiththefirstoftheseintheconsiderationofcomplexideas，andcometotheothertwointheirdueplaces。Assimpleideasareobservedtoexistinseveralcombinationsunitedtogether，sothemindhasapowertoconsiderseveralofthemunitedtogetherasoneidea；andthatnotonlyastheyareunitedinexternalobjects，butasitselfhasjoinedthemtogether。Ideasthusmadeupofseveralsimpleonesputtogether，Icallcomplex；-suchasarebeauty，gratitude，aman，anarmy，theuniverse；which，thoughcomplicatedofvarioussimpleideas，orcomplexideasmadeupofsimpleones，yetare，whenthemindpleases，consideredeachbyitself，asoneentirething，andsignifiedbyonename。
2。Madevoluntarily。Inthisfacultyofrepeatingandjoiningtogetheritsideas，themindhasgreatpowerinvaryingandmultiplyingtheobjectsofitsthoughts，infinitelybeyondwhatsensationorreflectionfurnisheditwith:butallthisstillconfinedtothosesimpleideaswhichitreceivedfromthosetwosources，andwhicharetheultimatematerialsofallitscompositions。Forsimpleideasareallfromthingsthemselves，andofthesethemindcanhavenomore，norotherthanwhataresuggestedtoit。Itcanhavenootherideasofsensiblequalitiesthanwhatcomefromwithoutbythesenses；
noranyideasofotherkindofoperationsofathinkingsubstance，thanwhatitfindsinitselfButwhenithasoncegotthesesimpleideas，itisnotconfinedbarelytoobservation，andwhatoffersitselffromwithout；itcan，byitsownpower，puttogetherthoseideasithas，andmakenewcomplexones，whichitneverreceivedsounited。
3。Complexideasareeitherofmodes，substances，orrelations。
COMPLEXIDEAS，howevercompoundedanddecompounded，thoughtheirnumberbeinfinite，andthevarietyendless，wherewiththeyfillandentertainthethoughtsofmen；yetIthinktheymaybeallreducedunderthesethreeheads:-
1。MODES。
2。SUBSTANCES。
3。RELATIONS。
4。Ideasofmodes。First，ModesIcallsuchcomplexideaswhich，howevercompounded，containnotinthemthesuppositionofsubsistingbythemselves，butareconsideredasdependenceson，oraffectionsofsubstances；-suchasaretheideassignifiedbythewordstriangle，gratitude，murder，&c。AndifinthisIusethewordmodeinsomewhatadifferentsensefromitsordinarysignification，Ibegpardon；itbeingunavoidableindiscourses，differingfromtheordinaryreceivednotions，eithertomakenewwords，ortouseoldwordsinsomewhatanewsignification；thelaterwhereof，inourpresentcase，isperhapsthemoretolerableofthetwo。
5。Simpleandmixedmodesofsimpleideas。Ofthesemodes，therearetwosortswhichdeservedistinctconsideration:
First，therearesomewhichareonlyvariations，ordifferentcombinationsofthesamesimpleidea，withoutthemixtureofanyother；-asadozen，orscore；whicharenothingbuttheideasofsomanydistinctunitsaddedtogether，andtheseIcallsimplemodesasbeingcontainedwithintheboundsofonesimpleidea。
Secondly，thereareotherscompoundedofsimpleideasofseveralkinds，puttogethertomakeonecomplexone；-v。g。beauty，consistingofacertaincompositionofcolourandfigure，causingdelighttothebeholder；theft，whichbeingtheconcealedchangeofthepossessionofanything，withouttheconsentoftheproprietor，contains，asisvisible，acombinationofseveralideasofseveralkinds:andtheseIcallmixedmodes。
6。Ideasofsubstances，singleorcollective。Secondly，theideasofSubstancesaresuchcombinationsofsimpleideasasaretakentorepresentdistinctparticularthingssubsistingbythemselves；thesupposedorconfusedideaofsubstance，suchasitis，isalwaysthefirstandchiefThusiftosubstancebejoinedthesimpleideaofacertaindullwhitishcolour，withcertaindegreesofweight，hardness，ductility，andfusibility，wehavetheideaoflead；andacombinationoftheideasofacertainsortoffigure，withthepowersofmotion，thoughtandreasoning，joinedtosubstance，theordinaryideaofaman。Nowofsubstancesalso，therearetwosortsofideas:-oneofsinglesubstances，astheyexistseparately，asofamanorasheep；
theotherofseveralofthoseputtogether，asanarmyofmen，orflockofsheep-whichcollectiveideasofseveralsubstancesthusputtogetherareasmucheachofthemonesingleideaasthatofamanoranunit。
7。Ideasofrelation。Thirdly，thelastsortofcomplexideasisthatwecallRelation，whichconsistsintheconsiderationandcomparingoneideawithanother。
Oftheseseveralkindsweshalltreatintheirorder。
