OfIdeasChapterI
OfIdeasingeneral，andtheirOriginal1。Ideaistheobjectofthinking。Everymanbeingconscioustohimselfthathethinks；andthatwhichhismindisappliedaboutwhilstthinkingbeingtheideasthatarethere，itispastdoubtthatmenhaveintheirmindsseveralideas，-suchasarethoseexpressedbythewordswhiteness，hardness，sweetness，thinking，motion，man，elephant，army，drunkenness，andothers:itisinthefirstplacethentobeinquired，Howhecomesbythem？
Iknowitisareceiveddoctrine，thatmenhavenativeideas，andoriginalcharacters，stampedupontheirmindsintheirveryfirstbeing。ThisopinionIhaveatlargeexaminedalready；and，IsupposewhatIhavesaidintheforegoingBookwillbemuchmoreeasilyadmitted，whenIhaveshownwhencetheunderstandingmaygetalltheideasithas；andbywhatwaysanddegreestheymaycomeintothemind；-forwhichIshallappealtoeveryone’sownobservationandexperience。
2。Allideascomefromsensationorreflection。Letusthensupposethemindtobe，aswesay，whitepaper，voidofallcharacters，withoutanyideas:-Howcomesittobefurnished？Whencecomesitbythatvaststorewhichthebusyandboundlessfancyofmanhaspaintedonitwithanalmostendlessvariety？Whencehasitallthematerialsofreasonandknowledge？TothisIanswer，inoneword，fromEXPERIENCE。Inthatallourknowledgeisfounded；andfromthatitultimatelyderivesitself。Ourobservationemployedeither，aboutexternalsensibleobjects，orabouttheinternaloperationsofourmindsperceivedandreflectedonbyourselves，isthatwhichsuppliesourunderstandingswithallthematerialsofthinking。Thesetwoarethefountainsofknowledge，fromwhencealltheideaswehave，orcannaturallyhave，dospring。
3。Theobjectsofsensationonesourceofideas。First，ourSenses，conversantaboutparticularsensibleobjects，doconveyintothemindseveraldistinctperceptionsofthings，accordingtothosevariouswayswhereinthoseobjectsdoaffectthem。Andthuswecomebythoseideaswehaveofyellow，white，heat，cold，soft，hard，bitter，sweet，andallthosewhichwecallsensiblequalities；whichwhenIsaythesensesconveyintothemind，Imean，theyfromexternalobjectsconveyintothemindwhatproducestherethoseperceptions。
Thisgreatsourceofmostoftheideaswehave，dependingwhollyuponoursenses，andderivedbythemtotheunderstanding，IcallSENSATION。
4。Theoperationsofourminds，theothersourceofthem。
Secondly，theotherfountainfromwhichexperiencefurnisheththeunderstandingwithideasis，-theperceptionoftheoperationsofourownmindwithinus，asitisemployedabouttheideasithasgot；-
whichoperations，whenthesoulcomestoreflectonandconsider，dofurnishtheunderstandingwithanothersetofideas，whichcouldnotbehadfromthingswithout。Andsuchareperception，thinking，doubting，believing，reasoning，knowing，willing，andallthedifferentactingsofourownminds；-whichwebeingconsciousof，andobservinginourselves，dofromthesereceiveintoourunderstandingsasdistinctideasaswedofrombodiesaffectingoursenses。Thissourceofideaseverymanhaswhollyinhimself；andthoughitbenotsense，ashavingnothingtodowithexternalobjects，yetitisverylikeit，andmightproperlyenoughbecalledinternalsense。ButasIcalltheotherSENSATION，soICallthisREFLECTION，theideasitaffordsbeingsuchonlyasthemindgetsbyreflectingonitsownoperationswithinitself。Byreflectionthen，inthefollowingpartofthisdiscourse，Iwouldbeunderstoodtomean，thatnoticewhichthemindtakesofitsownoperations，andthemannerofthem，byreasonwhereoftherecometobeideasoftheseoperationsintheunderstanding。Thesetwo，Isay，viz。externalmaterialthings，astheobjectsofSENSATION，andtheoperationsofourownmindswithin，astheobjectsofREFLECTION，aretometheonlyoriginalsfromwhenceallourideastaketheirbeginnings。ThetermoperationshereIuseinalargesense，ascomprehendingnotbarelytheactionsofthemindaboutitsideas，butsomesortofpassionsarisingsometimesfromthem，suchasisthesatisfactionoruneasinessarisingfromanythought。
5。Allourideasareoftheoneortheotherofthese。Theunderstandingseemstomenottohavetheleastglimmeringofanyideaswhichitdothnotreceivefromoneofthesetwo。Externalobjectsfurnishthemindwiththeideasofsensiblequalities，whichareallthosedifferentperceptionstheyproduceinus；andthemindfurnishestheunderstandingwithideasofitsownoperations。
These，whenwehavetakenafullsurveyofthem，andtheirseveralmodes，combinations，andrelations，weshallfindtocontainallourwholestockofideas；andthatwehavenothinginourmindswhichdidnotcomeinoneofthesetwoways。Letanyoneexaminehisownthoughts，andthoroughlysearchintohisunderstanding；andthenlethimtellme，whetheralltheoriginalideashehasthere，areanyotherthanoftheobjectsofhissenses，oroftheoperationsofhismind，consideredasobjectsofhisreflection。Andhowgreatamassofknowledgesoeverheimaginestobelodgedthere，hewill，upontakingastrictview，seethathehasnotanyideainhismindbutwhatoneofthesetwohaveimprinted；-thoughperhaps，withinfinitevarietycompoundedandenlargedbytheunderstanding，asweshallseehereafter。
6。Observableinchildren。Hethatattentivelyconsidersthestateofachild，athisfirstcomingintotheworld，willhavelittlereasontothinkhimstoredwithplentyofideas，thataretobethematterofhisfutureknowledge。Itisbydegreeshecomestobefurnishedwiththem。Andthoughtheideasofobviousandfamiliarqualitiesimprintthemselvesbeforethememorybeginstokeeparegisteroftimeororder，yetitisoftensolatebeforesomeunusualqualitiescomeintheway，thattherearefewmenthatcannotrecollectthebeginningoftheiracquaintancewiththem。Andifitwereworthwhile，nodoubtachildmightbesoorderedastohavebutaveryfew，evenoftheordinaryideas，tillheweregrownuptoaman。Butallthatarebornintotheworld，beingsurroundedwithbodiesthatperpetuallyanddiverselyaffectthem，varietyofideas，whethercarebetakenofitornot，areimprintedonthemindsofchildren。Lightandcoloursarebusyathandeverywhere，whentheeyeisbutopen；soundsandsometangiblequalitiesfailnottosolicittheirpropersenses，andforceanentrancetothemind；-butyet，Ithink，itwillbegrantedeasily，thatifachildwerekeptinaplacewhereheneversawanyotherbutblackandwhitetillhewereaman，hewouldhavenomoreideasofscarletorgreen，thanhethatfromhischildhoodnevertastedanoyster，orapine-apple，hasofthoseparticularrelishes。
7。Menaredifferentlyfurnishedwiththese，accordingtothedifferentobjectstheyconversewith。Menthencometobefurnishedwithfewerormoresimpleideasfromwithout，accordingastheobjectstheyconversewithaffordgreaterorlessvariety；andfromtheoperationsoftheirmindswithin，accordingastheymoreorlessreflectonthem。For，thoughhethatcontemplatestheoperationsofhismind，cannotbuthaveplainandclearideasofthem；yet，unlessheturnhisthoughtsthatway，andconsidersthemattentively，hewillnomorehaveclearanddistinctideasofalltheoperationsofhismind，andallthatmaybeobservedtherein，thanhewillhavealltheparticularideasofanylandscape，orofthepartsandmotionsofaclock，whowillnotturnhiseyestoit，andwithattentionheedallthepartsofit。Thepicture，orclockmaybesoplaced，thattheymaycomeinhiswayeveryday；butyethewillhavebutaconfusedideaofallthepartstheyaremadeupof，tillheapplieshimselfwithattention，toconsiderthemeachinparticular。
8。Ideasofreflectionlater，becausetheyneedattention。Andhenceweseethereasonwhyitisprettylatebeforemostchildrengetideasoftheoperationsoftheirownminds；andsomehavenotanyveryclearorperfectideasofthegreatestpartofthemalltheirlives。
Because，thoughtheypasstherecontinually，yet，likefloatingvisions，theymakenotdeepimpressionsenoughtoleaveintheirmindclear，distinct，lastingideas，tilltheunderstandingturnsinwarduponitself，reflectsonitsownoperations，andmakesthemtheobjectsofitsowncontemplation。Childrenwhentheycomefirstintoit，aresurroundedwithaworldofnewthings，which，byaconstantsolicitationoftheirsenses，drawthemindconstantlytothem；
forwardtotakenoticeofnew，andapttobedelightedwiththevarietyofchangingobjects。Thusthefirstyearsareusuallyemployedanddivertedinlookingabroad。Men’sbusinessinthemistoacquaintthemselveswithwhatistobefoundwithout；andsogrowingupinaconstantattentiontooutwardsensations，seldommakeanyconsiderablereflectiononwhatpasseswithinthem，tilltheycometobeofriperyears；andsomescarceeveratall。
9。Thesoulbeginstohaveideaswhenitbeginstoperceive。Toask，atwhattimeamanhasfirstanyideas，istoask，whenhebeginstoperceive；-havingideas，andperception，beingthesamething。I
knowitisanopinion，thatthesoulalwaysthinks，andthatithastheactualperceptionofideasinitselfconstantly，aslongasitexists；andthatactualthinkingisasinseparablefromthesoulasactualextensionisfromthebody；whichiftrue，toinquireafterthebeginningofaman’sideasisthesameastoinquireafterthebeginningofhissoul。For，bythisaccount，soulanditsideas，asbodyanditsextension，willbegintoexistbothatthesametime。
10。Thesoulthinksnotalways；forthiswantsproofs。Butwhetherthesoulbesupposedtoexistantecedentto，orcoevalwith，orsometimeafterthefirstrudimentsoforganization，orthebeginningsoflifeinthebody，Ileavetobedisputedbythosewhohavebetterthoughtofthatmatter。Iconfessmyselftohaveoneofthosedullsouls，thatdothnotperceiveitselfalwaystocontemplateideas；
norcanconceiveitanymorenecessaryforthesoulalwaystothink，thanforthebodyalwaystomove:theperceptionofideasbeing(asIconceive)tothesoul，whatmotionistothebody；notitsessence，butoneofitsoperations。Andtherefore，thoughthinkingbesupposedneversomuchtheproperactionofthesoul，yetitisnotnecessarytosupposethatitshouldbealwaysthinking，alwaysinaction。That，perhaps，istheprivilegeoftheinfiniteAuthorandPreserverofallthings，who\"neverslumbersnorsleeps；\"butisnotcompetenttoanyfinitebeing，atleastnottothesoulofman。Weknowcertainly，byexperience，thatwesometimesthink；andthencedrawthisinfallibleconsequence，-thatthereissomethinginusthathasapowertothink。Butwhetherthatsubstanceperpetuallythinksorno，wecanbenofurtherassuredthanexperienceinformsus。