8。Theabstrusestideaswecanhaveareallfromtwosources。Ifwetracetheprogressofourminds，andwithattentionobservehowitrepeats，addstogether，andunitesitssimpleideasreceivedfromsensationorreflection，itwillleadusfurtherthanatfirstperhapsweshouldhaveimagined。And，Ibelieve，weshallfind，ifwewarilyobservetheoriginalsofournotions，thateventhemostabstruseideas，howremotesoevertheymayseemfromsense，orfromanyoperationsofourownminds，areyetonlysuchastheunderstandingframestoitself，byrepeatingandjoiningtogetherideasthatithadeitherfromobjectsofsense，orfromitsownoperationsaboutthem:sothatthoseevenlargeandabstractideasarederivedfromsensationorreflection，beingnootherthanwhatthemind，bytheordinaryuseofitsownfaculties，employedaboutideasreceivedfromobjectsofsense，orfromtheoperationsitobservesinitselfaboutthem，may，anddoes，attainunto。
ThisIshallendeavourtoshowintheideaswehaveofspace，time，andinfinity，andsomefewothersthatseemthemostremote，fromthoseoriginals。
ChapterXIII
ComplexIdeasofSimpleModes:-
andFirst，oftheSimpleModesoftheIdeaofSpace1。Simplemodesofsimpleideas。ThoughintheforegoingpartIhaveoftenmentionedsimpleideas，whicharetrulythematerialsofallourknowledge；yethavingtreatedofthemthere，ratherinthewaythattheycomeintothemind，thanasdistinguishedfromothersmorecompounded，itwillnotbeperhapsamisstotakeaviewofsomeofthemagainunderthisconsideration，andexaminethosedifferentmodificationsofthesameidea；whichthemindeitherfindsinthingsexisting，orisabletomakewithinitselfwithoutthehelpofanyextrinsicalobject，oranyforeignsuggestion。
Thosemodificationsofanyonesimpleidea(which，ashasbeensaid，Icallsimplemodes)areasperfectlydifferentanddistinctideasinthemindasthoseofthegreatestdistanceorcontrariety。Fortheideaoftwoisasdistinctfromthatofone，asbluenessfromheat，oreitherofthemfromanynumber:andyetitismadeuponlyofthatsimpleideaofanunitrepeated；andrepetitionsofthiskindjoinedtogethermakethosedistinctsimplemodes，ofadozen，agross，amillion。
2。IdeaofSpace。Ishallbeginwiththesimpleideaofspace。I
haveshowedabove，chap。V，thatwegettheideaofspace，bothbyoursightandtouch；which，Ithink，issoevident，thatitwouldbeasneedlesstogotoprovethatmenperceive，bytheirsight，adistancebetweenbodiesofdifferentcolours，orbetweenthepartsofthesamebody，asthattheyseecoloursthemselves:norisitlessobvious，thattheycandosointhedarkbyfeelingandtouch。
3。Spaceandextension。Thisspace，consideredbarelyinlengthbetweenanytwobeings，withoutconsideringanythingelsebetweenthem，iscalleddistance:ifconsideredinlength，breadth，andthickness，Ithinkitmaybecalledcapacity。(Thetermextensionisusuallyappliedtoitinwhatmannersoeverconsidered。)
4。Immensity。Eachdifferentdistanceisadifferentmodificationofspace；andeachideaofanydifferentdistance，orspace，isasimplemodeofthisidea。Men，fortheuseandbythecustomofmeasuring，settleintheirmindstheideasofcertainstatedlengths，-
suchasareaninch，foot，yard，fathom，mile，diameteroftheearth，&c。，whicharesomanydistinctideasmadeuponlyofspace。
Whenanysuchstatedlengthsormeasuresofspacearemadefamiliartomen’sthoughts，theycan，intheirminds，repeatthemasoftenastheywill，withoutmixingorjoiningtothemtheideaofbody，oranythingelse；andframetothemselvestheideasoflong，square，orcubicfeet，yardsorfathoms，hereamongstthebodiesoftheuniverse，orelsebeyondtheutmostboundsofallbodies；and，byaddingthesestillonetoanother，enlargetheirideasofspaceasmuchastheyplease。Thepowerofrepeatingordoublinganyideawehaveofanydistanceandaddingittotheformerasoftenaswewill，withoutbeingeverabletocometoanystoporstint，letusenlargeitasmuchaswewill，isthatwhichgivesustheideaofimmensity。
5。Figure。Thereisanothermodificationofthisidea，whichisnothingbuttherelationwhichthepartsoftheterminationofextension，orcircumscribedspace，haveamongstthemselves。Thisthetouchdiscoversinsensiblebodies，whoseextremitiescomewithinourreach；andtheeyetakesbothfrombodiesandcolours，whoseboundariesarewithinitsview:where，observinghowtheextremitiesterminate，-eitherinstraightlineswhichmeetatdiscernibleangles，orincrookedlineswhereinnoanglescanbeperceived；byconsideringtheseastheyrelatetooneanother，inallpartsoftheextremitiesofanybodyorspace，ithasthatideawecallfigure，whichaffordstothemindinfinitevariety。For，besidesthevastnumberofdifferentfiguresthatdoreallyexist，inthecoherentmassesofmatter，thestockthatthemindhasinitspower，byvaryingtheideaofspace，andtherebymakingstillnewcompositions，byrepeatingitsownideas，andjoiningthemasitpleases，isperfectlyinexhaustible。Andsoitcanmultiplyfiguresininfinitum。
6。Endlessvarietyoffigures。Forthemindhavingapowertorepeattheideaofanylengthdirectlystretchedout，andjoinittoanotherinthesamedirection，whichistodoublethelengthofthatstraightline；orelsejoinanotherwithwhatinclinationitthinksfit，andsomakewhatsortofangleitpleases:andbeingablealsotoshortenanylineitimagines，bytakingfromitonehalf，onefourth，orwhatpartitpleases，withoutbeingabletocometoanendofanysuchdivisions，itcanmakeanangleofanybigness。Soalsothelinesthatareitssides，ofwhatlengthitpleases，whichjoiningagaintootherlines，ofdifferentlengths，andatdifferentangles，tillithaswhollyenclosedanyspace，itisevidentthatitcanmultiplyfigures，bothintheirshapeandcapacity，ininfinitum；allwhicharebutsomanydifferentsimplemodesofspace。
Thesamethatitcandowithstraightlines，itcanalsodowithcrooked，orcrookedandstraighttogether；andthesameitcandoinlines，itcanalsoinsuperficies；bywhichwemaybeledintofartherthoughtsoftheendlessvarietyoffiguresthatthemindhasapowertomake，andtherebytomultiplythesimplemodesofspace。
7。Place。Anotherideacomingunderthishead，andbelongingtothistribe，isthatwecallplace。Asinsimplespace，weconsidertherelationofdistancebetweenanytwobodiesorpoints；soinourideaofplace，weconsidertherelationofdistancebetwixtanything，andanytwoormorepoints，whichareconsideredaskeepingthesamedistanceonewithanother，andsoconsideredasatrest。Forwhenwefindanythingatthesamedistancenowwhichitwasyesterday，fromanytwoormorepoints，whichhavenotsincechangedtheirdistanceonewithanother，andwithwhichwethencomparedit，wesayithathkeptthesameplace:butifithathsensiblyaltereditsdistancewitheitherofthosepoints，wesayithathchangeditsplace:though，vulgarlyspeaking，inthecommonnotionofplace，wedonotalwaysexactlyobservethedistancefromtheseprecisepoints，butfromlargerportionsofsensibleobjects，towhichweconsiderthethingplacedtobearrelation，anditsdistancefromwhichwehavesomereasontoobserve。
8。Placerelativetoparticularbodies。Thus，acompanyofchess-men，standingonthesamesquaresofthechess-boardwhereweleftthem，wesaytheyareallinthesameplace，orunmoved，thoughperhapsthechess-boardhathbeeninthemeantimecarriedoutofoneroomintoanother；becausewecomparedthemonlytothepartsofthechess-board，whichkeepthesamedistanceonewithanother。Thechess-board，wealsosay，isinthesameplaceitwas，ifitremaininthesamepartofthecabin，thoughperhapstheshipwhichitisinsailsallthewhile。Andtheshipissaidtobeinthesameplace，supposingitkeptthesamedistancewiththepartsoftheneighbouringland；thoughperhapstheearthhathturnedround，andsobothchess-men，andboard，andship，haveeveryonechangedplace，inrespectofremoterbodies，whichhavekeptthesamedistanceonewithanother。Butyetthedistancefromcertainpartsoftheboardbeingthatwhichdeterminestheplaceofthechessmen；andthedistancefromthefixedpartsofthecabin(withwhichwemadethecomparison)beingthatwhichdeterminedtheplaceofthechess-board；andthefixedpartsoftheearththatbywhichwedeterminedtheplaceoftheship，-thesethingsmaybesaidtobeinthesameplaceinthoserespects:thoughtheirdistancefromsomeotherthings，whichinthismatterwedidnotconsider，beingvaried，theyhaveundoubtedlychangedplaceinthatrespect；andweourselvesshallthinkso，whenwehaveoccasiontocomparethemwiththoseother。
9。Placerelativetoapresentpurpose。Butthismodificationofdistancewecallplace，beingmadebymenfortheircommonuse，thatbyittheymightbeabletodesigntheparticularpositionofthings，wheretheyhadoccasionforsuchdesignation；menconsideranddetermineofthisplacebyreferencetothoseadjacentthingswhichbestservedtotheirpresentpurpose，withoutconsideringotherthingswhich，toanotherpurpose，wouldbetterdeterminetheplaceofthesamething。Thusinthechess-board，theuseofthedesignationoftheplaceofeachchess-manbeingdeterminedonlywithinthatchequeredpieceofwood，itwouldcrossthatpurposetomeasureitbyanythingelse；butwhentheseverychess-menareputupinabag，ifanyoneshouldaskwheretheblackkingis，itwouldbepropertodeterminetheplacebythepartoftheroomitwasin，andnotbythechess-board；therebeinganotheruseofdesigningtheplaceitisnowin，thanwheninplayitwasonthechess-board，andsomustbedeterminedbyotherbodies。Soifanyoneshouldask，inwhatplacearetheverseswhichreportthestoryofNisusandEuryalus，itwouldbeveryimpropertodeterminethisplace，bysaying，theywereinsuchapartoftheearth，orinBodley’slibrary:buttherightdesignationoftheplacewouldbebythepartsofVirgil’sworks；