For，tosaythatactualthinkingisessentialtothesoul，andinseparablefromit，istobegwhatisinquestion，andnottoproveitbyreason；-whichisnecessarytobedone，ifitbenotaself-evidentproposition。Butwhetherthis，\"Thatthesoulalwaysthinks，\"beaself-evidentproposition，thateverybodyassentstoatfirsthearing，Iappealtomankind。ItisdoubtedwhetherIthoughtatalllastnightorno。Thequestionbeingaboutamatteroffact，itisbeggingittobring，asaproofforit，anhypothesis，whichistheverythingindispute:bywhichwayonemayproveanything，anditisbutsupposingthatallwatches，whilstthebalancebeats，think，anditissufficientlyproved，andpastdoubt，thatmywatchthoughtalllastnight。Buthethatwouldnotdeceivehimself，oughttobuildhishypothesisonmatteroffact，andmakeitoutbysensibleexperience，andnotpresumeonmatteroffact，becauseofhishypothesis，thatis，becausehesupposesittobeso；whichwayofprovingamountstothis，thatImustnecessarilythinkalllastnight，becauseanothersupposesIalwaysthink，thoughImyselfcannotperceivethatIalwaysdoso。
Butmeninlovewiththeiropinionsmaynotonlysupposewhatisinquestion，butallegewrongmatteroffact。Howelsecouldanyonemakeitaninferenceofmine，thatathingisnot，becausewearenotsensibleofitinoursleep？Idonotsaythereisnosoulinaman，becauseheisnotsensibleofitinhissleep；butIdosay，hecannotthinkatanytime，wakingorsleeping:withoutbeingsensibleofit。Ourbeingsensibleofitisnotnecessarytoanythingbuttoourthoughts；andtothemitis；andtothemitalwayswillbenecessary，tillwecanthinkwithoutbeingconsciousofit。
11。Itisnotalwaysconsciousofit。Igrantthatthesoul，inawakingman，isneverwithoutthought，becauseitistheconditionofbeingawake。Butwhethersleepingwithoutdreamingbenotanaffectionofthewholeman，mindaswellasbody，maybeworthawakingman’sconsideration；itbeinghardtoconceivethatanythingshouldthinkandnotbeconsciousofit。Ifthesouldoththinkinasleepingmanwithoutbeingconsciousofit，Iaskwhether，duringsuchthinking，ithasanypleasureorpain，orbecapableofhappinessormisery？Iamsurethemanisnot；nomorethanthebedorearthhelieson。Fortobehappyormiserablewithoutbeingconsciousofit，seemstomeutterlyinconsistentandimpossible。Orifitbepossiblethatthesoulcan，whilstthebodyissleeping，haveitsthinking，enjoyments，andconcerns，itspleasuresorpain，apart，whichthemanisnotconsciousofnorpartakesin，-itiscertainthatSocratesasleepandSocratesawakeisnotthesameperson；buthissoulwhenhesleeps，andSocratestheman，consistingofbodyandsoul，whenheiswaking，aretwopersons:sincewakingSocrateshasnoknowledgeof，orconcernmentforthathappinessormiseryofhissoul，whichitenjoysalonebyitselfwhilsthesleeps，withoutperceivinganythingofit；nomorethanhehasforthehappinessormiseryofamanintheIndies，whomheknowsnot。For，ifwetakewhollyawayallconsciousnessofouractionsandsensations，especiallyofpleasureandpain，andtheconcernmentthataccompaniesit，itwillbehardtoknowwhereintoplacepersonalidentity。
12。Ifasleepingmanthinkswithoutknowingit，thesleepingandwakingmanaretwopersons。Thesoul，duringsoundsleep，thinks，saythesemen。Whilstitthinksandperceives，itiscapablecertainlyofthoseofdelightortrouble，aswellasanyotherperceptions；
anditmustnecessarilybeconsciousofitsownperceptions。Butithasallthisapart:thesleepingman，itisplain，isconsciousofnothingofallthis。Letussuppose，then，thesoulofCastor，whileheissleeping，retiredfromhisbody；whichisnoimpossiblesuppositionforthemenIhaveheretodowith，whosoliberallyallowlife，withoutathinkingsoul，toallotheranimals。Thesemencannotthenjudgeitimpossible，oracontradiction，thatthebodyshouldlivewithoutthesoul；northatthesoulshouldsubsistandthink，orhaveperception，evenperceptionofhappinessormisery，withoutthebody。Letusthen，Isay，supposethesoulofCastorseparatedduringhissleepfromhisbody，tothinkapart。Letussuppose，too，thatitchoosesforitssceneofthinkingthebodyofanotherman，v。g。Pollux，whoissleepingwithoutasoul。For，ifCastor’ssoulcanthink，whilstCastorisasleep，whatCastorisneverconsciousof，itisnomatterwhatplaceitchoosestothinkin。Wehavehere，then，thebodiesoftwomenwithonlyonesoulbetweenthem，whichwewillsupposetosleepandwakebyturns；andthesoulstillthinkinginthewakingman，whereofthesleepingmanisneverconscious，hasnevertheleastperception。Iask，then，whetherCastorandPollux，thuswithonlyonesoulbetweenthem，whichthinksandperceivesinonewhattheotherisneverconsciousof，norisconcernedfor，arenottwoasdistinctpersonsasCastorandHercules，orasSocratesandPlatowere？Andwhetheroneofthemmightnotbeveryhappy，andtheotherverymiserable？Justbythesamereason，theymakethesoulandthemantwopersons，whomakethesoulthinkapartwhatthemanisnotconsciousof。For，Isupposenobodywillmakeidentityofpersonstoconsistinthesoul’sbeingunitedtotheverysamenumercialparticlesofmatter。Forifthatbenecessarytoidentity，itwillbeimpossible，inthatconstantfluxoftheparticlesofourbodies，thatanymanshouldbethesamepersontwodays，ortwomoments，together。
13。Impossibletoconvincethosethatsleepwithoutdreaming，thattheythink。Thus，methinks，everydrowsynodshakestheirdoctrine，whoteachthatthesoulisalwaysthinking。Those，atleast，whodoatanytimesleepwithoutdreaming，canneverbeconvincedthattheirthoughtsaresometimesforfourhoursbusywithouttheirknowingofit；andiftheyaretakenintheveryact，wakedinthemiddleofthatsleepingcontemplation，cangivenomannerofaccountofit。
14。Thatmendreamwithoutrememberingit，invainurged。Itwillperhapsbesaid，-Thatthesoulthinkseveninthesoundestsleep，butthememoryretainsitnot。Thatthesoulinasleepingmanshouldbethismomentbusyathinking，andthenextmomentinawakingmannotremembernorbeabletorecollectonejotofallthosethoughts，isveryhardtobeconceived，andwouldneedsomebetterproofthanbareassertiontomakeitbebelieved。Forwhocanwithoutanymoreado，butbeingbarelytoldso，imaginethatthegreatestpartofmendo，duringalltheirlives，forseveralhourseveryday，thinkofsomething，whichiftheywereasked，eveninthemiddleofthesethoughts，theycouldremembernothingatallof？Mostmen，Ithink，passagreatpartoftheirsleepwithoutdreaming。Ionceknewamanthatwasbredascholar，andhadnobadmemory，whotoldmehehadneverdreamedinhislife，tillhehadthatfeverhewasthennewlyrecoveredof，whichwasaboutthefiveorsixandtwentiethyearofhisage。Isupposetheworldaffordsmoresuchinstances:atleasteveryone’sacquaintancewillfurnishhimwithexamplesenoughofsuchaspassmostoftheirnightswithoutdreaming。
15。Uponthishypothesis，thethoughtsofasleepingmanoughttobemostrational。Tothinkoften，andnevertoretainitsomuchasonemoment，isaveryuselesssortofthinking；andthesoul，insuchastateofthinking，doesverylittle，ifatall，excelthatofalooking-glass，whichconstantlyreceivesvarietyofimages，orideas，butretainsnone；theydisappearandvanish，andthereremainnofootstepsofthem；thelooking-glassisneverthebetterforsuchideas，northesoulforsuchthoughts。Perhapsitwillbesaid，thatinawakingmanthematerialsofthebodyareemployed，andmadeuseof，inthinking；andthatthememoryofthoughtsisretainedbytheimpressionsthataremadeonthebrain，andthetracesthereleftaftersuchthinking；butthatinthethinkingofthesoul，whichisnotperceivedinasleepingman，therethesoulthinksapart，andmakingnouseoftheorgansofthebody，leavesnoimpressionsonit，andconsequentlynomemoryofsuchthoughts。Nottomentionagaintheabsurdityoftwodistinctpersons，whichfollowsfromthissupposition，Ianswer，further，-Thatwhateverideasthemindcanreceiveandcontemplatewithoutthehelpofthebody，itisreasonabletoconcludeitcanretainwithoutthehelpofthebodytoo；orelsethesoul，oranyseparatespirit，willhavebutlittleadvantagebythinking。Ifithasnomemoryofitsownthoughts；ifitcannotlaythemupforitsownuse，andbeabletorecallthemuponoccasion；
ifitcannotreflectuponwhatispast，andmakeuseofitsformerexperiences，reasonings，andcontemplations，towhatpurposedoesitthink？Theywhomakethesoulathinkingthing，atthisrate，willnotmakeitamuchmorenoblebeingthanthosedowhomtheycondemn，forallowingittobenothingbutthesubtilistpartsofmatter。
Charactersdrawnondust，thatthefirstbreathofwindeffaces；orimpressionsmadeonaheapofatoms，oranimalspirits，arealtogetherasuseful，andrenderthesubjectasnoble，asthethoughtsofasoulthatperishinthinking；that，onceoutofsight，aregoneforever，andleavenomemoryofthemselvesbehindthem。Naturenevermakesexcellentthingsformeanornouses:anditishardlytobeconceivedthatourinfinitelywiseCreatorshouldmakesoadmirableafacultywhichcomesnearesttheexcellencyofhisownincomprehensiblebeing，tobesoidlyanduselesslyemployed，atleastafourthpartofitstimehere，astothinkconstantly，withoutrememberinganyofthosethoughts，withoutdoinganygoodtoitselforothers，orbeinganywayusefultoanyotherpartofthecreation，Ifwewillexamineit，weshallnotfind，Isuppose，themotionofdullandsenselessmatter，anywhereintheuniverse，madesolittleuseofandsowhollythrownaway。
16。Onthishypothesis，thesoulmusthaveideasnotderivedfromsensationorreflection，ofwhichthereisnoappearance。Itistrue，wehavesometimesinstancesofperceptionwhilstweareasleep，andretainthememoryofthosethoughts:buthowextravagantandincoherentforthemostparttheyare；howlittleconformabletotheperfectionandorderofarationalbeing，thosewhoareacquaintedwithdreamsneednotbetold。ThisIwouldwillinglybesatisfiedin，-
whetherthesoul，whenitthinksthusapart，andasitwereseparatefromthebody，actslessrationallythanwhenconjointlywithit，orno。Ifitsseparatethoughtsbelessrational，thenthesemenmustsay，thatthesoulowestheperfectionofrationalthinkingtothebody:ifitdoesnot，itisawonderthatourdreamsshouldbe，forthemostpart，sofrivolousandirrational；andthatthesoulshouldretainnoneofitsmorerationalsoliloquiesandmeditations。
17。IfIthinkwhenIknowitnot，nobodyelsecanknowit。Thosewhosoconfidentlytellusthatthesoulalwaysactuallythinks，I
wouldtheywouldalsotellus，whatthoseideasarethatareinthesoulofachild，beforeorjustattheunionwiththebody，beforeithathreceivedanybysensation。Thedreamsofsleepingmenare，asItakeit，allmadeupofthewakingman’sideas；thoughforthemostpartoddlyputtogether。Itisstrange，ifthesoulhasideasofitsownthatitderivednotfromsensationorreflection，(asitmusthave，ifitthoughtbeforeitreceivedanyimpressionsfromthebody，)thatitshouldnever，initsprivatethinking，(soprivate，thatthemanhimselfperceivesitnot，)retainanyofthemtheverymomentitwakesoutofthem，andthenmakethemangladwithnewdiscoveries。Whocanfinditreasonthatthesoulshould，initsretirementduringsleep，havesomanyhours’thoughts，andyetneverlightonanyofthoseideasitborrowednotfromsensationorreflection；oratleastpreservethememoryofnonebutsuch，which，beingoccasionedfromthebody，mustneedsbelessnaturaltoaspirit？Itisstrangethesoulshouldneveronceinaman’swholeliferecalloveranyofitspurenativethoughts，andthoseideasithadbeforeitborrowedanythingfromthebody；neverbringintothewakingman’sviewanyotherideasbutwhathaveatangofthecask，andmanifestlyderivetheiroriginalfromthatunion。Ifitalwaysthinks，andsohadideasbeforeitwasunited，orbeforeitreceivedanyfromthebody，itisnottobesupposedbutthatduringsleepitrecollectsitsnativeideas；andduringthatretirementfromcommunicatingwiththebody，whilstitthinksbyitself，theideasitisbusiedaboutshouldbe，sometimesatleast，thosemorenaturalandcongenialoneswhichithadinitself，underivedfromthebody，oritsownoperationsaboutthem:which，sincethewakingmanneverremembers，wemustfromthishypothesisconcludeeitherthatthesoulrememberssomethingthatthemandoesnot；orelsethatmemorybelongsonlytosuchideasasarederivedfromthebody，orthemind’soperationsaboutthem。
18。Howknowsanyonethatthesoulalwaysthinks？Forifitbenotaself-evidentproposition，itneedsproof。Iwouldbegladalsotolearnfromthesemenwhosoconfidentlypronouncethatthehumansoul，or，whichisallone，thatamanalwaysthinks，howtheycometoknowit；nay，howtheycometoknowthattheythemselvesthinkwhentheythemselvesdonotperceiveit。This，Iamafraid，istobesurewithoutproofs，andtoknowwithoutperceiving。Itis，Isuspect，aconfusednotion，takenuptoserveanhypothesis；andnoneofthosecleartruths，thateithertheirownevidenceforcesustoadmit，orcommonexperiencemakesitimpudencetodeny。Forthemostthatcanbesaidofitis，thatitispossiblethesoulmayalwaysthink，butnotalwaysretainitinmemory。AndIsay，itisaspossiblethatthesoulmaynotalwaysthink；andmuchmoreprobablethatitshouldsometimesnotthink，thanthatitshouldoftenthink，andthatalongwhiletogether，andnotbeconscioustoitself，thenextmomentafter，thatithadthought。
19。\"Thatamanshouldbebusyinthinking，andyetnotretainitthenextmoment，\"veryimprobable。Tosupposethesoultothink，andthemannottoperceiveit，is，ashasbeensaid，tomaketwopersonsinoneman。Andifoneconsiderswellthesemen’swayofspeaking，oneshouldbeledintoasuspicionthattheydoso。Fortheywhotellusthatthesoulalwaysthinks，donever，thatIremember，saythatamanalwaysthinks。Canthesoulthink，andnottheman？
Oramanthink，andnotbeconsciousofit？This，perhaps，wouldbesuspectedofjargoninothers。Iftheysaythemanthinksalways，butisnotalwaysconsciousofit，theymayaswellsayhisbodyisextendedwithouthavingparts。Foritisaltogetherasintelligibletosaythatabodyisextendedwithoutparts，asthatanythingthinkswithoutbeingconsciousofit，orperceivingthatitdoesso。Theywhotalkthusmay，withasmuchreason，ifitbenecessarytotheirhypothesis，saythatamanisalwayshungry，butthathedoesnotalwaysfeelit；whereashungerconsistsinthatverysensation，asthinkingconsistsinbeingconsciousthatonethinks。Iftheysaythatamanisalwaysconscioustohimselfofthinking，Iask，Howtheyknowit？Consciousnessistheperceptionofwhatpassesinaman’sownmind。CananothermanperceivethatIamconsciousofanything，whenI
perceiveitnotmyself？Noman’sknowledgeherecangobeyondhisexperience。Wakeamanoutofasoundsleep，andaskhimwhathewasthatmomentthinkingof。Ifhehimselfbeconsciousofnothinghethenthoughton，hemustbeanotabledivinerofthoughtsthatcanassurehimthathewasthinking。Mayhenot，withmorereason，assurehimhewasnotasleep？Thisissomethingbeyondphilosophy；anditcannotbelessthanrevelation，thatdiscoverstoanotherthoughtsinmymind，whenIcanfindnonetheremyself，AndtheymustneedshaveapenetratingsightwhocancertainlyseethatIthink，whenI
cannotperceiveitmyself，andwhenIdeclarethatIdonot；andyetcanseethatdogsorelephantsdonotthink，whentheygiveallthedemonstrationofitimaginable，exceptonlytellingusthattheydoso。ThissomemaysuspecttobeastepbeyondtheRosicrucians；itseemingeasiertomakeone’sselfinvisibletoothers，thantomakeanother’sthoughtsvisibletome，whicharenotvisibletohimself。
Butitisbutdefiningthesoultobe\"asubstancethatalwaysthinks，\"andthebusinessisdone。Ifsuchdefinitionbeofanyauthority，Iknownotwhatitcanserveforbuttomakemanymensuspectthattheyhavenosoulsatall；sincetheyfindagoodpartoftheirlivespassawaywithoutthinking。FornodefinitionsthatI
know，nosuppositionsofanysect，areofforceenoughtodestroyconstantexperience；andperhapsitistheaffectationofknowingbeyondwhatweperceive，thatmakessomuchuselessdisputeandnoiseintheworld。
20。Noideasbutfromsensationandreflection，evident，ifweobservechildren。Iseenoreason，therefore，tobelievethatthesoulthinksbeforethesenseshavefurnisheditwithideastothinkon；andasthoseareincreasedandretained，soitcomes，byexercise，toimproveitsfacultyofthinkingintheseveralpartsofit；aswellas，afterwards，bycompoundingthoseideas，andreflectingonitsownoperations，itincreasesitsstock，aswellasfacilityinremembering，imagining，reasoning，andothermodesofthinking。
21。Stateofachildinthemother’swomb。Hethatwillsufferhimselftobeinformedbyobservationandexperience，andnotmakehisownhypothesistheruleofnature，willfindfewsignsofasoulaccustomedtomuchthinkinginanew-bornchild，andmuchfewerofanyreasoningatall。Andyetitishardtoimaginethattherationalsoulshouldthinksomuch，andnotreasonatall。Andhethatwillconsiderthatinfantsnewlycomeintotheworldspendthegreatestpartoftheirtimeinsleep，andareseldomawakebutwheneitherhungercallsfortheteat，orsomepain(themostimportunateofallsensations)，orsomeotherviolentimpressiononthebody，forcesthemindtoperceiveandattendtoit；-he，Isay，whoconsidersthis，willperhapsfindreasontoimaginethatafoetusinthemother’swombdiffersnotmuchfromthestateofavegetable，butpassesthegreatestpartofitstimewithoutperceptionorthought；doingverylittlebutsleepinaplacewhereitneedsnotseekforfood，andissurroundedwithliquor，alwaysequallysoft，andnearofthesametemper；wheretheeyeshavenolight，andtheearssoshutuparenotverysusceptibleofsounds；andwherethereislittleornovariety，orchangeofobjects，tomovethesenses。
22。Themindthinksinproportiontothematteritgetsfromexperiencetothinkabout。Followachildfromitsbirth，andobservethealterationsthattimemakes，andyoushallfind，asthemindbythesensescomesmoreandmoretobefurnishedwithideas，itcomestobemoreandmoreawake；thinksmore，themoreithasmattertothinkon。Aftersometimeitbeginstoknowtheobjectswhich，beingmostfamiliarwithit，havemadelastingimpressions。
Thusitcomesbydegreestoknowthepersonsitdailyconverseswith，anddistinguishesthemfromstrangers；whichareinstancesandeffectsofitscomingtoretainanddistinguishtheideasthesensesconveytoit。Andsowemayobservehowthemind，bydegrees，improvesinthese；andadvancestotheexerciseofthoseotherfacultiesofenlarging，compounding，andabstractingitsideas，andofreasoningaboutthem，andreflectinguponallthese；ofwhichIshallhaveoccasiontospeakmorehereafter。
23。Amanbeginstohaveideaswhenhefirsthassensation。Whatsensationis。Ifitshallbedemandedthen，whenamanbeginstohaveanyideas，Ithinkthetrueansweris，-whenhefirsthasanysensation。For，sincethereappearnottobeanyideasinthemindbeforethesenseshaveconveyedanyin，Iconceivethatideasintheunderstandingarecoevalwithsensation；whichissuchanimpressionormotionmadeinsomepartofthebody，asproducessomeperceptionintheunderstanding。Itisabouttheseimpressionsmadeonoursensesbyoutwardobjectsthatthemindseemsfirsttoemployitself，insuchoperationsaswecallperception，remembering，consideration，reasoning，&c。
24。Theoriginalofallourknowledge。Intimethemindcomestoreflectonitsownoperationsabouttheideasgotbysensation，andtherebystoresitselfwithanewsetofideas，whichIcallideasofreflection。Thesearetheimpressionsthataremadeonoursensesbyoutwardobjectsthatareextrinsicaltothemind；anditsownoperations，proceedingfrompowersintrinsicalandpropertoitself，which，whenreflectedonbyitself，becomealsoobjectsofitscontemplation-are，asIhavesaid，theoriginalofallknowledge。
Thusthefirstcapacityofhumanintellectis，-thatthemindisfittedtoreceivetheimpressionsmadeonit；eitherthroughthesensesbyoutwardobjects，orbyitsownoperationswhenitreflectsonthem。Thisisthefirststepamanmakestowardsthediscoveryofanything，andthegroundworkwhereontobuildallthosenotionswhicheverheshallhavenaturallyinthisworld。Allthosesublimethoughtswhichtowerabovetheclouds，andreachashighasheavenitself，taketheirriseandfootinghere:inallthatgreatextentwhereinthemindwanders，inthoseremotespeculationsitmayseemtobeelevatedwith，itstirsnotonejotbeyondthoseideaswhichsenseorreflectionhaveofferedforitscontemplation。