andtheproperanswerwouldbe，thattheseverseswereaboutthemiddleoftheninthbookofhisAEneids，andthattheyhavebeenalwaysconstantlyinthesameplaceeversinceVirgilwasprinted:
whichistrue，thoughthebookitselfhathmovedathousandtimes，theuseoftheideaofplaceherebeing，toknowinwhatpartofthebookthatstoryis，thatso，uponoccasion，wemayknowwheretofindit，andhaverecoursetoitforuse。
10。Placeoftheuniverse。ThatourideaofplaceisnothingelsebutsucharelativepositionofanythingasIhavebeforementioned，I
thinkisplain，andwillbeeasilyadmitted，whenweconsiderthatwecanhavenoideaoftheplaceoftheuniverse，thoughwecanofallthepartsofit；becausebeyondthatwehavenottheideaofanyfixed，distinct，particularbeings，inreferencetowhichwecanimagineittohaveanyrelationofdistance；butallbeyonditisoneuniformspaceorexpansion，whereinthemindfindsnovariety，nomarks。Fortosaythattheworldissomewhere，meansnomorethanthatitdoesexist；this，thoughaphraseborrowedfromplace，signifyingonlyitsexistence，notlocation:andwhenonecanfindout，andframeinhismind，clearlyanddistinctly，theplaceoftheuniverse，hewillbeabletotelluswhetheritmovesorstandsstillintheundistinguishableinaneofinfinitespace:thoughitbetruethatthewordplacehassometimesamoreconfusedsense，andstandsforthatspacewhichanybodytakesup；andsotheuniverseisinaplace。
Theidea，therefore，ofplacewehavebythesamemeansthatwegettheideaofspace，(whereofthisisbutaparticularlimitedconsideration，)viz，byoursightandtouch；byeitherofwhichwereceiveintoourmindstheideasofextensionordistance。
11。Extensionandbodynotthesame。Therearesomethatwouldpersuadeus，thatbodyandextensionarethesamething，whoeitherchangethesignificationofwords，whichIwouldnotsuspectthemof，-
theyhavingsoseverelycondemnedthephilosophyofothers，becauseithathbeentoomuchplacedintheuncertainmeaning，ordeceitfulobscurityofdoubtfulorinsignificantterms。If，therefore，theymeanbybodyandextensionthesamethatotherpeopledo，viz。bybodysomethingthatissolidandextended，whosepartsareseparableandmovabledifferentways；andbyextension，onlythespacethatliesbetweentheextremitiesofthosesolidcoherentparts，andwhichispossessedbythem，-theyconfoundverydifferentideasonewithanother；forIappealtoeveryman’sownthoughtswhethertheideaofspacebenotasdistinctfromthatofsolidity，asitisfromtheideaofscarletcolour？Itistrue，soliditycannotexistwithoutextension，neithercanscarletcolourexistwithoutextension，butthishindersnot，butthattheyaredistinctideas。Manyideasrequireothers，asnecessarytotheirexistenceorconception，whichyetareverydistinctideas。Motioncanneitherbe，norbeconceived，withoutspace；andyetmotionisnotspace，norspacemotion；spacecanexistwithoutit，andtheyareverydistinctideas；andso，I
think，arethoseofspaceandsolidity。Solidityissoinseparableanideafrombody，thatuponthatdependsitsfillingofspace，itscontact，impulse，andcommunicationofmotionuponimpulse。Andifitbeareasontoprovethatspiritisdifferentfrombody，becausethinkingincludesnottheideaofextensioninit；thesamereasonwillbeasvalid，Isuppose，toprovethatspaceisnotbody，becauseitincludesnottheideaofsolidityinit；spaceandsoliditybeingasdistinctideasasthinkingandextension，andaswhollyseparableinthemindonefromanother。Bodythenandextension，itisevident，aretwodistinctideas。For，12。Extensionnotsolidity。First，Extensionincludesnosolidity，norresistancetothemotionofbody，asbodydoes。
13。Thepartsofspaceinseparable，bothreallyandmentally。
Secondly，Thepartsofpurespaceareinseparableonefromtheother；sothatthecontinuitycannotbeseparated，neitherreallynormentally。ForIdemandofanyonetoremoveanypartofitfromanother，withwhichitiscontinued，evensomuchasinthought。Todivideandseparateactuallyis，asIthink，byremovingthepartsonefromanother，tomaketwosuperficies，wherebeforetherewasacontinuity:andtodividementallyis，tomakeinthemindtwosuperficies，wherebeforetherewasacontinuity，andconsiderthemasremovedonefromtheother；whichcanonlybedoneinthingsconsideredbythemindascapableofbeingseparated；andbyseparation，ofacquiringnewdistinctsuperficies，whichtheythenhavenot，butarecapableofButneitherofthesewaysofseparation，whetherrealormental，is，asIthink，compatibletopurespace。