25。Inthereceptionofsimpleideas，theunderstandingisforthemostpartpassive。Inthisparttheunderstandingismerelypassive；
andwhetherornoitwillhavethesebeginnings，andasitwerematerialsofknowledge，isnotinitsownpower。Fortheobjectsofoursensesdo，manyofthem，obtrudetheirparticularideasuponourmindswhetherwewillornot；andtheoperationsofourmindswillnotletusbewithout，atleast，someobscurenotionsofthem。Nomancanbewhollyignorantofwhathedoeswhenhethinks。Thesesimpleideas，whenofferedtothemind，theunderstandingcannomorerefusetohave，noralterwhentheyareimprinted，norblotthemoutandmakenewonesitself，thanamirrorcanrefuse，alter，orobliteratetheimagesorideaswhichtheobjectssetbeforeitdothereinproduce。Asthebodiesthatsurroundusdodiverselyaffectourorgans，themindisforcedtoreceivetheimpressions；andcannotavoidtheperceptionofthoseideasthatareannexedtothem。
ChapterII
OfSimpleIdeas1。Uncompoundedappearances。Thebettertounderstandthenature，manner，andextentofourknowledge，onethingiscarefullytobeobservedconcerningtheideaswehave；andthatis，thatsomeofthemaresimpleandsomecomplex。
Thoughthequalitiesthataffectoursensesare，inthethingsthemselves，sounitedandblended，thatthereisnoseparation，nodistancebetweenthem；yetitisplain，theideastheyproduceinthemindenterbythesensessimpleandunmixed。For，thoughthesightandtouchoftentakeinfromthesameobject，atthesametime，differentideas；-asamanseesatoncemotionandcolour；thehandfeelssoftnessandwarmthinthesamepieceofwax:yetthesimpleideasthusunitedinthesamesubject，areasperfectlydistinctasthosethatcomeinbydifferentsenses。Thecoldnessandhardnesswhichamanfeelsinapieceoficebeingasdistinctideasinthemindasthesmellandwhitenessofalily；orasthetasteofsugar，andsmellofarose。Andthereisnothingcanbeplainertoamanthantheclearanddistinctperceptionhehasofthosesimpleideas；which，beingeachinitselfuncompounded，containsinitnothingbutoneuniformappearance，orconceptioninthemind，andisnotdistinguishableintodifferentideas。
2。Themindcanneithermakenordestroythem。Thesesimpleideas，thematerialsofallourknowledge，aresuggestedandfurnishedtothemindonlybythosetwowaysabovementioned，viz。sensationandreflection。Whentheunderstandingisoncestoredwiththesesimpleideas，ithasthepowertorepeat，compare，andunitethem，eventoanalmostinfinitevariety，andsocanmakeatpleasurenewcomplexideas。Butitisnotinthepowerofthemostexaltedwit，orenlargedunderstanding，byanyquicknessorvarietyofthought，toinventorframeonenewsimpleideainthemind，nottakeninbythewaysbeforementioned:norcananyforceoftheunderstandingdestroythosethatarethere。Thedominionofman，inthislittleworldofhisownunderstandingbeingmuchwhatthesameasitisinthegreatworldofvisiblethings；whereinhispower，howevermanagedbyartandskill，reachesnofartherthantocompoundanddividethematerialsthataremadetohishand；butcandonothingtowardsthemakingtheleastparticleofnewmatter，ordestroyingoneatomofwhatisalreadyinbeing。Thesameinabilitywilleveryonefindinhimself，whoshallgoabouttofashioninhisunderstandingonesimpleidea，notreceivedinbyhissensesfromexternalobjects，orbyreflectionfromtheoperationsofhisownmindaboutthem。Iwouldhaveanyonetrytofancyanytastewhichhadneveraffectedhispalate；orframetheideaofascenthehadneversmelt:andwhenhecandothis，Iwillalsoconcludethatablindmanhathideasofcolours，andadeafmantruedistinctnotionsofsounds。
3。Onlythequalitiesthataffectthesensesareimaginable。Thisisthereasonwhy-thoughwecannotbelieveitimpossibletoGodtomakeacreaturewithotherorgans，andmorewaystoconveyintotheunderstandingthenoticeofcorporealthingsthanthosefive，astheyareusuallycounted，whichhehasgiventoman-yetIthinkitisnotpossibleforanymantoimagineanyotherqualitiesinbodies，howsoeverconstituted，wherebytheycanbetakennoticeof，besidessounds，tastes，smells，visibleandtangiblequalities。Andhadmankindbeenmadebutwithfoursenses，thequalitiesthenwhicharetheobjectsofthefifthsensehadbeenasfarfromournotice，imagination，andconception，asnowanybelongingtoasixth，seventh，oreighthsensecanpossiblybe；-which，whetheryetsomeothercreatures，insomeotherpartsofthisvastandstupendousuniverse，maynothave，willbeagreatpresumptiontodeny。Hethatwillnotsethimselfproudlyatthetopofallthings，butwillconsidertheimmensityofthisfabric，andthegreatvarietythatistobefoundinthislittleandinconsiderablepartofitwhichhehastodowith，maybeapttothinkthat，inothermansionsofit，theremaybeotheranddifferentintelligentbeings，ofwhosefacultieshehasaslittleknowledgeorapprehensionasawormshutupinonedrawerofacabinethathofthesensesorunderstandingofaman；suchvarietyandexcellencybeingsuitabletothewisdomandpoweroftheMaker。
Ihaveherefollowedthecommonopinionofman’shavingbutfivesenses；though，perhaps，theremaybejustlycountedmore；-buteithersuppositionservesequallytomypresentpurpose。
ChapterIII
OfSimpleIdeasofSense1。Divisionofsimpleideas。Thebettertoconceivetheideaswereceivefromsensation，itmaynotbeamissforustoconsiderthem，inreferencetothedifferentwayswherebytheymaketheirapproachestoourminds，andmakethemselvesperceivablebyus。
First，then，Therearesomewhichcomeintoourmindsbyonesenseonly。
Secondly，Thereareothersthatconveythemselvesintothemindbymoresensesthanone。
Thirdly，Othersthatarehadfromreflectiononly。
Fourthly，Therearesomethatmakethemselvesway，andaresuggestedtothemindbyallthewaysofsensationandreflection。
Weshallconsiderthemapartundertheseseveralheads。
Ideasofonesense。Therearesomeideaswhichhaveadmittanceonlythroughonesense，whichispeculiarlyadaptedtoreceivethem。
Thuslightandcolours，aswhite，red，yellow，blue；withtheirseveraldegreesorshadesandmixtures，asgreen，scarlet，purple，sea-green，andtherest，comeinonlybytheeyes。Allkindsofnoises，sounds，andtones，onlybytheears。Theseveraltastesandsmells，bythenoseandpalate。Andiftheseorgans，orthenerveswhicharetheconduitstoconveythemfromwithouttotheiraudienceinthebrain，-themind’spresence-room(asImaysocallit)-areanyofthemsodisorderedasnottoperformtheirfunctions，theyhavenoposterntobeadmittedby；nootherwaytobringthemselvesintoview，andbeperceivedbytheunderstanding。
Themostconsiderableofthosebelongingtothetouch，areheatandcold，andsolidity:alltherest，consistingalmostwhollyinthesensibleconfiguration，assmoothandrough；orelse，moreorlessfirmadhesionoftheparts，ashardandsoft，toughandbrittle，areobviousenough。
2。Fewsimpleideashavenames。Ithinkitwillbeneedlesstoenumeratealltheparticularsimpleideasbelongingtoeachsense。Norindeedisitpossibleifwewould；therebeingagreatmanymoreofthembelongingtomostofthesensesthanwehavenamesfor。Thevarietyofsmells，whichareasmanyalmost，ifnotmore，thanspeciesofbodiesintheworld，domostofthemwantnames。Sweetandstinkingcommonlyserveourturnfortheseideas，whichineffectislittlemorethantocallthempleasingordispleasing；thoughthesmellofaroseandviolet，bothsweet，arecertainlyverydistinctideas。
Norarethedifferenttastes，thatbyourpalateswereceiveideasof，muchbetterprovidedwithnames。Sweet，bitter，sour，harsh，andsaltarealmostalltheepithetswehavetodenominatethatnumberlessvarietyofrelishes，whicharetobefounddistinct，notonlyinalmosteverysortofcreatures，butinthedifferentpartsofthesameplant，fruit，oranimal。Thesamemaybesaidofcoloursandsounds。I
shall，therefore，intheaccountofsimpleideasIamheregiving，contentmyselftosetdownonlysuchasaremostmaterialtoourpresentpurpose，orareinthemselveslessapttobetakennoticeofthoughtheyareveryfrequentlytheingredientsofourcomplexideas；amongstwhich，Ithink，Imaywellaccountsolidity，whichthereforeIshalltreatofinthenextchapter。
ChapterIV
IdeaofSolidity1。Wereceivethisideafromtouch。Theideaofsoliditywereceivebyourtouch:anditarisesfromtheresistancewhichwefindinbodytotheentranceofanyotherbodyintotheplaceitpossesses，tillithasleftit。Thereisnoideawhichwereceivemoreconstantlyfromsensationthansolidity。Whetherwemoveorrest，inwhatposturesoeverweare，wealwaysfeelsomethingunderusthatsupportus，andhindersourfurthersinkingdownwards；andthebodieswhichwedailyhandlemakeusperceivethat，whilsttheyremainbetweenthem，theydo，byaninsurmountableforce，hindertheapproachofthepartsofourhandsthatpressthem。Thatwhichthushinderstheapproachoftwobodies，whentheyaremovedonetowardsanother，I
callsolidity。Iwillnotdisputewhetherthisacceptationofthewordsolidbenearertoitsoriginalsignificationthanthatwhichmathematiciansuseitin。ItsufficesthatIthinkthecommonnotionofsoliditywillallow，ifnotjustify，thisuseofit；butifanyonethinkitbettertocallitimpenetrability，hehasmyconsent。OnlyIhavethoughtthetermsoliditythemorepropertoexpressthisidea，notonlybecauseofitsvulgaruseinthatsense，butalsobecauseitcarriessomethingmoreofpositiveinitthanimpenetrability；
whichisnegative，andisperhapsmoreaconsequenceofsolidity，thansolidityitself。This，ofallother，seemstheideamostintimatelyconnectedwith，andessentialtobody；soasnowhereelsetobefoundorimagined，butonlyinmatter。Andthoughoursensestakenonoticeofit，butinmassesofmatter，ofabulksufficienttocauseasensationinus:yetthemind，havingoncegotthisideafromsuchgrossersensiblebodies，tracesitfurther，andconsidersit，aswellasfigure，intheminutestparticleofmatterthatcanexist；andfindsitinseparablyinherentinbody，whereverorhowevermodified。