Itistrue，amanmayconsidersomuchofsuchaspaceasisanswerableorcommensuratetoafoot，withoutconsideringtherest，whichis，indeed，apartialconsideration，butnotsomuchasmentalseparationordivision；sinceamancannomorementallydivide，withoutconsideringtwosuperficiesseparateonefromtheother，thanhecanactuallydivide，withoutmakingtwosuperficiesdisjoinedonefromtheother:butapartialconsiderationisnotseparating。Amanmayconsiderlightinthesunwithoutitsheat，ormobilityinbodywithoutitsextension，withoutthinkingoftheirseparation。Oneisonlyapartialconsideration，terminatinginonealone；andtheotherisaconsiderationofboth，asexistingseparately。
14。Thepartsofspace，immovable。Thirdly，Thepartsofpurespaceareimmovable，whichfollowsfromtheirinseparability；motionbeingnothingbutchangeofdistancebetweenanytwothings；butthiscannotbebetweenpartsthatareinseparable，which，therefore，mustneedsbeatperpetualrestoneamongstanother。
Thusthedeterminedideaofsimplespacedistinguishesitplainlyandsufficientlyfrombody；sinceitspartsareinseparable，immovable，andwithoutresistancetothemotionofbody。
15。Thedefinitionofextensionexplainsitnot。IfanyoneaskmewhatthisspaceIspeakofis，Iwilltellhimwhenhetellsmewhathisextensionis。Fortosay，asisusuallydone，thatextensionistohavepartesextrapartes，istosayonly，thatextensionisextension。
ForwhatamIthebetterinformedinthenatureofextension，whenI
amtoldthatextensionistohavepartsthatareextended，exteriortopartsthatareextended，i。e。extensionconsistsofextendedparts？Asifone，askingwhatafibrewas，Ishouldanswerhim，-thatitwasathingmadeupofseveralfibres。Wouldhetherebybeenabledtounderstandwhatafibrewasbetterthanhedidbefore？Orrather，wouldhenothavereasontothinkthatmydesignwastomakesportwithhim，ratherthanseriouslytoinstructhim？
16。Divisionofbeingsintobodiesandspiritsprovesnotspaceandbodythesame。Thosewhocontendthatspaceandbodyarethesame，bringthisdilemma:-eitherthisspaceissomethingornothing；ifnothingbebetweentwobodies，theymustnecessarilytouch；ifitbeallowedtobesomething，theyask，Whetheritbebodyorspirit？TowhichIanswerbyanotherquestion，Whotoldthemthattherewas，orcouldbe，nothingbutsolidbeings，whichcouldnotthink，andthinkingbeingsthatwerenotextended？-whichisalltheymeanbythetermsbodyandspirit。
17。Substancewhichweknownot，noproofagainstspacewithoutbody。Ifitbedemanded(asusuallyitis)whetherthisspace，voidofbody，besubstanceoraccident，IshallreadilyanswerIknownot；norshallbeashamedtoownmyignorance，tilltheythataskshowmeacleardistinctideaofsubstance。
18。Differentmeaningsofsubstance。IendeavourasmuchasIcantodelivermyselffromthosefallacieswhichweareapttoputuponourselves，bytakingwordsforthings。Ithelpsnotourignorancetofeignaknowledgewherewehavenone，bymakinganoisewithsounds，withoutclearanddistinctsignifications。Namesmadeatpleasure，neitheralterthenatureofthings，normakeusunderstandthem，butastheyaresignsofandstandfordeterminedideas。AndIdesirethosewholaysomuchstressonthesoundofthesetwosyllables，substance，toconsiderwhetherapplyingit，astheydo，totheinfinite，incomprehensibleGod，tofinitespirits，andtobody，itbeinthesamesense；andwhetheritstandsforthesameidea，wheneachofthosethreesodifferentbeingsarecalledsubstances。Ifso，whetheritwillthencefollow-thatGod，spirits，andbody，agreeinginthesamecommonnatureofsubstance，differnotanyotherwisethaninabaredifferentmodificationofthatsubstance；
asatreeandapebble，beinginthesamesensebody，andagreeinginthecommonnatureofbody，differonlyinabaremodificationofthatcommonmatter，whichwillbeaveryharshdoctrine。Iftheysay，thattheyapplyittoGod，finitespirit，andmatter，inthreedifferentsignificationsandthatitstandsforoneideawhenGodissaidtobeasubstance；foranotherwhenthesouliscalledsubstance；
andforathirdwhenbodyiscalledso；-ifthenamesubstancestandsforthreeseveraldistinctideas，theywoulddowelltomakeknownthosedistinctideas，oratleasttogivethreedistinctnamestothem，topreventinsoimportantanotiontheconfusionanderrorsthatwillnaturallyfollowfromthepromiscuoususeofsodoubtfulaterm；whichissofarfrombeingsuspectedtohavethreedistinct，thatinordinaryuseithasscarceonecleardistinctsignification。Andiftheycanthusmakethreedistinctideasofsubstance，whathinderswhyanothermaynotmakeafourth？