2。Solidityfillsspace。Thisistheideawhichbelongstobody，wherebyweconceiveittofillspace。Theideaofwhichfillingofspaceis，-thatwhereweimagineanyspacetakenupbyasolidsubstance，weconceiveitsotopossessit，thatitexcludesallothersolidsubstances；andwillforeverhinderanyothertwobodies，thatmovetowardsoneanotherinastraightline，fromcomingtotouchoneanother，unlessitremovesfrombetweentheminalinenotparalleltothatwhichtheymovein。Thisideaofit，thebodieswhichweordinarilyhandlesufficientlyfurnishuswith。
3。Distinctfromspace。Thisresistance，wherebyitkeepsotherbodiesoutofthespacewhichitpossesses，issogreat，thatnoforce，howgreatsoever，cansurmountit。Allthebodiesintheworld，pressingadropofwateronallsides，willneverbeabletoovercometheresistancewhichitwillmake，softasitis，totheirapproachingoneanother，tillitberemovedoutoftheirway:
wherebyourideaofsolidityisdistinguishedbothfrompurespace，whichiscapableneitherofresistancenormotion；andfromtheordinaryideaofhardness。Foramanmayconceivetwobodiesatadistance，soastheymayapproachoneanother，withouttouchingordisplacinganysolidthing，tilltheirsuperficiescometomeet；
whereby，Ithink，wehavetheclearideaofspacewithoutsolidity。
For(nottogosofarasannihilationofanyparticularbody)Iask，whetheramancannothavetheideaofthemotionofonesinglebodyalone，withoutanyothersucceedingimmediatelyintoitsplace？I
thinkitisevidenthecan:theideaofmotioninonebodynomoreincludingtheideaofmotioninanother，thantheideaofasquarefigureinonebodyincludestheideaofasquarefigureinanother。
Idonotask，whetherbodiesdosoexist，thatthemotionofonebodycannotreallybewithoutthemotionofanother。Todeterminethiseitherway，istobegthequestionfororagainstavacuum。Butmyquestionis，-whetheronecannothavetheideaofonebodymoved，whilstothersareatrest？AndIthinkthisnoonewilldeny。Ifso，thentheplaceitdesertedgivesustheideaofpurespacewithoutsolidity；whereintoanyotherbodymayenter，withouteitherresistanceorprotrusionofanything。Whenthesuckerinapumpisdrawn，thespaceitfilledinthetubeiscertainlythesamewhetheranyotherbodyfollowsthemotionofthesuckerornot:nordoesitimplyacontradictionthat，uponthemotionofonebody，anotherthatisonlycontiguoustoitshouldnotfollowit。Thenecessityofsuchamotionisbuiltonlyonthesuppositionthattheworldisfull；
butnotonthedistinctideasofspaceandsolidity，whichareasdifferentasresistanceandnotresistance，protrusionandnotprotrusion。Andthatmenhaveideasofspacewithoutabody，theirverydisputesaboutavacuumplainlydemonstrate，asisshowninanotherplace。
4。Fromhardness。Solidityisherebyalsodifferencedfromhardness，inthatsolidityconsistsinrepletion，andsoanutterexclusionofotherbodiesoutofthespaceitpossesses:buthardness，inafirmcohesionofthepartsofmatter，makingupmassesofasensiblebulk，sothatthewholedoesnoteasilychangeitsfigure。Andindeed，hardandsoftarenamesthatwegivetothingsonlyinrelationtotheconstitutionsofourownbodies；thatbeinggenerallycalledhardbyus，whichwillputustopainsoonerthanchangefigurebythepressureofanypartofourbodies；andthat，onthecontrary，soft，whichchangesthesituationofitspartsuponaneasyandunpainfultouch。
Butthisdifficultyofchangingthesituationofthesensiblepartsamongstthemselves，orofthefigureofthewhole，givesnomoresoliditytothehardestbodyintheworldthantothesoftest；norisanadamantonejotmoresolidthanwater。For，thoughthetwoflatsidesoftwopiecesofmarblewillmoreeasilyapproacheachother，betweenwhichthereisnothingbutwaterorair，thaniftherebeadiamondbetweenthem；yetitisnotthatthepartsofthediamondaremoresolidthanthoseofwater，orresistmore；butbecausethepartsofwater，beingmoreeasilyseparablefromeachother，theywill，byasidemotion，bemoreeasilyremoved，andgivewaytotheapproachofthetwopiecesofmarble。Butiftheycouldbekeptfrommakingplacebythatsidemotion，theywouldeternallyhindertheapproachofthesetwopiecesofmarble，asmuchasthediamond；anditwouldbeasimpossiblebyanyforcetosurmounttheirresistance，astosurmounttheresistanceofthepartsofadiamond。Thesoftestbodyintheworldwillasinvinciblyresistthecomingtogetherofanyothertwobodies，ifitbenotputoutoftheway，butremainbetweenthem，asthehardestthatcanbefoundorimagined。Hethatshallfillayieldingsoftbodywellwithairorwater，willquicklyfinditsresistance。Andhethatthinksthatnothingbutbodiesthatarehardcankeephishandsfromapproachingoneanother，maybepleasedtomakeatrial，withtheairinclosedinafootball。Theexperiment，Ihavebeentold，wasmadeatFlorence，withahollowglobeofgoldfilledwithwater，andexactlyclosed；
whichfurthershowsthesolidityofsosoftabodyaswater。Forthegoldenglobethusfilled，beingputintoapress，whichwasdrivenbytheextremeforceofscrews，thewatermadeitselfwaythroughtheporesofthatveryclosemetal，andfindingnoroomforanearerapproachofitsparticleswithin，gottotheoutside，whereitroselikeadew，andsofellindrops，beforethesidesoftheglobecouldbemadetoyieldtotheviolentcompressionoftheenginethatsqueezedit。
5。Onsoliditydependimpulse，resistance，andprotrusion。Bythisideaofsolidityistheextensionofbodydistinguishedfromtheextensionofspace:-theextensionofbodybeingnothingbutthecohesionorcontinuityofsolid，separable，movableparts；andtheextensionofspace，thecontinuityofunsolid，inseparable，andimmovableparts。Uponthesolidityofbodiesalsodependtheirmutualimpulse，resistance，andprotrusion。Ofpurespacethen，andsolidity，thereareseveral(amongstwhichIconfessmyselfone)whopersuadethemselvestheyhaveclearanddistinctideas；andthattheycanthinkonspace，withoutanythinginitthatresistsorisprotrudedbybody。Thisistheideaofpurespace，whichtheythinktheyhaveasclearasanyideatheycanhaveoftheextensionofbody:
theideaofthedistancebetweentheoppositepartsofaconcavesuperficiesbeingequallyasclearwithoutaswiththeideaofanysolidpartsbetween:andontheotherside，theypersuadethemselvesthattheyhave，distinctfromthatofpurespace，theideaofsomethingthatfillsspace，thatcanbeprotrudedbytheimpulseofotherbodies，orresisttheirmotion。Iftherebeothersthathavenotthesetwoideasdistinct，butconfoundthem，andmakebutoneofthem，Iknownothowmen，whohavethesameideaunderdifferentnames，ordifferentideasunderthesamename，caninthatcasetalkwithoneanother；anymorethanamanwho，notbeingblindordeaf，hasdistinctideasofthecolourofscarletandthesoundofatrumpet，coulddiscourseconcerningscarletcolourwiththeblindmanI
mentionedinanotherplace，whofanciedthattheideaofscarletwaslikethesoundofatrumpet。
6。Whatsolidityis。Ifanyoneaskme，Whatthissolidityis，I
sendhimtohissensestoinformhim。Lethimputaflintorafootballbetweenhishands，andthenendeavourtojointhem，andhewillknow。Ifhethinksthisnotasufficientexplicationofsolidity，whatitis，andwhereinitconsists；Ipromisetotellhimwhatitis，andwhereinitconsists，whenhetellsmewhatthinkingis，orwhereinitconsists；orexplainstomewhatextensionormotionis，whichperhapsseemsmucheasier。Thesimpleideaswehave，aresuchasexperienceteachesthemus；butif，beyondthat，weendeavourbywordstomakethemclearerinthemind，weshallsucceednobetterthanifwewentabouttoclearupthedarknessofablindman’smindbytalking；andtodiscourseintohimtheideasoflightandcolours。ThereasonofthisIshallshowinanotherplace。
ChapterV
OfSimpleIdeasofDiversSensesIdeasreceivedbothbyseeingandtouching。Theideaswegetbymorethanonesenseare，ofspaceorextension，figure，rest，andmotion。
Forthesemakeperceivableimpressions，bothontheeyesandtouch；
andwecanreceiveandconveyintoourmindstheideasoftheextension，figure，motion，andrestofbodies，bothbyseeingandfeeling。Buthavingoccasiontospeakmoreatlargeoftheseinanotherplace，Ihereonlyenumeratethem。
ChapterVI
OfSimpleIdeasofReflection1。Simpleideasaretheoperationsofmindaboutitsotherideas。Themindreceivingtheideasmentionedintheforegoingchaptersfromwithout，whenitturnsitsviewinwarduponitself，andobservesitsownactionsaboutthoseideasithas，takesfromthenceotherideas，whichareascapabletobetheobjectsofitscontemplationasanyofthoseitreceivedfromforeignthings。
2。Theideaofperception，andideaofwilling，wehavefromreflection。Thetwogreatandprincipalactionsofthemind，whicharemostfrequentlyconsidered，andwhicharesofrequentthateveryonethatpleasesmaytakenoticeoftheminhimself，arethesetwo:-
Perception，orThinking；andVolition，orWilling。
ThepowerofthinkingiscalledtheUnderstanding，andthepowerofvolitioniscalledtheWill；andthesetwopowersorabilitiesinthemindaredenominatedfaculties。
Ofsomeofthemodesofthesesimpleideasofreflection，suchasareremembrance，discerning，reasoning，judging，knowledge，faith，&c。，Ishallhaveoccasiontospeakhereafter。
ChapterVII
OfSimpleIdeasofbothSensationandReflection1。Ideasofpleasureandpain。Therebeothersimpleideaswhichconveythemselvesintothemindbyallthewaysofsensationandreflection，viz。pleasureordelight，anditsopposite，pain，oruneasiness；power；existence；unity。
2。Mixwithalmostallourotherideas。Delightoruneasiness，oneorotherofthem，jointhemselvestoalmostallourideasbothofsensationandreflection:andthereisscarceanyaffectionofoursensesfromwithout，anyretiredthoughtofourmindwithin，whichisnotabletoproduceinuspleasureorpain。Bypleasureandpain，I
wouldbeunderstoodtosignify，whatsoeverdelightsormolestsus；
whetheritarisesfromthethoughtsofourminds，oranythingoperatingonourbodies。For，whetherwecallitsatisfaction，delight，pleasure，happiness，&c。，ontheoneside，oruneasiness，trouble，pain，torment，anguish，misery，&c。，ontheother，theyarestillbutdifferentdegreesofthesamething，andbelongtotheideasofpleasureandpain，delightoruneasiness；whicharethenamesI
shallmostcommonlyuseforthosetwosortsofideas。
3。Asmotivesofouractions。TheinfinitewiseAuthorofourbeing，havinggivenusthepoweroverseveralpartsofourbodies，tomoveorkeepthematrestaswethinkfit；andalso。bythemotionofthem，tomoveourselvesandothercontiguousbodies，inwhichconsistalltheactionsofourbody:havingalsogivenapowertoourminds，inseveralinstances，tochoose，amongstitsideas，whichitwillthinkon，andtopursuetheinquiryofthisorthatsubjectwithconsiderationandattention，toexciteustotheseactionsofthinkingandmotionthatwearecapableof，-hasbeenpleasedtojointoseveralthoughts，andseveralsensationsaperceptionofdelight。Ifthiswerewhollyseparatedfromallouroutwardsensations，andinwardthoughts，weshouldhavenoreasontopreferonethoughtoractiontoanother；negligencetoattention，ormotiontorest。Andsoweshouldneitherstirourbodies，noremployourminds，butletourthoughts(ifImaysocallit)runadrift，withoutanydirectionordesign，andsuffertheideasofourminds，likeunregardedshadows，tomaketheirappearancesthere，asithappened，withoutattendingtothem。Inwhichstateman，howeverfurnishedwiththefacultiesofunderstandingandwill，wouldbeaveryidle，inactivecreature，andpasshistimeonlyinalazy，lethargicdream。IthasthereforepleasedourwiseCreatortoannextoseveralobjects，andtheideaswhichwereceivefromthem，asalsotoseveralofourthoughts，aconcomitantpleasure，andthatinseveralobjects，toseveraldegrees，thatthosefacultieswhichhehadendoweduswithmightnotremainwhollyidleandunemployedbyus。
4。Anendanduseofpain。Painhasthesameefficacyandusetosetusonworkthatpleasurehas，webeingasreadytoemployourfacultiestoavoidthat，astopursuethis:onlythisisworthourconsideration，thatpainisoftenproducedbythesameobjectsandideasthatproducepleasureinus。Thistheirnearconjunction，whichmakesusoftenfeelpaininthesensationswhereweexpectedpleasure，givesusnewoccasionofadmiringthewisdomandgoodnessofourMaker，who，designingthepreservationofourbeing，hasannexedpaintotheapplicationofmanythingstoourbodies，towarnusoftheharmthattheywilldo，andasadvicestowithdrawfromthem。
Buthe，notdesigningourpreservationbarely，butthepreservationofeverypartandorganinitsperfection，hathinmanycasesannexedpaintothoseveryideaswhichdelightus。Thusheat，thatisveryagreeabletousinonedegree，byalittlegreaterincreaseofitprovesnoordinarytorment:andthemostpleasantofallsensibleobjects，lightitself，iftherebetoomuchofit，ifincreasedbeyondadueproportiontooureyes，causesaverypainfulsensation。Whichiswiselyandfavourablysoorderedbynature，thatwhenanyobjectdoes，bythevehemencyofitsoperation，disordertheinstrumentsofsensation，whosestructurescannotbutbeveryniceanddelicate，wemight，bythepain，bewarnedtowithdraw，beforetheorganbequiteputoutoforder，andsobeunfittedforitsproperfunctionforthefuture。Theconsiderationofthoseobjectsthatproduceitmaywellpersuadeus，thatthisistheendoruseofpain。For，thoughgreatlightbeinsufferabletooureyes，yetthehighestdegreeofdarknessdoesnotatalldiseasethem:becausethat，causingnodisorderlymotioninit，leavesthatcuriousorganunharmedinitsnaturalstate。Butyetexcessofcoldaswellasheatpainsus:
becauseitisequallydestructivetothattemperwhichisnecessarytothepreservationoflife，andtheexerciseoftheseveralfunctionsofthebody，andwhichconsistsinamoderatedegreeofwarmth；or，ifyouplease，amotionoftheinsensiblepartsofourbodies，confinedwithincertainbounds。
5。Anotherend。Beyondallthis，wemayfindanotherreasonwhyGodhathscatteredupanddownseveraldegreesofpleasureandpain，inallthethingsthatenvironandaffectus；andblendedthemtogetherinalmostallthatourthoughtsandsenseshavetodowith；-thatwe，findingimperfection，dissatisfaction，andwantofcompletehappiness，inalltheenjoymentswhichthecreaturescanaffordus，mightbeledtoseekitintheenjoymentofHimwithwhomthereisfullnessofjoy，andatwhoserighthandarepleasuresforevermore。
6。GoodnessofGodinannexingpleasureandpaintoourotherideas。
ThoughwhatIhaveheresaidmaynot，perhaps，maketheideasofpleasureandpainclearertousthanourownexperiencedoes，whichistheonlywaythatwearecapableofhavingthem；yettheconsiderationofthereasonwhytheyareannexedtosomanyotherideas，servingtogiveusduesentimentsofthewisdomandgoodnessoftheSovereignDisposerofallthings，maynotbeunsuitabletothemainendoftheseinquiries:theknowledgeandvenerationofhimbeingthechiefendofallourthoughts，andtheproperbusinessofallunderstandings。
7。Ideasofexistenceandunity。ExistenceandUnityaretwootherideasthataresuggestedtotheunderstandingbyeveryobjectwithout，andeveryideawithin。Whenideasareinourminds，weconsiderthemasbeingactuallythere，aswellasweconsiderthingstobeactuallywithoutus；-whichis，thattheyexist，orhaveexistence。
Andwhateverwecanconsiderasonething，whetherarealbeingoridea，suggeststotheunderstandingtheideaofunity。
8。Ideaofpower。Poweralsoisanotherofthosesimpleideaswhichwereceivefromsensationandreflection。For，observinginourselvesthatwedoandcanthink，andthatwecanatpleasuremoveseveralpartsofourbodieswhichwereatrest；theeffects，also，thatnaturalbodiesareabletoproduceinoneanother，occurringeverymomenttooursenses，-weboththesewaysgettheideaofpower。
9。Ideaofsuccession。Besidesthesethereisanotheridea，which，thoughsuggestedbyoursenses，yetismoreconstantlyofferedtousbywhatpassesinourminds；andthatistheideaofsuccession。Forifwelookimmediatelyintoourselves，andreflectonwhatisobservablethere，weshallfindourideasalways，whilstweareawake，orhaveanythought，passingintrain，onegoingandanothercoming，withoutintermission。
10。Simpleideasthematerialsofallourknowledge。These，iftheyarenotall，areatleast(asIthink)themostconsiderableofthosesimpleideaswhichthemindhas，andoutofwhichismadeallitsotherknowledge；allwhichitreceivesonlybythetwoforementionedwaysofsensationandreflection。
Norletanyonethinkthesetoonarrowboundsforthecapaciousmindofmantoexpatiatein，whichtakesitsflightfurtherthanthestars，andcannotbeconfinedbythelimitsoftheworld；thatextendsitsthoughtsoftenevenbeyondtheutmostexpansionofMatter，andmakesexcursionsintothatincomprehensibleInane。Igrantallthis，butdesireanyonetoassignanysimpleideawhichisnotreceivedfromoneofthoseinletsbeforementioned，oranycomplexideanotmadeoutofthosesimpleones。Norwillitbesostrangetothinkthesefewsimpleideassufficienttoemploythequickestthought，orlargestcapacity；andtofurnishthematerialsofallthatvariousknowledge，andmorevariousfanciesandopinionsofallmankind，ifweconsiderhowmanywordsmaybemadeoutofthevariouscompositionoftwenty-fourletters；orif，goingonestepfurther，wewillbutreflectonthevarietyofcombinationsthatmaybemadewithbarelyoneoftheabove-mentionedideas，viz。number，whosestockisinexhaustibleandtrulyinfinite:andwhatalargeandimmensefielddothextensionaloneaffordthemathematicians？
ChapterVIII
SomefurtherconsiderationsconcerningourSimpleIdeasofSensation1。Positiveideasfromprivativecauses。ConcerningthesimpleideasofSensation，itistobeconsidered，-thatwhatsoeverissoconstitutedinnatureastobeable，byaffectingoursenses，tocauseanyperceptioninthemind，doththerebyproduceintheunderstandingasimpleidea；which，whateverbetheexternalcauseofit，whenitcomestobetakennoticeofbyourdiscerningfaculty，itisbythemindlookedonandconsideredtheretobearealpositiveideaintheunderstanding，asmuchasanyotherwhatsoever；
though，perhaps，thecauseofitbebutaprivationofthesubject。
2。Ideasintheminddistinguishedfromthatinthingswhichgivesrisetothem。Thustheideasofheatandcold，lightanddarkness，whiteandblack，motionandrest，areequallyclearandpositiveideasinthemind；though，perhaps，someofthecauseswhichproducethemarebarelyprivations，inthosesubjectsfromwhenceoursensesderivethoseideas。Thesetheunderstanding，initsviewofthem，considersallasdistinctpositiveideas，withouttakingnoticeofthecausesthatproducethem:whichisaninquirynotbelongingtotheidea，asitisintheunderstanding，buttothenatureofthethingsexistingwithoutus。Thesearetwoverydifferentthings，andcarefullytobedistinguished；itbeingonethingtoperceiveandknowtheideaofwhiteorblack，andquiteanothertoexaminewhatkindofparticlestheymustbe，andhowrangedinthesuperficies，tomakeanyobjectappearwhiteorblack。
3。Wemayhavetheideaswhenweareignorantoftheirphysicalcauses。Apainterordyerwhoneverinquiredintotheircauseshaththeideasofwhiteandblack，andothercolours，asclearly，perfectly，anddistinctlyinhisunderstanding，andperhapsmoredistinctly，thanthephilosopherwhohathbusiedhimselfinconsideringtheirnatures，andthinksheknowshowfareitherofthemis，initscause，positiveorprivative；andtheideaofblackisnolesspositiveinhismindthanthatofwhite，howeverthecauseofthatcolourintheexternalobjectmaybeonlyaprivation。
4。Whyaprivativecauseinnaturemayoccasionapositiveidea。
Ifitwerethedesignofmypresentundertakingtoinquireintothenaturalcausesandmannerofperception，Ishouldofferthisasareasonwhyaprivativecausemight，insomecasesatleast，produceapositiveidea；viz。thatallsensationbeingproducedinusonlybydifferentdegreesandmodesofmotioninouranimalspirits，variouslyagitatedbyexternalobjects，theabatementofanyformermotionmustasnecessarilyproduceanewsensationasthevariationorincreaseofit；andsointroduceanewidea，whichdependsonlyonadifferentmotionoftheanimalspiritsinthatorgan。
5。Negativenamesneednotbemeaningless。ButwhetherthisbesoornotIwillnotheredetermine，butappealtoeveryone’sownexperience，whethertheshadowofaman，thoughitconsistsofnothingbuttheabsenceoflight(andthemoretheabsenceoflightis，themorediscernibleistheshadow)doesnot，whenamanlooksonit，causeasclearandpositiveideainhismindasamanhimself，thoughcoveredoverwithclearsunshine？Andthepictureofashadowisapositivething。Indeed，wehavenegativenames，whichstandnotdirectlyforpositiveideas，butfortheirabsence，suchasinsipid，silence，nihil，&c。；whichwordsdenotepositiveideas，v。g。taste，sound，being，withasignificationoftheirabsence。