19。Substanceandaccidentsoflittleuseinphilosophy。Theywhofirstranintothenotionofaccidents，asasortofrealbeingsthatneededsomethingtoinherein，wereforcedtofindoutthewordsubstancetosupportthem。HadthepoorIndianphilosopher(whoimaginedthattheearthalsowantedsomethingtobearitup)butthoughtofthiswordsubstance，heneedednottohavebeenatthetroubletofindanelephanttosupportit，andatortoisetosupporthiselephant:thewordsubstancewouldhavedoneiteffectually。AndhethatinquiredmighthavetakenitforasgoodananswerfromanIndianphilosopher，-thatsubstance，withoutknowingwhatitis，isthatwhichsupportstheearth，aswetakeitforasufficientanswerandgooddoctrinefromourEuropeanphilosophers，-thatsubstance，withoutknowingwhatitis，isthatwhichsupportsaccidents。Sothatofsubstance，wehavenoideaofwhatitis，butonlyaconfused，obscureoneofwhatitdoes。
20。Stickingonandunder-propping。Whateveralearnedmanmaydohere，anintelligentAmerican，whoinquiredintothenatureofthings，wouldscarcetakeitforasatisfactoryaccount，if，desiringtolearnourarchitecture，heshouldbetoldthatapillarisathingsupportedbyabasis，andabasissomethingthatsupportedapillar。Wouldhenotthinkhimselfmocked，insteadoftaught，withsuchanaccountasthis？Andastrangertothemwouldbeveryliberallyinstructedinthenatureofbooks，andthethingstheycontained，ifheshouldbetoldthatalllearnedbooksconsistedofpaperandletters，andthatletterswerethingsinheringinpaper，andpaperathingthatheldforthletters:anotablewayofhavingclearideasoflettersandpaper。ButweretheLatinwords，inhaerentiaandsubstantio，putintotheplainEnglishonesthatanswerthem，andwerecalledstickingonandunder-propping，theywouldbetterdiscovertoustheverygreatclearnessthereisinthedoctrineofsubstanceandaccidents，andshowofwhatusetheyareindecidingofquestionsinphilosophy。
21。Avacuumbeyondtheutmostboundsofbody。Buttoreturntoourideaofspace。Ifbodybenotsupposedinfinite，(whichIthinknoonewillaffirm)，Iwouldask，whether，ifGodplacedamanattheextremityofcorporealbeings，hecouldnotstretchhishandbeyondhisbody？Ifhecould，thenhewouldputhisarmwheretherewasbeforespacewithoutbody；andiftherehespreadhisfingers，therewouldstillbespacebetweenthemwithoutbody。Ifhecouldnotstretchouthishand，itmustbebecauseofsomeexternalhindrance；
(forwesupposehimalive，withsuchapowerofmovingthepartsofhisbodythathehathnow，whichisnotinitselfimpossible，ifGodsopleasedtohaveit；oratleastitisnotimpossibleforGodsotomovehim):andthenIask，-whetherthatwhichhindershishandfrommovingoutwardsbesubstanceoraccident，somethingornothing？
Andwhentheyhaveresolvedthat，theywillbeabletoresolvethemselves，-whatthatis，whichisormaybebetweentwobodiesatadistance，thatisnotbody，andhasnosolidity。Inthemeantime，theargumentisatleastasgood，that，wherenothinghinders，(asbeyondtheutmostboundsofallbodies)，abodyputinmotionmaymoveon，aswherethereisnothingbetween，theretwobodiesmustnecessarilytouch。Forpurespacebetweenissufficienttotakeawaythenecessityofmutualcontact；butbarespaceinthewayisnotsufficienttostopmotion。Thetruthis，thesemenmusteitherownthattheythinkbodyinfinite，thoughtheyarelothtospeakitout，orelseaffirmthatspaceisnotbody。ForIwouldfainmeetwiththatthinkingmanthatcaninhisthoughtssetanyboundstospace，morethanhecantoduration；orbythinkinghopetoarriveattheendofeither。Andtherefore，ifhisideaofeternitybeinfinite，soishisideaofimmensity；theyarebothfiniteorinfinitealike。
22。Thepowerofannihilationprovesavacuum。Farther，thosewhoasserttheimpossibilityofspaceexistingwithoutmatter，mustnotonlymakebodyinfinite，butmustalsodenyapowerinGodtoannihilateanypartofmatter。Noone，Isuppose，willdenythatGodcanputanendtoallmotionthatisinmatter，andfixallthebodiesoftheuniverseinaperfectquietandrest，andcontinuethemsolongashepleases。WhoeverthenwillallowthatGodcan，duringsuchageneralrest，annihilateeitherthisbookorthebodyofhimthatreadsit，mustnecessarilyadmitthepossibilityofavacuum。For，itisevidentthatthespacethatwasfilledbythepartsoftheannihilatedbodywillstillremain，andbeaspacewithoutbody。Forthecircumambientbodiesbeinginperfectrest，areawallofadamant，andinthatstatemakeitaperfectimpossibilityforanyotherbodytogetintothatspace。Andindeedthenecessarymotionofoneparticleofmatterintotheplacefromwhenceanotherparticleofmatterisremoved，isbutaconsequencefromthesuppositionofplenitude；whichwillthereforeneedsomebetterproofthanasupposedmatteroffact，whichexperimentcannevermakeout；-ourownclearanddistinctideasplainlysatisfyingus，thatthereisnonecessaryconnexionbetweenspaceandsolidity，sincewecanconceivetheonewithouttheother。Andthosewhodisputefororagainstavacuum，dotherebyconfesstheyhavedistinctideasofvacuumandplenum，i。e。