6。Whetheranyideasareduetocausesreallyprivative。Andthusonemaytrulybesaidtoseedarkness。For，supposingaholeperfectlydark，fromwhencenolightisreflected，itiscertainonemayseethefigureofit，oritmaybepainted；orwhethertheinkIwritewithmakesanyotheridea，isaquestion。TheprivativecausesIhavehereassignedofpositiveideasareaccordingtothecommonopinion；
but，intruth，itwillbehardtodeterminewhethertherebereallyanyideasfromaprivativecause，tillitbedetermined，whetherrestbeanymoreaprivationthanmotion。
7。Ideasinthemind，qualitiesinbodies。Todiscoverthenatureofourideasthebetter，andtodiscourseofthemintelligibly，itwillbeconvenienttodistinguishthemastheyareideasorperceptionsinourminds；andastheyaremodificationsofmatterinthebodiesthatcausesuchperceptionsinus:thatsowemaynotthink(asperhapsusuallyisdone)thattheyareexactlytheimagesandresemblancesofsomethinginherentinthesubject；mostofthoseofsensationbeinginthemindnomorethelikenessofsomethingexistingwithoutus，thanthenamesthatstandforthemarethelikenessofourideas，whichyetuponhearingtheyareapttoexciteinus。
8。Ourideasandthequalitiesofbodies。Whatsoeverthemindperceivesinitself，oristheimmediateobjectofperception，thought，orunderstanding，thatIcallidea；andthepowertoproduceanyideainourmind，Icallqualityofthesubjectwhereinthatpoweris。Thusasnowballhavingthepowertoproduceinustheideasofwhite，cold，andround，-thepowertoproducethoseideasinus，astheyareinthesnowball，Icallqualities；andastheyaresensationsorperceptionsinourunderstandings，Icallthemideas；whichideas，ifIspeakofsometimesasinthethingsthemselves，Iwouldbeunderstoodtomeanthosequalitiesintheobjectswhichproducetheminus。
9。Primaryqualitiesofbodies。Qualitiesthusconsideredinbodiesare，First，suchasareutterlyinseparablefromthebody，inwhatstatesoeveritbe；andsuchasinallthealterationsandchangesitsuffers，alltheforcecanbeuseduponit，itconstantlykeeps；
andsuchassenseconstantlyfindsineveryparticleofmatterwhichhasbulkenoughtobeperceived；andthemindfindsinseparablefromeveryparticleofmatter，thoughlessthantomakeitselfsinglybeperceivedbyoursenses:v。g。Takeagrainofwheat，divideitintotwoparts；eachparthasstillsolidity，extension，figure，andmobility:divideitagain，anditretainsstillthesamequalities；
andsodivideiton，tillthepartsbecomeinsensible；theymustretainstilleachofthemallthosequalities。Fordivision(whichisallthatamill，orpestle，oranyotherbody，doesuponanother，inreducingittoinsensibleparts)cannevertakeawayeithersolidity，extension，figure，ormobilityfromanybody，butonlymakestwoormoredistinctseparatemassesofmatter，ofthatwhichwasbutonebefore；allwhichdistinctmasses，reckonedassomanydistinctbodies，afterdivision，makeacertainnumber。TheseIcalloriginalorprimaryqualitiesofbody，whichIthinkwemayobservetoproducesimpleideasinus，viz。solidity，extension，figure，motionorrest，andnumber。
10。Secondaryqualitiesofbodies。Secondly，suchqualitieswhichintrutharenothingintheobjectsthemselvesbutpowertoproducevarioussensationsinusbytheirprimaryqualities，i。e。bythebulk，figure，texture，andmotionoftheirinsensibleparts，ascolours，sounds，tastes，&c。TheseIcallsecondaryqualities。Tothesemightbeaddedathirdsort，whichareallowedtobebarelypowers；thoughtheyareasmuchrealqualitiesinthesubjectasthosewhichI，tocomplywiththecommonwayofspeaking，callqualities，butfordistinction，secondaryqualities。Forthepowerinfiretoproduceanewcolour，orconsistency，inwaxorclay，-byitsprimaryqualities，isasmuchaqualityinfire，asthepowerithastoproduceinmeanewideaorsensationofwarmthorburning，whichIfeltnotbefore，-bythesameprimaryqualities，viz。thebulk，texture，andmotionofitsinsensibleparts。
11。Howbodiesproduceideasinus。Thenextthingtobeconsideredis，howbodiesproduceideasinus；andthatismanifestlybyimpulse，theonlywaywhichwecanconceivebodiestooperatein。
12。Bymotions，external，andinourorganism。Ifthenexternalobjectsbenotunitedtoourmindswhentheyproduceideastherein；
andyetweperceivetheseoriginalqualitiesinsuchofthemassinglyfallunderoursenses，itisevidentthatsomemotionmustbethencecontinuedbyournerves，oranimalspirits，bysomepartsofourbodies，tothebrainsortheseatofsensation，theretoproduceinourmindstheparticularideaswehaveofthem。Andsincetheextension，figure，number，andmotionofbodiesofanobservablebigness，maybeperceivedatadistancebythesight，itisevidentsomesinglyimperceptiblebodiesmustcomefromthemtotheeyes，andtherebyconveytothebrainsomemotion；whichproducestheseideaswhichwehaveoftheminus。
13。Howsecondaryqualitiesproducetheirideas。Afterthesamemanner，thattheideasoftheseoriginalqualitiesareproducedinus，wemayconceivethattheideasofsecondaryqualitiesarealsoproduced，viz。bytheoperationofinsensibleparticlesonoursenses。
For，itbeingmanifestthattherearebodiesandgoodstoreofbodies，eachwhereofaresosmall，thatwecannotbyanyofoursensesdiscovereithertheirbulk，figure，ormotion，-asisevidentintheparticlesoftheairandwater，andothersextremelysmallerthanthose；perhapsasmuchsmallerthantheparticlesofairandwater，astheparticlesofairandwateraresmallerthanpeasorhail-stones；-letussupposeatpresentthatthedifferentmotionsandfigures，bulkandnumber，ofsuchparticles，affectingtheseveralorgansofoursenses，produceinusthosedifferentsensationswhichwehavefromthecoloursandsmellsofbodies；v。g。thataviolet，bytheimpulseofsuchinsensibleparticlesofmatter，ofpeculiarfiguresandbulks，andindifferentdegreesandmodificationsoftheirmotions，causestheideasofthebluecolour，andsweetscentofthatflowertobeproducedinourminds。ItbeingnomoreimpossibletoconceivethatGodshouldannexsuchideastosuchmotions，withwhichtheyhavenosimilitude，thanthatheshouldannextheideaofpaintothemotionofapieceofsteeldividingourflesh，withwhichthatideahathnoresemblance。
14。Theydependontheprimaryqualities。WhatIhavesaidconcerningcoloursandsmellsmaybeunderstoodalsooftastesandsounds，andotherthelikesensiblequalities；which，whateverrealitywebymistakeattributetothem，areintruthnothingintheobjectsthemselves，butpowerstoproducevarioussensationsinus；anddependonthoseprimaryqualities，viz。bulk，figure，texture，andmotionofpartsasIhavesaid。
15。Ideasofprimaryqualitiesareresemblances；ofsecondary，not。FromwhenceIthinkiteasytodrawthisobservation，-thattheideasofprimaryqualitiesofbodiesareresemblancesofthem，andtheirpatternsdoreallyexistinthebodiesthemselves，buttheideasproducedinusbythesesecondaryqualitieshavenoresemblanceofthematall。Thereisnothinglikeourideas，existinginthebodiesthemselves。Theyare，inthebodieswedenominatefromthem，onlyapowertoproducethosesensationsinus:andwhatissweet，blue，orwarminidea，isbutthecertainbulk，figure，andmotionoftheinsensibleparts，inthebodiesthemselves，whichwecallso。
16。Examples。Flameisdenominatedhotandlight；snow，whiteandcold；andmanna，whiteandsweet，fromtheideastheyproduceinus。
Whichqualitiesarecommonlythoughttobethesameinthosebodiesthatthoseideasareinus，theonetheperfectresemblanceoftheother，astheyareinamirror，anditwouldbymostmenbejudgedveryextravagantifoneshouldsayotherwise。Andyethethatwillconsiderthatthesamefirethat，atonedistanceproducesinusthesensationofwarmth，does，atanearerapproach，produceinusthefardifferentsensationofpain，oughttobethinkhimselfwhatreasonhehastosay-thatthisideaofwarmth，whichwasproducedinhimbythefire，isactuallyinthefire；andhisideaofpain，whichthesamefireproducedinhimthesameway，isnotinthefire。Whyarewhitenessandcoldnessinsnow，andpainnot，whenitproducestheoneandtheotherideainus；andcandoneither，butbythebulk，figure，number，andmotionofitssolidparts？
17。Theideasoftheprimaryalonereallyexist。Theparticularbulk，number，figure，andmotionofthepartsoffireorsnowarereallyinthem，-whetheranyone’ssensesperceivethemorno:andthereforetheymaybecalledrealqualities，becausetheyreallyexistinthosebodies。Butlight，heat，whiteness，orcoldness，arenomorereallyinthemthansicknessorpainisinmanna。Takeawaythesensationofthem；letnottheeyesseelightorcolours，northeearshearsounds；letthepalatenottaste，northenosesmell，andallcolours，tastes，odours，andsounds，astheyaresuchparticularideas，vanishandcease，andarereducedtotheircauses，i。e。bulk，figure，andmotionofparts。
18。Thesecondaryexistinthingsonlyasmodesoftheprimary。A
pieceofmannaofasensiblebulkisabletoproduceinustheideaofaroundorsquarefigure；andbybeingremovedfromoneplacetoanother，theideaofmotion。Thisideaofmotionrepresentsitasitreallyisinmannamoving:acircleorsquarearethesame，whetherinideaorexistence，inthemindorinthemanna。Andthis，bothmotionandfigure，arereallyinthemanna，whetherwetakenoticeofthemorno:thiseverybodyisreadytoagreeto。Besides，manna，bytiebulk，figure，texture，andmotionofitsparts，hasapowertoproducethesensationsofsickness，andsometimesofacutepainsorgripingsinus。Thattheseideasofsicknessandpainarenotinthemanna，buteffectsofitsoperationsonus，andarenowherewhenwefeelthemnot；thisalsoeveryonereadilyagreesto。Andyetmenarehardlytobebroughttothinkthatsweetnessandwhitenessarenotreallyinmanna；whicharebuttheeffectsoftheoperationsofmanna，bythemotion，size，andfigureofitsparticles，ontheeyesandpalate:asthepainandsicknesscausedbymannaareconfessedlynothingbuttheeffectsofitsoperationsonthestomachandguts，bythesize，motion，andfigureofitsinsensibleparts，(forbynothingelsecanabodyoperate，ashasbeenproved):asifitcouldnotoperateontheeyesandpalate，andtherebyproduceinthemindparticulardistinctideas，whichinitselfithasnot，aswellasweallowitcanoperateonthegutsandstomach，andtherebyproducedistinctideas，whichinitselfithasnot。Theseideas，beingalleffectsoftheoperationsofmannaonseveralpartsofourbodies，bythesize，figurenumber，andmotionofitsparts；-whythoseproducedbytheeyesandpalateshouldratherbethoughttobereallyinthemanna，thanthoseproducedbythestomachandguts；orwhythepainandsickness，ideasthataretheeffectofmanna，shouldbethoughttobenowherewhentheyarenotfelt；andyetthesweetnessandwhiteness，effectsofthesamemannaonotherpartsofthebody，bywaysequallyasunknown，shouldbethoughttoexistinthemanna，whentheyarenotseenortasted，wouldneedsomereasontoexplain。
19。Examples。Letusconsidertheredandwhitecoloursinporphyry。
Hinderlightfromstrikingonit，anditscoloursvanish；itnolongerproducesanysuchideasinus:uponthereturnoflightitproducestheseappearancesonusagain。Cananyonethinkanyrealalterationsaremadeintheporphyrybythepresenceorabsenceoflight；andthatthoseideasofwhitenessandrednessarereallyinporphyryin。thelight，whenitisplainithasnocolourinthedark？
Ithas，indeed，suchaconfigurationofparticles，bothnightandday，asareapt，bytheraysoflightreboundingfromsomepartsofthathardstone，toproduceinustheideaofredness，andfromotherstheideaofwhiteness；butwhitenessorrednessarenotinitatanytime，butsuchatexturethathaththepowertoproducesuchasensationinus。
20。Poundanalmond，andtheclearwhitecolourwillbealteredintoadirtyone，andthesweettasteintoanoilyone。Whatrealalterationcanthebeatingofthepestlemakeinanybody，butanalterationofthetextureofit？
21。Explainshowwaterfeltascoldbyonehandmaybewarmtotheother。Ideasbeingthusdistinguishedandunderstood，wemaybeabletogiveanaccounthowthesamewater，atthesametime，mayproducetheideaofcoldbyonehandandofheatbytheother:whereasitisimpossiblethatthesamewater，ifthoseideaswerereallyinit，shouldatthesametimebebothhotandcold。For，ifweimaginewarmth，asitisinourhands，tobenothingbutacertainsortanddegreeofmotionintheminuteparticlesofournervesoranimalspirits，wemayunderstandhowitispossiblethatthesamewatermay，atthesametime，producethesensationsofheatinonehandandcoldintheother；whichyetfigureneverdoes，thatneverproducing-theideaofasquarebyonehandwhichhasproducedtheideaofaglobebyanother。Butifthesensationofheatandcoldbenothingbuttheincreaseordiminutionofthemotionoftheminutepartsofourbodies，causedbythecorpusclesofanyotherbody，itiseasytobeunderstood，thatifthatmotionbegreaterinonehandthanintheother；ifabodybeappliedtothetwohands，whichhasinitsminuteparticlesagreatermotionthaninthoseofoneofthehands，andalessthaninthoseoftheother，itwillincreasethemotionoftheonehandandlessenitintheother；andsocausethedifferentsensationsofheatandcoldthatdependthereon。
22。Anexcursionintonaturalphilosophy。IhaveinwhatjustgoesbeforebeenengagedinphysicalinquiriesalittlefurtherthanperhapsIintended。But，itbeingnecessarytomakethenatureofsensationalittleunderstood；andtomakethedifferencebetweenthequalitiesinbodies，andtheideasproducedbytheminthemind，tobedistinctlyconceived，withoutwhichitwereimpossibletodiscourseintelligiblyofthem；-IhopeIshallbepardonedthislittleexcursionintonaturalphilosophy；itbeingnecessaryinourpresentinquirytodistinguishtheprimaryandrealqualitiesofbodies，whicharealwaysinthem(viz。solidity，extension，figure，number，andmotion，orrest，andaresometimesperceivedbyus，viz。
whenthebodiestheyareinarebigenoughsinglytobediscerned)，fromthosesecondaryandimputedqualities，whicharebutthepowersofseveralcombinationsofthoseprimaryones，whentheyoperatewithoutbeingdistinctlydiscerned；-wherebywemayalsocometoknowwhatideasare，andwhatarenot，resemblancesofsomethingreallyexistinginthebodieswedenominatefromthem。
23。Threesortsofqualitiesinbodies。Thequalities，then，thatareinbodies，rightlyconsidered，areofthreesorts:-
First，Thebulk，figure，number，situation，andmotionorrestoftheirsolidparts。Thoseareinthem，whetherweperceivethemornot；
andwhentheyareofthatsizethatwecandiscoverthem，wehavebytheseanideaofthethingasitisinitself；asisplaininartificialthings。TheseIcallprimaryqualities。
Secondly，Thepowerthatisinanybody，byreasonofitsinsensibleprimaryqualities，tooperateafterapeculiarmanneronanyofoursenses，andtherebyproduceinusthedifferentideasofseveralcolours，sounds，smells，tastes，&c。Theseareusuallycalledsensiblequalities。
Thirdly，Thepowerthatisinanybody，byreasonoftheparticularconstitutionofitsprimaryqualities，tomakesuchachangeinthebulk，figure，texture，andmotionofanotherbody，astomakeitoperateonoursensesdifferentlyfromwhatitdidbefore。
Thusthesunhasapowertomakewaxwhite，andfiretomakeleadfluid。Theseareusuallycalledpowers。
Thefirstofthese，ashasbeensaid，Ithinkmaybeproperlycalledreal，original，orprimaryqualities；becausetheyareinthethingsthemselves，whethertheyareperceivedornot:andupontheirdifferentmodificationsitisthatthesecondaryqualitiesdepend。
Theothertwoareonlypowerstoactdifferentlyuponotherthings:whichpowersresultfromthedifferentmodificationsofthoseprimaryqualities。
24。Thefirstareresemblances；thesecondthoughttoberesemblances，butarenot；thethirdneitherarenorarethoughtso。
But，thoughthetwolattersortsofqualitiesarepowersbarely，andnothingbutpowers，relatingtoseveralotherbodies，andresultingfromthedifferentmodificationsoftheoriginalqualities，yettheyaregenerallyotherwisethoughtof。Forthesecondsort，viz，thepowerstoproduceseveralideasinus，byoursenses，arelookeduponasrealqualitiesinthethingsthusaffectingus:butthethirdsortarecalledandesteemedbarelypowers。v。g。Theideaofheatorlight，whichwereceivebyoureyes，ortouch，fromthesun，arecommonlythoughtrealqualitiesexistinginthesun，andsomethingmorethanmerepowersinit。Butwhenweconsiderthesuninreferencetowax，whichitmeltsorblanches，welookonthewhitenessandsoftnessproducedinthewax，notasqualitiesinthesun，buteffectsproducedbypowersinit。Whereas，ifrightlyconsidered，thesequalitiesoflightandwarmth，whichareperceptionsinmewhenIamwarmedorenlightenedbythesun，arenootherwiseinthesun，thanthechangesmadeinthewax，whenitisblanchedormelted，areinthesun。Theyareallofthemequallypowersinthesun，dependingonitsprimaryqualities；wherebyitisable，intheonecase，sotoalterthebulk，figure，texture，ormotionofsomeoftheinsensiblepartsofmyeyesorhands，astherebytoproduceinmetheideaoflightorheat；andintheother，itisablesotoalterthebulk，figure，texture，ormotionoftheinsensiblepartsofthewax，astomakethemfittoproduceinmethedistinctideasofwhiteandfluid。
25。Whythesecondaryareordinarilytakenforrealqualities，andnotforbarepowers。Thereasonwhytheoneareordinarilytakenforrealqualities，andtheotheronlyforbarepowers，seemstobe，becausetheideaswehaveofdistinctcolours，sounds，&c。，containingnothingatallinthemofbulk，figure，ormotion，wearenotapttothinkthemtheeffectsoftheseprimaryqualities；whichappearnot，tooursenses，tooperateintheirproduction，andwithwhichtheyhavenotanyapparentcongruityorconceivableconnexion。Henceitisthatwearesoforwardtoimagine，thatthoseideasaretheresemblancesofsomethingreallyexistingintheobjectsthemselves:
sincesensationdiscoversnothingofbulk，figure，ormotionofpartsintheirproduction；norcanreasonshowhowbodies，bytheirbulk，figure，andmotion，shouldproduceinthemindtheideasofblueoryellow，&c。But，intheothercase，intheoperationsofbodieschangingthequalitiesoneofanother，weplainlydiscoverthatthequalityproducedhathcommonlynoresemblancewithanythinginthethingproducingit；whereforewelookonitasabareeffectofpower。
For，throughreceivingtheideaofheatorlightfromthesun，weareapttothinkitisaperceptionandresemblanceofsuchaqualityinthesun；yetwhenweseewax，orafairface，receivechangeofcolourfromthesun，wecannotimaginethattobethereceptionorresemblanceofanythinginthesun，becausewefindnotthosedifferentcoloursinthesunitself。For，oursensesbeingabletoobservealikenessorunlikenessofsensiblequalitiesintwodifferentexternalobjects，weforwardlyenoughconcludetheproductionofanysensiblequalityinanysubjecttobeaneffectofbarepower，andnotthecommunicationofanyqualitywhichwasreallyintheefficient，whenwefindnosuchsensiblequalityinthethingthatproducedit。Butoursenses，notbeingabletodiscoveranyunlikenessbetweentheideaproducedinus，andthequalityoftheobjectproducingit，weareapttoimaginethatourideasareresemblancesofsomethingintheobjects，andnottheeffectsofcertainpowersplacedinthemodificationoftheirprimaryqualities，withwhichprimaryqualitiestheideasproducedinushavenoresemblance。
26。Secondaryqualitiestwofold；first，immediatelyperceivable；
secondly，mediatelyperceivable。Toconclude。Besidesthosebefore-mentionedprimaryqualitiesinbodies，viz。bulk，figure，extension，number，andmotionoftheirsolidparts；alltherest，wherebywetakenoticeofbodies，anddistinguishthemonefromanother，arenothingelsebutseveralpowersinthem，dependingonthoseprimaryqualities；wherebytheyarefitted，eitherbyimmediatelyoperatingonourbodiestoproduceseveraldifferentideasinus；orelse，byoperatingonotherbodies，sotochangetheirprimaryqualitiesastorenderthemcapableofproducingideasinusdifferentfromwhatbeforetheydid。Theformerofthese，Ithink，maybecalledsecondaryqualitiesimmediatelyperceivable:thelatter，secondaryqualities，mediatelyperceivable。