thattheyhaveanideaofextensionvoidofsolidity，thoughtheydenyitsexistence；orelsetheydisputeaboutnothingatall。Fortheywhosomuchalterthesignificationofwords，astocallextensionbody，andconsequentlymakethewholeessenceofbodytobenothingbutpureextensionwithoutsolidity，musttalkabsurdlywhenevertheyspeakofvacuum；sinceitisimpossibleforextensiontobewithoutextension。Forvacuum，whetherweaffirmordenyitsexistence，signifiesspacewithoutbody；whoseveryexistencenoonecandenytobepossible，whowillnotmakematterinfinite，andtakefromGodapowertoannihilateanyparticleofit。
23。Motionprovesavacuum。Butnottogosofarasbeyondtheutmostboundsofbodyintheuniverse，norappealtoGod’somnipotencytofindavacuum，themotionofbodiesthatareinourviewandneighbourhoodseemstomeplainlytoevinceit。ForIdesireanyonesotodivideasolidbody，ofanydimensionhepleases，astomakeitpossibleforthesolidpartstomoveupanddownfreelyeverywaywithintheboundsofthatsuperficies，iftherebenotleftinitavoidspaceasbigastheleastpartintowhichhehasdividedthesaidsolidbody。Andif，wheretheleastparticleofthebodydividedisasbigasamustard-seed，avoidspaceequaltothebulkofamustard-seedberequisitetomakeroomforthefreemotionofthepartsofthedividedbodywithintheboundsofitssuperficies，wheretheparticlesofmatterare100，000，000lessthanamustard-seed，theremustalsobeaspacevoidofsolidmatterasbigas100，000，000partofamustard-seed；forifitholdintheoneitwillholdintheother，andsoonininfinitum。Andletthisvoidspacebeaslittleasitwill，itdestroysthehypothesisofplenitude。Foriftherecanbeaspacevoidofbodyequaltothesmallestseparateparticleofmatternowexistinginnature，itisstillspacewithoutbody；andmakesasgreatadifferencebetweenspaceandbodyasifitweremegachasma，adistanceaswideasanyinnature。Andtherefore，ifwesupposenotthevoidspacenecessarytomotionequaltotheleastparcelofthedividedsolidmatter，butto1/10or1/1000ofit，thesameconsequencewillalwaysfollowofspacewithoutmatter。
24。Theideasofspaceandbodydistinct。Butthequestionbeinghere，-Whethertheideaofspaceorextensionbethesamewiththeideaofbody？itisnotnecessarytoprovetherealexistenceofavacuum，buttheideaofit；whichitisplainmenhavewhentheyinquireanddisputewhethertherebeavacuumorno。Foriftheyhadnottheideaofspacewithoutbody，theycouldnotmakeaquestionaboutitsexistence:andiftheirideaofbodydidnotincludeinitsomethingmorethanthebareideaofspace，theycouldhavenodoubtabouttheplenitudeoftheworld；anditwouldbeasabsurdtodemand，whethertherewerespacewithoutbody，aswhethertherewerespacewithoutspace，orbodywithoutbody，sincethesewerebutdifferentnamesofthesameidea。
25。Extensionbeinginseparablefrombody，provesitnotthesame。
Itistrue，theideaofextensionjoinsitselfsoinseparablywithallvisible，andmosttangiblequalities，thatitsuffersustoseenoone，orfeelveryfewexternalobjects，withouttakinginimpressionsofextensiontoo。Thisreadinessofextensiontomakeitselfbetakennoticeofsoconstantlywithotherideas，hasbeentheoccasion，Iguess，thatsomehavemadethewholeessenceofbodytoconsistinextension；whichisnotmuchtobewonderedat，sincesomehavehadtheirminds，bytheireyesandtouch，(thebusiestofalloursenses，)sofilledwiththeideaofextension，and，asitwere，whollypossessedwithit，thattheyallowednoexistencetoanythingthathadnotextension。Ishallnotnowarguewiththosemen，whotakethemeasureandpossibilityofallbeingonlyfromtheirnarrowandgrossimaginations:buthavingheretodoonlywiththosewhoconcludetheessenceofbodytobeextension，becausetheysaytheycannotimagineanysensiblequalityofanybodywithoutextension，-Ishalldesirethemtoconsider，that，hadtheyreflectedontheirideasoftastesandsmellsasmuchasonthoseofsightandtouch；nay，hadtheyexaminedtheirideasofhungerandthirst，andseveralotherpains，theywouldhavefoundthattheyincludedinthemnoideaofextensionatall，whichisbutanaffectionofbody，aswellastherest，discoverablebyoursenses，whicharescarceacuteenoughtolookintothepureessencesofthings。
26。Essencesofthings。Ifthoseideaswhichareconstantlyjoinedtoallothers，mustthereforebeconcludedtobetheessenceofthosethingswhichhaveconstantlythoseideasjoinedtothem，andareinseparablefromthem；thenunityiswithoutdoubttheessenceofeverything。Forthereisnotanyobjectofsensationorreflectionwhichdoesnotcarrywithittheideaofone:buttheweaknessofthiskindofargumentwehavealreadyshownsufficiently。
27。Ideasofspaceandsoliditydistinct。Toconclude:whatevermenshallthinkconcerningtheexistenceofavacuum，thisisplaintome-thatwehaveasclearanideaofspacedistinctfromsolidity，aswehaveofsoliditydistinctfrommotion，ormotionfromspace。
Wehavenotanytwomoredistinctideas；andwecanaseasilyconceivespacewithoutsolidity，aswecanconceivebodyorspacewithoutmotion，thoughitbeneversocertainthatneitherbodynormotioncanexistwithoutspace。Butwhetheranyonewilltakespacetobeonlyarelationresultingfromtheexistenceofotherbeingsatadistance；
orwhethertheywillthinkthewordsofthemostknowingKingSolomon，\"Theheaven，andtheheavenofheavens，cannotcontainthee\"；orthosemoreemphaticalonesoftheinspiredphilosopherSt。Paul，\"Inhimwelive，move，andhaveourbeing，\"aretobeunderstoodinaliteralsense，Ileaveeveryonetoconsider:onlyourideaofspaceis，Ithink，suchasIhavementioned，anddistinctfromthatofbody。
For，whetherweconsider，inmatteritself，thedistanceofitscoherentsolidparts，andcallit，inrespectofthosesolidparts，extension；orwhether，consideringitaslyingbetweentheextremitiesofanybodyinitsseveraldimensions，wecallitlength，breadth，andthickness；orelse，consideringitaslyingbetweenanytwobodiesorpositivebeings，withoutanyconsiderationwhethertherebeanymatterornotbetween，wecallitdistance；-howevernamedorconsidered，itisalwaysthesameuniformsimpleideaofspace，takenfromobjectsaboutwhichoursenseshavebeenconversant；
whereof，havingsettledideasinourminds，wecanrevive，repeat，andaddthemonetoanotherasoftenaswewill，andconsiderthespaceordistancesoimagined，eitherasfilledwithsolidparts，sothatanotherbodycannotcometherewithoutdisplacingandthrustingoutthebodythatwastherebefore；orelseasvoidofsolidity，sothatabodyofequaldimensionstothatemptyorpurespacemaybeplacedinit，withouttheremovingorexpulsionofanythingthatwasthere。
But，toavoidconfusionindiscoursesconcerningthismatter，itwerepossiblytobewishedthatthenameextensionwereappliedonlytomatter，orthedistanceoftheextremitiesofparticularbodies；
andthetermexpansiontospaceingeneral，withorwithoutsolidmatterpossessingit，-soastosayspaceisexpandedandbodyextended。Butinthiseveryonehashisliberty:Iproposeitonlyforthemoreclearanddistinctwayofspeaking。
28。Mendifferlittleinclear，simpleideas。Theknowingpreciselywhatourwordsstandfor，would，Iimagine，inthisaswellasagreatmanyothercases，quicklyendthedispute。ForIamapttothinkthatmen，whentheycometoexaminethem，findtheirsimpleideasallgenerallytoagree，thoughindiscoursewithoneanothertheyperhapsconfoundoneanotherwithdifferentnames。I
imaginethatmenwhoabstracttheirthoughts，anddowellexaminetheideasoftheirownminds，cannotmuchdifferinthinking；
howevertheymayperplexthemselveswithwords，accordingtothewayofspeakingtotheseveralschoolsorsectstheyhavebeenbredupin:
thoughamongstunthinkingmen，whoexaminenotscrupulouslyandcarefullytheirownideas，andstripthemnotfromthemarksmenuseforthem，butconfoundthemwithwords，theremustbeendlessdispute，wrangling，andjargon；especiallyiftheybelearned，bookishmen，devotedtosomesect，andaccustomedtothelanguageofit，andhavelearnedtotalkafterothers。Butifitshouldhappenthatanytwothinkingmenshouldreallyhavedifferentideas，Idonotseehowtheycoulddiscourseorarguewithanother。HereImustnotbemistaken，tothinkthateveryfloatingimaginationinmen’sbrainsispresentlyofthatsortofideasIspeakof。Itisnoteasyforthemindtoputoffthoseconfusednotionsandprejudicesithasimbibedfromcustom，inadvertency，andcommonconversation。Itrequirespainsandassiduitytoexamineitsideas，tillitresolvesthemintothoseclearanddistinctsimpleones，outofwhichtheyarecompounded；andtoseewhich，amongstitssimpleones，haveorhavenotanecessaryconnexionanddependenceoneuponanother。Tillamandoththisintheprimaryandoriginalnotionsofthings，hebuildsuponfloatinganduncertainprinciples，andwilloftenfindhimselfataloss。
